Saturday, March 1, 2014

An Epistemological Problem for Idealists

I think this is a defensible inductive argument by analogy for the idealist who wants to propose the existence of a god or super-mind:
(1) the idealist:
We observe things directly that claim to be minds that probably have minds (e.g., people). On analogy, there might be an unobserved super-mind or super-minds that are the external cause of our perceptions of these things.
First, the inference that there may be a super-mind that is the external cause of our perceptions is a hypothesis, a thing proposed on inductive analogy.

The idealist has no direct or immediate access to the super-mind, and actually it does not even follow from his argument that there need be a single mind at all.

Actually, from the inductive analogy as above it is logically possible that the postulated cause could be:
(1) a single super-mind

(2) two single super-minds

(3) three super-minds

(4) four or more super-minds, etc.
Furthermore, once we get to very large numbers of postulated super-minds, suddenly a panpsychical idealist may propose the following analogy:
(1) the panpsychical idealist:
We observe things directly that claim to be minds that probably have minds (e.g., people) and animals that appear to have less sophisticated minds (e.g., without language). On analogy, it might be that all objects of perception are external independent minds of different types and the cause of our perceptions of these things.
Some philosophers have seriously proposed this view, and idealist panpsychism is a real view.

A variant on panpsychism is personal or pluralistic idealism which proposed many independent minds that somehow collectively generate an external mental realm with consistent ideas, but with no absolute mind (e.g., the idealism of John M. E. McTaggart, who denied that any god or absolute mind existed).

So now we must add to our list of logically possible hypotheses about minds that might be external causes of our perceptions:
(1) a single super-mind;

(2) two single super-minds;

(3) three super-minds;

(4) four or more super-minds;

(5) no super-mind or super-minds but vast numbers of external independent minds corresponding to each object of perception;

(6) there are many independent minds that collectively generate an external mental realm with consistent objects of perception, but with no absolute mind.
So what arguments can the idealist employ for defending (1) to argue it is more probable than (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6)?

I contend the preference for (1) is mainly a legacy of Western monotheism.

Why? The reason is that, when we propose or think of some greater being that is the causal origin of us, the natural way to think in our culture is a single Judeo-Christian god or some single being like it.

But that tendency to make people accept hypothesis (1) is a mere bias. For example, someone from a polytheist society might lean towards (4) when considering idealist arguments.

So what rational arguments can the idealist offer to defend (1)?

35 comments:

  1. I thought that I already dealt with this but I guess I should be clearer.

    The super-mind is a response to the question of what makes the constancy of our ideas possible. Since these ideas are constant we assume that they exist in a single vessel. If we assumed more than one vessels we would have to assume that ideas weren't constant at all and that different variations existed in different super-minds.

    Do you recognise this problem? If not, then you should because its the hypothesis of parallel universes that is sometimes used to interpret the findings of quantum physics. In this interpretation everything that can happen does happen, in different universes -- read: different super-minds.

    Do I believe in parallel universes? No. Why? Because I see no evidence that they exist. If I were transported to one ala Star Trek then I would believe in them but until I see evidence I do not.

    The reason I assume a single super-mind is the same reason you may assume a single "material universe". Or maybe you believe in many "material universes". I don't know. But this is seriously tangential to the discussion at hand.

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    1. "The super-mind is a response to the question of what makes the constancy of our ideas possible. Since these ideas are constant we assume that they exist in a single vessel. If we assumed more than one vessels we would have to assume that ideas weren't constant at all and that different variations existed in different super-minds."

      No, that doesn't follow. It is a non sequitur.

      Two or more super-minds might simply be working in concert together and by mutual agreement by create a constant set of consistent objects of perception for us. Why not??

      Are you even willing to admit that this is at least logically possible?

      Suppose, for the sake of argument, I fold totally and agree with you: yes, Philip, you've convinced me there is no good argument for an external world of matter.

      But I can construct a good inductive argument -- that is just as good as yours -- that 2 or more super-minds might be the cause of our constant objects of perception.

      Surely you are not telling me that you can prove with absolute certainty and logical necessity that there is only one super-mind that is the cause of the constant/consistent objects of perception?

