Updated
Below is my updated version of a preliminary bibliography on probability and Keynes’s theory of probability. Suggestions are welcome!
GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bunge, M. 1981. “Four Concepts of Probability,” Applied Mathematical Modelling 5: 306–312.
Bunge, Mario. 1988. “Two Faces and Three Masks of Probability,” in Evandro Agazzi (ed.), Probability in the Sciences. Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht and London. 27–50.
Fine, T. 1973. Theories of Probability. Academic Press, Waltham, MA.
De Finetti, Bruno. 1972. Probability, Induction and Statistics: The Art of Guessing. Wiley, London and New York.
De Finetti, Bruno. 1990. Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment. Wiley, Chichester.
Galavotti, M. C. 2005. Philosophical Introduction to Probability. CSLI Publications, Stanford.
Gillies, D. 1973. An Objective Theory of Probability. Methuen, London.
Gillies, D. 2000. Philosophical Theories of Probability. Routledge, London.
Hacking, Ian. 1975. The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference. Cambridge University Press, London.
Hacking, Ian. 2006. The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference (2nd edn.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Howson, C. and Urbach, P. 1993. Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach (2nd edn.). Open Court, La Salle, IL.
Johns, Richard. 2002. A Theory of Physical Probability. University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
Kyburg, Henry E. and Mariam Thalos. 2002. Probability is the Very Guide of Life: The Philosophical Uses of Chance. Eurospan, London.
Mellor, D. H. 2005. Probability: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge, London.
Salmon, Wesley Charles. 1967. Foundations of Scientific Inference. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.
Savage, Leonard Jimmie. 1972. The Foundations of Statistics (2nd rev. edn.). Dover, New York.
Schum, David A. 2001. The Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Ill.
Skyrms, B. 2000. Choice and Chance (4th edn.). Wadsworth, Belmont, CA.
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2007. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Allen Lane, London.
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2005. Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets (2nd edn.), Random House, New York.
von Plato, J. 1994. Creating Modern Probability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Weatherford, Roy. 1982. Philosophical Foundations of Probability Theory. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Reviews of Keynes’s Treatise on Probability
[Anonymous?] W. L. C. 1922. “A Treatise on Probability by John Maynard Keynes,” Journal of the Institute of Actuaries (1886-1994) 53.1: 78–83.
[Anonymous?] W. L. C. 1923. “A Treatise on Probability. by J. M. Keynes,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 18.141: 678–682.
[Anonymous]. 1924 “A Treatise on Probability by J.-M. Keynes,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 31.1: 11–12.
Borel, Émile. 1924. “A propos d’un traité de probabilités,” Revue philosophique 98: 321–326.
Broad, C. D. 1922. “A Treatise on Probability. by J. M. Keynes,” Mind n.s. 31.121: 72–85.
Costello, Harry T. 1923. “A Treatise on Probability by John Maynard Keynes,” The Journal of Philosophy 20.11: 301–306.
De Laguna, Theodore. 1930. “On Keynes’ Theory of Probability,” The Philosophical Review 39.3: 227–242.
Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro. 1922. “A Treatise on Probability by John Maynard Keynes,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 85.1: 107–113.
Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro. 1922. “The Philosophy of Chance,” Mind n.s. 31.123: 257–283.
Fisher, R. A. 1923. “Mr. Keynes’s Treatise on Probability,” Eugenics Review 14: 46–50.
Foster, William S. 1922. “A Treatise on Probability by John Maynard Keynes,” The American Journal of Psychology 33.3: 439–442.
Joseph, H. W. B. 1923. “Mr. Keynes on Probability,” Mind n.s. 32.128: 408–431.
Lewis, Clarence Irving. 1922. “A Treatise on Probability by John Maynard Keynes,” The Philosophical Review. 31.2: 180–186.
Pigou, A. C. 1921. “A Treatise on Probability,” The Economic Journal 31.124: 507–512.
Ramsey, Frank. P. 1922. “Mr. Keynes on Probability,” Cambridge Magazine 1.1: 3–5. [Reprinted in Ramsey 1989.]
Ramsey, Frank. P. 1926. “Truth and Probability,” in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, London.
Ramsey, Frank. P. 1989. “Mr Keynes on Probability,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40: 219–222.
Russell, Bertrand. 1922. “A Treatise on Probability by John Maynard Keynes,” The Mathematical Gazette 11.159: 119–125. [Reprinted in Russell 1948.]
Russell, Bertrand. 1948. “A Treatise on Probability by John Maynard Keynes,” The Mathematical Gazette 32.300: 152–159.
Sheppard, W. F. 1923. “Probability and Statistics,” The Mathematical Gazette 11.167: 405–409.
Wilson, E. B. 1923. “Keynes on Probability,” Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 29.7: 319-322.
Wolf, A. 1922. “Studies in Probability. I. Probability,” Economica 4: 87–97.
KEYNES AND PROBABILITY
Basili, Marcello and Carlo Zappia. 2009. “Keynes’s ‘Non-Numerical’ Probabilities and Non-Additive Measures,” Journal of Economic Psychology 30.3: 419–430.
Basili, Marcello and Carlo Zappia. 2010. “Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Ellsberg and Shackle,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 34: 449–474.
Bateman, Bradley W. 1987. “Keynes’s Changing Conception of Probability,” Economics and Philosophy 3: 97-119.
Bateman, Bradley W. 1988. “G. E. Moore and J. M. Keynes: A Missing Chapter in the History of the Expected Utility Model,” American Economic Review 78: 1098–1106.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1983. The Foundation of Keynes’s Macrotheory: His Logical Theory of Probability and its Application in the General Theory and After, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Riverside.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1987. “J. M. Keynes’ Theory of Evidential Weight: Its Relation to Information Processing Theory and Application in the General Theory,” Synthese 71: 37–60.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1988. “J. M. Keynes’s Position on the General Applicability of Mathematical, Logical and Statistical Methods in Economics and Social Science,” Synthese 76.1: 1–24.
