But it does not necessarily follow from this that the subjective utilities of different people are totally incomparable even in principle, as one vulgar Austrian suggests here.
If this were so, one must posit that every single person’s emotions of happiness, satisfaction and pleasure (the emotions that subjective utility must be identified with) are utterly unique and in no way resemble anyone else’s. This is a bizarre, anti-scientific, and utterly unconvincing idea: it violates everything we know about human psychology, neuroscience and evolution.
Human beings are all products of Darwinian evolution, and the mind and all its emotions (like utility) are causally dependent on the same underlying brain processes. While there is no doubt individual variation in the way people experience these emotions and the subjective utility any two people might experience from the same good is likely to be different, it still does not necessarily follow that they are incomparable even in principle.
In fact, the sciences of the brain and mind are advancing every day. Non-evasive scanning like MRI is identifying the biochemical and neural basis of human mental states and emotions. It is even conceivable that eventually science can measure the intensity of human emotions underlying “utility” objectively.
For example, already there is some evidence that MRI will one day be used to assess the intensity of pain even with an objective measure (see Wager et al. 2013, with summary here).
Curiously, even an Austrian economist like Robert Murphy admits this possibility:
“It may be that one day neuroscientists come up with an objective way to quantify various degrees of happiness, such that they can coherently talk about Mary being ‘three times more satisfied’ than Bill.” (Murphy 2010: 41).That admission requires that, despite what vulgar Austrians think, at least in principle subjective utilities are comparable, and that it might even be possible to one day obtain a scientific quantification of the intensity and nature of human emotions underlying utility, with some objective unit of measurement.
At that point, the Austrian claim that subjective utilities cannot be objectively measured will have been refuted.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Murphy, Robert P. 2010. Lessons for the Young Economist. Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Ala.
Wager, T. D., Atlas, L. Y., Lindquist, M. et al. 2013. “An fMRI-Based Neurologic Signature of Physical Pain,” New England Journal of Medicine 368: 1388–1397.
Hey, LK, irrelevant, but what do you think of this?
ReplyDeletehttp://smilingdavesblog.wordpress.com/2013/06/24/where-will-the-money-come-from-to-replace-hoarded-money/
I'm specifically curious about your response to the idea that decreasing the money supply merely increases its buying power and thus equalizes everything. I assume this is a view of super-neutrality?
What's the Post-keynesian retort?
Money is never neutral. Take a major reason why the real balances effect is not effective: nominal debt contracts (and many types of nominal contract) are not normally adjusted just because inflation rates have changed.
DeleteSee Keynes in Chapter 19 of the GT:
http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2014/01/the-general-theory-chapter-19-changes.html
No one ever said it was impossible for future science to somehow determine value. No one can tell the future, so obviously I am talking about the actual, current state of affairs. You constantly mix up the modality of statements in order to suit your particular argument. The context is key in order to figure out what people are talking about. Learn reading comprehension.
ReplyDelete"But it does not necessarily follow from this that the subjective utilities of different people are totally incomparable even in principle"
Right now, with current technology, it is actually impossible. What does "in principle" even mean in this context? We are not talking about future, potential ability to determine value. We are talking about the current actuality of the world. Therefore, everything you say about future potentialities are completely irrelevant to the argument.
"If this were so, one must posit that every single person’s emotions of happiness, satisfaction and pleasure (the emotions that subjective utility must be identified with) are utterly unique and in no way resemble anyone else’s."
This is, and always has been, utterly false. If this somehow follows, please show us. You did not provide any valid syllogism where this would be the conclusion.
The entire point of subjective value is the absence of this assumption. We don't know IF they are potentially comparable with future technology. Again, currently, they are incomparable. That is simply the reality of the world in which we live.
"Human beings are all products of Darwinian evolution, and the mind and all its emotions (like utility) are causally dependent on the same underlying brain processes."
So provide measurements of brain processes. Again, you have absolutely no physical, empirical evidence for any assertions that you make. If you had any evidence please provide it.
"In fact, the sciences of the brain and mind are advancing every day. Non-evasive scanning like MRI is identifying the biochemical and neural basis of human mental states and emotions. It is even conceivable that eventually science can measure the intensity of human emotions underlying “utility” objectively. "
Again, you are talking about the future, which is irrelevant to the argument.
"For example, already there is some evidence that MRI will one day be used to assess the intensity of pain even with an objective measure (see Wager et al. 2013, with summary here)."
This is also irrelevant. First of all, its about the future. Second, its not even about value.
"Curiously, even an Austrian economist like Robert Murphy admits this possibility: "
Again, we aren't talking about potentialities, we are talking about actualities.
"That admission requires that, despite what vulgar Austrians think, at least in principle subjective utilities are comparable, and that it might even be possible to one day obtain a scientific quantification of the intensity and nature of human emotions underlying utility, with some objective unit of measurement."
Providing absolutely no demonstration, nor any physical evidence means your argument is not supported. Merely you saying so does not make it so.
"At that point, the Austrian claim that subjective utilities cannot be objectively measured will have been refuted."
Great job. You just said that this claim might be refuted in the future. As of right now, you have not refuted anything. Your argument stands on nothing but opinion. The Austrian position stands on reality.
Your argument has been completely destroyed. You provide absolutely no physical evidence nor any conceptual analysis that supports any assertions that you make. Give up. Your attempt to refute these facts don't work.
"Right now, with current technology, it is actually impossible."
DeleteYou confuse and conflate (1) not possible now in practice from (2) impossible even in principle.
If you concede that it is possible in principle, my argument in the previous post follows.
And despite your comment above, if you seriously think that human utilities are totally incomparable even in principle, then you must, as noted above, posit that every single person’s emotions of happiness, satisfaction and pleasure (the emotions that subjective utility must be identified with) are utterly unique and in no way resemble anyone else’s.
Like I said, there's no point in talking about "impossible even in principle" when you are not specifying what principles you are referring to. Are you referring to your own normative ethical principles, which you have never elaborated on?
DeleteWe have already established that the modality (whether its possible, impossible, or necessary) cannot currently be determined (the comparability nor commensurability) by physical science.
I don't even know if you think that economics is a science at all (or its status if you have a more nuanced position). You have tons of blog posts, so I can't sift through all of them in order to figure out your positions.
(1) "And despite your comment above, if you seriously think that human utilities are totally incomparable even in principle, then you must, as noted above, posit that every single person’s emotions of happiness, satisfaction and pleasure (the emotions that subjective utility must be identified with) are utterly unique and in no way resemble anyone else’s."
DeleteNotice how you don't even address that point, even though it is a major point.
(2) "I don't even know if you think that economics is a science at all (or its status if you have a more nuanced position)"
Of course, it is a science in the sense of a "particular branch of knowledge" dealing with real world phenomena.
The straightforward comparison of pleasure the people experience could lead to problems that having a steady diet of heroin will have more 'utility' than the socialization and self-actualization. This is fine as a mental exercise, but I probably would not like to live in a world where this utility maximization was put to practice.
ReplyDeleteBesides, this whole idea seems to me like the researcher choosing utilitarianism above other ethical systems, which in itself is loaded. Why not virtue ethics, for example? I don't think that this question could even in principle be answered in a satisfactory manner, notwithstanding that if quantifying pleasure is fickle, quantification of virtue is impossible.