Risk and Uncertainty in Post Keynesian Economics

The distinction between risk and uncertainty is fundamental in Post Keynesian economics, as it was in the economic thinking of John Maynard Keynes. While risk can be quantified, uncertainty simply cannot be quantified.

The notion of future uncertainty is partly related to David Hume’s difficult philosophical problem of induction. According to Hume, we have no basis for believing that induction is rational. Human beings use induction out of habit, but there is no rational justification for this belief in induction. Although a full discussion of the problem of induction is not what I want to do here, a few comments can be made.

In brief, induction is the use of a finite number of specific observations to make a general conclusion. The most common form is the use of past observations of events to infer a general conclusion about how nature will behave in the future (e.g., gravity will continue to operate tomorrow or 10 minutes from now). But we can just as easily appeal to observed events in the recent past or present to make a general conclusion about the past (e.g., miracles do not happen in the past). The conclusion of an inductive argument is only probable and never certain.

The trouble is that observation of a finite number of events in the past does not seem to justify the belief that events will continue to happen in this way in the future. One solution to the problem is to assume the uniformity of nature. But even here the assumption that nature is uniform requires an inductive argument, so the reasoning is circular (and note that the radical sense of uncertainty that emerges in the absence of a justification for induction and the uniformity of nature is rather different from Keynesian uncertainty, which relates to future events for which no measurable probability can be given, as we will see below). Various philosophers have tried to solve the problem of induction (Will 1953; Edwards 1965; Strawson 1952; BonJour 1998; Salmon 1974), but many believe there is no satisfactory justification. Hume concluded that we use induction out of habit but with no legitimate basis, and modern evolutionary psychologists might argue that our ability to instinctively reason inductively is an innate property of the brain (like language or moral sentiments), which we have acquired by evolution, even though there is no rational justification for it.

Probably the best solution to the problem of induction (for both the natural and social sciences) is the use of Karl Popper’s critical rationalism (even though Popper’s critical rationalism seems to be widely criticised in modern analytic philosophy [Musgrave 2004: 16–17], and another complaint is that, while many working scientists claim to be Popperians in method, in practice they behave like good Bayesian inductivists [Evans 2007: 33]).

Popper adopts the hypothetico-deductive method, with falsification (not verification) of hypotheses by empirical evidence the key. In hypothetico-deduction, we use the method of forming a hypothesis, deducing predictions or conclusions from it, then empirically testing the predictions or conclusions, and thereby attempting to falsify the hypothesis. Popper comes to an astonishing conclusion:

“I go further than Hume: I hold that inductive procedures simply do not exist (not even low-level ones) and that the story of their existence is a myth” (Popper 1983: 118; see also Musgrave 2004: 18).

Induction is also unnecessary: we simply do not need it. In the natural sciences and other scientific inquiry, what really happens is that we use deduction, especially by means of the modus tollens and the elimination of erroneous hypotheses by empirical evidence, in a process of trial and error (more on this below).

John Maynard Keynes’ Treatise on Probability (1921) was an attempt to answer Hume on the problem of induction. Keynes took the view that induction was justified by a relation of probability which was objective (although later he conceded that probability was not an objective relation). But Keynes also came to argue that there must be a distinction between risk and uncertainty.

Risk is something where a measurable probability can be given to outcomes, e.g., the probability of rolling a 3 when throwing a dice is 1 in 6 (Glickman 2003: 366). In contrast, we face fundamental uncertainty about many other events, and no measurable probabilities can be assigned (e.g., what the interest rate will be in 10 years time). This distinction between risk and uncertainty was also made by Frank Knight.

Keynes’s conception of uncertainty applies to what is technically called a nonergodic stochastic system (Davidson 2002: 187). Our economies are such complex systems, as are many other economic phenomena (e.g., stock markets and financial markets).

We face fundamental ontological or metaphysical uncertainty about many events in the future, a state of affairs which – when applied to economics – can be called “Keynesian uncertainty” (or uncertainty in the sense of Frank Knight, Keynes, George L. S. Shackle and Ludwig Lachmann).