Brady, Michael Emmett and Howard B. Lee, 1989. “Dynamics of Choice Behavior: The Logical Relation between Linear Objective Probability and Nonlinear Subjective Probability,” Psychological Reports 64: 91-97.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1993. “J. M. Keynes’s Theoretical Approach to Decision-Making under Conditions of Risk and Uncertainty,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44.2: 357–376.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1994. “On the Application of J. M. Keynes’s Approach to Decision Making,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8.2: 99–112.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 2010. “A Comparison-Contrast of Adam Smith, J.M. Keynes and Jeremy Bentham on Probability, Risk, Uncertainty, Optimism-Pessimism and Decision Making with Applications Concerning Banking, Insurance and Speculation,” SSRN Working Paper Series.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1728225
Brady, Michael Emmett and Rogério Arthmar, 2010. “Keynes’ Lower-Upper Bound Interval Approach to Probability,” SSRN Working Paper Series (February 2).
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546726
Brady, Michael Emmett, 2010. “How to Use Keynes’s Conventional Coefficient of Risk and Weight, c, to clear up Misunderstandings and Confusions about Keynes’s Views on the use on his Principle of Indifference Versus the use of Laplace’s Principle of Nonsufficient Reason,” SSRN Working Paper Series (November 27).
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1716043
Brady, Michael Emmett, 2011. “Comparing J. M. Keynes’s and F. von Hayek’s Differing Definitions of Uncertainty as it relates to Knowledge: Keynes’s Unavailable or Missing Knowledge Concept versus Hayek’s Dispersal of Knowledge Concept,” SSRN Working Paper Series.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1751569
Brady, Michael Emmett, 2011. “Keynes, Mathematics and Probability: A Reappraisal,” SSRN Working Paper Series, August 31.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1920569
Brady, Michael Emmett. 2011. “The ‘Early’ Logical Empiricism of J. M. Keynes versus the Rhetoric of Subjectivism,” SSRN Working Paper Series, August 31
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1920578
Brady, Michael Emmett. 2012. “John Maynard Keynes’s Upper and Lower Valued Probabilities: A Study of How Statisticians, Philosophers, Logicians, Historians, and Economists Failed to Comprehend Keynes’s Breakthrough Application of G.Boole’s Interval Approach to Probability in the 20th Century,” January 30
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1996129
Brady, Michael Emmett and Rogério Arthmar. 2012. “Keynes, Boole and the Interval Approach to Probability,” History of Economic Ideas 20.3: 65–84.
Carabelli, Anna M. 1988. On Keynes’s Method, Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Carabelli, Anna M. 2002. “Speculation and Reasonableness: a non-Bayesian Theory of Rationality,” in S. Dow and J. Hillard (eds.), Keynes, Uncertainty and the Global Economy: Beyond Keynes (Vol. 2), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA. 165–185.
Cottrell, A. 1993. “Keynes’s Theory of Probability and its Relevance to His Economics: Three Theses,” Economics and Philosophy 9: 25–51.
Crocco, M. 2000. “The Future’s Unknowability: Keynes’s Probability, Probable Knowledge and the Decision to Innovate,” in F. Louçã and M. Perlman (eds.), Is Economics an Evolutionary Science? Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Crocco, M. 2002. “The Concept of Degrees of Uncertainty in Keynes, Shackle, and Davidson,” Nova Economia 12.2: 11–28.
Davis, John B. 1994. Keynes’s Philosophical Development. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Davis, John B. 2003. “The Relationship between Keynes’s Early and Later Philosophical Thinking,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 100–110.
Davidson, P. 1982–1983. “Rational Expectations: A Fallacious Foundation for Studying Crucial Decision-making Processes,” Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics 5.2: 182-198.
Davidson, Paul. 1991. “Is Probability Theory Relevant for Uncertainty? A Post Keynesian Perspective,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5.1: 129-143.
De Carvalho, Fernando J. Cardim. 1988. “Keynes on Probability, Uncertainty, and Decision Making,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 11.1: 66-81.
Dequech, David. 1997. “Uncertainty in a Strong Sense: Meaning and Sources,” Economic Issues 2.2: 21–43.
Dequech, David. 2008. “Varieties of Uncertainty: A Survey of the Economic Literature,”
http://ideas.repec.org/p/anp/en2008/200807211223070.html
Dequech, David. 2011. “Uncertainty: A Typology and Refinements of Existing Concepts,” Journal of Economic Issues 45.3: 621-640.
Dickens, Edwin. 2008. “Keynes’s Theory of Probability, Investment Behaviour, and Behavioral Finance,” in L. Randall Wray and Mathew Forstater (eds.), Keynes and Macroeconomics After 70 years: Critical Assessments of the General Theory, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA.
Dow, Sheila C. 1994. “Uncertainty,” in Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer (eds.), The Elgar Companion to Radical Political Economy. Edward Elgar, Aldershot. 434–438.
Dow, Sheila C. 1995. “Uncertainty about Uncertainty,” in S. C. Dow and J. Hillard (eds.). Keynes, Knowledge and Uncertainty. Edward Elgar, Aldershot. 117–127.
Dow, Sheila C. 2012. “Uncertainty about Uncertainty,” in Sheila C. Dow, Foundations for New Economic Thinking: A Collection of Essays. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 72–82.
Dow, Sheila C. 2012. Foundations for New Economic Thinking: A Collection of Essays. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Ellsberg, Daniel. 1961. “Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 75: 643–669.
Ellsberg, Daniel. 2001 []. Risk, Ambiguity and Decision. Garland, New York and London.
Feduzi, Alberto. 2007. “On the Relationship between Keynes’s Conception of Evidential Weight and the Ellsberg Paradox,” Journal of Economic Psychology 28: 545–565.
Fitzgibbons, Athol. 1988. Keynes’s Vision: A New Political Economy, Clarendon, Oxford.
Gerrard, B. 2003. “Keynesian Uncertainty: What Do We Know?,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 239–251.
Gillies, Donald. 2006. “Keynes and Probability,” in R. Backhouse and B. Bateman (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Keynes Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York. 199-216.
