Showing posts with label aggregates. Show all posts
Showing posts with label aggregates. Show all posts

Monday, March 26, 2012

Some Discussion of Aggregates in the Blogosphere

There are some interesting posts on various blogs at the moment dealing with the Austrian attitude to aggregates:
(1) “Is There Macroeconomics?,” 3 March, 2012.

(2) “Crude Austrians, Macroeconomics, and Complexity,” Facts & Other Stubborn Things, 25 March, 2012.

(3) Jonathan Finegold Catalán, “AAA = Aggregates Annoy (Crude) Austrians,” Economic Thought, 26 March, 2012.

(4) “‘Free Market’ Double Standards 4.0,” Unlearning Economics, March 23, 2012.
(see point 6).

(5) Gene Callahan, “Vulgar Austrians and Aggregates,” September 25, 2011.
(this post by Gene Callahan is somewhat older than the ones above, but I will post a link to it anyway).
I have always said that it is utterly absurd to watch Austrians deny the existence of aggregates. Often it is the sign of a truly infantile mind that thinks that, just because something has no concrete existence, then it must not exist.

But our universe contains a vast number of abstract things that have no concrete existence, say, like universals or numbers. For example, the number 5 has no concrete existence, but does anyone doubt that the number 5, and indeed numbers in general, are real, meaningful concepts? (of course, the advocates of the philosophical position called nominalism would dispute the idea that numbers are real, but the crude Austrians never seem even to have the wit or intelligence to frame the debate on aggregates in terms of nominalism versus realism. I take a “moderate realist” position, for the record). Do people doubt that the sum of 5, 6, 3, 4, 8, and 1 (itself a number) is not a real, meaningful concept?

Aggregates just have no concrete existence like a concrete particular, as, for example, the particular chair you are sitting on, as you read this post.

When we move to economics or finance, it is obvious how aggregates permeate everything.

A business can sell units of a good or even units of heterogeneous goods. But it can calculate value of the volume of its sales of goods as a monetary aggregate in any given period (say, the financial year or even a month or day). It is the same with the aggregated money value of purchased final goods and services throughout an economy in a given year, the aggregate that is used to express or calculate the value of aggregate demand.

Aggregate concepts are required by Say’s law: (1) the value of total factor payments considered as aggregate supply, and (2) aggregate demand as the aggregate of spending on output that has been earned from total factor payments. If aggregate concepts are invalid, then Say’s law is also invalid.

While I am pleased to see Jonathan Finegold Catalán proclaim that only crude Austrians deny the existence of aggregates, a more interesting question is whether he is willing to repudiate statements like this from the Austrian William L. Anderson:
“When Krugman uses ‘demand,’ he means ‘aggregate demand,’ which economically speaking is a nonsensical term. There is no such thing as “aggregate demand.’”

William L. Anderson, “Krugman: In the Long Run, We Screw Future Generations,” Krugman-in-Wonderland, June 25, 2010.

“The problem is that Krugman, as a Keynesian macro guy, cannot see anything but aggregates, which is not economics at all. There is no such thing as ‘aggregate demand’ and ‘aggregate supply,’ or at least something with such terms that can be represented in the crude ‘Keynesian Cross’ or an AD-AS graph.”

William L. Anderson, “The ‘Stimulus’ that Failed to ‘Fix’ the Economy ,” Krugman-in-Wonderland, December 21, 2011.

“For all of his ‘credentials,’ let us not forget that Krugman is a Keynesian who has no clue whatsoever what happens in a real economy. His world is the imaginary world of aggregates, GDP numbers, crude graphs, and no real people and certainly no real production.”

William L. Anderson, “Jeremy Warner Gets It Right on Krugman,” Krugman-in-Wonderland, March 21, 2010.
Anderson sets himself up as a serious Austrian critic of Paul Krugman, yet here he is caught making the most risible, stupid statements.

And this sort of stupidity is far more common amongst Austrians, especially internet Austrians, than the more “astute” Austrians think.

