Michael Emmett Brady’s Papers on Keynes: A Bibliography

I am deeply immersed in the biography of John Maynard Keynes at the moment. I am also rapidly coming to the point in my readings where Keynes publishes his Treatise on Probability (1921). That being so, I will start a list below of papers by Michael Emmett Brady on Keynes’s contribution to probability theory and on broader issues:

Brady, Michael Emmett, 1983. The Foundation of Keynes’s Macrotheory: His Logical Theory of Probability and its Application in the General Theory and After, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Riverside.

Brady, Michael Emmett, 1987. “J. M. Keynes’ Theory of Evidential Weight: Its Relation to Information Processing Theory and Application in the General Theory,” Synthese 71: 37–60.

Brady, Michael Emmett, 1988. “J. M. Keynes’s Position on the General Applicability of Mathematical, Logical and Statistical Methods in Economics and Social Science,” Synthese 76.1: 1–24.

Brady, Michael Emmett and Howard B. Lee, 1989. “Dynamics of Choice Behavior: The Logical Relation Between Linear Objective Probability and Nonlinear Subjective Probability,” Psychological Reports 64: 91-97.

Brady, Michael Emmett, 1990. “The Mathematical Development of Keynes’s Aggregate Supply Function in the General Theory,” History of Political Economy 22.1: 167-172.

Brady, Michael Emmett, 1993. “J. M. Keynes’s Theoretical Approach to Decision-Making under Conditions of Risk and Uncertainty,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44.2: 357–376.

Brady, Michael Emmett, 1994. “Keynes, Pigou and the Supply Side of the General Theory,” History of Economics Review 21: 34–46.

Brady, Michael Emmett, 1994. “A Note on the Keynes-Pigou Controversy,” History of Political Economy 26.4: 697–705.

Brady, Michael Emmett, 1994. “On the Application of J. M. Keynes’s Approach to Decision Making,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8.2: 99–112.

Brady, Michael Emmett, 2010. “A Comparison-Contrast of Adam Smith, JM Keynes and Jeremy Bentham on Probability, Risk, Uncertainty, Optimism-Pessimism and Decision Making with Applications Concerning Banking, Insurance and Speculation,” SSRN Working Paper Series.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1728225

Brady, Michael Emmett and Rogério Arthmar, 2010. “Keynes’ Lower-Upper Bound Interval Approach to Probability,” SSRN Working Paper Series (February 2).
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546726

Brady, Michael Emmett, 2010. “How to Use Keynes’s Conventional Coefficient of Risk and Weight, c, to Clear Up Misunderstandings and Confusions About Keynes’s Views on the Use on His Principle of Indifference Versus the Use of Laplace’s Principle of Nonsufficient Reason,” SSRN Working Paper Series (November 27).
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1716043

Brady, Michael Emmett, 2011. “Comparing J. M. Keynes’s and F. Von Hayek’s Differing Definitions of Uncertainty as it Relates to Knowledge: Keynes’s Unavailable or Missing Knowledge Concept Versus Hayek’s Dispersal of Knowledge Concept,” SSRN Working Paper Series.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1751569

Brady, Michael Emmett, 2011. “Keynes, Mathematics and Probability: A Reappraisal,” SSRN Working Paper Series, August 31.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1920569

This is a quick list. No doubt I’ve left things out. I will update as needed.

Note that other treatments can be found in Carabelli (1988); Fitzgibbons (1988); O’Donnell (1989); Moggridge (1992: 143–166); and (Skidelsky 1992: 74–89). Other relevant works are in the bibliography below.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bateman, Bradley W. 1987. “Keynes’s Changing Conception of Probability,” Economics and Philosophy 3: 97-119.

Carabelli, Anna M. 1988. On Keynes’s Method, Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Cottrell, A. 1993. “Keynes’s Theory of Probability and its Relevance to His Economics: Three Theses,” Economics and Philosophy 9: 25-51.

Davidson, Paul. 1991. “Is Probability Theory Relevant for Uncertainty? A Post Keynesian Perspective,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5.1: 129-143.

De Carvalho, Fernando J. Cardim. 1988. “Keynes on Probability, Uncertainty, and Decision Making,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 11.1: 66-81.

