Showing posts with label GDP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label GDP. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 13, 2015

Libertarian Gold Standard Myths Never Die

Updated: I have added an average for 1870 to 1913 calculated from Romer (1989)

Proof in the video debate below on gold, which involves Peter Schiff and Rick Rule (pro-gold) versus Marshall Auerback and Cullen Roche (anti-gold).



But it is Peter Schiff’s comments here in the video clip below that represent a libertarian/Austrian economics myth that will not die.



Peter Schiff says this:
“Look at the period between the end of the Civil War and the beginning of the First World War. That economic growth rate is unmatched at any point in US economic history.”
The Austrian school economist Jesús Huerta de Soto recently put his foot in his mouth and made a very similar but utterly wrong comment which I refute here.

What about Schiff’s comments? According to Schiff, the period between 1866 and 1914 had an “economic growth rate” that is “unmatched at any point in US economic history.”

Of course, by “economic growth rate” he could mean either of the following:
(1) real GDP growth rate, or

(2) real per capita GDP growth rate.
So what is the evidence?

The standard source for both modern real GDP and real per capita GDP growth rates in virtually every nation is Angus Maddison’s The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris, 2003).

I have crunched the numbers on both real US GDP and per capita GDP growth rates (here and here).

First, let us start with real US GDP. Because of an anomaly in Maddison’s data (as described here), it is best to give estimates from both Maddison’s and Balke and Gordon’s data. For real GDP averages below, I have also given an average calculated from Romer (1989) (the data can be seen here), even though Romer’s estimates are now generally regarded as inferior to those of Balke and Gordon.

Unfortunately, annual estimates of GDP from 1866 to 1868 are not available, but we do have annual estimates for 1870 to 1914. Since the US suffered a recession in 1914 after the First World War started, I will remove this year from my estimates to make things better for advocates of the gold standard.

If we select those periods of economic and historical significance in US history, including the 1870 to 1913 period, and rank them from the highest to the lowest in terms of growth, we get the following average annual GDP figures:
(1) World War II average annual growth rate: 12.491%
(2) Recovery from Depression: 1934–1940: 6.511%
(3) Roaring ’20s 1922–1929: 4.856%
(4) Average annual real GDP rate 1983–1989 (Reagan boom): 4.282%
(5) Average annual real GDP rate 1950–1973: 4.160%
(6) Average real GNP growth rate, 1870–1913 (Balke and Gordon): 4.06%
(7) Average real GNP growth rate, 1870–1913 (Romer): 4.05%
(8) Average annual real GDP rate 1871–1913 (Maddison): 4.034%
(9) Average annual real GDP rate 1948–1973: 4.000%
(10) Average annual real GDP rate 1873–1896 (Maddison): 3.666%
(11) Average annual real GNP growth rate, 1873–1896 (Balke and Gordon): 3.596%
(12) Average annual real GDP rate 1974–2001: 2.963%.
As we can see, the 1870–1913 or 1871–1913 period was not “unmatched at any point in US economic history” in terms of economic growth. The largest GDP growth happened in America’s moderate command economy in World War II.

Even putting wars aside, it was the recovery from the Great Depression from 1934–1940 under Roosevelt that had the highest average GDP growth rate at 6.511%. Next comes the Roaring ’20s (if we calculate this as 1922–1929) then the Reagan boom (1983–1989), and then the Golden Age of Capitalism if we reckon this as the 1950–1973 period.

Only then does the 1870 to 1913 period occur in the ranking, and no matter what data you use.

Schiff’s comments are clearly falsified by our best data, at least with reference to real GDP.

But of course here an objection can be made: isn’t real per capita GDP a better way to measure real wealth in a nation, if we wish to gauge how wealth was increasing in relation to the population (that is, per capita or by head)?

Yes, though one should also look at distribution of wealth issues too. But I will put aside the inequality and distribution of wealth issues to make it easier for the libertarians.

Is the real per capita GDP data any better for the Austrians? No, it is worse.

The full data can be seen here.

Again, we can take those periods of economic and historical significance in US history, including the 1870 to 1913 period, and rank them from the highest to the lowest, and get the following average annual real per capita GDP figures:
(1) World War II average per capita growth rate: 11.204%
(2) Recovery from Depression, average real per capita GDP growth rate 1934–1940: 5.75%
(3) Average real per capita GDP growth rate, Roaring ’20s 1922–1929: 3.35%
(4) Average real per capita GDP rate 1983–1989 (Reagan boom): 3.338%
(5) Average real per capita GDP growth rate 1950–1973: 2.66%
(6) Average real per capita GDP growth rate 1948–1973: 2.30%
(7) Average real per capita GDP growth rate 1974–2001: 1.88%
(8) Average real per capita GDP growth rate 1871–1914: 1.63%
(9) Average real per capita GDP growth rate 1873 to 1896: 1.42%
Admittedly, one should discount the WWII period, since the output of this period included mostly war production, not consumer goods.

But even with the war discounted, the highest period of real per capita GDP growth was still the recovery from depression from 1934–1940, with an average real per capita GDP growth rate of 5.75%.

Next comes the Roaring ’20s, the Reagan boom, the Golden Age of Capitalism (whether reckoned either as 1950–1973 or 1948–1973), and the neoliberal era (1974 to 2001).

The gold standard era from 1871 to 1914 comes second last in the list, and is followed by the 1873 to 1896 deflationary period, which was the worst of all periods.

Could the data be any clearer?

Remember the comment by Peter Schiff:
“Look at the period between the end of the Civil War and the beginning of the First World War. That economic growth rate is unmatched at any point in US economic history.”
The data that we have show us clearly that this is false. It is a libertarian/Austrian myth.

What was that about if you repeat a lie enough times people will start to believe it?