      If you cannot provide an argument for the absolute certainty and logical necessity of your single super-mind hypothesis, you have to defend it inductively against your fellow idealists, and certainly against personal idealists like John M. E. McTaggart, who argue that we have no reason to believe in super-minds as all, just multiple real minds somehow generating a common set of perceptions by some process not understood.

      (Also, the hypothesis of parallel universes is not relevant here.)

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    2. **Two or more super-minds might simply be working in concert together and by mutual agreement to create ...**

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    3. No. I have never seen any evidence that two minds can merge together to produce a single stream of ideas.

      If you would like to introduce me to one of your Vulcan friends who can then mind-meld with me then I might consider such a possibility. But until I see evidence of psychic abilities and mind-melds the only reasonable hypothesis is that ideas are contained within single minds.

      We can engage in plenty of science fiction thought experiments in idealism. But you'll find that you can engage in these in materialism too. For example, we could assume two overlapping material universes producing what you call matter. Why not?

      Most of these assumptions are clearly stupid on their own terms as there is no reason for such assumptions -- i.e. there is no evidence for them. But we can certainly let our imaginations run away with us -- and that tendency is not dependent on any metaphysical worldview.

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    4. "I have never seen any evidence that two minds can merge together to produce a single stream of ideas.

      But, come on:

      (1) it is not necessary that the super-minds have to "merge" together

      (2) all that is necessary is that two or more independent powerful minds communicate and cooperate together to produce our constant perceptions, just by, e.g., division of labour.

      But there is no logical reason in theory why two entities working in agreement can't do this, e.g., share the burden: super-mind 1 takes care of our perceptions about things on earth and super-mind 2 the rest of the universe we observe.

      "Most of these assumptions are clearly stupid on their own terms as there is no reason for such assumptions -- i.e. there is no evidence for them. "

      Sure there is:

      (1) We observe things directly that claim to be minds that probably have minds (e.g., people). On analogy, there might be unobserved super-minds that are the external cause of our constant perceptions.

      (2) we observe that two minds or more can divide a task and engage in division of labour. On analogy, there might be unobserved super-minds engaged in a similar division of labour to create our consistent objects of perception.
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      This is not "stupid": it is a logically possibility, and you need some inference to the best explanation to defend one hypothesis over others.

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    5. I infer the super-mind from my experiences of my mind, my ideas and, to a lesser extent, other minds.

      I have never been given reason to believe that two minds can "work together" to produce a single idea or single stream of ideas. (This is the assumption of psychic powers).

      Therefore I have no reason to assume that a super-mind can engage in psychic interaction with another super-mind. If, however, I was given reason to believe in psychic powers between my mind and others then I might be willing to consider this possibility.

      Does all this rule out your ideas tout court? No. But I can come up with lots of this stuff. I can do so in materialist language or idealist language. It really makes very little difference. To me it is just stories. But if you want to put weight in abstractions that you have zero evidence for, be my guest.

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    6. But wait:

      "I have never been given reason to believe that two minds can "work together" to produce a single idea or single stream of ideas."

      But this is the essence of idealism!

      Look how Berkeley’s and your own arguments require that the ideas that we cannot control are literally explained by sharing in god’s own mind, like some form of telepathy or Vulcan mind meld:

      “Philonous: …. Take here in brief my meaning: - It is evident that the things I perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it be in a mind: nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived, either themselves of their archetypes, exist independently of my mind, since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to determine at pleasure what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon opening my eyes or ears: they must therefore exist in some other Mind, whose Will it is they should be exhibited to me. The things, I say, immediately perceived are ideas or sensations, call them which you will. But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by, anything but a mind or spirit? This indeed is inconceivable. And to assert that which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense: is it not?

      “ Philonous: …. but I say, the things by me perceived are known by the understanding, and produced by the will of an infinite Spirit.

      Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

      In fact, isn’t Berkeley’s view that our finite minds are in god’s mind in some sense?

      So already your idealist position – if it is the same as Berkeley’s – entails that minds can be shared to some extent and two minds can share ideas.