Since there is fundamental uncertainty about many economic variables in the future (particularly in the long-term future), investment decisions cannot be based on a firm calculation of probabilities of future earnings. Since subjective preferences can change in the future, not all investment decisions today will be profitable in the future. The process involved in decision-making about investment and the action of investment itself is not rational calculation.

There is a time difference between production of commodities and the successful sale of those commodities at a profit, and so even the production of commodities has a speculative element, in which decisions to invest in production involve habits of minds, instincts, and conventions.

Thus the investment decisions of a firm are based on expectations of future earnings, which are not necessarily rational at all. When investment decisions are made, they are done under conditions of subjective expectations by business, and the expectations depend on what Keynes called “animal spirits” (for the original concept, see Gerrard 1994). Keynes discussed the factors influencing long-run expectations in Chapter 12 of the General Theory. Because of uncertainty about the future, expectations in investment decisions is not a matter of mathematical calculation. Decisions to invest are taken

“as a result of animal spirits – of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities” (Keynes 2008 [1936]: 144).

The term “animal spirits” was borrowed by Keynes from Descartes (Gerrard 1994: 15), and whether or not modern psychology provides support for Keynes’ idea that we have a “spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction” is really irrelevant. The fundamental point here is that, because of uncertainty about the future and changing subjective preferences of consumers and other exogenous factors driving supply and demand, there can be no genuine rationality in expectations. Expectations are subjective, and the investment decision is essentially non-rational.

There has been a resurgence of interest in subjective expectations since the great recession of 2008/2009, and most notably the New Keynesians George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller have published a book studying this subject (Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism, 2009).

Neoclassical economics in its various forms (e.g., general equilibrium analysis, the efficient market hypothesis, and New Classical economics) assumes the ergodic axiom, the belief that the future can be known or events in the future given objective probabilities. But recognition of the ontological uncertainty of events in the future and changing subjective preferences means that events cannot be quantified in terms of probabilities. This destroys the basis of rational expectations and other neoclassical theories.

In the face of the shock of the financial crisis in 2008, the severe global recession in 2008–2009, and debt deflation, business expectations across the world plummeted. The destruction of optimistic expectations is undoubtedly an important factor that will mire many economies around the world in periods of stagnation with low growth and high unemployment in years to come. The Keynesian resurgence and stimulus packages in many countries in 2008–2009 prevented a depression, but much more stimulus is needed in the major economies to restore better growth and to bring unemployment down (there are of course other problems too, such as poorly regulated financial markets and loss of manufacturing in countries like the US that will have to be fixed). Government spending and fiscal stimulus can help to overcome the poor business expectations in many countries.

To return to an earlier point above, how can we justify government intervention in the face of uncertainty? If one accepts that induction can be justified (perhaps along the lines of Will 1953 or Strawson 1952), then obviously one could use an inductive argument for government intervention.

But, if we argue that induction has severe philosophical problems and cannot be justified, how in fact do we justify the hypothesis that government stimulus packages should be used and will work? My answer is that we do not need inductive arguments. We can use Karl Popper’s hypothetico-deductive method to test Keynesian hypotheses about stimulus. Our Keynesian models of stimulus will make predictions about what will happen to an economy, and, if they are not falsified by the empirical evidence, they will have passed the test of falsification, just as they have many times in the past. Popper argued that the hypothetico-deductive method was fundamental to both the natural sciences and social sciences, and he makes a good case for this (Popper 1976: 130–143; Milonakis and Fine 2009: 262–263). In short, induction is unnecessary, and economic methodology can be hypothetico-deductive with falsification of hypotheses by empirical evidence, as M. Blaug (1992) has also argued.

The issue of how Popper’s critical rationalism should be properly applied to economics is not my purpose, and the issue is a difficult one.