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Balke, N. S., and R. J. Gordon, 1989. “The Estimation of Prewar Gross National Product: Methodology and New Evidence,” Journal of Political Economy 97.1: 38–92.

Maddison, Angus. 2003. The World Economy: Historical Statistics. OECD Publishing, Paris.

Monday, April 29, 2013

Robert Murphy Takes Issue with my Reading of Empirical Data on the US Stimulus

For the interested reader, you can find his posts here:
“Just the Facts, Ma’am: “Testing” Keynesian Theory,” 29 April, 2013.

“Believing Is Seeing, Part II,” 29 April.
The unrealistic assumption that he appears to be making in his criticisms of me is this: that real output and private investment must have started expanding immediately after the stimulus began.

But it is obvious that government spending takes time to induce changes in private investment.

Why should there be an immediate and instant movement? I know of no Keynesian economist who has ever thought that there should be instant effects on private investment from stimulus.

With reference to the graph of US private-sector investment Murphy posts, I do not find it surprising that private investment continued to contract in 2008 and early in 2009. The shocks to business confidence were very severe indeed in 2008: probably worse than in any other recession after 1945.

But private sector investment did turn around in mid-2009: after 6 months or so of stimulus spending, which stabilised demand for products. There is a clear trend of rising private sector investment with rising government spending for years after mid-2009.

If private sector investment had continued to contract for years after the stimulus, then Murphy would have empirical evidence to support his anti-Keynesian, Austrian case. But that is not what the data show.

Saturday, February 2, 2013

The Great Depression in Europe: Selected Comparative Data on GDP

I have assembled data on real GDP loss during the Great depression in Western Europe for 12 nations: Austria, Germany, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, UK, Italy, Finland, and Denmark. Countries not listed are Portugal, Spain and Ireland.

We can rank the real output loss in Western European nations from the most severe to the least severe, as follows:
Nation | Real GDP loss | Years of Contraction
Austria | 22.45% | 1929–1933
Germany | 16.11% | 1929–1932
France | 14.65% | 1930–1932
Netherlands | 9.46% | 1930–1934
Switzerland | 8.02% | 1930–1932
Belgium | 7.89% | 1929–1932
Norway | 7.75% | 1931
Sweden | 6.20% | 1931–1932
UK | 5.80% | 1930–1931
Italy | 5.47% | 1930–1931
Finland | 3.97% | 1930–1932
Denmark | 2.62% | 1932
From this we can see that Austria and Germany had the most severe depressions in the data, with France not far behind.

The Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and UK had real output losses ranging from 9.46 to 5.8%

Most surprising is how comparatively mild the Great Depression was in Finland and Denmark. I have not investigated why this is.

What is most interesting is that, of all nations in the data, Austria had the worst depression: it lost 22.45% of real GDP from 1929–1933. Also, as can be seen from the data below, its recovery was so poor it was almost stagnation.

In these years the country was run by the Austro-fascist Engelbert Dollfuss, who became Chancellor of Austria in May 1932. In March 1933, Dollfuss effectively abolished democracy, and established an authoritarian regime, but was assassinated in July 25, 1934 and replaced by another dictator called Kurt Schuschnigg, who was Chancellor from July 1934 to the Anschluss in March 1938. While Dollfuss engaged in some limited interventions in the economy, mostly he seems to have pursued deflationary austerity.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe tells us, quite shamelessly, that Mises was a close adviser of Dollfuss:
“Engelbert Dollfuss [sc. was] ... the Austrian Chancellor who tried to prevent the Nazis from taking over Austria. During this period Mises was chief economist for the Austrian Chamber of Commerce. Before Dollfuss was murdered for his politics, Mises was one of his closest advisers.”
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “The Meaning of the Mises Papers,” Mises.org, April 1997
We can obtain some background on the type of policies implemented by the Austro-fascists:
“In tackling the economic crisis the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg dictatorship pursued harsh deflationary policies designed to balance the budget and stabilize the currency. The government’s program featured severe spending cuts, high interest rates, and frozen wages. …. In a sense the Christian Corporative regime demonstrated the viability of the Austrian state, but it did so at the cost of alienating a majority of the Austrian people. On the eve of Anschluss a third of the population was still out of work, while those fortunate enough to have jobs were bringing home paychecks considerably smaller than before the Great War” (Bukey 2000: 17).

“Beginning in in 1931, [Austrian] unemployment grew rapidly, reaching a peak in 1933–6, with between 24 and 26 per cent of the labour force out of work .... When, in 1937 and 1938, there was a modest recovery, unemployment never dropped below the 20 per cent value. This had a devastating effect on the legitimacy of the Austrian system .... As the Austrian government sustained its reluctance to apply Keynesian policies, the economic recovery never entered a serious tale-off phase in the second half of the 1930s. Linked to an exhausted determination of the Austrian government to resist the pressures from Germany, the economic crisis of the 1930s should be seen as an additional reason why the Austrian society was receptive to the annexation by Germany in March 1938” (Gerlich and Campbell 2000: 55).
I have also found some data on unemployment in Austria here (which appears to come indirectly from Maddison [1982]):
Austrian Unemployment (% of Total Labour Force)
Year | Unemployment Rate

1929 | 5.5%
1930 | 7.0%
1931 | 9.7%
1932 | 13.7%
1933 | 16.3%
1934 | 16.1%
1935 | 15.2%
1936 | 15.2%
1937 | 13.7%
1938 | 8.1%
Unemployment soared to 16.3% by 1933 and stayed virtually the same for a further three years. All in all, the unemployment data shows no serious decrease until 1938, the year Austria was integrated into the interventionist economy of Nazi Germany, after which unemployment fell rapidly (it fell to 3.2% by 1939 [Kirk 2002: 68]).

