Showing posts with label Joan Robinson. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Joan Robinson. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 11, 2015

Joan Robinson on Marx’s Labour Theory of Value: A Few Points

Joan Robinson’s An Essay on Marxian Economics (1966) is her extended analysis and critique of Marxism, and this should be of great interest to Post Keynesians given Robinson’s role in developing Post Keynesian theory.

Some quick points:
(1) Although she finds some value in Marx, her condemnation of the labour theory of value is nevertheless fairly harsh: Robinson calls the labour theory of value a Marxist “incantation” and compares it to witchcraft (Robinson 1966: 22).

(2) Robinson (1966: 10) notes the contradictions between volume 1 and volume 3 of Capital, just as Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk did in his much earlier critique of Marx (Böhm-Bawerk 1896 = Böhm-Bawerk 1949: 3–120). Of the two theories of value, Robinson preferred Marx’s exposition in volume 3 of Capital, which was a rather more intricate formulation than the “simple dogmatism” of volume 1 (Robinson 1966: 10).

(3) Robinson, like other commentators, noted that Marx needed to reduce all heterogeneous human labour to a meaningful homogenous unit (Robinson 1966: 12), but this actually “leaves open the problem of assessing labour of different degrees of skill in terms of a unit of ‘simple labour’” (Robinson 1966: 19). This is also exactly the point I have made too. There is a severe aggregation problem here that is never adequately explained by Marxists.

(4) If individual commodity prices were directly equal to labour value (and all labour were paid a wage rate commensurate to the socially-necessary labour time of each worker), then the aggregate output prices would equal the aggregate value of labour. But the problem is that there are different organic compositions of capital throughout the economy (Robinson 1966: 15). But, as Robinson notes, by volume 3 it is conceded by Marx that the rate of exploitation is different in different industries and relative prices do not correspond to values (Robinson 1966: 15). It follows, Robinson concludes, that Marx’s theory cannot provide any theory of price determination (Robinson 1966: 17).

(5) Robinson points out that, since machines can make labour more productive, Marx’s saying that only labour produces value is a silly verbal game (Robinson 1966: 18).
In short, even one of the most influential founders of Post Keynesianism noted that contradiction between the theories of value in volume 1 and volume 3 of Capital, and the other problems and dogmas of Marxism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Böhm-Bawerk, Eugen von. 1949. “Karl Marx and the Close of His System,” in Paul. M. Sweezy (ed.), Karl Marx and the Close of His System and Böhm-Bawerk’s Criticism of Marx. August M. Kelley, New York. 3–120.

Robinson, Joan. 1966. An Essay on Marxian Economics (2nd edn.). Macmillan, London.

Friday, April 25, 2014

Joan Robinson on the Weimar Hyperinflation

Joan Robinson’s review of Costantino Bresciani-Turroni’s The Economics of Inflation (The Economic Journal 48.191 [1938]: 507–513) contains Robinson’s views on the causes of the Weimar hyperinflation.

In essence, there are three major explanations of Weimar hyperinflation, as follows:
(1) the standard “quantity theory of money” explanation, which was sometimes called the “English” or “Allied” view. An influential statement of this view was Bresciani-Turroni (1937), and it assumes that money supply is exogenous;

(2) the “balance of payments theory” or what was called the “German” view. This explanation was pursued by Williams (1922), and Graham (1930) is considered by some to hold to some form of it;

(3) a Post Keynesian “balance of payments” theory but emphasising endogenous money and wage and price versus foreign-exchange spirals.

Joan Robinson (1938) formulated this on the basis of the earlier “balance of payments” view.
First, it is necessary to stress what the argument is not about. The argument is not about whether money supply exploded in Weimar Germany or whether the Weimar government ran a huge budget deficit in 1923 that was funded by central bank money creation (or monetising of the deficit).

These things are true.

Nor, as far as I can see, do Post Keynesians dispute that a sustained general increase in prices or hyperinflation requires a growing money stock to sustain it.