Gillies, Donald. 2003. “Probability and Uncertainty in Keynes’s Economics,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 111–129.
Gilles, Dostaler. 2007. Keynes and his Battles. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Hailperin, Theodore. 1986. Boole’s Logic and Probability: A Critical Exposition from the Standpoint of Contemporary Algebra, Logic, and Probability Theory (2nd rev. edn.), North-Holland, Amsterdam and New York.
Jespersen, Jesper. 2009. Macroeconomic Methodology: A Post-Keynesian Perspective. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA. Appendix 1. pp.126-131
Kelsey D. and J. Quiggin. 1992. “Theories of Choice under Ignorance and Uncertainty,” Journal of Economic Surveys 6.2: 133-153.
Keynes, J. M. 1921. A Treatise on Probability (1st edn.), Macmillan, London.
Lavoie, M. 2009. An Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics (rev. edn.). Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Lawson, Tony. 1985. “Uncertainty and Economic Analysis,” Economic Journal 95: 909-927.
Lawson, Tony. 1988. “Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Analysis,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 11.1: 38-65.
Lawson, Tony. 1993. “Keynes and Conventions,” Cambridge University Review of Social Economy 51: 174-200.
McCann, Charles R. 1994. Probability Foundations of Economic Theory. Routledge, London.
McCann, Charles, R. 2003. “On the Nature of Keynesian Probability,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 37-45.
Mandelbrot, Benoit B. 1997. Fractals and Scaling in Finance: Discontinuity, Concentration, Risk. Springer, New York.
Mandelbrot, Benoit B. and Richard L. Hudson. 2004. The (Mis)behavior of Markets: A Fractal View of Risk, Ruin, and Reward. Basic Books, New York.
Meeks, J. G. T. 1991. “Keynes on the Rationality of Decision Procedures under Uncertainty: The Investment Decision,” in J. G. T. Meeks (ed.), Thoughtful Economic Man: Essays on Rationality, Moral Rules and Benevolence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. l26-160.
Moggridge, D. E. 1992. Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography, Routledge, London. pp. 143-166.
Narayanan, Sunder. 1994. “Comments on M. E. Brady’s Extension to J. M. Keynes’ Decision Rule,” Psychological Reports 75.1: 126.
O’Donnell, R. M. 1989. Keynes: Philosophy, Economics and Politics: The Philosophical Foundations of Keynes’s Thought and their Influence on his Economics and Politics, Macmillan, Basingstoke.
O’Donnel, R. 2003. “The Thick and the Think of Controversy,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 85–99.
Ramsey, F. P. 1989 [1922]. “Mr Keynes on Probability,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40.2: 219-222.
Roncaglia, Alessandro. 2009. “Keynes and Probability: An Assessment,” European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 16.3: 489-510.
Rotheim, Roy J. 1988. “Keynes and the Language of Probability and Uncertainty,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 11.1: 82-99.
Rowbottom, D. P. 2007. “The Insufficiency of the Dutch Book Argument,” Studia Logica 87.1: 65-71.
Runde, Jochen. 1990. “Keynesian Uncertainty and the Weight of Arguments,” Economics and Philosophy 6.2: 275–292.
Runde, Jochen. 1991. “Keynesian Uncertainty and Stability of Beliefs,” Review of Political Economy 3: 125–145.
Runde, Jochen. 1994. “Keynes After Ramsey—In Defence of A Treatise on Probability,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 25.1: 97-121.
Runde, Jochen. 1995. “Risk, Uncertainty and Bayesian Decision Theory: A Keynesian View,” in S. C. Dow and J. Hillard (eds.), Keynes, Knowledge and Uncertainty. Edward Elgar, Aldershot, UK. 197–210.
Runde, Jochen. 1995. “Chances and Choices: Some Notes on Probability and Belief in Economic Theory,” The Monist 78: 330–351.
Runde, Jochen. 1998. “Frank Knight’s Discussion of the Meaning of Risk and Uncertainty,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 22.5: 539-546.
Runde, Jochen. 2000. “Shackle on Probability,” in Stephen F. Frowen and Peter Earl (eds.), Economics as an Art of Thought: Essays in Memory of G. L. S. Shackle. Routledge, New York.
Runde, Jochen and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.). 2003. The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York.
Ryder, J. M. 1981. “Consequences of a Simple Extension of the Dutch Book Argument,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32.2: 164–167.
Syll, Lars Pålsson. 2007. John Maynard Keynes SNS Förlag, Stockholm.
Skidelsky, R. J. A. 1992. John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour, 1920–1937 (vol. 2), Macmillan, London.
My Posts
“Degrees of Uncertainty,” November 24, 2011.
“Michael Emmett Brady on Keynes’s Probability Theory in Mises and Rothbard,” November 29, 2011.
Showing posts with label Keynes’s Theory of Probability. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Keynes’s Theory of Probability. Show all posts
Friday, July 19, 2013
Sunday, July 14, 2013
Moggridge on Keynes’s Theory of Probability
Keynes’s Treatise on Probability was published in 1921, but had grown out of the intellectual issues raised by G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica. Probability theory had occupied a considerable part of Keynes’s time between 1906 and 1914. His first discussion of the subject can be dated to 23 January 1904, in a paper called “Ethics in Relation to Conduct” read before the Apostles (Skidelsky 1983: 151–152), and his work in probability was originally an attempt to refute one of Moore’s ideas in the Principia Ethica (Moggridge 1992: 118).
In fact, during Keynes’s work as a junior clerk in the Military Department of the India Office and the Revenue, Statistics and Commerce Department (from March 1907), he spent his spare time writing a thesis on probability theory (Skidelsky 1983: 177). On 12 December 1907, he handed in his dissertation on probability, and it was examined by W. E. Johnson and Alfred North Whitehead (Skidelsky 1983: 182).