      So unless you can explain how we can have ideas from a super-mind without sharing in at least some of its ideas, surely your position already admits that two minds can share ideas.

      So therefore there can be no logical objection or even empirical objection (under the standard idealism theory) to the idea of two super-minds sharing ideas in common and being engaged in a division of labour to create our common ideas, by sharing certain ideas in their minds and in turn sharing them with us.

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    7. Also, you need only type :

      berkeley minds telepathy

      into Google books to see how Berkeley scholars themselves refer to his view as committing him to a type of telepathy.

      E.g., in Georges Dicker 's Berkeley's Idealism: A Critical Examination. p. 233, he says plainly Berkeley's view entails that god gives us ideas by "what can only be called 'divine telepathy'".

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    8. "If you would like to introduce me to one of your Vulcan friends who can then mind-meld with me then I might consider such a possibility. But until I see evidence of psychic abilities and mind-melds the only reasonable hypothesis is that ideas are contained within single minds."

      But can't you see the consequences of this?

      You argue that we use our normal experience to infer what might be the cause of our shared objects of perception.

      We find that humans cannot share minds or engage in telepathy, but then that would discredit the whole idealist thesis:

      (1) We observe that we cannot get direct access to anyone else's mind nor share minds. On analogy, it is unlikely there is an unobserved super-mind that has the power to share ideas or share minds with us.

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    9. This is getting terribly muddled, LK.

      Idealism posits that the super-mind imprints ideas directly on finite minds. It reasons this through inference. Because all we experience are ideas and minds then the ideas we have experience of must exist in another mind.

      But it does not follow that (a) finite minds can share ideas directly or that (b) multiple super-minds can share ideas directly.

      If you want to make the latter case you have to give me a reason why you are doing so. For example, you might show me why multiple super-minds explain the empirical phenomena we experience better than a single mind. Otherwise you are avoiding the Ockham's Razor condition of correct reasoning.

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    10. "Because all we experience are ideas and minds then the ideas we have experience of must exist in another mind."

      (1) It simply doesn't follow even if you accept the general argument, that it need be one mind.

      (2) If you argue that the "ideas we have experience of must exist in another mind", that entails that finite minds share god's/the super-mind's mind to some degree. Yes or no?

      (3) And furthermore aren't our finite minds actually being thought of by the super-mind, so that our minds are inside in some sense? Yes or no?
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      If "yes" in (2) and (3), it follows logically that the idea of sharing minds per se is not logically impossible, and you have no necessary objection to the multiple super-minds theory on that ground.

      Your only objection is inductive or inference to the best explanation, and you have not given a good one.

      In fact, all I am looking for here is a bit of humility!

      You excuse the materialists of having indefensible ideas, but look how your own theory can't even get off the ground without a good inference to the best explanation to defend the single god or super-mind theory

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    11. (2) Yes.

      (3) Depends. Berkeley believed in free will. You might prefer predestination. Again, we're going off track here.

      (4a) I accuse materialists of having EMPTY ideas. Whatever you think about mine, they are not empty.

      (4b) Again, apply Ockham's Razor: what does the multiple super-mind theory explain that the single super-mind theory does not? To me the single theory explains everything fine, so we eliminate the multiple theory until it needs be brought in to explain something that the single theory cannot explain.

      Can I be frank with you, LK? I think you're trying to pick holes in this because you don't like the fact that the theory points out that the term matter is a hollow one. But the manner in which you're trying to pick holes is by concocting anything you want and then saying to me "Hey Phil, you can't REALLY disprove this particular thought experiment...". We could do this all day. I could come up with some stuff too ("You can't REALLY disprove bigfoot..." etc.). And we could go at it until one of us just said "Well, this is really dumb...".

      If you're really concerned about the criticisms I've raised about the meaning of the term 'matter' then try to come up with a solid ontological meaning for this term. Stop trying to attack your opponents by asking the impossible from them. It's not a good way to argue.

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    12. "(4b) Again, apply Ockham's Razor: what does the multiple super-mind theory explain that the single super-mind theory does not? To me the single theory explains everything fine, so we eliminate the multiple theory until it needs be brought in to explain something that the single theory cannot explain."

