George Berkeley’s (1685–1753) philosophy of subjective idealism (which he called “immaterialism”) has two bold and fundamental assertions about reality:
Proposition (1): that the only things that exist are (i) minds and (ii) objects of perception (ideas), andIt follows from this that the external world of matter we normally think exists does not exist, under Berkeley’s ontology.
Proposition (2): the objects of perception only exist at the same time when they are perceived by a mind (Stoneham 2009: 119).
I think any non-dogmatic realist would accept that it is possible that these propositions might be true. Also, I doubt whether any idealist can prove such propositions with necessary or apodictic truth. Also, I assume that a non-dogmatic idealist would also admit that it is possible that the realist position might be true.
Realists and materialists who reject Berkeley’s idealism come in two main groups:
(1) indirect or representative realists (and modern scientific realists), andDirect realists would argue that actual physical objects in the external world are amongst the “objects of perception,” whereas the indirect realists argue that physical objects in the external world are not amongst Berkeley’s “objects of perception.”
(2) direct realists. (Stoneham 2009: 120–121).
Thus it is possible for an indirect realist to accept Berkeley’s proposition (2) above, but reject as untrue proposition (1) above.
On realism, I take position (1): the indirect or representative realist view. This states that it is highly probable that there is an external physical world of objects or things/events that corresponds indirectly to some objects of perception in the sense that some objects of perception are causally dependent on real objects.
But we do not have direct access to the external objects of reality, but only to some conscious “objects of perception” that are causally dependent on them. That is to say, the objects and events of the world of matter and energy described by science are not objects of immediate experience/“objects of perception”.
So the indirect realist/materialist’s inductive argument does not say that the external object and the internal “objects of perception” are absolutely equivalent (as noted in Stoneham 2009: 121).
The human mind’s “objects of perception” are representations (with colour sensations, shapes and so on) of sense data from the external world such as, for example, from the swarm of particles called a tree, and this system of internal representation is the product of Darwinian evolution, and one could conceive of a mind capable of representing the same tree in different ways from different data beyond the visible spectrum (e.g., infrared or x-rays).
Furthermore, the actual qualities we perceive in our minds like green and red are not qualities of the actual object existing in material reality, but are merely causally dependent on them to some extent (e.g., light waves reflected off the object are the causal factor for perception of colours).
So we see that the indirect realist makes a crucial distinction between (1) “objects of perception” and (2) external objects that we do not experience directly. Our argument for the existence of an external world of events/objects is an inductive one based on empirical evidence. Its truth is at most very probable, not certain.
But to return to Berkeley’s arguments, as Stoneham (2009: 121) notes, Berkeley has a great many arguments for his two fundamental positions, such as
(1) the argument that there is no serious difference between primary qualities (such as size, motion and shape) and secondary qualities (colour, taste and texture), against Locke’s claim that primary qualities inhere in the external objects we perceive, andThese major arguments are presented in The Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713).
(2) the so-called “master argument”;
I intend below to focus on what has come to be called Berkeley’s “master argument” (coined by Gallois 1974) because Berkeley intended it to be a crucial argument in support of his idealism.
I. The Master Argument
First, let us look at the master argument as written in The Principles of Human Knowledge (1710):
“22. …. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this issue – if you can but conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause. And, as for all that compages of external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist I say, the bare possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that it is so.Next, the master argument in Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713). In this philosophical dialogue, Philonous is Berkeley’s mouthpiece:
23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose it only shews you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it does not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance.” (The Principles of Human Knowledge §21–22).
“Philonous: Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory. Though indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another, yet my arguments or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that the Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by itself; but, that they were not at all without the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure and motion we concluded they could not exist without the mind, because it was impossible even in thought to separate them from all secondary qualities, so as to conceive them existing by themselves. But then this was not the only argument made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.It seems clear that Berkeley thinks of “sensible objects” or “ideas” as the objects of perception (Stoneham 2009: 119).
Hylas: If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.
Philonous: How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?
Hylas: No, that were a contradiction.
Philonous: Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is unconceived?
Hylas: It is.
Philonous: The tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you?
Hylas: How should it be otherwise?
Philonous: And what is conceived is surely in the mind?
Hylas: Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.
Philonous: How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?” (Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, first dialogue).
Now since both passages above present an informal argument, let us re-write it as the following mixed conditional syllogism:
Major premise: If conscious ideas/sensations cannot even be conceived without a mind, then conscious ideas/sensations cannot exist externally or independently of a mind.This argument is formally valid. Let us assume that its major premise is sound, to make it easy for the idealist.
Minor premise: Conscious ideas/sensations cannot even be conceived without a mind
Conclusion: Therefore conscious ideas/sensations cannot exist externally or independently of a mind.
It follows that the conclusion is necessarily true.