So the only nation where a major Austrian economist was giving some kind of policy advice (and I assume it was liquidationism) had one of the worst depressions (possibly the worst) in Western Europe and an unsuccessful recovery. Things were so bad that the Austrian population to some degree became sympathetic to the German annexation in 1938.

Certain lessons suggest themselves from this data, but I doubt whether Austrians have either the wit or intelligence to learn them.

To return to the broader issue here, a detailed analysis of the monetary and fiscal policies in each country is an enormous research task, but I will attempt gradually to fill it out in updates to this post. At present, I have some analysis on Norway (see below).

1. Italy
Real GDP in Italy, 1928–1945
* in millions of international Geary-Khamis dollars
1928 | 121 182 |
1929 | 125 180 | 3.29%
1930 | 119 014 | -4.92%
1931 | 118 323 | -0.58%

1932 | 122 140 | 3.22%
1933 | 121 317 | -0.67%
1934 | 121 826 | 0.41%
1935 | 133 559 | 9.63%
1936 | 133 792 | 0.17%
1937 | 142 954 | 6.84%
1938 | 143 981 | 0.71%
1939 | 154 470 | 7.28%
1940 | 155 424 | 0.61%
1941 | 153 517 | -1.22%
1942 | 151 610 | -1.24%
1943 | 137 307 | -9.43%
1944 | 111 562 | -18.74%
1945 | 87 342 | -21.70%
(Maddison 2003: 50).
From 1930 to 1931 the real GDP loss was 5.47%.

2. Austria
Real GDP in Austria, 1928–1938
* in millions of international Geary-Khamis dollars
1928 | 24 295 | 4.64%
1929 | 24 647 | 1.44%
1930 | 23 967 | -2.75%
1931 | 22 044 | -8.02%
1932 | 19 769 | -10.32%
1933 | 19 113 | -3.31%

1934 | 19 277 | 0.85%
1935 | 19 652 | 1.94%
1936 | 20 238 | 2.98%
1937 | 21 317 | 5.33%
1938 | 24 037 | 12.75%
1939 | 27 250 | 13.36%
1940 | 26 547 | -2.57%
1941 | 28 446 | 7.15%
1942 | 27 016 | -5.02%
1943 | 27 672 | 2.42%
1944 | 28 376 | 2.54%
1945 | 11 726 | -58.67%
(Maddison 2003: 50).
During Austria’s deflationary depression from 1929 to 1933, real output fell by 22.45%.

3. Switzerland
Real GDP in Switzerland, 1928–1945
* in millions of international Geary-Khamis dollars
1928 | 24 609 |
1929 | 25 466 | 3.48%
1930 | 25 301 | -0.64%
1931 | 24 246 | -4.16%
1932 | 23 422 | -3.39%

1933 | 24 593 | 4.99%
1934 | 24 642 | 0.19%
1935 | 24 543 | -0.40%
1936 | 24 626 | 0.33%
1937 | 25 796 | 4.75%
1938 | 26 785 | 3.83%
1939 | 26 752 | -0.12%
1940 | 27 032 | 1.04%
1941 | 26 851 | -0.66%
1942 | 26 175 | -2.51%
1943 | 25 944 | -0.88%
1944 | 26 571 | 2.41%
1945 | 34 202 | 28.71%
(Maddison 2003: 51).
The real output loss from 1930 to 1932 was 8.02%.

4. Germany
Real GDP in Germany, 1928–1945
* in millions of international Geary-Khamis dollars
1928 | 263 367 | 4.37%
1929 | 262 284 | -0.41%
1930 | 258 602 | -1.40%
1931 | 238 893 | -7.62%
1932 | 220 916 | -7.52%

1933 | 234 778 | 6.27%
1934 | 256 220 | 9.13%
1935 | 275 496 | 7.52%
1936 | 299 753 | 8.80%
1937 | 317 783 | 6.01%
1938 | 342 351 | 7.73%
1939 | 374 577 | 9.41%
1940 | 377 284 | 0.72%
1941 | 401 174 | 6.33%
1942 | 406 582 | 1.34%
1943 | 414 696 | 1.99%
1944 | 425 041 | 2.49%
1945 | 302 457 | -28.84%
(Maddison 2003: 50).
The real output loss from 1929 to 1932 was 16.11%, extended over four years of depression.

5. France
Real GDP in France, 1928–1945
* in millions of international Geary-Khamis dollars
1928 | 181 912 |
1929 | 194 193 | 6.75%
1930 | 188 558 | -2.90%
1931 | 177 288 | -5.97%
1932 | 165 729 | -6.51%

1933 | 177 577 | 7.14%
1934 | 175 843 | -0.97%
1935 | 171 364 | -2.54%

1936 | 177 866 | 3.79%
1937 | 188 125 | 5.76%
1938 | 187 402 | -0.38%
1939 | 200 840 | 7.17%
1940 | 165 729 | -17.48%
1941 | 131 052 | -20.92%
1942 | 117 470 | -10.36%
1943 | 111 546 | -5.04%
1944 | 94 207 | -15.54%
1945 | 102 154 | 8.43%
(Maddison 2003: 50).
The real output loss from 1930 to 1932 was 14.65%.

6. Netherlands
Real GDP in Netherlands, 1928–1945
* in millions of international Geary-Khamis dollars
1928 | 43 921 |
1929 | 44 270 | 0.79%
1930 | 44 170 | -0.22%
1931 | 41 475 | -6.10%
1932 | 40 901 | -1.38%
1933 | 40 826 | -0.18%
1934 | 40 078 | -1.83%

1935 | 41 575 | 3.73%
1936 | 44 195 | 6.30%
1937 | 46 716 | 5.70%
1938 | 45 593 | -2.40%
1939 | 48 687 | 6.78%
1940 | 42 898 | -11.89%
1941 | 40 627 | -5.29%
1942 | 37 133 | -8.60%
1943 | 36 235 | -2.41%
1944 | 24 306 | -32.92%
1945 | 24 880 | 2.36%
(Maddison 2003: 51).
The real output loss from 1930 to 1934 was 9.46%.