But, while a money supply expansion is a necessary condition for this, what is being disputed is whether exogenous money creation was the primary causal factor. The alternative view is that money creation can be seen largely as endogenous and a type of intermediate, though necessary, cause driven by other factors.

The “balance of payments theory” argues that the severe depreciation of the German mark was the fundamental causal factor in the hyperinflation, and that in turn was driven by the burden of the reparations imposed on Germany.

We can see how the Post Keynesian view contradicts the “quantity theory” view by looking at how both sides understand the causality involved in the hyperinflation.

If one accepts the “quantity theory” view and assumes an exogenous money supply, then the chain of causality runs as follows:
exogenous money supply → price inflation → the exchange rate depreciation.
The Post Keynesian view rejects this, and the depreciation of the mark is seen as the fundamental causal mechanism.

So under the Post Keynesian “balance of payments” view, then, the chain of causality runs as follows:
the exchange rate depreciation → price and wage inflation → inflation of money supply.
How does Robinson’s review fit into this?

First, Robinson noted that the facts seem to support the “balance of payments view”: the severe inflation that hit Germany in the later half of 1921 was preceded by the severe depreciation in the exchange value of the mark from May 1921 to November 1921 when the German government began paying large cash reparations payments (Robinson 1938: 507–508).

Of course, one has to demonstrate the causal mechanisms involved in this and look for further empirical evidence in support of it, and Robinson points to this:
“If the impulse comes from the side of the exchange, we should expect the fall in exchange to run ahead of the rise in prices, and the prices of traded goods to run ahead of home prices. This is precisely what occurred, the magnitude and speed of change being in this order: exchange, import prices, export prices, home prices, cost-of-living, wages. Moreover, the geographical diffusion of prices supports the argument, the movement spreading from the great ports and commercial centres to the interior of the country.” (Robinson 1938: 508).
Next, Robinson notes that the proponents of the “quantity theory” explanation of the hyperinflation like Bresciani-Turroni argued that this cannot be the case, because the tendency to balance of payments equilibrium would have prevented this, and that it was the German budget deficit financed by Reichsbank money creation that was the primary cause of the hyperinflation (Robinson 1938: 509).

But Robinson notes that the actual German government budget deficit was falling in 1921 and 1922: in 1920 the deficit was 6 billion gold marks, in 1921 it was 3.7 billion gold marks, and in 1922 2.4 billion (Robinson 1938: 509). Although Robinson concedes it had a role, nevertheless both the “quantity theory” view and the former “balance of payments theory” view had neglected an important missing link in the cause of the hyperinflation:
“The missing item is not far to seek. It is the rise in money wages. Neither exchange depreciation nor a budget deficit can account for inflation by itself. But if the rise in money wages is brought into the story, the part which each plays can be clearly seen. With the collapse of the mark in 1921, import prices rose abruptly, dragging home prices after them. The sudden rise in the cost of living led to urgent demands for higher wages. Unemployment was low …, profits were rising with prices, and the German workers were faced with starvation. Wage rises had to be granted. Rising wages, increasing both home costs and home money incomes, counteracted the effect of exchange depreciation in stimulating exports and restricting imports. Each rise in wages, therefore, precipitated a further fall in the exchange rate, and each fall in the exchange rate called forth a further rise in wages. This process became automatic when wages began to be paid on a cost-of-living basis … . Thus … [Bresciani-Turroni’s] contention that the collapse of the mark cannot have caused the inflation, because the exchange rate will always find an equilibrium level, is deprived of all force as soon as the rise of money wages is allotted its proper role. ….

Without rising money wages, inflation cannot occur, and whatever starts a violent rise in money wages starts inflation.” (Robinson 1938: 510).
To the extent that the Reichsbank met the demand for high-powered money and loans from the private sector as wages and prices soared and there were also both official and unofficial “supplementary currencies” improvised during the course of the hyperinflation to meet demand for money (Robinson 1938: 511), then the explosion in the money supply was endogenous to a great extent.