On the strength of Alfred North Whitehead’s (1861–1947) opinion of a revised version of Keynes’s dissertation, Keynes was elected in March 1909 to a prize fellowship at King’s College, Cambridge (Skidelsky 1983: 204; Moggridge 1992: 185). However, the First World War and post-war issues intervened and it was not until 1921 that Keynes published a book on the subject.
Moggridge (1992: 143–166) gives a brief account of Keynes’s theory of probability.
Keynes held that science was concerned not only with certain knowledge but limited knowledge (Moggridge 1992: 145). The latter was concerned with the probability of inferences not absolutely certain, but the knowledge obtained Keynes did not regard as subjective (Moggridge 1992: 145).
Keynes held that probability was a property of propositions, and that an inferred proposition is probable only in relation to other propositions that function as premises. The logic of probability was the logic of rational belief (Moggridge 1992: 145–146).
Moggridge (1992: 146–147) sees Keynes doctrine of probability as having five elements:
In Chapter 4, discussed the “principle of indifference” (his term for the “the principle of non-sufficient reason”) limited domain of mathematical probabilities where numerical values can be given.
In Chapter 6, Keynes turned to what he called “weight of arguments,” which depended on the absolute amount of evidence available.
Part III of the Treatise (Chapters XVIII–XXIII) was devoted to induction and analogy, and Keynes also attempted to solve Hume’s problem of induction (Moggridge 1992: 157).
The last seven chapters of the Treatise (Part V) were devoted to statistical inference.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Moggridge, D. E. 1992. Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography. Routledge, London.
Skidelsky, R. J. A. 1983. John Maynard Keynes: Hopes Betrayed 1883–1920 (vol. 1). Macmillan, London.
In fact, during Keynes’s work as a junior clerk in the Military Department of the India Office and the Revenue, Statistics and Commerce Department (from March 1907), he spent his spare time writing a thesis on probability theory (Skidelsky 1983: 177). On 12 December 1907, he handed in his dissertation on probability, and it was examined by W. E. Johnson and Alfred North Whitehead (Skidelsky 1983: 182).
On the strength of Alfred North Whitehead’s (1861–1947) opinion of a revised version of Keynes’s dissertation, Keynes was elected in March 1909 to a prize fellowship at King’s College, Cambridge (Skidelsky 1983: 204; Moggridge 1992: 185). However, the First World War and post-war issues intervened and it was not until 1921 that Keynes published a book on the subject.
Moggridge (1992: 143–166) gives a brief account of Keynes’s theory of probability.
Keynes held that science was concerned not only with certain knowledge but limited knowledge (Moggridge 1992: 145). The latter was concerned with the probability of inferences not absolutely certain, but the knowledge obtained Keynes did not regard as subjective (Moggridge 1992: 145).
Keynes held that probability was a property of propositions, and that an inferred proposition is probable only in relation to other propositions that function as premises. The logic of probability was the logic of rational belief (Moggridge 1992: 145–146).
Moggridge (1992: 146–147) sees Keynes doctrine of probability as having five elements:
(1) his conception of knowledge;In Chapter 3 of the Treatise on Probability, Keynes was clear that numerical values cannot be given to every proposition in an inductive argument (Moggridge 1992: 149).
(2) the notion of probability as indefinable;
(3) the often non-numerical non-comparable nature of probabilities;
(4) the way in which preference, judgement, indifference, relevance or irrelevance in determining the preferability of one of a set of probabilities is the basis for belief, and
(5) the idea of the weight of argument.
In Chapter 4, discussed the “principle of indifference” (his term for the “the principle of non-sufficient reason”) limited domain of mathematical probabilities where numerical values can be given.
In Chapter 6, Keynes turned to what he called “weight of arguments,” which depended on the absolute amount of evidence available.
Part III of the Treatise (Chapters XVIII–XXIII) was devoted to induction and analogy, and Keynes also attempted to solve Hume’s problem of induction (Moggridge 1992: 157).
The last seven chapters of the Treatise (Part V) were devoted to statistical inference.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Moggridge, D. E. 1992. Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography. Routledge, London.
Skidelsky, R. J. A. 1983. John Maynard Keynes: Hopes Betrayed 1883–1920 (vol. 1). Macmillan, London.
Saturday, July 13, 2013
Bibliography on Keynes’s Theory of Probability
I am making an attempt to understand at least the essentials of probability theory, philosophy of probability and, ultimately, Keynes’s theory of probability at the moment.
That being so, I post this preliminary bibliography below. Suggestions are welcome!
GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bunge, M. 1981. “Four Concepts of Probability,” Applied Mathematical Modelling 5: 306–312.
Bunge, Mario. 1988. “Two Faces and Three Masks of Probability,” in Evandro Agazzi (ed.), Probability in the Sciences. Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht and London. 27–50.
Fine, T. 1973. Theories of Probability. Academic Press, Waltham, MA.
Galavotti, M. C. 2005. Philosophical Introduction to Probability. CSLI Publications, Stanford.
Gillies, D. 1973. An Objective Theory of Probability. Methuen, London.
Gillies, D. 2000. Philosophical Theories of Probability. Routledge, London.
Hacking, Ian. 1975. The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference. Cambridge University Press, London.
Hacking, Ian. 2006. The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference (2nd edn.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Howson, C. and Urbach, P. 1993. Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach (2nd edn.). Open Court, La Salle, IL.
Mellor, D. H. 2005. Probability: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge, London.
Salmon, Wesley Charles. 1967. Foundations of Scientific Inference. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.
Savage, Leonard Jimmie. 1972. The Foundations of Statistics (2nd rev. edn.). Dover, New York.
Skyrms, B. 2000. Choice and Chance (4th edn.). Wadsworth, Belmont, CA.
von Plato, J. 1994. Creating Modern Probability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Weatherford, Roy. 1982. Philosophical Foundations of Probability Theory. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
KEYNES AND PROBABILITY
Basili, M. and C. Zappia. 2010. “Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Ellsberg and Shackle,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 34: 449–474.
Bateman, Bradley W. 1987. “Keynes’s Changing Conception of Probability,” Economics and Philosophy 3: 97-119.