What does this prove? It certainly does not prove that an external world of matter, containing objects on which some of our ideas/sensations/perceptions are causally dependent, does not exist.
As Stoneham (2009: 121) argues, it is only evidence in support of Berkeley’s proposition (2) above. That is, it proves only that conscious sensations or ideas of any type cannot exist independently of minds. But this is not denied by modern indirect realist materialists/physicalists.
In short, the “master argument” is no devastating demolition of the indirect realist arguments for the reality of an external world of matter and energy as described by science: it is consistent with it.
If Berkeley has some definitive argument against the existence of an external world of matter, the master argument does not qualify for such an argument.
Let us now turn to some other criticisms of both Berkeley’s idealism and the non-theist versions.
II. The Consistency of Conscious Experience
There is a high degree of consistency in the passive sense data or certain “objects of perception” that we cannot control, both between different people and in the same mind over time.
Berkeley does not deny this. Berkeley admits that some ideas of sensation and perception (as opposed to dreams or imagination) are given to the mind and not freely determined by the conscious mind (Musgrave 1993: 127). Regularities in our experience are “laws of nature” for Berkeley (Musgrave 1993: 128).
It would appear that the consistency requires an explanation. In fact, Berkeley did invoke a common cause and an external cause (external to the mind of the individual) to account for it: a theistic god. His explanation is that a theistic god of the type familiar from Judeo-Christian theology is the cause of the consistency of our sensory experiences, and he must be a benevolent one for he does not engage in pernicious and confusing changes in our normally consistent “objects of perception.”
But that raises a whole set of assumptions and the need for a rock-solid argument for the existence of god, something which, as modern philosophy has shown, is a highly problematic exercise.
But what about the non-theistic idealist? The observation about consistency becomes a “brute fact” for the non-theistic idealist. He cannot really explain it, and this leads me into my third criticism.
III. Non-Theistic Idealism has weak Explanatory Power
A final argument against non-theistic idealism is that it is utterly incapable of providing any answers to fundamental question about existence:
(1) why do we have a conscious existence with a high degree of consistency and what looks like external constraints facing us?;One could add a welter of other questions to these, but the conclusion is clear: the explanatory power of idealism is feeble and weak (Musgrave 1988: 241), and the idealist must shrug his or her shoulders and proclaim that we cannot even begin to seriously answer these questions.
(2) where do minds come from?;
(3) in fact, how can you justify the view that other minds even exist? (why doesn’t non-theistic idealism collapse into solipsism?);
(4) if the idealist accepts that other minds exist, do animals have minds?
By contrast, the indirect realist materialist can provide convincing answers to all these questions from our best scientific theories and inductive argument.
For example, take point (3): the charge that non-theistic idealism leads to solipsism. If the only direct experience you have of conscious minds is inside your own conscious mind and one does not believe in the existence of an external world of matter, then what reason is there to think that any other minds even exist?
For the materialist, one strong and straightforward argument is that we have a strong degree of empirical evidence that human minds are causally dependent on brains, and empirical investigations of other human beings show that they have brains (either by non-invasive scanning technologies or sometimes surgery on living humans or autopsies on dead ones). It is therefore a convincing inductive inference that other human minds exist.
In short, here as in numerous other questions, an indirect realist materialism provides a theory with a rich and powerful explanatory power, which is lacking in idealism.
Further Reading
For a defence of idealism and a somewhat different interpretation of the master argument, see Philip Pilkington’s posts here:
Philip Pilkington, “Berkeley’s ‘Master Argument’ Doesn’t Exist,” Fixing the Economists, January 3, 2014.
http://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/2014/01/03/berkeleys-master-argument-doesnt-exist/
Philip Pilkington, “Faith-Based Arguments in Empirical, Causal and Probabilistic Reasoning,” Fixing the Economists, October 4, 2013.
http://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/2013/10/04/faith-based-arguments-in-empirical-causal-and-probabilistic-reasoning/
Philip Pilkington, “The Theory of Relativity: Anticipated at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century by George Berkeley,” Fixing the Economists, October 5, 2013.
http://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/2013/10/05/the-theory-of-relativity-anticipated-at-the-turn-of-the-seventeenth-century-by-george-berkeley/
Philip Pilkington, “Berkeley’s ‘Master Argument’ Doesn’t Exist,” Fixing the Economists, January 3, 2014
http://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/2014/01/03/berkeleys-master-argument-doesnt-exist/
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Freeley, and Austin and David Steinberg. 2014. Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making (13th edn.). Wadsworth Cengage Learning, Boston, MA.
Gallois, A. 1974. “Berkeley’s Master Argument,” Philosophical Review 83: 55–69.
Grayling, A. C. 2005. “Berkeley’s Argument for Immaterialism,” in Kenneth P. Winkler (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York. 166–189.
Mandik, Pete. 2014. This is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester.
