Roosevelt’s Volte Face

Roosevelt’s volte face was basically this: in the 1933 election he had campaigned as a kind of fiscal conservative in favour of a balanced federal budget, and that can be seen in the Democratic Party Platform of 1932:

“The Democratic Party solemnly promises by appropriate action to put into effect the principles, policies, and reforms herein advocated, and to eradicate the policies, methods, and practices herein condemned. We advocate an immediate and drastic reduction of governmental expenditures by abolishing useless commissions and offices, consolidating departments and bureaus, and eliminating extravagance to accomplish a saving of not less than twenty-five per cent in the cost of the Federal Government. And we call upon the Democratic Party in the states to make a zealous effort to achieve a proportionate result.

We favor maintenance of the national credit by a federal budget annually balanced on the basis of accurate executive estimates within revenues, raised by a system of taxation levied on the principle of ability to pay.”
Democratic Party Platform, 1932

Austrians and libertarians make a big deal of this, yet when one reads the rest of the policy platform one finds somewhat progressive stances as well, such as the following:

“We advocate the extension of federal credit to the states to provide unemployment relief wherever the diminishing resources of the states makes it impossible for them to provide for the needy; expansion of the federal program of necessary and useful construction effected [sic] with a public interest, such as adequate flood control and waterways.

We advocate the spread of employment by a substantial reduction in the hours of labor, the encouragement of the shorter week by applying that principle in government service; we advocate advance planning of public works.

We advocate unemployment and old-age insurance under state laws.”

In short, the Democratic Party Platform of 1932 was a mixed bag, but there is no denying its concern with eliminating federal deficits.

I suspect that most American voters really paid very little attention to the “fiscally conservative” rhetoric Roosevelt was using in 1933. Most Americans were sick and tied of three years of deflationary depression and voted against Hoover by voting for his major opponent.

Once Roosevelt got into office he abandoned his immediate concern with fiscal conservatism until he turned to it once again in 1937 and actually nearly balanced the budget in a move that induced another recession in 1937–1938.

But, above all, before this second recession induced by austerity the American people had voted Roosevelt into office again, re-electing him, and giving the vote of confidence in his shift to intervention in the election of 1936:

“The United States presidential election of 1936 was the most lopsided presidential election in the history of the United States in terms of electoral votes. In terms of the popular vote, it was the third biggest victory since the election of 1820, which was not seriously contested. The election took place as the Great Depression entered its eighth year. Incumbent President Franklin D. Roosevelt was still working to push the provisions of his New Deal economic policy through Congress and the courts. However, the New Deal policies he had already enacted, such as Social Security and unemployment benefits, had proven to be highly popular with most Americans … Although some political pundits predicted a close race, Roosevelt went on to win the greatest electoral landslide since the beginning of the current two-party system in the 1850s, carrying all but 8 electoral votes. Roosevelt carried every state except Maine and Vermont.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_election,_1936

So it is quite clear that Roosevelt’s New Deal and volte face on fiscal policy won him the election of 1936!

US Unemployment in the 1930s

US unemployment statistics for the 1930s are normally taken from the standard Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data based on the work of Stanley Lebergott (1964).

A serious problem with this standard data is that it significantly overestimates unemployment because it excludes emergency workers employed in US federal government programs like the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC, April 1933–June 1943), the National Youth Administration (NYA, January 1936–May 1943), the Civil Works Administration (CWA, November 1933–July 1934), the Emergency Work-Relief Program (April 1934–December 1935) of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), and the Works Progress Administration (WPA, July 1935–June 1943) (Darby 1976: 4). Most of these were full-time jobs in construction projects and public works (Darby 1976: 4).

First, the conventional BLS unemployment data can be seen below.

This can also be seen in table form:

Year | Unemployment Rate
1929 | 3.2%
1930 | 8.7%
1931 | 15.9%
1932 | 23.6%
1933 | 24.9%
1934 | 21.7%
1935 | 20.1%
1936 | 16.9%
1937 | 14.3%
1938 | 19.0%
1939 | 17.2%
1940 | 14.6%
1941 | 9.9%
1942 | 4.7%
1943 | 1.9%
(Darby 1976: 8).