Bateman, Bradley W. 1988. “G. E. Moore and J. M. Keynes: A Missing Chapter in the History of the Expected Utility Model,” American Economic Review 78: 1098–1106.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1983. The Foundation of Keynes’s Macrotheory: His Logical Theory of Probability and its Application in the General Theory and After, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Riverside.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1987. “J. M. Keynes’ Theory of Evidential Weight: Its Relation to Information Processing Theory and Application in the General Theory,” Synthese 71: 37–60.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1988. “J. M. Keynes’s Position on the General Applicability of Mathematical, Logical and Statistical Methods in Economics and Social Science,” Synthese 76.1: 1–24.
Brady, Michael Emmett and Howard B. Lee, 1989. “Dynamics of Choice Behavior: The Logical Relation between Linear Objective Probability and Nonlinear Subjective Probability,” Psychological Reports 64: 91-97.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1990. “The Mathematical Development of Keynes’s Aggregate Supply Function in the General Theory,” History of Political Economy 22.1: 167-172.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1993. “J. M. Keynes’s Theoretical Approach to Decision-Making under Conditions of Risk and Uncertainty,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44.2: 357–376.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1994. “Keynes, Pigou and the Supply Side of the General Theory,” History of Economics Review 21: 34–46.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1994. “A Note on the Keynes-Pigou Controversy,” History of Political Economy 26.4: 697–705.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1994. “On the Application of J. M. Keynes’s Approach to Decision Making,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8.2: 99–112.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 2010. “A Comparison-Contrast of Adam Smith, J.M. Keynes and Jeremy Bentham on Probability, Risk, Uncertainty, Optimism-Pessimism and Decision Making with Applications Concerning Banking, Insurance and Speculation,” SSRN Working Paper Series.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1728225
Brady, Michael Emmett and Rogério Arthmar, 2010. “Keynes’ Lower-Upper Bound Interval Approach to Probability,” SSRN Working Paper Series (February 2).
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546726
Brady, Michael Emmett, 2010. “How to Use Keynes’s Conventional Coefficient of Risk and Weight, c, to clear up Misunderstandings and Confusions about Keynes’s Views on the use on his Principle of Indifference Versus the use of Laplace’s Principle of Nonsufficient Reason,” SSRN Working Paper Series (November 27).
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1716043
Brady, Michael Emmett, 2011. “Comparing J. M. Keynes’s and F. von Hayek’s Differing Definitions of Uncertainty as it relates to Knowledge: Keynes’s Unavailable or Missing Knowledge Concept versus Hayek’s Dispersal of Knowledge Concept,” SSRN Working Paper Series.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1751569
Brady, Michael Emmett, 2011. “Keynes, Mathematics and Probability: A Reappraisal,” SSRN Working Paper Series, August 31.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1920569
Brady, Michael Emmett. 2011. “The ‘Early’ Logical Empiricism of J. M. Keynes versus the Rhetoric of Subjectivism,” SSRN Working Paper Series, August 31
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1920578
Brady, Michael Emmett. 2012. “John Maynard Keynes’s Upper and Lower Valued Probabilities: A Study of How Statisticians, Philosophers, Logicians, Historians, and Economists Failed to Comprehend Keynes’s Breakthrough Application of G.Boole’s Interval Approach to Probability in the 20th Century,” January 30
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1996129
Carabelli, Anna M. 1988. On Keynes’s Method, Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Carabelli, Anna M. 2002. “Speculation and Reasonableness: a non-Bayesian Theory of Rationality,” in S. Dow and J. Hillard (eds.), Keynes, Uncertainty and the Global Economy: Beyond Keynes (Vol. 2), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA. 165–185.
Cottrell, A. 1993. “Keynes’s Theory of Probability and its Relevance to His Economics: Three Theses,” Economics and Philosophy 9: 25–51.
Crocco, M. 2000. “The Future’s Unknowability: Keynes’s Probability, Probable Knowledge and the Decision to Innovate,” in F. Louçã and M. Perlman (eds.), Is Economics an Evolutionary Science? Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Crocco, M. 2002. “The Concept of Degrees of Uncertainty in Keynes, Shackle, and Davidson,” Nova Economia 12.2: 11–28.
Davis, John B. 1994. Keynes’s Philosophical Development. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Davis, John B. 2003. “The Relationship between Keynes’s Early and Later Philosophical Thinking,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and
Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 100–110.
Davidson, P. 1982–1983. “Rational Expectations: A Fallacious Foundation for Studying Crucial Decision-making Processes,” Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics 5.2: 182-198.
Davidson, Paul. 1991. “Is Probability Theory Relevant for Uncertainty? A Post Keynesian Perspective,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5.1: 129-143.
De Carvalho, Fernando J. Cardim. 1988. “Keynes on Probability, Uncertainty, and Decision Making,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 11.1: 66-81.
Dequech, David. 1997. “Uncertainty in a Strong Sense: Meaning and Sources,” Economic Issues 2.2: 21–43.
Dequech, David. 2008. “Varieties of Uncertainty: A Survey of the Economic Literature,”
http://ideas.repec.org/p/anp/en2008/200807211223070.html
Dequech, David. 2011. “Uncertainty: A Typology and Refinements of Existing Concepts,” Journal of Economic Issues 45.3: 621-640.
Dickens, Edwin. 2008. “Keynes’s Theory of Probability, Investment Behaviour, and Behavioral Finance,” in L. Randall Wray and Mathew Forstater (eds.), Keynes and Macroeconomics After 70 years: Critical Assessments of the General Theory, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA.
Dow, Sheila C. 1994. “Uncertainty,” in Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer (eds.), The Elgar Companion to Radical Political Economy. Edward Elgar, Aldershot. 434–438.
Dow, Sheila C. 1995. “Uncertainty about Uncertainty,” in S. C. Dow and J. Hillard (eds.). Keynes, Knowledge and Uncertainty. Edward Elgar, Aldershot. 117–127.