Of course, there are numerous economists who do not think that a strict Popperian methodology of economics is workable (Caldwell 1985: 126), and on this subject one can consult as a starting point the critical essays in N. De Marchi (ed.). The Popperian Legacy in Economics: Papers Presented at a Symposium in Amsterdam, December 1985 (Cambridge and New York, 1988), with a response by L. A. Boland (1990–1992).

Lawrence A. Boland contends that economists promoting a Popperian methodology for economics have not fully understood Popper’s critical rationalism, and have been misled by Imre Lakatos’s alleged distortion of Popper’s thought by overemphasizing the role of falsificationism (Boland 2006: 222–223). Boland (2006: 223–224) believes that an Imre Lakatos-inspired and pseudo-Popperian method has been adopted by some proponents of a Popperian methodology for economics.

Although this question requires a post in its own right, there is no doubt that Popper argued for the unity of method and the importance of hypothetico-deduction in the The Poverty of Historicism:

“I … propose a doctrine of the unity of method; that is to say, the view that all theoretical or generalizing sciences make use of the same method, whether they are natural sciences or social sciences …. I do not intend to assert that there are no differences whatever between the methods of the theoretical sciences of nature and of society …. But I agree with Comte and Mill—and with many others, such as C. Menger—that the methods in the two fields are fundamentally the same (though what I understand by them may not be what they had in mind). The methods always amount to deductive causal explanation, prediction, and testing, as sketched in the foregoing section. This has sometimes been called the hypothetico-deductive method, or more often the method of hypothesis, for it does not achieve absolute certainty for any of the scientific statements which it tests; rather, these statements always retain the character of tentative hypotheses, even though their character of tentativeness may cease to be obvious after they have passed a great number of severe tests” (Popper 1976: 130–131).

I will note in conclusion that a Critical Realist methodology is often proposed for Post Keynesianism (King 2002: 197–200; Jespersen 2009), and that this position might be compatible with the core elements of a Popperian methodology too (King 2002: 253–254; Jespersen 2009: 57–62), and that in his later work Popper appears to have moved closer to Critical Realism (Lawson 1999: 8–9).

APPENDIX 1: THE PARADOX OF INDUCTION?

I noted above that an intuitive ability to reason inductively is probably an innate trait of the human mind, given to us by evolution by natural selection. Animals, for example, appear to use rudimentary induction in probability calculations when they forage for food (Real 1991).

Even though there is no rational justification for it, why then has induction been so successful and obviously selected for as a survival trait? Even if Popper and Hume are right, we are faced with the paradox that we appear use induction very frequently and that it is a successful form of reasoning, by and large (the fact that induction is of limited use in non-ergodic stochastic systems and that we can err in our inductive arguments does not change this fact [for a list of common fallacies in defective inductive reasoning, see Copi and Cohen 2005: 140–145]).

That inductive reasoning has been highly successful and useful in increasing our chances of survival (and was thus selected by evolution) does not necessarily mean that is it rationally justified, of course.

For example, the belief in life after death might very well help some human beings overcome the trauma and stress of losing a loved one or even contemplating their own death (perhaps it might even make them healthier and better able to survive?), but it is still an irrational, unjustified idea.

But the success of induction is presumably explained by the uniformity of nature which has persisted since the first living things with rudimentary inductive reasoning evolved (for example, if the law of gravity had stopped working 1 million years ago, then all land animals would simply have floated off the planet into space and been killed, and there would be no human beings today; the fact that we are here strongly suggests that basic natural laws have remained uniform).

Human beings have also evolved to use induction. I am aware that this is somewhat similar to Willard Van Orman Quine’s (1908–2000) naturalized epistemology and his explanation of why induction is successful. Quine argues that, while Darwinian evolution does not justify induction, it must explain why it is so effective (Derksen 2000: 27–28; Quine 1975; as an aside, Quine also argues that there is no synthetic/analytic distinction. Thus analytic propositions are just firmly-held synthetic propositions, and there are no real a priori propositions. Quine agrees with Popper that the essence of science is the falsificationist hypothetico-deductive method). And, if the uniformity of nature continues to hold in the future, then presumably inductive reasoning will continue to be successful in those areas where it works well.


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