If one regards the Reichsbank’s money creation to finance the German budget deficits and especially the huge deficit of 1923 as “exogenous” money creation, then the continuance of hyperinflation was dependent on both endogenous and exogenous money creation: this is what “allowed it to continue” (Robinson 1938: 511). Robinson also conceded that the very large German budget deficit of 1923 also had a role in the hyperinflation (Robinson 1938: 510).*

But even these observations do not lessen the role of (1) the exchange rate depreciation as the fundamental and primary causal driver of the hyperinflation and (2) the significant role that endogenous money creation played in the explosion of the money supply.

Addendum
To gauge the role of the German government budget deficits in the period from 1919 to 1923, we can look at this graph below of German government spending and tax revenue (in billions of gold marks) (from Eichengreen 1995: 138, Table 5.1).


As we can see, the hyperinflation was accompanied by a disastrous collapse of tax revenues, especially in 1923 when the deficit widened considerably. Government spending actually fell in 1922 and only rose slightly in 1923. The major cause of the massive budget deficit in 1923, then, was tax revenue collapse, not massive increases in government spending.

Another point is that budget deficits in 1919 and 1920 were very large, but inflation did not spiral out of control in these years even though it did rise appreciably (as seen in the second graph below). If such large budget deficits were the primary cause of hyperinflation, then why did it not begin earlier in 1919 or 1920? Why did it spiral out of control only after the currency depreciation?



Note
* And we can note that Joan Robinson (1938: 510), far from being some unreasonable dogmatist, was perfectly prepared to concede that excessively large budget deficits in periods of very low unemployment can initiate inflations, and that it is “even possible that an increase in the quantity of money might start an inflation” (Robinson 1938: 511), though that was not the primary cause of German hyperinflation.

Further Reading
There is an excellent analysis of the hyperinflation here by Matias Vernengo:

Matias Vernengo, “Inflation, Hyperinflation and Monetarist Perceptions about the Functioning of the Economy,” Naked Keynesianism, Monday, March 24, 2014.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bresciani-Turroni, Costantino. 1937. The Economics of Inflation: A Study of Currency Depreciation in Post-War Germany (trans. Millicent E. Sayers), Allen & Unwin, London.

De Grauwe, P. and Polan, M. 2005. “Is Inflation Always and Everywhere a Monetary Phenomenon?,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 107: 239–259.

Eichengreen, Barry J. 1995. “The Legacy of Hyperinflation,” in Barry J. Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939. Oxford University Press, New York. 125–151.

Graham, Frank Dunstone. 1967 [1930]. Exchange, Prices, and Production in Hyperinflation: Germany, 1920–1923. Russell, New York.

Robinson, Joan. 1938. Review of The Economics of Inflation by C. Bresciani-Turroni, The Economic Journal 48.191: 507–513.

Williams, John H. 1922. “German Foreign Trade and Reparations Payments,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 36: 482–503.

Wednesday, March 12, 2014

Robinson on Marshall on Diminishing Marginal Utility

John Robinson quotes Alfred Marshall on the law of diminishing marginal utility:
“The marginal utility of a thing to anyone diminishes with every increase in the amount of it he already has.

There is however an implicit condition in this law which should be made clear. It is that we do not suppose time to be allowed for any alteration in the character or tastes of the man himself. It is therefore no exception to the law that the more good music a man hears, the stronger is his taste for it likely to become; that avarice and ambition are often insatiable; or that the virtue of cleanliness and the vice of drunkenness alike grow on what they feed upon. For in such cases our observations range over some period of time; and the man is not the same at the beginning as at the end of it. If we take a man as he is, without allowing time for any change in his character, the marginal utility of a thing to him diminishes steadily with every increase in his supply of it.”
Marshall, Principles of Economics (8th edn.), 1920.
http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP11.html
Robinson notes that this restriction makes testing of the law of diminishing marginal utility rather difficult (Robinson 1964: 50): for how do we know preferences did not change from one time to the next when a person consumes the same good?