7. Belgium
Real GDP in Belgium, 1927–1945
* in millions of international Geary-Khamis dollars
1927 | 38 913 |
1928 | 40 951 | 5.23%
1929 | 40 595 | -0.86%
1930 | 40 207 | -0.95%
1931 | 39 496 | -1.76%
1932 | 37 717 | -4.50%

1933 | 38 525 | 2.14%
1934 | 38 202 | -0.83%
1935 | 40 563 | 6.18%
1936 | 40 854 | 0.71%
1937 | 41 404 | 1.34%
1938 | 40 466 | -2.26%
1939 | 43 216 | 6.79%
1940 | 38 072 | -11.90%
1941 | 36 067 | -5.26%
1942 | 32 962 | -8.60%
1943 | 32 198 | -2.31%
1944 | 34 094 | 5.88%
1945 | 36 132 | 5.97%
(Maddison 2003: 50).
From 1929 to 1932, there was a real output loss of 7.89%.

8. Denmark
Real GDP in Denmark, 1928–1945
* in millions of international Geary-Khamis dollars
1928 | 16 735 |
1929 | 17 855 | 6.69%
1930 | 18 917 | 5.94%
1931 | 19 127 | 1.11%
1932 | 18 625 | -2.62%
1933 | 19 220 | 3.19%
1934 | 19 804 | 3.03%
1935 | 20 247 | 2.23%
1936 | 20 749 | 2.47%
1937 | 21 251 | 2.41%
1938 | 21 765 | 2.41%
1939 | 22 803 | 4.76%
1940 | 19 606 | -14.0%
1941 | 17 668 | -9.88%
1942 | 18 065 | 2.24%
1943 | 20 061 | 11.04%
1944 | 22 161 | 10.46%
1945 | 20 493 | -7.52%
(Maddison 2003: 50).
Denmark’s real GDP loss was just 2.62% in 1932.

9. Norway
Real GDP in Norway, 1928–1945
* in millions of international Geary-Khamis dollars
1928 | 8 879
1929 | 9 705 | 9.30%
1930 | 10 421 | 7.37%
1931 | 9 613 | -7.75%
1932 | 10 255 | 6.67%
1933 | 10 500 | 2.38%
1934 | 10 837 | 3.20%
1935 | 11 302 | 4.29%
1936 | 11 993 | 6.11%
1937 | 12 422 | 3.57%
1938 | 12 734 | 2.51%
1939 | 13 339 | 4.75%
1940 | 12 152 | -8.89%
1941 | 12 446 | 2.41%
1942 | 11 963 | -3.88%
1943 | 11 724 | -1.99%
1944 | 11 112 | -5.22%
1945 | 12 452 | 12.05%
(Maddison 2003: 51).
In 1931 there was a real output loss of 7.75%.

Now Norway abandoned the gold standard in 1931 and implemented a loose and stimulative monetary policy, helping banks and apparently preventing financial collapse. A severe and prolonged deflation was avoided and moderate inflation resulted. This must have averted a debt deflationary collapse (though I do not know to what extent excessive private debt was an issue in the Norwegian economy). The end to the gold standard also allowed a currency depreciation, which stimulated export-led growth and import substitution.

Ole Colbjørnsen and the economist Ragnar Frisch proposed a strongly Keynesian policy to revive the Norwegian economy around 1933-1934, but I do not know to what extent it was actually implemented.

Some quick research seems to indicate that from 1935 under Johan Nygaardsvold the Norwegian government engaged in some mild Keynesian fiscal stimulus, though other economists deny this.

Apparently, the Nygaardsvold government did implement welfare measures and the economy revived from export-led growth (to a considerable extent driven by German demand for Norwegian goods) after 1935.

Although government spending rose, it appears to have been covered by tax increases. One suggestion has been that tax policy took in a certain amount of money that was not being spent on capital goods investment or consumption, and hence that government spending was stimulative to some degree, but other scholars dispute this:
“There was a significant growth in the public sector. However, this increase was levelled out by higher taxes. Thus, in this respect, the net effect on demand was neutral. On the other hand, the marginal propensities to consume and save differed from the public to the private sector. Empirical evidence from Norway reflects that the marginal propensity to consume was higher in the public sector than in the private. Thus, [ceteris paribus] ... the relative growth in the public sector had a positive impact on demand. Nevertheless, due to budget discipline and moderate multiplier effects the fiscal policy in Norway under the Labour Party rule in the 1930s was neutral. In sum, fiscal policy seems to have played a minor, if any, role for the relative good performance of the Nordic economies during the 1930s.”

Ola Honningdal Grytten, “Why was the Great Depression not so Great in the Nordic Countries? Economic Policy and Unemployment,” p. 18.
Moreover, the data indicates that Norway had a serious unemployment problem right up to the war:
Unemployment in Norway
Year | Unemployment Rate

1927 | 8.9%
1928 | 7.9%
1929 | 7.0%
1930 | 7.0%
1931 | 10.2%
1932 | 10.6%
1933 | 10.8%
1934 | 10.3%
1935 | 9.9%
1936 | 8.7%
1937 | 7.3%
1938 | 6.8%
1939 | 5.7%
Ola Honningdal Grytten, “Why was the Great Depression not so Great in the Nordic Countries? Economic Policy and Unemployment,” p. 13.
So overall one would have to say that government intervention added recovery to some extent (via monetary policy and banking stabilisation), but also international trade helped. Fiscal stimulus was either too mild or just neutral: it needed to be much larger.