Musgrave, Alan. 1988. “The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism,” in R. Nola (ed.), Relativism and Realism in Science. Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht. 229–252.
Musgrave, Alan. 1993. Common Sense, Science and Scepticism: A Historical Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.
Rickless, Samuel Charles. 2013. Berkeley’s Argument for Idealism. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Robinson, Howard. 2003. “Berkeley,” in Nicholas Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy (2nd edn.). Blackwell, Malden, Mass. and Oxford, UK. 694–708.
Stoneham, Tom. 2009. “Berkeley. Arguments for Idealism,” in Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Simons, Andrew McGonigal, Ross Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge, London and New York. 119–130.
(1) I don't understand... you raise the Master Argument but then you cite my piece on how the Master Argument does not exist...
ReplyDeleteIn that piece I clearly show that the reason Berkeley made this case had to do with the fact that he considered matter to be an abstraction that has no purpose. I.e. it is an extraneous abstraction that does not serve a function and has no evidence for it.
His argument is not that he can disprove matter but that he can show that the assumption of matter is (a) groundless and based on faith and (b) useless. He then asks:why bother believing in matter given that there is no evidence for it and as an abstraction it serves no purpose?
(2) Yes, Berkeley requires a belief in God to establish constancy. But you require a belief in matter.
Berkeley's argument is that a belief in God -- i.e. an uber-consciousness -- is less abstract and less likely to be correct. Why? Because we have NO experience of matter. But we do have experience of consciousness. So, it is far less of a leap of the imagination to think about a more comprehensive consciousness, similar to our own but more powerful, than it is to imagine a substance called matter that we have literally no experience of whatsoever.
(3) Berkeley would agree that non-theist idealism leads to skepticism. He makes a very long case for this. But as I said in (2) the belief in matter is far more abstract and lacking immediate experiential evidence than a belief in an uber-consciousness.
That said, I can only repeat, that "evidence" that consciousness depends on the body and its organs says nothing about anything. For Berkeley this merely means that the idea/perception that we call a "brain" is in some way connected to certain facets of our lived experience. The argument really starts and ends prior to the consideration of "evidence". Indeed, as Berkeley would point out: there is no evidence of consciousness depending on the brain-as-matter (we do not experience matter) but only evidence of consciousness depending on the brain-as-idea. So, the evidence is actually in his favour...
Should read:
Delete"Berkeley's argument is that a belief in God -- i.e. an uber-consciousness -- is less abstract and less likely to be INcorrect."
Sorry, typo...
(1):
Deletebut his master argument, as I have read it, does not show that belief in the external world of matter is "(a) groundless and based on faith and (b) useless".
All he has shown is that our human internal perceptions/sensations cannot exist without human minds.
As I point out, the indirect realist agrees.
And Berkeley has not disproved that some of our perceptions are causally dependent on an external world that we do not have direct access to.
(2) and (3):
Well, there is not a shred of evidence that we have any **direct experience** of Berkeley's god either.
All deductive arguments for god's existence are unconvincing. With that failure, all Berkeley is left with is inductive arguments. He is in the same epistemological category as the realist -- except that the realist can appeal to all sorts of empirical evidence that an external world is the ultimate cause of many of our internal perceptions.
"His argument is not that he can disprove matter but that he can show that the assumption of matter is (a) groundless and based on faith and (b) useless."
DeleteIf he cannot disprove it in the sense of
(a) showing it is absolutely impossible or
(b) showing that idealist propositions (1) an (2) above are necessarily true,
then it follows his proofs of the view that "the assumption of matter is (a) groundless and based on faith and (b) useless" can only be inductive, which means his argument is
(1) only probable and
(2) possibly fallible.
But didn't you say before his argument is deductive?
Also, if you think my translation of Berkeley's master argument into a formal syllogism is wrong, then I am happy to see what you think is a correct formal form of the argument.
Delete(1) The idea is this: we do not have any experience in matter. Therefore matter is an abstraction. Berkeley thinks that abstractions are fine provided they have a purpose. But he finds no purpose for the abstraction of matter. He asks: what does it explain that we cannot explain with less abstractions? This is a variant on the Ockham's Razor argument and it is deductive.
DeleteHe does not disprove matter -- he does not claim to, you cannot disprove an abstraction -- but he refutes it by showing it to be useless.
(2) There is no direct experience of an uber-consciousness. But let's compare it to the abstraction of matter and see which idea has more content.
____
(i) We have experience of consciousness. We know what it is like. We know that we can create some ideas -- i.e. imagination/abstraction etc. -- and that some are given to us over which we cannot control -- i.e. the table in front of me etc.
Now, it is not that much of an abstraction to assume that the reason for the ideas over which we have no control is due to these being created in another mind; an uber-consciousness. This is an abstraction on our part but it is one that is derived pretty closely from experience.