In these figures, we see that unemployment fell from 24.9% in 1933 to 14.3% in 1937. That was a significant fall during the moderate fiscal stimulus employed by Roosevelt, and it essentially shows us private sector employment growth.

But it is still a serious overestimate of real unemployment rates. Now let us look at the corrected data for unemployment in Darby (1976: 8), by including employment provided by US federal government programs.

Again, this can also be seen in table form:

Year | Unemployment Rate
1929 | 3.2%
1930 | 8.7%
1931 | 15.3%
1932 | 22.5%
1933 | 20.6%
1934 | 16.0%
1935 | 14.2%
1936 | 9.9%
1937 | 9.1%
1938 | 12.5%
1939 | 11.3%
1940 | 9.5%
1941 | 6.0%
1942 | 3.1%
1943 | 1.8%
(Darby 1976: 8).

When employment provided by federal relief work is included in the employment figures, unemployment under Roosevelt came down from 20.6% in 1933 just under 9.9% by 1936 – a quite significant fall.

In fact, both data sets show us a significant fall in unemployment which occurred during the recovery under Roosevelt.

The fundamental point is this: if Roosevelt had not turned to austerity in 1937 the US was on track for a return to full employment by 1939. Many of the public programs could have been reduced too as private sector demand for labour would have transferred people from the public to private sector.

We can see this by looking at the revised graph with a rough trend line for falling unemployment added.

But instead of pursuing continuing fiscal stimulus or (better still) increased stimulus, Roosevelt turned to budget balancing and contractionary fiscal and monetary policy in 1937, and the result was that he induced a second recession from 1937 to 1938 (the so-called “Roosevelt recession”).

This is the fundamental lesson ignored by Austrians, libertarians and other critics of Keynesianism.

Further Reading
Mitchell, B., “What causes mass unemployment?,” January 11th, 2010.

“(Very) short reading list: unemployment in the 1930s,” October 10, 2008.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Darby, M. R. 1976. “Three-and-a-Half Million U.S. Employees Have Been Mislaid: Or, an Explanation of Unemployment, 1934–1941,” Journal of Political Economy 84.1: 1–16.

Lebergott, S. 1964. Manpower in Economic Growth: The American Record since 1800. McGraw-Hill, New York.

Another Austrian Fable

I refer to the last statement made by Robert P. Murphy at the end of this post:

Robert P. Murphy, “There’s Really Been a Lot of Real Shocks to the Economy,” 24 September, 2012.

Here is what he says:

“And–if I might be even bolder–maybe all of the crazy things FDR did under the New Deal explain the length of the Great Depression, as opposed to ‘tight money’ (even though the US went off gold in 1933, and we never had a depression as long under the gold standard as we did after we went off it).”

Notice how this statement depends on a loose definition of the word “depression” to include not just a period of real output collapse, but its aftermath. If we define “depression” as GDP contraction and its aftermath with high unemployment, then the 19th century had two serious “depressions”: the 1870s and 1890s, for example.

According to the data from Davis’s (2004) industrial index, the US had a recession from 1873 to 1875 lasting less than 3 years, but then an aftermath of continued, rising unemployment right down until 1878. The 1890s saw a double dip recession and rising unemployment until 1898. In one important respect, both these decades were worse than the Great Depression, because in the 1870s and 1890s unemployment continued to rise even after a recovery began. By contrast, at least unemployment started falling in 1933 (and subsequent years) when the recovery from the Great Depression occurred.

In economic literature, however, one will find a useful definition of “depression” as a contraction of 10% or more in the value of real output (or real GDP/GNP). Even the Economist informs us that there are “two principal criteria for distinguishing a depression from a recession: a decline in real GDP that exceeds 10%, or one that lasts more than three years.”

By this definition, America had a depression from 1929–1933. The depression – that is to say, the real output contraction – ended in 1933, and what followed was its aftermath: a period of high, but falling, unemployment and recovery, where there was real output growth.

And, by the same definition, it is patently absurd to blame Roosevelt for what happened from 1929 to March 1933 (when the actual depression occurred), since he was not even inaugurated until the later month and year.

It also equally absurd to invoke the gold standard. The US abandoned the gold standard in June 1933, and after this experienced a period of recovery. The US had the worst depression in its history while it was on a gold exchange standard.