10. Sweden
Real GDP in Sweden, 1928–1945
* in millions of international Geary-Khamis dollars
1928 | 22 293 |
1929 | 23 651 | 6.09%
1930 | 24 138 | 2.05%
1931 | 23 268 | -3.60%
1932 | 22 641 | -2.69%

1933 | 23 076 | 1.92%
1934 | 24 834 | 7.61%
1935 | 26 418 | 6.37%
1936 | 27 949 | 5.79%
1937 | 29 272 | 4.73%
1938 | 29 759 | 1.66%
1939 | 31 813 | 6.90%
1940 | 30 873 | -2.95%
1941 | 31 395 | 1.69%
1942 | 33 309 | 6.09%
1943 | 34 789 | 4.44%
1944 | 35 972 | 3.40%
1945 | 36 947 | 2.71%
(Maddison 2003: 51).
From 1931 to 1932, there was a real output loss of 6.20%.

11. Finland
Real GDP in Finland, 1928–1945
* in millions of international Geary-Khamis dollars
1928 | 9 194 |
1929 | 9 302 | 1.17%
1930 | 9 194 | -1.16%
1931 | 8 970 | -2.43%
1932 | 8 932 | -0.42%

1933 | 9 526 | 6.65%
1934 | 10 606 | 11.33%
1935 | 11 059 | 4.27%
1936 | 11 807 | 6.76%
1937 | 12 478 | 5.68%
1938 | 13 123 | 5.16%
1939 | 12 561 | -4.28%
1940 | 11 909 | -5.19%
1941 | 12 299 | 3.27%
1942 | 12 337 | 0.30%
1943 | 13 756 | 11.50%
1944 | 13 762 | 0.04%
1945 | 12 963 | -5.80%
(Maddison 2003: 50).
Real GDP loss from 1930 to 1932 was 3.97%.

12. United Kingdom
Real GDP in the UK, 1928–1945
* in millions of international Geary-Khamis dollars
1928 | 244 160 |
1929 | 251 348 | 2.94%
1930 | 249 551 | -0.71%
1931 | 236 747 | -5.13%

1932 | 238 544 | 0.75%
1933 | 245 507 | 2.91%
1934 | 261 680 | 6.58%
1935 | 271 788 | 3.86%
1936 | 284 142 | 4.54%
1937 | 294 025 | 3.47%
1938 | 297 619 | 1.22%
1939 | 300 539 | 0.98%
1940 | 330 638 | 10.01%
1941 | 360 737 | 9.10%
1942 | 369 721 | 2.49%
1943 | 377 807 | 2.18%
1944 | 362 983 | -3.92%
1945 | 347 035 | -4.39%
(Maddison 2003: 51).
Real GDP loss from 1930 to 1931 was 5.80%.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bukey, E. B. 2000. Hitler’s Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938–1945. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

Gerlich, P. and D. Campbell, 2000. “Austria: From Compromise to Authoritarianism,” in D. Berg-Schlosser and J. Mitchell (eds). The Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919–39: Systematic Case Studies. Macmillan, Basingstoke. 40–58.

Grytten, Ola Honningdal. “Why was the Great Depression not so Great in the Nordic Countries? Economic Policy and Unemployment,” online.

Kirk, Tim. 2002. Nazism and the Working Class in Austria: Industrial Unrest and Political Dissent in the National Community. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Maddison, Angus. 1982. Phases of Capitalist Development. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Maddison, Angus. 2003. The World Economy: Historical Statistics. OECD Publishing, Paris.


Thursday, March 22, 2012

Ireland Returns to Recession: The Failure of Austerity

It is now official: Ireland has slipped back into recession with a 0.2% fall in GDP in the last quarter of 2011. In Q3 2011, GDP contracted 1.1%, so we now have two consecutive periods of contraction: the official definition of a recession.

But it gets worse. In Q4 2011, Irish GNP (probably a better measure of real national output in Ireland’s case) slumped by a shocking 2.2%.

The reason is that exports have fallen, along with the Eurozone problems. Most of the growth Ireland has had since 2010 has been based on exports.

You can see the record of Ireland’s quarterly GDP here:
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ireland/gdp-growth
From 2008 to 2009, Ireland suffered a depression, both in terms of its GDP decline (10.1%) and its GNP contraction (14.1%) (a depression is technically a fall in the value of real output exceeding 10%). Of the 16 quarters from Q1 2008 (when the global recession hit), Ireland has had but 4 quarters of positive GDP growth. A miserable performance.

Meanwhile unemployment is at 14.2%, and has been stagnating between 14.2% and 14.4% ever since the middle of 2011.

Another development (seen in other nations like Estonia and Latvia that have gone down the path of severe austerity) is that people are leaving Ireland in droves, often the young and unemployed. From 2009 to 2011, some 86,000 emigrated. In 2012, some 75,000 are predicted to leave, figures higher than the last emigration surge owing to economic problems in the late 1980s. That trend can be seen in the video below, describing Irish emigration to Australia in 2011.




Lessons here are obvious: export-led growth is highly unreliable, and it is unlikely a nation will achieve robust, long-term growth by fiscal contraction and domestic wage and price deflation (especially when other nations pursue austerity), which, in any case, guts its domestic sectors.

So much for austerity, the policy prescription of fools and madmen.

Sunday, January 22, 2012

Austrian Substitutes for GDP – They are Aggregates!

How often do we hear endless nonsense from Austrians that GDP is unsound because it is an aggregate value?

And yet – astonishingly – the only serious Austrian measures of real national output proposed in place of GDP, such as Rothbard’s Gross Private Product (GPP) and Mark Skousen’s Gross Domestic Output (GDO) are nothing but aggregates!