(ii) We have no experience of matter. We also have no experience of anything like matter. We cannot describe matter in any way. We cannot see it, smell it etc. I cannot draw analogies between matter and anything I experience. It is an abstraction wholly without content.
____
Now, Berkeley's argument is that the abstraction we deploy in (i) is far less outlandish to the abstraction we deploy in (ii). The abstraction in (i) I can describe in somewhat familiar terms as I can draw analogies to my experience. The abstraction in (ii) I cannot describe in any way at all. It is an abstraction entirely without content.
Berkeley's argument is that as an empiricist it is more reasonable for him to believe in (i) than in (ii). I think that he is correct. I would prefer to posit an abstraction that has content and which I can somewhat describe to an abstraction that has absolutely no content and which, at the end of the day, is a totally undefined idea.
OK:
Delete(1) That we do not have any **direct and immediate** experience of the world of physical objects with matter/energy is no knockdown argument against its existence, because you already concede in (2) that we have "no direct experience of an uber-consciousnes" either.
Both hypotheses -- external world of matter or god -- are abstractions.
OK, you present a case for an "uber-consciousnes" as the most convincing and simple explanation.
But the realist can reply to Berkeley:
(i) the hypothesis of an external world of matter is not "useless": it is a parsimonious explanation of the consistency of many conscious experiences which we clearly cannot control. That is, some external cause is at work.
In fact, we both -- realists and idealists (at least in the form you use above) -- need to invoke an external cause to explain the relative consistency of many aspects conscious life.
(i) the hypothesis of an external world of matter is not ridiculously complicated or overly complex: it is a relatively simple hypothesis on the basis of indirect evidence and by Occam's razor less outlandish than a theistic god with the highly complex -- and possibly logically impossible -- properties of omniscience, omnipotence and benevolence.
--------------------
At this point, can you at least admit that a non-dogmatic person should at least admit that a realist position as defend above might be true?
As I say above: "I think any non-dogmatic realist would accept that it is possible that these propositions might be true. "
(2) just on the "uber-consciousness", even if you accept the arguments for something like this, it does not even follow that the "uber-consciousness" that causes our conscious life need be anything like a god of classical theism.
But then one opens up a can of worms: but IS this uber-consciousness"? Where did it come from? Why cant we ever get any direct experience of it?
We are back to a theory with little explanatory power.
"We also have no experience of anything like matter."
DeleteBut we do all the time -- but indirectly.
I have perceptions of a table right now. It's hard and spatially extended.
It looks like some object might actually be there that is the causal origin of my consistent sensations, even though I do not have direct access to whatever the object ultimately is.
(1) You see that second comment seems to me to be outlandish and this is really the crux of the matter.
DeleteYou see the table. It is hard and spatially extended -- but you admit these are just ideas. So, you need something to account for the constancy of these ideas. We have two explanations: matter and an uber-consciousness.
Here's the point: I can describe the uber-consciousness by drawing analogies to my own consciousness. The uber-consciousness brings the table into being using the same faculties that I use to imagine things. It then imprints these on my consciousness as ideas over which I have no control. This idea, whether you believe it or not, has content.
But the argument for matter is completely hollow. It has literally no content. I cannot describe matter. I cannot draw analogies between matter and my experiences. It is just a word; a signifier with no signified. It means nothing.
That is Berkeley's point. He cannot concede that matter may account for the constancy of ideas because matter is a non-concept.
I am certainly open accepting that matter might account for the constancy of ideas. But first you have to tell me what matter is. You have to describe it to me. You have to give it properties or attributes just like I gave the uber-consciousness properties and attributes. Berkeley contends that you cannot do this. I think that he is correct. And it seems to me very strange indeed to have as an explanation for something a concept with no content -- a word that signifies nothing.
(2) Is the uber-consciousness the God of classical theism? Not necessarily. Berkeley believed that God could intervene in the world directly. I see no reason to believe this. But these are all questions of theology and faith and, although some may find this odd, I'm not terribly interested in this side of the debate. Frankly, I'm not a very religious person.
It is easy to say that the differences between a sufficiently refined idealism and a sufficiently refined materialism boil down to aesthetics -- whether we call the substance of reality "matter" or "God-thoughts," etc.
DeleteGene Callahan wrote a paper a few years ago illustrating some synergies and overlaps between idealism and critical realism (taking Lawson as his chief expositor, though in my opinion Collier wrote the best introduction). In the paper, he pulls this handy quote from Collingwood:
"To ask whether mind is a form of matter or matter a form of mind is very largely a question of words. The important thing is that we should be able to bring the two into relation at all; that we should hold such a conception of matter as does not prevent us from admitting truth, morality, and life as a whole to be real facts, and that we should hold such a conception of mind, as does not reduce the world to an illusion and experience to a dream. The first of these errors is that of crude materialism, and the second that of an equally crude idealism. The view for which we are contending would claim the title of idealism rather than materialism, but only because the current conception of mind seems a more adequate description of the world than the current conception of matter."
