That being so, I list a quick, but far from complete, bibliography on Alfred Marshall below:
Biographies and Studies on Marshall’s Economics
Arena, Richard and Michel Quéré. 2003. The Economics of Alfred Marshall: Revisiting Marshall’s Legacy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York and Basingstoke, UK.
Cook, Simon J. 2009. The Intellectual Foundations of Alfred Marshall’s Economic Science: A Rounded Globe of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.
Groenewegen, Peter. 1995. A Soaring Eagle: Alfred Marshall, 1842–1924. Edward Elgar, Aldershot and Brookfield, VT.
The best and most detailed biography of Marshall.
Groenewegen, Peter. 2007. Alfred Marshall: Economist 1842–1924. Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., New York.
A shorter, introductory biography.
Groenewegen, Peter. 2012. The Minor Marshallians and Alfred Marshall: An Evaluation. Routledge, New York.
A good study of the minor Marshallian economists and students of Marshall and their contributions to economics.
Raffaelli, Tiziano, Becattini, Giacomo, and Marco Dardi (eds). 2006. The Elgar Companion to Alfred Marshall. Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, Mass.
Wood, John Cunningham (ed.). 1982. Alfred Marshall: Critical Assessments. Croom Helm, London.
Marshall’s Writings and Collections of his Writings
Marshall, A. 1887. “Remedies for Fluctuations in General Prices,” Contemporary Review 51 (March): 357–375. (reprinted in Marshall 1925.)
Marshall, A. and Marshall, M. P. 1879. The Economics of Industry. Macmillan, London.
Marshall, Alfred. 1890. Principles of Economics (1st edn.). Macmillan, London.
Marshall, Alfred. 1891. Principles of Economics (2nd edn.). Macmillan, London.
Marshall, Alfred. 1895. Principles of Economics (3rd edn.). Macmillan, London.
Marshall, Alfred. 1898. Principles of Economics (4th edn.). Macmillan, London.
Marshall, Alfred. 1907. Principles of Economics (5th edn.). Macmillan, London.
Marshall, Alfred. 1916. Principles of Economics (7th edn.). Macmillan, London.
Marshall, Alfred. 1920. Principles of Economics: An Introductory Volume (8th edn.). Macmillan, London.
Marshall, A. 1923. Money, Credit and Commerce. Macmillan, London.
Marshall, Alfred. 1925. Memorials of Alfred Marshall (ed. by A. C. Pigou). Macmillan, London.
Marshall, Alfred. 1925 [1887]. “Remedies for Fluctuations in General Prices,” in A. C. Pigou (ed.), Memorials of Alfred Marshall. Macmillan, London. 188–212.
Marshall, A. 1926. Official Papers of Alfred Marshall (ed. by J. M. Keynes). Macmillan, London.
Marshall, Alfred. 1975. The Early Economic Writings of Alfred Marshall, 1867–1890 (ed. by J. K. Whitaker). Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, London.
Whitaker, John K. (ed.). 1996. The Correspondence of Alfred Marshall, Economist. Volume One: Climbing, 1868–1890. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Whitaker, John K. (ed.). 1996. The Correspondence of Alfred Marshall, Economist. Volume Two: At the Summit, 1891–1902. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Whitaker, John K. (ed.). 1996 . The Correspondence of Alfred Marshall, Economist. Volume Three: Towards the Close, 1903-1924. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Debt deflation.
ReplyDeleteIn the dd theory liquidation does not succeed in relieving the slump because of the "stampede" effect, correct?
In Austrian theory liquidation succeeds in relieving a slump right?
So dd cannot be a core part of the Austrian theory. Correct?
Or to be precise, correct if I accept the law of non contradiction, which MF and Murphy do not ...
(1) yes, if you get mass distress selling of assets (what you can call a "stampede" effect), then this will just reduce the value of everyone's assets and portfolios, destroy the value of the collateral backing debt, and to some people/institutions actually cause balance sheet insolvency.
Delete(2) "In Austrian theory liquidation succeeds in relieving a slump right?"
Right: and reasonably quickly and effectively too. E.g., just look at what Bob says here:
“Generally speaking, most depressions (or “recessions” as they came to be redefined after the New Deal) in U.S. history were over within two years, and all of them within five …. Krugman’s “explanation” for the stagnant investment of the 1930s can’t explain why the U.S. economy managed to quickly recover from all of the earlier depression in its history”
Robert Murphy, The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Great Depression and the New Deal, pp. 112–113.
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Well, how did the US economy recover "quickly" from "all of the earlier depression in its history"?
According to the Austrians -- just like neoclassicals -- it is wage and price flexibility that is the panacea for economic problems: wage and price adjustment tends to clear markets and tends to eliminate involuntary unemployment, as (supposedly) the wage adjusts towards market clearing levels and tends to clear the labour market.
Of course, it is not a quick and effective panacea for many reasons: a major one is that if the volume of private debt is high, and nominal debts and other nominal contracts remain fixed, then really serious wage and price deflation wreaks havoc on market economies.
The real value of debt rises. Spending on goods and services falls. Debtors are driven into bankruptcy and creditors follow. The point is: the price flexibility makes things worse, not better.
There is also evidence that Bob's rosy view of the 19th century is badly wrong. The 1870s and 1890s saw pretty bad economic problems that went on for more than 5 years. The 1890s was a forerunner of the Great Depression in my view. The data:
http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2013/12/us-unemployment-in-1890s-who-is-right.html
(3) "So dd cannot be a core part of the Austrian theory. Correct? "
Absolutely. It is not a core part of the Austrian theory. It is nowhere to be found in the classic expositions of ABCT.
And one can add: credit where credit is due.
DeleteOf course Hayek came to see "secondary deflation" as a bad thing later in life, though not, as far as I can see, by explicitly invoking debt deflation theory. (Maybe he does somewhere but I've not seen it.)
And crucially: when Hayek saw "secondary deflation" as a bad thing he repudiated his earlier liquidationism, seeing a role for both monetary and even some limited fiscal policy in depressions:
http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2011/09/did-hayek-advocate-public-works-in.html
One would be hard pressed to find any modern Austrians who advanced as far as Hayek did on understanding the deleterious effects of deflation -- though perhaps modern GMU Austrians are an exception.
So now M.F says AB-Cycle-T only explains the booms? ie, half the cycle? AB1/2CT?
ReplyDeleteThat is risible even by FreeAdvice standards!