GDP is the following:
GDP = C + I + G + (X-M).
Rothbard’s Gross Private Product is little more than GDP, with G removed. That is to say, Rothbard’s Gross Private Product is merely this:
GDP = C + I + (X-M).
This is an aggregate of aggregates too: the total value of final consumer goods and total value of gross investment (new housing, replacement purchases, net additions to capital assets and investments in inventories), and exports minus imports. If Rothbard’s Gross Private Product is to be taken seriously, then it must be legitimate to aggregate the value of C, I, and (X-M).

Think of C as an example: the aggregation of the sale price of consumer goods in money terms in one year must be perfectly valid and meaningful, though such goods are heterogeneous. If you could not, for example, meaningfully aggregate the value of sales of heterogeneous goods in one year for a firm, how could a firm calculate its total income from sales?

Now gross investment is, as I have said, new housing, replacement purchases, net additions to capital assets and investments in inventories. Obviously, these goods are heterogeneous, and not all capital goods investments in one year will lead to a profit in the future, but you can still aggregate the sale price of these new capital goods bought (or value of new capital goods added into the capital stock). Rothbard’s Gross Private Product requires gross investment.

Government spending (G) is (1) final consumption expenditure by government and (2) government gross capital formation (infrastructure investment or research spending). Government expenditures that are transfers of money (social security payments, pensions, etc.) are transfer payments. Transfer payments are not included in government purchases. Rothbard’s Gross Private Product removes income originating in government and government enterprises.

Mark Skousen appeals to “Gross Output (GO)” – which is intermediate input plus GDP – as a more accurate measure of national output. In The Structure of Production (1990), Skousen attempted to create a new output statistic: Gross Domestic Output (GDO), as his “Austrian” alternative to GDP. However, he seems to regard Gross Output (GO) as an acceptable version of this, and Gross Output (GO) is nothing but an official Commerce department aggregate measure of output that aggregates GDP and the value of intermediate input (or what Skousen calls the “goods-in-process sector of the economy,” including commodity factor inputs, manufacturing, and wholesale stages of production).

Now, if GDP is not a meaningful or valid measure of output, how could Skousen’s Gross Output (GO) be meaningful or valid? The answer is: it couldn’t, and Gross Output can only be meaningful, if we also accept the meaningful nature of GDP.

Without a measure of the value or volume of real output, most attempts by any type of economist (Austrians included) to analyse an economy collapse: for how could you know whether Keynesian stimulus or Austrian liquidationism have the effects allegedly claimed for them, without looking at real output in some aggregate form? How could you even know whether the economy is in a recession or an expansionary phase?

Appendix

Robert Batemarco (1987) discusses Rothbard’s Gross Private Product, and on p. 183 gives a table of US GNP and Gross Private Product for the period 1947-1983.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Batemarco, R. 1987. “GNP, PPR, and the Standard of Living,” Review of Austrian Economics 1: 181-186.

Skousen, Mark. 1990. The Structure of Production, New York University Press, New York and London.

Skousen, Mark, 2001. “Beyond GDP: A Breakthrough in National Income Accounting,” Mskousen.com, April 1, 2001
http://www.mskousen.com/2001/04/beyond-gdp-a-breakthrough-in-national-income-accounting/

Wednesday, September 15, 2010

Ireland’s Sham Recovery: GNP versus GDP

Ireland’s GDP growth of 2.66% in Q1 2010 needs some analysis. Technically, Ireland is out of recession, but does this prove that austerity is the path to robust growth?

It has to be stressed that one really needs to look at Irish GNP as well as GDP to get the whole picture about Ireland. GNP strips out the part of GDP that includes factor flows to foreigners, and in particular profit repatriation to foreigners. In other words, GNP gives a measure of the value of goods and services produced in a country that is earned by domestic institutions and individuals, and can be expressed in this way:

GNP = GDP + net foreign factor income.

Factor income is equal to the earnings on foreign investments minus payments made to foreign investors, and is a component of the current account.(1)

Although GNP and GDP are calculated differently and are different measures of national income, for many countries GDP tends to be very similar to GNP, with no significant difference (see “Output Volatility: GDP v. GNP”). However, there is a set of countries where this is not the case, and Ireland is in that set (for the figures on Irish GDP versus GNP, see here).

Professor Bill Mitchell has given an outstanding analysis of the actual situation in Ireland (Bill Mitchell, “The Celtic Tiger is not a good example,” Billyblog, July 5th, 2010). He demonstrates that Ireland’s GNP continues to plunge and fell by 0.5% in Q1 2010, even though GDP growth in Q1 2010 was 2.66%.

On the basis of the GNP figures, Ireland is still in recession. Moreover, since one definition of a depression is a fall in the value of output exceeding 10%, it is probably more accurate to say that in 2009 Ireland entered a depression both in terms of its GDP decline (10.1%) and its GNP contraction (14.1%) since 2008 (for figures, see here).

Irish GDP growth in Q1 2010 was mainly driven by exports, but the problem is that most of Ireland’s internationally-oriented export sector is foreign-owned.

This means that the foreign-owned sector recovered, while the domestic economy declined or stagnated (see “Irish Economy: No exit from recession in Q1 2010,” June 30, 2010).

It can also be noted that Ireland – just like Germany and other Eurozone nations – has benefited from the weaker Euro in export markets. But this surge in exports partly caused by Euro depreciation has nothing to do with Ireland’s austerity.

As Bill Mitchell has argued:

There are over 600 American companies with major operations in Ireland. As the Euro depreciates Ireland’s exports (pharmaceuticals, software, food and services) are increasingly cheaper and more attractive to its two major trading partners Britain and the US.