This seems to jive with the above comment, but I don't find that last point convincing. Saying that 'we understand how we can imagine things, and then we extend that to our explanation of how things come to be externally' recognizes the limits of our understanding, and then does nothing to attempt to correct for them. It's a bit like that old gag:
"I could have lost my wallet anywhere in this stadium."
"Then why are you only searching in the lobby?"
"Light's better in here."
And for all the content supposed, it doesn't actually advance our understanding any further. After admitting that we can't explain matter, an idealist appears to attempt to explain it anyway by asserting another entity that we can't explain. This is important; if the primary objection is that one's fundamental entity is ill-defined, then the same critiques directed at materialist's matter must be leveled not at the idealist's uber-thought, but rather the idealist's uber-thinker.
On that note, there seems to be a certain epistemic immodesty, especially considering what we know of brain-mind causality, in assuming that the world MUST be constituted along the lines of our own phenomenology. Who's to say an "uber-mind" would be comprehensible to our minds, even in the simple ways expressed? If our god-entity is "radically one" in the sense of being non-relational and thereby containing no categories (just a ferinstance, as I'm not looking to turn this into a whole scholasticism retread), then what worth is there in this all-important "content" demanded of our matter/uberthought definitions?
In either case, whatever signifier we attach to our monistic substance, we've got enough of a working definition to start: "the fundamental constituent of our intransitive reality." For philosophy to go further than that, it'll need more input from science.
I strongly disagree Hedlund. As I keep saying. The uber-consciousness is something that I can describe through the use of analogy. It is a word with explanatory content. Matter, on the other hand, cannot be described at all -- even through analogy. It is a word empty of content.
DeleteIf this is a "question of words", ala Gene Callahan, then it is a question of words with explanatory content versus words with no explanatory content. It is not for aesthetic reasons but rather for logical reasons that I opt for the former.
I guess I just don't see why that's such an important point. "Ease of analogy" may be useful in some cases as a pedagogical tool, but as a criterion for our entire understanding of reality, it can just as easily be an impediment -- especially in those cases where the behavior of reality moves further and further away from the mechanisms we're hard-wired to perceive or otherwise intuit. Cutting-edge physics these days is all "virtual particle this" and "quantum foam that" -- it's utterly alien, and yet it may also prove to be an apt description of reality. To speak intelligently on it calls for years of intense study to adapt oneself to a subject that bears no resemblance to the reality we confront, e.g., on our way to work every day.
DeleteMore to the point: If you're dealing with the stuff that is, as I said, a fundamental constituent in a monistic world, then any analogy must necessarily be to something constituted. If we're going to be consistent in our claims that emergent properties are distinct from those of the stratum of reality constituting them, then starting off looking for consistency across strata seems a prima facie folly.
The "it" that we often say "is raining" has no distinct meaning, and yet it is at the same time perfectly comprehensible to any speaker of English. I don't for a moment think you'd argue that describing rain as some anthropomorphic deity's tears enriches our understanding of weather. So why insist upon the personification here?
Bad analogy. (Yes, you just used an analogy to establish an argument by the way...). In modern physics they are still using analogical reasoning to discuss virtual particle and all that sort of thing. They are not using words devoid of content.
DeleteIf we can use words devoid of content to account for the constancy of ideas then what stops me from claiming that the constancy of ideas is caused by 'tuyaleenago'? I just made that word up. It means nothing and I cannot further elaborate on it. Would you accept it as a fundamental metaphysical principle? If not then why not?
I think I have a better sense of where you're coming from, now. And if you really and truly believe that "matter" and "tuyaleenago" are equivalents, then I suspect that maybe I've given too much ground by allowing that "matter" is devoid of content. Far from a word that I just made up and on which I cannot elaborate (speaking of weak analogies), "matter" expresses something very distinct -- again, the constituent of reality, that which exists independently of (and also makes up) mind, as structures of particulate mass and energy.
DeleteTuyaleenago can mean this, too, but only (and tellingly!) if we set its meaning equal to "matter." In that case I would be more disposed towards accepting it as a fundamental principle, as per your question. But absent that correspondence, no, I wouldn't.
Maybe we can't point our finger at something and say "this, this right here is matter in its most fundamental form: ur-matter." But this isn't a problem, since the concept still refers to just that, in the sense of a placeholder that signifies something that we can't directly access at this time but may in the future. Similarly, to restate a point that kind of slipped by, the ubermind is also a placeholder. You yourself have said as much: "Is the uber-consciousness the God of classical theism? Not necessarily." Why not necessarily? Can it be conceived of in a variety of ways? Then how can we make the kinds of definite and content-rich claims about it that you're describing?