Marshall’s requirement of no “alteration in the character or tastes” of the person supposedly subject to the law of diminishing marginal utility is akin to the ceteris paribus assumption of the law of demand: what we have here is a restriction that, as noted by Hans Albert, comes to immunise the law against empirical testing, and effectively renders it an analytic a priori proposition, which is true merely by definition.

For example, if a person becomes serially addicted to an arcade game after the first game, and appears to derive greater utility from each successive computer game (as he does better at it), then this appears to be an exception to the law of diminishing marginal utility.

But presumably if Marshall lived today he would say that the new addiction altered the man’s “character or tastes” so that he is a different person from the one who played the first game: therefore the law of diminishing marginal utility is not violated.

But now the law has become effectively immune to any testing and a tautologous statement.

And, furthermore, since time must always intervene between one purchase of a good and an additional purchase of the same good, one must wonder how anyone at all can be known to have the same character, tastes or preferences over time given that, technically speaking, even a small or minute change in the latter qualities would render them unstable, under Marshall’s view.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Marshall, Alfred. 1920. Principles of Economics (8th edn.). Macmillan and Co., Ltd. London.

Robinson, Joan. 1964. Economic Philosophy. Penguin, Harmondsworth.

Monday, March 3, 2014

Joan Robinson on the Quantity Theory of Money

Joan Robinson (1970) is a short but perceptive paper on the quantity theory of money and its problems.

First, consider the equation of exchange:
The Equation of Exchange: MV = PT,
where
M = quantity of money;
V = velocity of circulation;
P = general price level, and
T = total number of transactions.
Is T to include (1) all transactions in, say, a year or (2) only those that are connected with real GDP? (Robinson 1970: 504). The Cambridge Cash Balance equation remedies the confusion, and P is an index of prices suitably constructed as appropriate to the type of transactions in T (Robinson 1970: 504). But is not new money also spent, for example, on purchases of assets on secondary financial asset markets? How does this affect the equation? (one modern economist who defends the quantity theory tries to address the problem in this talk, with a Post Keynesian critique following).

Furthermore, the quantity theory has been interpreted to mean that changes in the quantity of money produce a proportionate change in the price level (Robinson 1970: 505), something which is mostly untrue.

And then there is the fundamental problem: the direction of causation in the relationship between money supply and real output:
“The correlations to be explained [sc. in the relationship between money supply and real output] could be set out in quantity theory terms if the equation were read right-handed. Thus we might suggest that a marked rise in the level of activity is likely to be preceded by an increase in the supply of money (if M is widely defined) or in the velocity of circulation (if M is narrowly defined) because a rise in the wage bill and in borrowing for working capital is likely to precede an increase in the value of output appearing in the statistics. Or that a fall in activity sharp enough to cause losses deprives the banks of credit-worthy borrowers and brings a contraction in their position. But the tradition of Chicago consists in reading the equation from left to right. Then the observed relations are interpreted without any hypothesis at all except post hoc ergo propter hoc.

There is an unearthly, mystical element in Friedman’s thought. The mere existence of a stock of money somehow promotes expenditure. …. The general implication of Friedman’s doctrines is that money is very important, not as a symptom but as a cause of instability. …

… the essence of the quantity theory is that there is a definable and recognizable quantity, M, the movements of which have a powerful influence upon the movements of PT. In short, the whole argument of both [sc. of the two main monetarist] schools [sc. of Friedman and Henry C. Simons] consists in reading the quantity equation from left to right instead of from right to left.” (Robinson 1970: 510–511).
This has always been the severe problem with the quantity theory.

That is, in contrast to monetarist and conventional neoclassical interpretations, the fundamental causal relationship is actually running from
(1) business demand for credit (to pay for goods and labour factor inputs, whose prices may have risen against previous production periods) + demand for demand deposits

→ (2) increases in broad money

→ (3) banks’ demand for more reserves (high-powered money) when they need to clear obligations.

→ (4) the central bank creates the needed reserves.
Changes in the general price level are a highly complex result of many factors, and not some simple function of money supply.

Further Reading
“Hans Albert on the Quantity Theory of Money,” March 2, 2014.

“The Quantity Theory of Money is Wrong,” August 7, 2013.