Bill Mitchell, “The Celtic Tiger is not a good example,” Billyblog, July 5th, 2010.

But both the UK and the US have had Keynesian stimulus, so even here the demand for Irish exports must have been influenced by, and related to, the Keynesian stimulus measures taken in both the US and the UK to increase aggregate demand. If the US and the UK had both pursued brutal austerity, would their imports of Irish goods have been significantly reduced? Undoubtedly, they would have been, and Ireland’s growth in Q1 would no doubt have suffered as well.

Yet again we can see that export-led growth in Ireland, as in the case of Germany in Q2 2010, has been influenced by global Keynesianism.

The truth about Ireland is that its domestic economy continues to decline, and that the profits earned by its foreign-owned export sector are – as you would expect – flowing to foreigners and not increasing domestic Irish GNP or per capita GNP. The most devastating proof of how misleading the GDP figures are is that Ireland’s unemployment rate continues to rise.

The most recent news is that estimated unemployment in August has risen to 13.8%, as compared with 12.9% in Q1 2010 (see “Irish recovery stutters as retail falls,” September 1, 2010).

Since unemployment in Ireland was 4.3% in 2007 when the recession struck, the Irish unemployment rate has soared by a shocking 220.93% since 2007 (for figures, see here).

Even if we take the worst estimates of US unemployment as calculated by John Williams of Shadowstats, the US unemployment rate rose from about 12% in 2007 to about 22% today, an increase of about 83.33% (for the figures, see here), which, while certainly very bad indeed, is nowhere near as bad as Ireland in terms of the percentage increase.

One has to ask: if austerity Irish-style is the path to recovery, then where are the new jobs and employment? Where is the growth in GNP? Where is the domestic growth?

Another consequence of the austerity and contraction is that thousands of young, skilled men and women are leaving the country in droves (see Liz Alderman, “In Ireland, a Picture of the High Cost of Austerity,” New York Times, June 28, 2010).

So apparently the path to prosperity in Ireland is: 13.8% unemployment, a 14% contraction in GNP since 2008, and a brain drain.

If this is what austerity brings, the argument for it is poor indeed.

UPDATE ON IRELAND
23 September 2010

Figures for GDP growth in Q2 2010 have just come out.
So what has happened?
Irish GNP (the real measure of the domestic economy) has fallen by 0.3% in Q2 and GDP has fallen by 1.2%:

Larry Elliott, "Irish economy faces double dip recession," Guardian, 23 September 2010.

Even with its austerity Ireland has no confidence from the markets: the Irish credit default swap rate has risen to 5% and yields on the 10-year bond have soared.

Moreover, the growth in Q1 2010 has been revised downward from 2.7% to 2.2%.

Perhaps the hapless advocates of austerity will complain that the cuts just weren’t large enough…

Meanwhile for those of us in the real world, we have yet more confirmation of the stupidity of austerity.


FOOTNOTES

(1) Note that the current account = balance of trade (exports - imports) + factor income (earnings on foreign investments - payments made to foreign investors) + cash transfers.

Saturday, July 3, 2010

Is GDP Meaningless?

The truly strange idea that GDP is “meaningless” seems quite prevalent. The idea is seen frequently on the Cynicus Economicus blog.

Are we really to believe that GDP literally has no “meaning”? To think so, one would seriously have to argue that GDP
(1) lacks any significance;
(2) is without use or value, and
(3) contains nothing of substance which can be agreed or disagreed with.
Unfortunately for those who believe this, the idea that GDP is “meaningless” is utterly ludicrous.

First, what is GDP? GDP equals private consumption + gross investment + government spending + (exports − imports).

GDP is a measure of the value of a country’s overall economic output or national income in terms of output. It can also be defined as “the market value of all final goods and services made within the borders of a country in a year.”

One objection that people have is that GDP is “fake” because it supposedly measures “consumption on imported products as national income.” But these people are actually clueless about what GDP actually is. In fact, by definition, the value of imported goods in the trade deficit is subtracted from GDP whether they were bought in consumption, investment or by government spending, and the resulting measure of GDP leaves us with the value of all domestic goods and services. Thus GDP is national income minus imports in the trade deficit. The value of the remaining imports is paid for by earnings on exports, so one can hardly complain that this is based on debt.

Now to the idea that GDP is “meaningless.” If this were really the case, then an immediate consequence is the components of GDP are also meaningless.

We can start with exports minus imports. Does the total value of UK exports “lack any significance” or have “no use”? The earnings from exports are a fundamental source of income through foreign exchange for a country. The total value of money spent on imports also shows how much a country is consuming from overseas. And are we to say that establishing whether or not a country has a trade deficit or surplus (i.e., exports – imports) “lacks any significance”? Clearly it does not. It is a fundamental measure of trade balance. People who regard current account deficits as a form of “living beyond one’s means” are clearly directly dependent on a major component of GDP to establish whether a country has a trade deficit or not. Such people cannot claim that a country is “living beyond its means” and then claim that the trade balance component of GPD is a meaningless measure because they are dependent on it themselves. Without it, they would have no justification whatsoever for their view, as they would have no knowledge at all of whether the country is in trade balance or not.

Next, let’s look at gross investment. Although gross investment includes spending on housing, it excludes spending on financial assets or financial instruments. Thus by definition it excludes the second major type of economic activity that causes debt-fuelled bubble growth. Although much housing is funded with debt, it at least provides a real asset that is of use to the community that can be resold as a benefit to other people. That overinvestment in housing through debt was a major factor in distorting economies over the last 20 years is undeniable. But, with orderly deleveraging and a proper correction in prices, the houses themselves are real assets that will make the community wealthier, not poorer. There is no sense in which the housing construction component of GDP “lacks any significance.” It might have been funded by excessive private debt, but this is saying something quite different from the former statement about GDP. Moreover, gross investment also includes replacement purchases, net additions to capital assets and investments in inventories. Thus gross investment includes new spending in capital goods, production facilities and factories. These are fundamental parts of the productive sector of the economy allowing it to engage in production. The belief that a measure of this “lacks any meaning” is utterly absurd. It can tell you a great deal about how much investment there is in real productive capacity in an economy (one criticism of gross investment is that it does not take account of the cost of depreciation. But this limitation is well known, and hardly makes the measure “without significance or value”).