On the contrary, uber-consciousness and matter are here once again shown to be of a kind -- fundaments for which we cannot fully account, by dint of which we nevertheless proceed to explain other things. Incidentally, and a bit ironically, this also provides an analogy for matter, and a jumping point to others -- e.g., "Matter is that which has the same function, and occupies the same place grammatically, as uberthought, except that it doesn't presuppose an uberthinker."
Also, I notice you also didn't respond to the real thrust of my last comment, contained in its second paragraph. Quick restatement: Any analogy to a fundamental constituent must necessarily be to something constituted thereby. In light of the principle of emergence, which I know idealists embrace, how can we justify this contradictory assumption of consistency across different strata of reality?
"..."matter" expresses something very distinct -- again, the constituent of reality, that which exists independently of (and also makes up) mind, as structures of particulate mass and energy."
DeleteThat matter makes up the "constituent of reality" is a tautology given that it is this constituent that you are trying to explain by using the word "matter".
Particulate mass and energy are just ideas. If matter = particulate mass and energy, then matter is just another word for "idea" because we only know the latter through the senses.
Ok, that makes sense. So let's leave behind that part of my comment and just focus on the last three paragraphs, which is where lies all the stuff I am actually excited to see argued.
DeleteYour thoughts?
"But this isn't a problem, since the concept still refers to just that, in the sense of a placeholder that signifies something that we can't directly access at this time but may in the future."
DeleteThat is mysticism. 'Matter' then becomes an unknown X with no known properties. This is fine if you want a mystical metaphysics and if you are happy with mysticism. Personally, I am not comfortable with this.
(Although, if you are familiar with the work of Lacan you can equate this X with his 'object small a' and you have a good starting principle for a psychological doctrine... That I am happy with if it is subordinate to a less mystical metaphysics).
"You yourself have said as much: "Is the uber-consciousness the God of classical theism? Not necessarily." Why not necessarily?"
Depends what you mean by classic theism...
"Can it be conceived of in a variety of ways?"
Sure. Benevolent. Vengeful. Neutral. Omnipotent. Unable to intervene in the world. And so on... These are theological questions. They don't interest me greatly.
"Then how can we make the kinds of definite and content-rich claims about it that you're describing?"
Because I can describe the uber-conciousness by using analogy to my own mind. The process is very similar to inducing that other finite minds exist in other people.
If you consider this 'mysticism' then you also largely consider me saying that other finite minds exist 'mysticism'. I don't think it is. I think it is a logical induction.
"Any analogy to a fundamental constituent must necessarily be to something constituted thereby. In light of the principle of emergence, which I know idealists embrace, how can we justify this contradictory assumption of consistency across different strata of reality?"
I don't understand. Can you restate?
"'Matter' then becomes an unknown X with no known properties."
DeleteI would describe it more like: "Matter" becomes the object of our inquiry -- the intransitive object, whereas the various ideas we generate about it are the transitive objects of our intellectual labor.
"If you consider this 'mysticism' then you also largely consider me saying that other finite minds exist 'mysticism'. I don't think it is. I think it is a logical induction."
Interesting angle! But then again, other minds assist in our apprehension of them. As LK has been pointing out, we can't inductively apprehend the overmind. Thus, as you say, we use an analogy to our own minds, which brings me to the point you've asked me to restate.
I'll expand it a bit: Let us accept "ideas" as the fundamental constituent of reality, in place of the vacuous "matter." (Honest aside, what is your preferred, most-complete definition of "idea"?)
We know from our perceptions that things are comprised of other things -- thus, there is a structuring to ideas, and ideas are made up of other, more fundamental ideas that operate along different functional principles. Thus the idea of biology is constituted by ideas of chemistry, but it is not wholly reducible to chemistry, as a reductionist materialist might try to assert; rather, life events may be composed of, e.g., biological and chemical mechanisms in no fixed proportion.
However, chemical mechanisms nevertheless underpin biological mechanisms, and in this way the laws of biology are non-reciprocally dependent on the laws of chemistry.
Thus, we can say that some strata of reality "emerge" from more fundamental ones. The recognition of this enables us to see the fallacy at work in the methodological individualism of economists, for example; we can no more determine the motion of the economy from individual actors than we can the movements of large bodies from the interactions of their constituent subatomic particles, even if the former cannot occur independently of the latter.
As P.W. Anderson famously put it: "More is different."
Now, I know from other discussions and sources that this structuring of reality is nothing an idealist would scoff at -- in fact, it seems a natural fit. But herein lies the problem.
We reject dualism, and thus we recognize that our bodies and our minds are not separable. Our minds, rather, emerge from the idea of our biology in a non-reciprocal fashion similar to that described above. So, to cut the brain can change memory, preferences, behavior, etc., but adopting such behavioral changes voluntarily doesn't lead to brains with cuts in them.