      OK: an inference to the best explanation.

      Fine.

      But that still doesn't deal with:

      (5) no super-mind or super-minds exist but vast numbers of external independent minds corresponding to each object of perception (idealist panpsychism);

      (6) there are many independent minds that collectively generate an external mental realm with consistent objects of perception, but with no absolute mind (personal idealism).

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    13. (5) I don't understand this. Is this an idea of an infinite number of minds corresponding to every point in time and space? You need to explain this idea coherently.

      (6) What is this external mental realm?

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    14. (5) no, just to all objects of perception: they are independent external mental entities and can exist in their own right.

      Therefore on Ockham's Razor you have no need for a super-mind.

      (6) all objects that appear external to us.

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    15. (5) I don't grasp this at all.

      (6) Yes, but how is it generated by many independent minds? I.e. how do all these minds generate it in the same way? Why don't they all generate it differently?

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  2. "(1) We observe that we cannot get direct access to anyone else's mind nor share minds. On analogy, it is unlikely there is an unobserved super-mind that has the power to share ideas or share minds with us."

    We're not drawing an analogy from other minds. We're recognising that only minds and ideas exist and since minds contain ideas then those that are not contained in our mind must be contained in another mind.

    I don't know where you're coming up with this bizarre stuff about telepathy, LK...

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    1. "I don't know where you're coming up with this bizarre stuff about telepathy, LK..."

      Straight from Berkeley!

      Just look:
      nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived, either themselves of their archetypes, exist independently of my mind, since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to determine at pleasure what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon opening my eyes or ears: they must therefore exist in some other Mind, whose Will it is they should be exhibited to me.

      Exhibited to me? That means I must mean I share the experience. That commits you to the view that we share minds to some degree with the supermind.

      The Berkeley scholars are saying that Berkeley's view entails that god gives us ideas by "what can only be called 'divine telepathy'" (Georges Dicker 's Berkeley's Idealism: A Critical Examination. p. 233) -- between us and the super-mind.

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    2. Yes. But then you start talking about multiple super-minds with telepathic links. It's bizarre. It's aimless and the only reason I can see you to be positing such things -- which fall apart if Ockham's Razor is applied -- is to engage in agnotology because I showed that 'matter' is a meaningless term with no content.

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    3. "But then you start talking about multiple super-minds with telepathic links."

      Yes: because just look at your argument above:

      "Therefore I have no reason to assume that a super-mind can engage in psychic interaction with another super-mind. If, however, I was given reason to believe in psychic powers between my mind and others then I might be willing to consider this possibility.

      But your own idealist position already entails that it is logically possible for a super-mind to engage in psychic interaction with another super-mind.

      Your view entails that your own mind has links to another mind (the super-mind)

      Your attempt to reject my super-minds theory falls on your original argument as used above.

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    4. If what you mean to say is that you have no direct personal evidence that you can share another mind, then you have no direct evidence either that anything like a super-mind can even exist, because you only have experience of your own finite mind.

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    5. You know what else is logically possible: that bigfoot exists! There are a lot of things that are LOGICALLY possible. But we have to organise what are good arguments and what are bad arguments.

      The argument that bigfoot exists is bad because we have no evidence. The argument that multiple super-minds in telepathic interaction with each other are creating our experiences is bad because it explains nothing that the simpler theory (single super-mind) does not already explain.

      You are trying to argue with me by arguing logical possibilities. Don't you see that we could do this all day because anything that isn't a logical contradiction is logically POSSIBLE? Such arguments are... a poor use of logic.

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    6. "The argument that multiple super-minds in telepathic interaction with each other are creating our experiences is bad because it explains nothing that the simpler theory (single super-mind) does not already explain."

      OK: so now by Occam's razor as inference to a presumed simpler explanation, which is much better than the first explanation.

      But I can use Occam's razor too:

      (1) We observe things directly in our minds that appear to have (1) no minds and probably do not have minds and (2) appear to be non-mental (e.g., tables, chairs, rocks, books). On analogy, there may be unobserved non-mental objects without minds that are the external causal origin of our perceptions of these things.
      ---------------

      This is much simpler than the postulate of a very complex god or super-mind.