Private consumption is the total value of private household final consumption expenditure, including durable goods, non-durable goods, and services. But it also excludes home purchases. It is here that critics complain that GDP is meaningless, because over the past two decades an increasing part of it has been financed by private debt. On the contrary, a measure of the value of private consumption allows us to calculate the extent to which consumption is being increased by private debt. Far from being meaningless or without significance, this is a crucial indicator of the health of the economy. Excessive private debt is a serious problem, but you can only know how serious by calculating GDP and looking at the annual increase in private debt. One can complain that consumption is excessive because of too much private debt, but this does not make the total value of private consumption “meaningless.” It obviously has a great deal of significance.

Lastly, we come to government spending. This is the component of GDP that anti-government advocates of free markets object to. Their objections are usually justified with the a priori belief that government spending is never productive or beneficial. However, if you reject their a priori premise that government is bad, then there is no reason why government spending should not be included in GDP. Government provides fundamental things like basic R&D for science, education, health care, and public infrastructure – all things of use to the community. For example, our public infrastructure and transportation systems are the foundation of economic life.

The second argument against counting government spending in GDP is that sometimes it is based on public debt. This commits the fallacy of equating public debt with private debt. But public debt is wholly different from private sector debt, for these reasons:
(1) the government is the monopoly issuer of its own currency; no private individual can print money;

(2) if necessary, the government can monetise its deficit;

(3) the government has the power to rollover much of its debt, unlike private individuals;

(4) the government’s central bank has the power to buy back bonds with new money and to control interest rates and bond yields if necessary, and

(5) the government has access to tax receipts which grow over time and with economic growth.
Clearly, the belief that government debt is like household debt is utterly false. It may be a “common sense” and “intuitive” idea for many people, but this is no convincing argument in its favour. For many people over the centuries, the idea that the sun revolves around the earth was a “common sense” and “intuitive” belief. But that “belief” couldn’t be more wrong. The same thing applies to the belief that governments are like private households.

Consequently, the government spending component of GDP is meaningful.

On the other hand, there are legitimate criticisms of GDP that can be made. For example, that GDP takes no account of inequality of wealth and does not measure unpaid work. In developing countries where monetary exchanges are much less significant (e.g., where barter still has a place), GDP underestimates economic activity. In cases where economic activity involves repairing damage or rebuilding after some destructive event like a natural disaster or war, GDP is boosted in a way that can be misleading. Yet another problem is that GDP neglects negative externalities, or the harmful effects of economic transactions that are not reflected in the price.

All these criticisms of GDP, however, tend to recognise that it does convey useful information, although there may be limits to how much can be learned from the measure. This is a far cry from the absurd claim that GDP has no meaning.

Appendix 1: Other Confusions about GDP

Reviewing some of the comments on the Cynicus Economicus blog, one finds other confusions about GDP. I list these comments below with responses.
as Cynicus has previously stated GDP is no longer a measure of productivity, but it is a measure of consumption, most of which is via debt spending in shops and by companies.
GDP does not measure productivity. GDP measures the value of output, or national income in terms of output, as some prefer to say. You measure productivity by productivity indices.
Moreover, GDP includes a measure of gross investment (e.g., fixed capital investment), takes account of earnings from exports, and a good deal of government spending in R&D and education can be considered as investment as well. It is not possible to say that GDP is just “a measure of consumption.” Although consumption is clearly part of it, much of this consumption is also national income, spent on domestically-produced goods and services.
and you fail to acknowledge that consumer debt spending on imported goods is also measured in GDP of national income when clearly it is not.
This is false. As I have noted above, GDP is national income in terms of domestic goods and services, and by definition all imported goods in the trade deficit are subtracted from GDP whether they were bought in consumption, investment or by government spending.

Appendix 2: Total US Domestic Spending and Investment Minus Total Imports

As noted above, GDP subtracts the value of the trade deficit. The means to pay for imports not part of the trade deficit come from earnings from exports.

But one can also calculate the value of total US domestic public and private spending and investment minus total imports (= TDSI). To do this we would remove the value of exports from the calculation of GDP as below:

private consumption + gross investment + government spending – imports = TDSI.

Some basic figures (in 2009 US dollars):

US GDP: $14.26 trillion (2009 est.)
US Exports: $1.571 trillion (2009 est.)
US Imports – $1.946 trillion (2009 est.)
US trade deficit = 0. 3749 trillion (2009 est.).

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/2009pr/final_revisions/exh1.txt

The formula we need to work from is here:
GDP = private consumption + gross investment + government spending + (exports − imports).
So in 2009 US private consumption + gross investment + government spending = $14.6349 trillion (which is GDP + the trade deficit).

US imports were $1.946 trillion (2009 est.).

Therefore total US domestic public and private spending and investment minus total imports is as follows:

14.6349 – 1.946 = $12.6889.

Therefore the total value of all US domestic spending and investment minus total imports was $12.6889 trillion.

This means that 88.98% of US GDP was actually private or public spending or investment on US domestic goods and services. That means that the vast majority of GDP was not due to imports at all.

If you seriously believe that GDP is a “worthless” measure because it includes consumption of foreign imports, then it is not difficult to calculate that the actual size of the US economy once imports are subtracted is $12.6889 trillion.