What happened after Roosevelt was inaugurated and in the years when he turned to moderately expansionary fiscal policy? Both real GDP and real per capita GDP grew and expanded at quite high rates historically, as we can see here:

Year | GDP* | Growth Rate
1929 | $977,000
1930 | $892,800 | -8.61%
1931 | $834,900 | -6.48%
1932 | $725,800 | -13.06%
1933 | $716,400 | -1.29%
1934 | $794,400 | 10.88%
1935 | $865,000 | 8.88%
1936 | $977,900 | 13.05%
1937 | $1,028,000 | 5.12%
1938 | $992,600 | -3.44%
1939 | $1,072,800 | 8.07%
1940 | $1,166,900 | 8.77%
* Millions of 2005 dollars
http://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/usgdp/result.php

Next, real per capita GDP:

Real US Per Capita GDP 1870–2001
(in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars)
Year | GDP | Growth rate
1929 | 6899 | 5.02%
1930 | 6213 | -9.94%
1931 | 5691 | -8.40%
1932 | 4908 | -13.75%
1933 | 4777 | -2.66%
1934 | 5114 | 7.05%
1935 | 5467 | 6.90%
1936 | 6204 | 13.48%
1937 | 6430 | 3.64%
1938 | 6126 | -4.72%
1939 | 6561 | 7.10%
1940 | 7010 | 6.84%
(Maddison 2006: 88).

By 1936, real GDP had surpassed its 1929 level, and in 1937 real per capita GDP was close to reaching its 1929 level as well – until Roosevelt listened to advocates of fiscal austerity and the economy plunged back into recession.

And unemployment under Roosevelt fell consistently down to 1938. It is now well known that the official statistics do not include the employment provided by emergency and relief work in US federal government programs (Darby 1976). The reason for this was nothing but an ideological bias on the part of Lebergott, who compiled the figures.

When employment provided by relief work is included in the employment figures, unemployment under Roosevelt came down from 25% to just under 10% by 1937. This is a much better record on unemployment than the official statistics reveal.

One can see proper graphs of the falls in unemployment here:

Mitchell, B., “What causes mass unemployment?,” January 11th, 2010.

“(Very) short reading list: unemployment in the 1930s,” October 10, 2008.

The unemployment rate soared again when Roosevelt cut government spending in 1937, but the adjusted figures show it rising from under 10% to about 12.5% in 1938, and not to around 19% in the old figures

The Austrians just flunk history, time and again.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Darby, M. R. 1976. “Three-and-a-Half Million U.S. Employees Have Been Mislaid: Or, an Explanation of Unemployment, 1934–1941,” Journal of Political Economy 84.1: 1–16.

Davis, Joseph H. 2004. “An Annual Index of U. S. Industrial Production, 1790–1915,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119.4: 1177–1215.

Davis, Joseph H. 2006. “An Improved Annual Chronology of U.S. Business Cycles since the 1790s,” Journal of Economic History 66.1: 103–121.

Lebergott, S. 1964. Manpower in Economic Growth: The American Record since 1800. McGraw-Hill, New York.

Maddison, Angus. 2003. The World Economy: Historical Statistics. OECD Publishing, Paris.

The “Dreaded” Post Keynesians?

In my various readings of the blogs that I find interesting, I just came across these remarks (that I seem to have missed) by George Selgin on the Free Banking blog referring to the debate that I recently had with Selgin here in the comments section of my blog on the Keynes versus Hayek LSE debate:

“At Social Democracy a post-Keynesian blogger who styles himself ‘Lord Keynes’ similarly misinterpreted my ‘liquidationist’ stand, inviting what became a long exchange with me there that was interesting in part because by engaging in it I learned that trying to argue with a dreaded Post-Keynesian can after all be a lot more rewarding, as well as a lot more pleasant, than trying to argue with many Rothbardians!
George Selgin, “The Keynesians Answer Back,” August 5th, 2011.

I did indeed make an error in my original post on Selgin’s position, but I was happy to correct it. And it was a pleasant surprise to find that Selgin’s position on the bailouts was one that a Post Keynesian could readily agree with. In actual fact, debating Selgin was a pleasure, and so much more rewarding than the blathering nonsense that one normally encounters from Rothbardian anarcho-capitalists.