      By Occam's razor, I argue that it is more probable as a simpler explanation.

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    7. No, as I keep saying to you -- but you don't seem to grasp and I really hate repeating myself -- (2) is not valid.

      Tables, chairs etc. are only presented to us as ideas in our minds. If you have not grasped this very basic point at this stage then I see no point in continuing the conversation.

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    8. I grasped the idealist position from the very beginning.

      It has been my position all along: that all our mental life is internal perception (on the representational theory of perception).

      But it does not follow that, because our mental life is internal perceptions, therefore we have no grounds whatsoever for postulating an external world of independent objects.

      You've already admitted in the past that you concur it is logically possible.

      E.g., If I can show that Berkeley's argument for rejecting primary qualities as real properties of external objects is unsound (which I think I can and many realists have argued), then I have a reasonable basis for a realist epistemology,

      At that point, the means for determining what ontological theory -- skepticism, idealism, realism -- is better is inference to the best explanation.

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    9. Something from a previous conversation has been niggling, so maybe this is a good place to clear it up.

      It's been posited that, because "idea" is alleged to have more content than "matter" by way of an appeal to subjectivity (which still rings kinda circular but whatever), idealism is thus "more likely" to be true.

      I'm just wondering: how much more likely, exactly? 10%? 30%? What's the confidence interval?

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    10. No, it does not follow that it is logically impossible that a material world exists. But it is an inference based on the postulation of a substance that (a) we have no experience of and consequently (b) we cannot describe in any way at all.

      Thus, any argument you make is non-empiricist as it infers that this other substance exists without you having ANY experience of it whatsoever. Your argument is based absolutely PURELY on a leap of faith.

      If you are comfortable with that I am not going to try to change your mind. But then you should be very careful when you say that others should not believe in things that they have no experience of (i.e. perfectly competitive markets and so forth).

      The substances that I require to explain the world, on the other hand -- mind and ideas -- I do have experience of directly and I can describe. Thus, my argument begins empirically where your's begins by a leap of faith.

      When I bring the super-mind in to the argument my argument is no longer strictly empirical. But it is closer to empirics than the theory of matter (which is just a made up substance with no content). The super-mind theory is only really an argument against scepticism. If you want to be PURELY empirical you just accept the first part of the argument and reject the constancy of ideas. No problem. Have at it. I don't buy it. But you can if you please.

      What we are trying to avoid is the leap of faith involved in the belief in matter. If you choose to be sceptical instead then I think that is a better position than the argument for matter, which appears to me pure dogmatics with no content.

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  3. Hedlund, I think its time to read Keynes' Treatise on Probability and stop asking for confidence intervals in non-numerical arguments...

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    1. I thought Keynes used "non-numerical" to mean precisely "interval estimates," distinct from point estimates? That's the impression I get from the various Michael Emmett Brady essays floating around, at least...

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    2. Okay, Hedlund. I can't give you a meaningful numerical estimate of how much "more probable" my argument is any more than I can give you a meaningful numerical estimate of what the likelihood of the Labour Party remaining in power after the next general election in Ireland. Frankly, it strikes me as a silly question.

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    3. Maybe it is silly. But my point is that you should be able to at least express something as more or less likely in terms of something else you can articulate, right? Analogically, so to speak.

      You seem to believe you're saying something like: "Idealism is more likely than materialism in the same way that I am more likely to find my lost wallet when the light is turned on."

      To me, it seems like you're saying something more like: "Idealism is more likely than materialism in the same way that my lost wallet is more likely to be found in this well-lit lobby than the dark theater beyond."

      But it's cool, I get where you stand and I respect your convictions, even if I don't share them. As you said, beyond a point this all ceases to be productive.