Dow, Sheila C. 2012. “Uncertainty about Uncertainty,” in Sheila C. Dow, Foundations for New Economic Thinking: A Collection of Essays. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 72–82.
Dow, Sheila C. 2012. Foundations for New Economic Thinking: A Collection of Essays. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Ellsberg, Daniel. 1961. “Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 75: 643–669.
Ellsberg, Daniel. 2001. Risk, Ambiguity and Decision. Garland, New York and London.
Feduzi, Alberto. 2007. “On the Relationship between Keynes’s Conception of Evidential Weight and the Ellsberg Paradox,” Journal of Economic Psychology 28: 545–565.
Fitzgibbons, Athol. 1988. Keynes’s Vision: A New Political Economy, Clarendon, Oxford.
Gerrard, B. 2003. “Keynesian Uncertainty: What Do We Know?,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 239–251.
Gillies, Donald. 2006. “Keynes and Probability,” in R. Backhouse and B. Bateman (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Keynes Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York. 199-216.
Gillies, Donald. 2003. “Probability and Uncertainty in Keynes’s Economics,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 111–129.
Gilles, Dostaler. 2007. Keynes and his Battles. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Hailperin, Theodore. 1986. Boole’s Logic and Probability: A Critical Exposition from the Standpoint of Contemporary Algebra, Logic, and Probability Theory (2nd rev. edn.), North-Holland, Amsterdam and New York.
Jespersen, Jesper. 2009. Macroeconomic Methodology: A Post-Keynesian Perspective. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA. Appendix 1. pp.126-131
Keynes, J. M. 1921. A Treatise on Probability (1st edn.), Macmillan, London.
Lawson, Tony. 1985. “Uncertainty and Economic Analysis,” Economic Journal 95: 909-927.
Lawson, Tony. 1988. “Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Analysis,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 11.1: 38-65.
Lawson, Tony. 1993. “Keynes and Conventions,” Cambridge University Review of Social Economy 51: 174-200.
McCann, Charles R. 1994. Probability Foundations of Economic Theory. Routledge, London.
McCann, Charles, R. 2003. “On the Nature of Keynesian Probability,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 37-45.
Mandelbrot, Benoit B. and Richard L. Hudson. 2004. The (Mis)behavior of Markets: A Fractal View of Risk, Ruin, and Reward. Basic Books, New York.
Meeks, J. G. T. 1991. “Keynes on the Rationality of Decision Procedures under Uncertainty: The Investment Decision,” in J. G. T. Meeks (ed.), Thoughtful Economic Man: Essays on Rationality, Moral Rules and Benevolence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. l26-160.
Moggridge, D. E. 1992. Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography, Routledge, London. pp. 143-166.
O’Donnell, R. M. 1989. Keynes: Philosophy, Economics and Politics: The Philosophical Foundations of Keynes’s Thought and their Influence on his Economics and Politics, Macmillan, Basingstoke.
O’Donnel, R. 2003. “The Thick and the Think of Controversy,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 85–99.
Ramsey, F. P. 1989 [1922]. “Mr Keynes on Probability,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40.2: 219-222.
Roncaglia, Alessandro. 2009. “Keynes and Probability: An Assessment,” European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 16.3: 489-510.
Rotheim, Roy J. 1988. “Keynes and the Language of Probability and Uncertainty,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 11.1: 82-99.
Rowbottom, D. P. 2007. “The Insufficiency of the Dutch Book Argument,” Studia Logica 87.1: 65-71.
Runde, Jochen. 1990. “Keynesian Uncertainty and the Weight of Arguments,” Economics and Philosophy 6.2: 275–292.
Runde, Jochen. 1991. “Keynesian Uncertainty and Stability of Beliefs,” Review of Political Economy 3: 125–145.
Runde, Jochen. 1994. “Keynes After Ramsey—In Defence of A Treatise on Probability,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 25.1: 97-121.
Runde, Jochen. 1995. “Risk, Uncertainty and Bayesian Decision Theory: A Keynesian View,” in S. C. Dow and J. Hillard (eds.), Keynes, Knowledge and Uncertainty. Edward Elgar, Aldershot, UK. 197–210.
Runde, Jochen. 1995. “Chances and Choices: Some Notes on Probability and Belief in Economic Theory,” The Monist 78: 330–351.
Runde, Jochen. 1998. “Frank Knight’s Discussion of the Meaning of Risk and Uncertainty,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 22.5: 539-546.
Runde, Jochen. 2000. “Shackle on Probability,” in Stephen F. Frowen and Peter Earl (eds.), Economics as an Art of Thought: Essays in Memory of G. L. S. Shackle. Routledge, New York.
Runde, Jochen and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.). 2003. The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York.
Ryder, J. M. 1981. “Consequences of a Simple Extension of the Dutch Book Argument,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32.2: 164–167.
Syll, Lars Pålsson. 2007. John Maynard Keynes SNS Förlag, Stockholm.
Skidelsky, R. J. A. 1992. John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour, 1920–1937 (vol. 2), Macmillan, London.
My Posts
“Degrees of Uncertainty,” November 24, 2011.
“Michael Emmett Brady on Keynes’s Probability Theory in Mises and Rothbard,” November 29, 2011.
That being so, I post this preliminary bibliography below. Suggestions are welcome!
GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bunge, M. 1981. “Four Concepts of Probability,” Applied Mathematical Modelling 5: 306–312.
Bunge, Mario. 1988. “Two Faces and Three Masks of Probability,” in Evandro Agazzi (ed.), Probability in the Sciences. Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht and London. 27–50.
Fine, T. 1973. Theories of Probability. Academic Press, Waltham, MA.
Galavotti, M. C. 2005. Philosophical Introduction to Probability. CSLI Publications, Stanford.
Gillies, D. 1973. An Objective Theory of Probability. Methuen, London.
Gillies, D. 2000. Philosophical Theories of Probability. Routledge, London.
Hacking, Ian. 1975. The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference. Cambridge University Press, London.
Hacking, Ian. 2006. The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference (2nd edn.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Howson, C. and Urbach, P. 1993. Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach (2nd edn.). Open Court, La Salle, IL.