But Selgin refers to the “dreaded” Post-Keynesians? Why “dreaded”?

It has long been known that the radical subjectivist wing of the Austrians and the Post Keynesians have ideas in common. In fact, the Austrian moderate subjectivists O’Driscoll and Rizzo tried to reach out to Post Keynesians in their book The Economics of Time and Ignorance with this comment:

“[i]t is evident that there is much more common ground between post-Keynesian subjectivism and Austrian subjectivism …. the possibilities for mutually advantageous interchange seem significant” (The Economics of Time and Ignorance, Oxford, UK, 1985, p. 9).

The “possibilities for mutually advantageous interchange” seem real to me, but there is so much mutual hostility from both sides that dialogue rarely comes to anything, mainly because Austrian economics is hijacked by the Rothbardian cult.

But I would like to think that the Austrians and Post Keynesians can learn from each other, even if obstacles remain. Ludwig Lachmann seems to be an Austrian whose work should be seriously examined by Post Keynesians.

Another point is that aspects of the Austrian/libertarian critique of Roosevelt’s New Deal, particularly those of Robert Higgs, are quite reasonable in some ways, especially since Keynes himself was also critical of the New Deal. There was undoubtedly some degree of “regime uncertainty” caused by the unprecedented interventions of Roosevelt’s New Deal which had never been seen before in America. When Keynes visited America in 1934, he saw first hand something that would confirm Higg’s view:

“[sc. Keynes] acknowledged that some aspects of the New Deal had created a crisis of confidence in the business community, but turned this into an argument that the government should increase its emergency expenditure to $400m. a month, while trying to reassure business that ‘they know the worst’ and discontinuing some aspects of the objectionable policies of the National Recovery Administration.” (Skidelsky 1992: 508).

The truth is that certain aspects of the New Deal had little if anything to do with Keynesianism. The New Deal came out of different ideas and types of thinking, and one of these was the sort of American corporatism/cartelism that even Herbert Hoover had supported to some extent. The solution to Roosevelt’s troubles was simply stopping his anti-business rhetoric and ending many of his counterproductive programs, and concentrating on fiscal stimulus, just as Keynes advised.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Skidelsky, R. J. A. 1992. John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour, 1920–1937 (vol. 2), Macmillan, London.

Debunking Catalán on the Recession of 1937-1938

Jonathan M. Finegold Catalán attempts to prove that the recession of 1937–1938 was not caused by contractionary fiscal and monetary policy:

Jonathan M. Finegold Catalán, “Dangerous Lessons of 1937,” Mises Daily, February 2, 2010.

I. The Data
First, some basic facts about the recession and data:

(1) In the US, the fiscal year before 1976 ran from July 1 to June 30 in the next year. So in the relevant years the actual fiscal years were as follows:

Roosevelt inaugurated March 4, 1933.
Fiscal 1934: July 1, 1933 – June 30, 1934
Fiscal 1935: July 1, 1934 – June 30, 1935
Fiscal 1936: July 1, 1935 – June 30, 1936
Fiscal 1937: July 1, 1936 – June 30, 1937
Fiscal 1938: July 1, 1937 – June 30, 1938
Fiscal 1939: July 1, 1938 – June 30, 1939
Fiscal 1940: July 1, 1939 – June 30, 1940

In analysing the effects of fiscal policy in these years, one should not confuse the calendar year with the fiscal year: these are two different things.

(2) The actual recession (economic contraction) ran from May 1937 to June 1938.¹ Thus the contraction began in the last months of fiscal year 1937 and lasted until the end of fiscal year 1938.

(3) Data on the Federal budget can be found here:

Federal Budget Receipts and Outlays: Coolidge – Obama.

(4) Data on total government spending (including local, state and federal) can be found here:

Total US Government Spending in billions of dollars.

The figures on total government spending (state, local, federal):

Year Outlays
1933 $12.62
1934 $12.81
1935 $14.78
1936 $16.76
1937 $17.22
1938 $17.68
1939 $19.05
1940 $20.42

Now these figures do not show us whether increases in total government spending were expansionary or contractionary, as one needs to look at whether the spending increases occurred by deficit spending or merely out of current revenues.