Fitzgibbons, Athol. 1988. Keynes’s Vision: A New Political Economy, Clarendon, Oxford.

Gillies, D. 2006. “Keynes and Probability,” in R. Backhouse and B. Bateman (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Keynes Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York. 199-216.

Moggridge, D. E. 1992. Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography, Routledge, London.

O’Donnell, R. M. 1989. Keynes: Philosophy, Economics and Politics: The Philosophical Foundations of Keynes’s Thought and their Influence on his Economics and Politics, Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Ramsey, F. P. 1989 [1922]. “Mr Keynes on Probability,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40.2: 219-222.

Roncaglia, Alessandro. 2009. “Keynes and Probability: An Assessment,” European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 16.3: 489-510.

Rotheim, Roy J. 1988. “Keynes and the Language of Probability and Uncertainty,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 11.1: 82-99.

Skidelsky, R. J. A. 1992. John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour, 1920–1937 (vol. 2), Macmillan, London.

Michael Emmett Brady on Keynes’s Probability Theory in Mises and Rothbard

A quick post. There are some interesting reviews here by Michael Emmett Brady on Mises and Rothbard’s understanding of Keynes’ work on probability theory:

“Why Richard von Mises had no Clue about Keynes’s Approach,” http://www.amazon.com/gp/richpub/syltguides/fullview/R30TUJZSINCMJH

“Rothbard’s Many Errors about Keynes and Probability,” http://www.amazon.com/gp/richpub/syltguides/fullview/R83TIX8MB95QW

These bear careful reading, especially the second on Rothbard.

A sample:

‘Rothbard has made at least 10 errors in the space of 5 short paragraphs. The first 4 errors occur in Rothbard’s claim that “Keynes’s Treatise championed the classical a priori theory of probability, where probability fractions are deduced purely by logic and have nothing to do with empirical reality.” First, Keynes’s logical theory of probability is based on George Boole’s 1854 The Laws of Thought. It has nothing to do with the Classical theory of Laplace, whose Principle of Non Sufficient Reason Keynes decimated in the A Treatise on Probability in chapter 4. Second, all of Keynes’s probabilities are conditional. Third, the hypothesis, h, is always related to empirical evidence, e. Thus, a probability is always of the form P(h/e). Fourth, the claim that the “probability fractions are deduced purely by logic and have nothing to do with empirical reality” is simply bizarre as Keynes’s probabilities, in general, are intervals and are not sharp or point probabilities (fractions) except in the limiting case where the weight of the evidence, w, = or approaches 1. The condition that w = 1 or approaches 1 only occurs in the physical and biological sciences. Fifth, the probability relation is not deduced. It is perceived by the decision maker based on intuition, analogy and pattern recognition. …. Eighth, the claim that “… Keynes’s a priori theory was demolished by Richard von Mises (1951) in his 1920s work, ‘Probability, Statistics, and Truth’ is a bad joke. Richard von Mises incorrectly identifies Keynes as a subjectivist and committed the fatal error of overlooking Keynes’s requirement that all probabilities require that w > 0. Richard von Mises claim that Keynes specified probabilities for the case where w = 0 means that he never read the book he claimed to be discussing. Nineth, Rothbard’s claim that “Mises demonstrated that the probability fraction can be meaningfully used only when it embodies an empirically derived law of entities which are homogeneous, random, and indefinitely repeatable” had already been done by Keynes in chapters 8 and 33 of the TP. Keynes would have added the terms uniform and stable as he did in his debate with Tinbergen in 1939–40 in the Economic Journal. Ninth, the claim that “probability theory can only be applied to events which, in human life, are confined to those like the lottery or the roulette wheel” is only correct if one is using mathematical probability. Keynes includes interval probability as the main way in which people use probability. … Rothbard’s scholarship can only be characterized as pathetic.’
“Rothbard’s Many Errors about Keynes and Probability,” http://www.amazon.com/gp/richpub/syltguides/fullview/R83TIX8MB95QW

Comments are welcome: I have no hesitation in saying that the finer, technical points of probability theory are not my area.