Sunday, January 22, 2012

Austrian Substitutes for GDP – They are Aggregates!

How often do we hear endless nonsense from Austrians that GDP is unsound because it is an aggregate value?

And yet – astonishingly – the only serious Austrian measures of real national output proposed in place of GDP, such as Rothbard’s Gross Private Product (GPP) and Mark Skousen’s Gross Domestic Output (GDO) are nothing but aggregates!

GDP is the following:
GDP = C + I + G + (X-M).
Rothbard’s Gross Private Product is little more than GDP, with G removed. That is to say, Rothbard’s Gross Private Product is merely this:
GDP = C + I + (X-M).
This is an aggregate of aggregates too: the total value of final consumer goods and total value of gross investment (new housing, replacement purchases, net additions to capital assets and investments in inventories), and exports minus imports. If Rothbard’s Gross Private Product is to be taken seriously, then it must be legitimate to aggregate the value of C, I, and (X-M).

Think of C as an example: the aggregation of the sale price of consumer goods in money terms in one year must be perfectly valid and meaningful, though such goods are heterogeneous. If you could not, for example, meaningfully aggregate the value of sales of heterogeneous goods in one year for a firm, how could a firm calculate its total income from sales?

Now gross investment is, as I have said, new housing, replacement purchases, net additions to capital assets and investments in inventories. Obviously, these goods are heterogeneous, and not all capital goods investments in one year will lead to a profit in the future, but you can still aggregate the sale price of these new capital goods bought (or value of new capital goods added into the capital stock). Rothbard’s Gross Private Product requires gross investment.

Government spending (G) is (1) final consumption expenditure by government and (2) government gross capital formation (infrastructure investment or research spending). Government expenditures that are transfers of money (social security payments, pensions, etc.) are transfer payments. Transfer payments are not included in government purchases. Rothbard’s Gross Private Product removes income originating in government and government enterprises.

Mark Skousen appeals to “Gross Output (GO)” – which is intermediate input plus GDP – as a more accurate measure of national output. In The Structure of Production (1990), Skousen attempted to create a new output statistic: Gross Domestic Output (GDO), as his “Austrian” alternative to GDP. However, he seems to regard Gross Output (GO) as an acceptable version of this, and Gross Output (GO) is nothing but an official Commerce department aggregate measure of output that aggregates GDP and the value of intermediate input (or what Skousen calls the “goods-in-process sector of the economy,” including commodity factor inputs, manufacturing, and wholesale stages of production).

Now, if GDP is not a meaningful or valid measure of output, how could Skousen’s Gross Output (GO) be meaningful or valid? The answer is: it couldn’t, and Gross Output can only be meaningful, if we also accept the meaningful nature of GDP.

Without a measure of the value or volume of real output, most attempts by any type of economist (Austrians included) to analyse an economy collapse: for how could you know whether Keynesian stimulus or Austrian liquidationism have the effects allegedly claimed for them, without looking at real output in some aggregate form? How could you even know whether the economy is in a recession or an expansionary phase?

Appendix

Robert Batemarco (1987) discusses Rothbard’s Gross Private Product, and on p. 183 gives a table of US GNP and Gross Private Product for the period 1947-1983.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Batemarco, R. 1987. “GNP, PPR, and the Standard of Living,” Review of Austrian Economics 1: 181-186.

Skousen, Mark. 1990. The Structure of Production, New York University Press, New York and London.

Skousen, Mark, 2001. “Beyond GDP: A Breakthrough in National Income Accounting,” Mskousen.com, April 1, 2001
http://www.mskousen.com/2001/04/beyond-gdp-a-breakthrough-in-national-income-accounting/

Friday, July 15, 2011

A Simple Example of Micro versus Macro Effects

The various types of economic systems that we know as capitalism are characterised by decentralised decision-making by individual agents under uncertainty and shifting subjective expectations and utilities.

But decisions by a large enough number of people that appear advantageous at the micro level can have negative macro effects.