Mellor, D. H. 2005. Probability: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge, London.
Salmon, Wesley Charles. 1967. Foundations of Scientific Inference. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.
Savage, Leonard Jimmie. 1972. The Foundations of Statistics (2nd rev. edn.). Dover, New York.
Skyrms, B. 2000. Choice and Chance (4th edn.). Wadsworth, Belmont, CA.
von Plato, J. 1994. Creating Modern Probability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Weatherford, Roy. 1982. Philosophical Foundations of Probability Theory. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
KEYNES AND PROBABILITY
Basili, M. and C. Zappia. 2010. “Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Ellsberg and Shackle,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 34: 449–474.
Bateman, Bradley W. 1987. “Keynes’s Changing Conception of Probability,” Economics and Philosophy 3: 97-119.
Bateman, Bradley W. 1988. “G. E. Moore and J. M. Keynes: A Missing Chapter in the History of the Expected Utility Model,” American Economic Review 78: 1098–1106.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1983. The Foundation of Keynes’s Macrotheory: His Logical Theory of Probability and its Application in the General Theory and After, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Riverside.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1987. “J. M. Keynes’ Theory of Evidential Weight: Its Relation to Information Processing Theory and Application in the General Theory,” Synthese 71: 37–60.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1988. “J. M. Keynes’s Position on the General Applicability of Mathematical, Logical and Statistical Methods in Economics and Social Science,” Synthese 76.1: 1–24.
Brady, Michael Emmett and Howard B. Lee, 1989. “Dynamics of Choice Behavior: The Logical Relation between Linear Objective Probability and Nonlinear Subjective Probability,” Psychological Reports 64: 91-97.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1990. “The Mathematical Development of Keynes’s Aggregate Supply Function in the General Theory,” History of Political Economy 22.1: 167-172.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1993. “J. M. Keynes’s Theoretical Approach to Decision-Making under Conditions of Risk and Uncertainty,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44.2: 357–376.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1994. “Keynes, Pigou and the Supply Side of the General Theory,” History of Economics Review 21: 34–46.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1994. “A Note on the Keynes-Pigou Controversy,” History of Political Economy 26.4: 697–705.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 1994. “On the Application of J. M. Keynes’s Approach to Decision Making,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8.2: 99–112.
Brady, Michael Emmett, 2010. “A Comparison-Contrast of Adam Smith, J.M. Keynes and Jeremy Bentham on Probability, Risk, Uncertainty, Optimism-Pessimism and Decision Making with Applications Concerning Banking, Insurance and Speculation,” SSRN Working Paper Series.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1728225
Brady, Michael Emmett and Rogério Arthmar, 2010. “Keynes’ Lower-Upper Bound Interval Approach to Probability,” SSRN Working Paper Series (February 2).
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546726
Brady, Michael Emmett, 2010. “How to Use Keynes’s Conventional Coefficient of Risk and Weight, c, to clear up Misunderstandings and Confusions about Keynes’s Views on the use on his Principle of Indifference Versus the use of Laplace’s Principle of Nonsufficient Reason,” SSRN Working Paper Series (November 27).
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1716043
Brady, Michael Emmett, 2011. “Comparing J. M. Keynes’s and F. von Hayek’s Differing Definitions of Uncertainty as it relates to Knowledge: Keynes’s Unavailable or Missing Knowledge Concept versus Hayek’s Dispersal of Knowledge Concept,” SSRN Working Paper Series.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1751569
Brady, Michael Emmett, 2011. “Keynes, Mathematics and Probability: A Reappraisal,” SSRN Working Paper Series, August 31.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1920569
Brady, Michael Emmett. 2011. “The ‘Early’ Logical Empiricism of J. M. Keynes versus the Rhetoric of Subjectivism,” SSRN Working Paper Series, August 31
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1920578
Brady, Michael Emmett. 2012. “John Maynard Keynes’s Upper and Lower Valued Probabilities: A Study of How Statisticians, Philosophers, Logicians, Historians, and Economists Failed to Comprehend Keynes’s Breakthrough Application of G.Boole’s Interval Approach to Probability in the 20th Century,” January 30
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1996129
Carabelli, Anna M. 1988. On Keynes’s Method, Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Carabelli, Anna M. 2002. “Speculation and Reasonableness: a non-Bayesian Theory of Rationality,” in S. Dow and J. Hillard (eds.), Keynes, Uncertainty and the Global Economy: Beyond Keynes (Vol. 2), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA. 165–185.
Cottrell, A. 1993. “Keynes’s Theory of Probability and its Relevance to His Economics: Three Theses,” Economics and Philosophy 9: 25–51.
Crocco, M. 2000. “The Future’s Unknowability: Keynes’s Probability, Probable Knowledge and the Decision to Innovate,” in F. Louçã and M. Perlman (eds.), Is Economics an Evolutionary Science? Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Crocco, M. 2002. “The Concept of Degrees of Uncertainty in Keynes, Shackle, and Davidson,” Nova Economia 12.2: 11–28.
Davis, John B. 1994. Keynes’s Philosophical Development. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Davis, John B. 2003. “The Relationship between Keynes’s Early and Later Philosophical Thinking,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and
Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 100–110.
Davidson, P. 1982–1983. “Rational Expectations: A Fallacious Foundation for Studying Crucial Decision-making Processes,” Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics 5.2: 182-198.
Davidson, Paul. 1991. “Is Probability Theory Relevant for Uncertainty? A Post Keynesian Perspective,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5.1: 129-143.
De Carvalho, Fernando J. Cardim. 1988. “Keynes on Probability, Uncertainty, and Decision Making,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 11.1: 66-81.
Dequech, David. 1997. “Uncertainty in a Strong Sense: Meaning and Sources,” Economic Issues 2.2: 21–43.
Dequech, David. 2008. “Varieties of Uncertainty: A Survey of the Economic Literature,”
http://ideas.repec.org/p/anp/en2008/200807211223070.html
Dequech, David. 2011. “Uncertainty: A Typology and Refinements of Existing Concepts,” Journal of Economic Issues 45.3: 621-640.