It's clear that our minds are part of the same continuum in which these different strata of reality make use of different mechanisms. If this were not the case, the sort of reductionism that leads some materialists to hard determinism would be unavoidable.
Why, therefore, do we view the mechanism of our finite consciousness as in any way adequate as an analogy for the far, far more fundamental mechanism at work in the overmind -- which not only presents us with the ideas of our perceptions, but the objective existence of the very bodies fundamental to our own ideation?
We wouldn't expect the mechanisms responsible for a basketball bouncing off the backboard would provide us with a coherent glimpse into the workings of quarks or gluons. So: Why would we assume our finite, constituted consciousnesses would yield any analogical insight into the mind whose thoughts constitutes them at the most fundamental level possible and therefore operates according to entirely different mechanisms and principles?
As someone once said: "My thoughts are not your thoughts," eh?
I hope that's clearer!
"But then again, other minds assist in our apprehension of them. As LK has been pointing out, we can't inductively apprehend the overmind."
DeleteThat's not true. We apprehend it through the fact that I have sensations. I'm apprehending it right now.
We cannot understand its scope and reach -- i.e. we cannot share its experiences. But that is true of other finite minds also.
"Honest aside, what is your preferred, most-complete definition of "idea"?"
Anything that appears in a mind. Alternatively: the contents of a mind.
"Why, therefore, do we view the mechanism of our finite consciousness as in any way adequate as an analogy for the far, far more fundamental mechanism at work in the overmind?"
Because all we experience is minds and ideas. Some ideas are not under control of our minds, so they must be controlled by another mind.
All the evidence indicates that only minds produce ideas, so we take from this evidence that ideas that are not produced in our minds are produced in another.
We could posit that something else is going on here (i.e. matter etc.) but there would be ZERO evidence. If I'm faced with an explanation that has some evidence in its favor and another which has none I choose the former. That is hardly a controversial way of reasoning and I am not sure why any rational person would debate this point.
"We could posit that something else is going on here (i.e. matter etc.) but there would be ZERO evidence. "
DeletePhilip Pilkington,
Just to clarify things: Can you explain or confirm how you justify these statements:
(1) "There are ideas over which I have no control (perceptions)."
This is a synthetic a posteriori statement.
I assume you would justify it by appeal to direct personal experience, yes?
(2) "there are ideas over which I have no control (perceptions) with a causal origin external to me"
You must also believe this even as an idealist, because to invoke an "super-mind" or god to explain these ideas logically entails an external source of the ideas over which we have no control.
But how do you justify this statement?
"That's not true. We apprehend it through the fact that I have sensations. I'm apprehending it right now."
DeleteDon't you see how that begs the question, though?
"Anything that appears in a mind. Alternatively: the contents of a mind."
How do we define "contents" or "mind"? Are these not ideas, too? I expect you see where I'm going with this.
"Because all we experience is minds and ideas. Some ideas are not under control of our minds, so they must be controlled by another mind."
But here's where it no longer follows. Even if we permit the very reasonable position that only minds produce ideas (I'm with you here!) and that all we perceive is ideal (ditto!), we still don't have any way of distinguishing a "better" choice between a) someone else made the idea and b) I made the idea based on an intransitive reality. Either way we're hanging everything on an assumption of an intransitive reality that is a) governed by a mind or b) not governed by a mind. If there's a knockdown argument one way or the other, apparently no one here (or, it would seem, in all of history) has made it.
The only evidence we can suggest points us in one direction or the other is highly inconclusive. We've got, on one hand, a view of the world exclusively from the perspective of mind; were it not so, then our new vantage point would also be termed "mind." It's unavoidable. But on the other hand, we don't perceive any supposed thinker in and of itself, and most of what we perceive is not obviously mind; rocks and clouds and so on. To say otherwise calls for a derivation based on some premises that are indisputable ("only minds produce ideas") and some that assume the very thing they set out to prove ("there is no world independent of mind").
While I'm much more sympathetic to the idealist perspective now, it still seems like a monumental leap to be more than agnostic about it -- especially if it doesn't actually have any implication for how we conduct our investigations of what we understand to be reality.
In fact, to extend that last bit, I don't think it's right to charge anyone in this debate with "mysticism," so long as they're willing to accept their position as inherently fallible.
DeleteAs you said right at the top: "Berkeley's argument is that a belief in God -- i.e. an uber-consciousness -- is less abstract and less likely to be incorrect."
By invoking likelihood, you've actually situated us much closer together than may have been immediately apparent. Nobody here is, far as I can tell, making claims to apodicticity.
It's late but here it goes...
DeleteLK: (1) is an empirical statement, yes. It says that there are certain ideas (perceptions etc.) over which I have no control. (2) states that therefore these uncontrollable ideas (perceptions etc.) must have a source outside of me. I see no problem with this. But you ask why. I'm not sure why you ask this.