A perfect analogy is crowd behaviour during stampedes at large events that result in loss of life and injury. Rumour and panic can thrive in large crowds and the macro-effects are disastrous when people are killed or injured in stampedes. From the individual (or micro) perspective it makes sense to leave a crowded event as fast as possible to avoid what might be a treat to your life: when enough people do it the result might not, however, be beneficial to you.

Aggregate variables like investment and macro phenomena like stock markets can be subject to similar problems related to micro versus macro effects. Rumour and panic can cause crashes in financial markets or in investment decisions: negative subjective expectations (with or without rational foundation) can spread to large numbers of business people causing investment and employment to collapse.

Government is akin to the management of a theatre, where theatre managers use their power (through public announcement and their security staff) to prevent disastrous macro events like stampedes. Intervention by theatre management (the analogy to government) to prevent panic and disaster in a theatre (or government stopping secondary deflation and depression in an economy) is a better outcome than allowing large scale micro-behaviour that has terrible macro-effects.

In the case of a slump in investment owing to shocked business expectations, this can take the form of what Keynes called “socialization of investment” (public works and other public spending programs that can be analogous to investment), or increasing people’s spending power to create the demand necessary for increased production.

Monday, July 11, 2011

A Startling Admission from Ludwig Lachmann

To follow up on my post “Ludwig Lachmann on Government Intervention” (July 9, 2011), I have (thanks to Gene Callahan) located a work where Lachmann gives his views on cases where government intervention might be effective.

One can find the relevant passage in Lachmann’s short essay Macro-economic Thinking and the Market Economy: An Essay on the Neglect of the Micro-Foundations and its Consequences (1973), which is worth reading in its own right.

Lachmann comments on the nature of aggregates towards the end of his essay, and states:
“Aggregates, such as gross domestic product or gross investment in manufacturing industries, are therefore not to be regarded as magnitudes which would or could remain constant but for growth. Their composition is undergoing continuous change affecting their total magnitude. Growth of the aggregates is always the cumulative result of other changes in quantities of resources and factor productivity, in relative prices and demand, and so on. Only in a one-commodity world could it be otherwise. It is therefore impossible to discuss meaningfully policy measures designed to affect the magnitude of such aggregates without also discussing those changes in their composition which must accompany them.

Perhaps an historical example will elucidate what we mean. Policies based on Keynesian macro-economic recipes might have succeeded (had they then been tried) in 1932 and did succeed in 1940 because it so happened that at the bottom of the Great Depression as well as during the Second World War all sectors of the economy were equally affected. In 1932 any kind of additional spending on whatever kind of goods would have had a favourable effect on incomes because there was unemployment everywhere, as well as idle capital equipment and surplus stocks of raw materials. During the war the situation was exactly the opposite, but precisely for this reason the same recipes, but with opposite sign, applied. With millions of men and women in the armed forces everything, not merely labour, was scarce and any reduction in demand anywhere welcome.

These are, of course, abnormal situations. Normally in an industrial economy we find some declining industries (coal mining, cinemas) side by side with rapidly expanding ones. Problems arising here require detailed study and are resistant to macro-economic panaceas.” (Lachmann 1973: 50).
In conditions of severe unemployment, idle capital equipment (what we would now call low capacity utilization), and surplus stocks of raw materials, according to Lachmann, we have reason to believe that Keynesian policies will work.

It seems to me that, although capacity utilization has risen from less than 70% in the depth of the US recession in 2009 to 76% in 2011, these factors still apply to the US economy: mass unemployment and space for increased production. The US can also import raw materials and other commodities needed for expansion, and this would help growth in the rest of the world. The US is in much the same state now as it was in 1935: a recovery owing to fiscal stimulus, but not enough stimulus for full employment.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lachmann, L. M. 1973. Macro-economic Thinking and the Market Economy: An Essay on the Neglect of the Micro-Foundations and its Consequences, Institute of Economic Affairs.