Dickens, Edwin. 2008. “Keynes’s Theory of Probability, Investment Behaviour, and Behavioral Finance,” in L. Randall Wray and Mathew Forstater (eds.), Keynes and Macroeconomics After 70 years: Critical Assessments of the General Theory, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA.
Dow, Sheila C. 1994. “Uncertainty,” in Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer (eds.), The Elgar Companion to Radical Political Economy. Edward Elgar, Aldershot. 434–438.
Dow, Sheila C. 1995. “Uncertainty about Uncertainty,” in S. C. Dow and J. Hillard (eds.). Keynes, Knowledge and Uncertainty. Edward Elgar, Aldershot. 117–127.
Dow, Sheila C. 2012. “Uncertainty about Uncertainty,” in Sheila C. Dow, Foundations for New Economic Thinking: A Collection of Essays. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 72–82.
Dow, Sheila C. 2012. Foundations for New Economic Thinking: A Collection of Essays. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Ellsberg, Daniel. 1961. “Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 75: 643–669.
Ellsberg, Daniel. 2001. Risk, Ambiguity and Decision. Garland, New York and London.
Feduzi, Alberto. 2007. “On the Relationship between Keynes’s Conception of Evidential Weight and the Ellsberg Paradox,” Journal of Economic Psychology 28: 545–565.
Fitzgibbons, Athol. 1988. Keynes’s Vision: A New Political Economy, Clarendon, Oxford.
Gerrard, B. 2003. “Keynesian Uncertainty: What Do We Know?,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 239–251.
Gillies, Donald. 2006. “Keynes and Probability,” in R. Backhouse and B. Bateman (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Keynes Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York. 199-216.
Gillies, Donald. 2003. “Probability and Uncertainty in Keynes’s Economics,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 111–129.
Gilles, Dostaler. 2007. Keynes and his Battles. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Hailperin, Theodore. 1986. Boole’s Logic and Probability: A Critical Exposition from the Standpoint of Contemporary Algebra, Logic, and Probability Theory (2nd rev. edn.), North-Holland, Amsterdam and New York.
Jespersen, Jesper. 2009. Macroeconomic Methodology: A Post-Keynesian Perspective. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA. Appendix 1. pp.126-131
Keynes, J. M. 1921. A Treatise on Probability (1st edn.), Macmillan, London.
Lawson, Tony. 1985. “Uncertainty and Economic Analysis,” Economic Journal 95: 909-927.
Lawson, Tony. 1988. “Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Analysis,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 11.1: 38-65.
Lawson, Tony. 1993. “Keynes and Conventions,” Cambridge University Review of Social Economy 51: 174-200.
McCann, Charles R. 1994. Probability Foundations of Economic Theory. Routledge, London.
McCann, Charles, R. 2003. “On the Nature of Keynesian Probability,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 37-45.
Mandelbrot, Benoit B. and Richard L. Hudson. 2004. The (Mis)behavior of Markets: A Fractal View of Risk, Ruin, and Reward. Basic Books, New York.
Meeks, J. G. T. 1991. “Keynes on the Rationality of Decision Procedures under Uncertainty: The Investment Decision,” in J. G. T. Meeks (ed.), Thoughtful Economic Man: Essays on Rationality, Moral Rules and Benevolence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. l26-160.
Moggridge, D. E. 1992. Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography, Routledge, London. pp. 143-166.
O’Donnell, R. M. 1989. Keynes: Philosophy, Economics and Politics: The Philosophical Foundations of Keynes’s Thought and their Influence on his Economics and Politics, Macmillan, Basingstoke.
O’Donnel, R. 2003. “The Thick and the Think of Controversy,” in Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York. 85–99.
Ramsey, F. P. 1989 [1922]. “Mr Keynes on Probability,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40.2: 219-222.
Roncaglia, Alessandro. 2009. “Keynes and Probability: An Assessment,” European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 16.3: 489-510.
Rotheim, Roy J. 1988. “Keynes and the Language of Probability and Uncertainty,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 11.1: 82-99.
Rowbottom, D. P. 2007. “The Insufficiency of the Dutch Book Argument,” Studia Logica 87.1: 65-71.
Runde, Jochen. 1990. “Keynesian Uncertainty and the Weight of Arguments,” Economics and Philosophy 6.2: 275–292.
Runde, Jochen. 1991. “Keynesian Uncertainty and Stability of Beliefs,” Review of Political Economy 3: 125–145.
Runde, Jochen. 1994. “Keynes After Ramsey—In Defence of A Treatise on Probability,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 25.1: 97-121.
Runde, Jochen. 1995. “Risk, Uncertainty and Bayesian Decision Theory: A Keynesian View,” in S. C. Dow and J. Hillard (eds.), Keynes, Knowledge and Uncertainty. Edward Elgar, Aldershot, UK. 197–210.
Runde, Jochen. 1995. “Chances and Choices: Some Notes on Probability and Belief in Economic Theory,” The Monist 78: 330–351.
Runde, Jochen. 1998. “Frank Knight’s Discussion of the Meaning of Risk and Uncertainty,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 22.5: 539-546.
Runde, Jochen. 2000. “Shackle on Probability,” in Stephen F. Frowen and Peter Earl (eds.), Economics as an Art of Thought: Essays in Memory of G. L. S. Shackle. Routledge, New York.
Runde, Jochen and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.). 2003. The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. Routledge, London and New York.
Ryder, J. M. 1981. “Consequences of a Simple Extension of the Dutch Book Argument,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32.2: 164–167.
Syll, Lars Pålsson. 2007. John Maynard Keynes SNS Förlag, Stockholm.
Skidelsky, R. J. A. 1992. John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour, 1920–1937 (vol. 2), Macmillan, London.
My Posts
“Degrees of Uncertainty,” November 24, 2011.
“Michael Emmett Brady on Keynes’s Probability Theory in Mises and Rothbard,” November 29, 2011.
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