II. Critique
Let us now refute and correct Catalán’s assertions and errors here:

(1) Catalán states that

“The idea that Herbert Hoover was a laissez-faire president and that Roosevelt's New Deal paved the road to recovery have been refuted elsewhere.”

I have already refuted the Austrian attempts to paint Herbert Hoover as some radical interventionist president or big-spending Keynesian here:

“Herbert Hoover’s Budget Deficits: A Drop in the Ocean,” May 24, 2011.

Hoover adopted some very limited policy interventions and very mild increases in federal government spending from 1929–1932, but these were almost completely destroyed by state and local austerity.

(2) Catalán states that

“Interestingly, during 1935 — a year considered one of recovery — total government outlays measured $6.4 billion, less than during both 1936 and 1937. In fact, looking back to the years from 1933 to 1935, government spending peaked at $6.5 billion in 1934. It suffices to say that explaining Roosevelt's recession by pointing at a decrease in government spending is severely dishonest.”

Catalán commits the red herring fallacy, and is laughably ignorant of basic Keynesian theory: to gauge the effects of fiscal policy in any particular year and to see whether it was expansionary or contractionary, one must look at

(1) the size of the deficit and whether there was increased spending done via deficits, not just the size of spending per se;
(2) whether tax policy changed and if revenues rose owing to tax increases, and
(3) not just federal spending by itself, but total government spending at the local, state and federal level, to see if the net effect of deficit spending was expansionary.

In fact, total government spending in fiscal years 1935 and 1936 was highly expansionary:

Year* Total Outlays
1933 $12.62
1934 $12.81
1935 $14.78
1936 $16.76
1937 $17.22
1938 $17.68
1939 $19.05
1940 $20.42
*the fiscal year

The expansionary effect of fiscal policy in these years must be attributed to the large federal deficits. In fiscal year 1934 there had been a large deficit, but its expansionary effect was reduced to some extent by state and local austerity. In the fiscal years 1935 and 1936 federal deficits overcame that state and local austerity and imparted significant stimulus at a time when the financial system had been stabilised and monetary policy aided recovery.

It is no surprise that GDP soared in these years, with growth rates of 8.1% (1935) and 14.1% (1936). In 1937 and 1938, Roosevelt turned to budget balancing: the result was that federal deficit was virtually eliminated by fiscal year 1938 by

(1) the raising of taxes (which contracted private spending power), and
(2) reducing overall federal spending.

This shows up in the figures above for total government spending for 1937 and 1938, where total spending barely moved, and was at any rate offset by contractionary state and local fiscal policy, as in 1934 (Cary Brown 1956: 867–868).

In fact, the role of state and local governments during the depression was deeply contractionary most of the time:

“The nation’s fiscal policy throughout the Great Depression included the fiscal actions of state and local governments as well as of the federal government. During the early years of the depression, state governments increased spending for unemployment relief, primarily through subventions to local governments, which faced sharply declining property tax revenues, soaring rates of default, and even popular revolts, including a tax strike in Chicago. They did so by increasing sales taxes and by reducing spending on public works, especially highways, and schools. State constitutions, however, limited deficit finance, and new state and municipal bonds were extremely difficult to market. As the Depression worsened in 1931 and 1932, state and local governments found it impossible to conduct business as usual and still balance their budgets. State and local governments began adopting drastic economies, scaling back total expenditures in 1931 and sharply contracting them in 1933 and 1934. State governments welcomed federal funding of unemployment relief and public works, although they resisted the requirement of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration and the PWA for state matching funds. When economic recovery advanced, particularly in 1936 and 1938, state and local governments resumed spending on public works and education and thus once again increased their total outlays. Sharp increases in tax rates, however, erased any stimulative effect of state and local spending. State and local governments had pushed up tax rates every year between 1929 and 1933, and maintained those high levels until 1936, when they undertook even further increases. State governments increased the scope and rates of their sales taxes until, in 1940, they raised most of their funds through such levies.” (Elliot Brownlee 2000: 1044).

What was also deeply contractionary was the fact that state and local governments were running surpluses:

“Over the same seven years [sc. 1932–1938], state and local government revenues increased—principally from higher taxes—at a faster rate than expenditure.” (Bagwell and Mingay 1987: 282).