“Some Empirical Evidence on Endogenous Money,” May 27, 2013.

“Richard Werner on ‘The Quantity Theory of Credit,’” April 13, 2013.

“Empirical Evidence on Endogenous Money,” August 10, 2013.

“The Quantity Theory of Money: A Critique,” July 18, 2010.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Robinson, Joan. 1970. “Quantity Theories Old and New: Comment,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 2.4: 504–512.

Sunday, January 1, 2012

Keynes’s Marginal Efficiency of Capital: A Mistake?

It is very interesting to note what Joan Robinson thought of Keynes’s notion of the marginal efficiency of capital:
“[sc. Keynes] made a fatal mistake in offering a quasi-long-period definition of the inducement to invest as the ‘marginal efficiency of capital’, that is, the profit that will be realised on the increment to the stock of capital that results from current investment and, still worse, identified the profitability of capital with its social utility. This was an element in the old doctrine from which he failed to escape. He had an alternative concept of the inducement to invest as the expected future return on sums of finance to be devoted to investment. Minsky (1976) points out that he did not seem to recognise the difference between the two formulations. If he had stuck to his short-period brief, he would have used only the second.” (Robinson 1979: 179–180).
I have seen other criticisms of the marginal efficiency of capital idea, on the grounds that Keynes, in developing it, failed to free himself from the neoclassical marginal productivity of capital (King 2002: 209). Keynes was also influenced by Sraffa’s own rates of interest concept (Barens and Caspari 1997: 294). In fact, Knut Wicksell’s natural interest rate concept, by one of his definitions, appears rather similar to the marginal efficiency of capital:
“The rate of interest at which the demand for loan capital and the supply of savings exactly agree, and which more or less corresponds to the expected yields on the newly created real capital, will then be the normal or natural rate. It is essentially variable. If the prospects of employment of capital become more promising, demand will increase and will at first exceed supply; interest rates will then rise as the demand from entrepreneurs contracts until a new equilibrium is reached at a slightly higher rate of interest. At the same time equilibrium must ipso facto obtain—broadly speaking, and if it is not disturbed by other causes—in the market for goods and services, so that wages and prices remain unchanged” (Wicksell 1934: 193).
The natural rate or “the expected yields on the newly created real capital” is the analogue of the marginal efficiency of capital (Uhr 1994: 94). But Keynes’s marginal efficiency of capital is arguably not a “real” concept: the marginal efficiency of capital is a rate expressed in terms of money.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barens, I. and V. Caspari, 1997. “Own-Rates of Interest and Their Relevance for the Existence of Underemployment Equilibrium Positions,” in G. C. Harcourt and P. A. Riach (eds.), A “Second Edition” of The General Theory (Vol. 1), Routledge, London. 283–303.

Harcourt, G. C. and P. A. Riach. 1997. A “Second Edition” of The General Theory (Vol. 1), Routledge, London.

King, J. E. 2002. A History of Post Keynesian Economics since 1936, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA.

Lawlow, M. S. 1994. “The Own-Rates Framework as an Interpretation of the General Theory: A Suggestion for Complication the Keynesian Theory of Money,” in J. B. Davis (ed.). The State of Interpretation of Keynes, Kluwer Academic, Boston and London. 39–90.

Robinson, J. 1979. “Garegnani on Effective Demand,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 3: 179–180.

Uhr, C. G. 1994. “Knut Wicksell – A Centennial Evaluation,” in J. Cunningham (ed.), Knut Wicksell: Critical Assessments (vol. 3), Routledge, London. 72–103.

Wicksell, K. 1934. Lectures on Political Economy (trans. E. Classen), Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

Sunday, September 4, 2011

Audio Recordings of Joan Robinson in 1974

There are a number of lectures given by the Cambridge Keynesian Joan Robinson (1903–1983) at Stanford University in May 1974 here:
Joan Robinson at Stanford, May 1974.
The quality of some of the audio is not the best, but the first lecture on “What is Wrong with Neoclassical Economics?” is of great interest.