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    4. That point was crossed LONG ago. What I've been dealing with all day has been nitpicking, weird tangents, requests that I provide grandiose proofs for my claims that are by their nature impossible (this is one of the most insidious forms of arguments in existence, by the way, and should be avoided by anyone who cares about rational debate) and general obfuscation. Meanwhile, any attempts to provide me with a coherent, non-faith based definition of a substance called 'matter' has either been fudged or scrupulously avoided. I think that this is because the faith on which this is based is something that has been drilled into peoples' heads since they were infants: it is the idea that Science forms a coherent metaphysical worldview that is non-dogmatic. This, of course, is entirely false. But it is the illusion that much of the educated world live under today -- one which has established its own churches and its own courts of appeal.

      But with regards to your last comment my argument is more like this: "Idealism is more likely because I can give a coherent argument based on inferences regarding aspects of the world that I have actually experienced whereas materialism is based on pure faith and appeals to supposed aspects of the world that not only have I never experienced but I CAN never experience."

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    5. "Meanwhile, any attempts to provide me with a coherent, non-faith based definition of a substance called 'matter' has either been fudged or scrupulously avoided."

      (1) Well, it is only because you repeatedly beg the question and just assume that Berkeley's arguments are true, that you refuse to accept that the realist can even in principle describe what matter is.

      As I said above, if I can show that Berkeley's argument for rejecting primary qualities as real properties of external objects is unsound (which I think I can and many realists have argued as, e.g., in J. L. Mackie, 1976. Problems from Locke. Clarendon Press, Oxford), then I have a reasonable basis for a indirect realist epistemology.

      Are you willing to even admit that if -- hypothetically -- I could show you that Berkeley's argument on that subject is wrong, then I would be justified in indirect realism, and in accepting what science says in the standard model about matter?

      This is straightforward question of reasonableness.

      (2) "Meanwhile, any attempts to provide me with a coherent, non-faith based definition of a substance called 'matter' has either been fudged or scrupulously avoided. I think that this is because the faith on which this is based is something that has been drilled into peoples' heads since they were infants: it is the idea that Science forms a coherent metaphysical worldview that is non-dogmatic."

      And yet nobody needs to brainwash children into thinking there is an external world.

      The belief that there is a real external world is a natural, intuitive and straightforward commonsensical idea that virtually all humans have: I don't recall my parents having to convince against my intuitions that the real world exists, or them having to appeal to science to convince me!!

      In fact the subject never come up at all!

      It was a natural intuitive belief probably from the time I was very young.

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    6. In fairness, LK, I don't think he's alleging that direct indoctrination from a parent or other is necessary; it could just as well be an indirect, social phenomenon -- an effect of our very episteme, such as it is. We can just as easily access beliefs and assumptions through culture, as with your own argument re: the possible effect of monotheism on idealism. If we're staying humble about it, we ought to admit to ourselves the possibility, as I now do.

      I agree with you that it's tough to cotton to it if one draws one's position from skepticism that X exists rather than faith that Y does -- as I suspect we both do -- and thus just kind of roll with Y as more of a point of intuitive convenience rather than dogmatic conviction. But even that may be a culturally embedded convenience. Hard to control for these things.

      Philip: as much as I appreciate you taking the time to reply, that wasn't an analogy; just an restatement of your premise, complete with all the questions I keep trying to indicate as begged. But as I said, don't worry; nothing much else to be said about the number of angels on the head of this pin.

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  4. Ah. Her'es where I can give you the evidence for atheism.

    We can show that there is a difference between the results we see which were created by minds -- designed -- and the results which were not created by minds. There are certain well-understood, well-identified ways of telling design apart from other forces, such as evolution by natural selection.

    These are used when digging up ancient sites, to identify the artifacts of humanity, vs. the natural effects of wind, rain, etc. (Telling the artifacts of humanity apart from the artifacts of animals is harder!)

    This is used in biology to prove the theory of evolution. There's an awful lot of jerry-rigged "you wouldn't design it that way" stuff.

    Now, when we look at the universe, does it look like it was designed by one or more minds -- remember that we know what things designed by minds tend to look like -- or does it not?

    Answer: it does not. You have to actually look at a pile of evidence from nature to realize this, of course. I consider gods to be a reasonable hypothesis which simply happened to be false.

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