BUT I guess you could mean: how do I conclude that the ideas over which I have no control have a source external to me? Well, I guess it depends how you define "me". I would define it as "those ideas over which I have control". I think this overlaps with common sense in that the "I" or "me" is that entity in grammar which I use to designate my actions. So, in that sense the equating is a tautology. But then, a self-stable "me" will always be so.
Hedlund: "Don't you see how that begs the question, though?"
Not really...
"How do we define "contents" or "mind"? Are these not ideas, too? I expect you see where I'm going with this."
Contents = that which is internal to. This is an idea/concept.
Mind = that entity that I think of as self-same and which acts and reacts to ideas. This is not an idea because it is that which reacts to ideas.
I don't fully understand the rest. But on the point where you say the idealist/materialist dichotomy doesn't make any difference I'd entirely disagree. I've written a lot on this. Eg:
http://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/2013/10/06/matter-and-models/
"By invoking likelihood, you've actually situated us much closer together than may have been immediately apparent. Nobody here is, far as I can tell, making claims to apodicticity."
DeleteOf course not! I'm an empiricist, as is Berkeley! We base our opinions on evidence and likelihood -- not Truth!
But the idealist argument, being logically coherent, it more likely than the materialist on, which is not based on logic or reason.
Thanks for clarifying, but on this:
Delete"Well, I guess it depends how you define "me". I would define it as "those ideas over which I have control". I think this overlaps with common sense in that the "I" or "me" is that entity in grammar which I use to designate my actions. So, in that sense the equating is a tautology. But then, a self-stable "me" will always be so."
Surely you need a better argument than this.
To say it is a tautology really doesn't take you very far.
For example, even the idealist is subject to the radical skeptical objection: what if even your waking life and even objects over which you have no control are just your own dreams?
I will write another post on this later to clarify what I mean here.
Yeah sure. It's always open to skeptical doubt of the Hume "the I is not real" etc. But so is any doctrine of the coherence of consciousness. I think that there is an "I" -- it encompasses my will, my ability to reason, my ability to imagine and act and so on.
DeleteFrankly, if you deny the "I" you have a very hard time explaining these things. You also have a very hard time explaining the coherence of consciousness -- the fact that, even if you doubt it, I do experience myself as an "I".
"I don't fully understand the rest. But on the point where you say the idealist/materialist dichotomy doesn't make any difference I'd entirely disagree."
DeleteI dunno if I'd say it doesn't make a difference per se. I mean, I don't think they are the same, in any substantive sense of the word. It's just that they share a comparable problem: being confronted with something radically other that nevertheless constitutes their reality, including their selves.
Here's the most compact and neutral way I can think of to express the difference: Materialists cannot intuit that which they experience (matter), and Idealists cannot experience that which they intuit (the overmind as such).
I'm not looking to convert anyone, since my own convictions are not terribly strong. I mostly just signed on to the discussion because I felt particular idealist charges about materialists were unfounded and frankly unfair.
I'm not sure there's much more to say about it, though I've enjoyed this discussion.
"Materialists cannot intuit that which they experience (matter), and Idealists cannot experience that which they intuit (the overmind as such)."
DeleteI don't think that's accurate. Materialists don't experience matter. They experience ideas.
Matter is just a made up term. It contains nothing descriptive.
Yes, thank you, good catch. Kindly add "their ideas of" before either of those referents.
Delete"For the materialist, one strong and straightforward argument is that we have a strong degree of empirical evidence that human minds are causally dependent on brains,"
ReplyDeleteThe non-materialist, however, might argue that this apparently "causal" link between brains and minds can be alternatively explained as follows. Rather than being the cause of mind/consciousness, the brain simply act as a transmitter between mind and body, analogues to a radio-antenna.
Hence a non-materialist might argue that brain damage (the principal argument in favour of the materialist position on the mind) does not in fact alter one's mind, but it in reality just hinders the communication between mind and body.
I agree. But this is still a dualist argument. It's analogous to what I said in the comments of the last piece: for a dualist, consciousness is dependent on the brain but it is not determined by the brain.
DeleteThe idealist argument is more radical and simpler. We would say: the brain? But that's just an idea that we have in our minds. There is no "matter" underlying the brain. It is just a perception that we have.
Now, we know that if we damage this perception we alter consciousness. But that is no different from saying that if we take the perception of fire and move it to the perception I have of my hand then I feel heat. This is all fine. We know all this already. What we are saying is that these are just ideas/perceptions. We can establish relations and even laws between these ideas/perceptions. That's fine. We just say that there is no "matter" underlying these because the word is without meaning and cannot be given meaning.
I feel a bout of Pantheism coming on.
ReplyDeleteI walked into a glass door the other day. It was embarassing.
ReplyDeleteThe other day I walked into a glass door. It was embarrassing. Would Idealists and Non-Idealists interpret this event differently?
ReplyDelete