What the figures for total government spending (state, local and federal) from 1937–1938 tell us is that, while state and local governments did increase spending (which led to an overall increase in total government spending in each year), they

(1) did so by raising taxes (which did not stimulate the economy), and

(2) they even ran surpluses, which drained even more spending power from the economy, an astonishingly anti-Keynesian thing to do at a time when the economy needed countercyclical fiscal policy.

State and local government contractionary fiscal policy in 1937 and 1938 was thus caused by (1) raising taxes and (2) running surpluses.

The net effect of government fiscal policy in 1937 was to cause “a shift in demand of over [2.5] per cent of GNP in one year” (Cary Brown 1956: 866).

Catalán also ignores the following:

(1) in June 1936, the Revenue Act passed Congress and caused a significant increase in income tax rates, as well as the tax on undistributed profits. The main effect of the tax on undistributed profits was to adversely affect the cost of investment for small and medium-sized firms. There is a reasonable case to be made that this tax increased business uncertainty about profitability of investment.

(2) collection of the Social Security tax began in January 1937, another tax measure contracting private spending power.

(3) The Fed increased Reserve requirements on July 14, 1937 and this went into effect the next month; the second and third increases in reserve requirements were announced on January 30, 1937, and came into effect on March 1 and May 1 respectively. From December 1936, the treasury began to sterilise gold inflows into the United States by using proceeds of bond sales to pay for gold brought to the treasury. From December 1936 to February 1938 the monetary base grew by only 4% while gold stock grew by 15%.

The tax increases reduced the federal deficit very significantly indeed by fiscal year 1938, by causing revenues to rise. The net effect of all this when combined with federal spending cuts was highly contractionary: this was the cause of the 1937–1938 recession.

(3) Catalán ignores the fact that the Federal deficit was almost abolished in fiscal year 1938. Catalán states:

“It is not much more useful to look at deficit spending. True, deficit spending in 1937 was at its lowest since 1933, but it is worth mentioning that in 1938 — the same year as the economy rebounded from the 1937 dip — total government deficit spending amounted to only $89 million.”

In a strange non sequitur Catalán notes in passing that the deficit was massively reduced in fiscal year 1938 (July 1, 1937 – June 30, 1938): in fact, it was virtually eliminated and caused contractionary fiscal policy. The deficit in fiscal year 1938 was the lowest ever in all the years from 1931–1941. In terms of its fiscal impact, the federal budget was almost balanced in fiscal year 1938.

Catalán also confuses the fiscal year with the calendar year. Some data:

(1) The actual recession (economic contraction) ran from May 1937 to June 1938.

(2) Fiscal years:
Fiscal 1937: July 1, 1936 – June 30, 1937
Fiscal 1938: July 1, 1937 – June 30, 1938
Fiscal 1939: July 1, 1938 – June 30, 1939.

The recovery began in July 1938, which is in fiscal year 1939. Most of the actual recession coincided with fiscal year 1938, precisely the year when the deficit had been nearly abolished.

It was only in about April 1938 that Roosevelt turned once again to expansionary fiscal policy and ended the austerity programs. It was no surprise that some months later the recession ended, and economy began to grow again, and entered another expansionary phase of real GNP growth, as the federal deficit soared to $2.8 billion in fiscal year 1939 (July 1, 1938–June 30, 1939).

FOOTNOTES
(1) There seems to be some disagreement about when the recession ended. Cf. Gene Smiley (1997: 154), who states that the recession lasted from May 1937 until August 1938. The official NBER chronology, however, shows a recession from May 1937 to June 1938.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bagwell, P. S. and G. E. Mingay, 1987. Britain and America 1850–1939: A Study of Economic Change (2nd edn.), Routledge, London.

Cary Brown, E. 1956. “Fiscal Policy in the ’Thirties: A Reappraisal,” American Economic Review 46.5: 857–879.

Elliot Brownlee, W. 2000. “The Public Sector,” in S. L. Engerman and R. E. Gallman (eds), The Cambridge Economic History of the United States. Volume 3. The Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 1013–1060.

Gene Smiley, W. 1997. “Depression of 1937–1939,” in D. Glasner and T. F. Cooley (eds), Business Cycles and Depressions: An Encyclopedia, Garland Pub., New York. 154–155.