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Thursday, July 31, 2014

Coggs v. Bernard and the History of English Bailment Law

The case Coggs v. Bernard (1703) (sometimes written Coggs v. Barnard) was an important case revising some aspects of English bailment law, under the judge Sir John Holt, in 1703.

A brief summary of the case is available here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coggs_v_Bernard
In brief, this case concerned one William Bernard, who agreed (without charge) to transport “several barrels of brandy” owned by John Coggs. In the process of transporting the barrels, one was punctured and “150 gallons” of brandy were lost.

John Coggs brought an action against Bernard for the lost brandy.

The crucial point about this case was that Sir John Holt (Chief Justice of the King’s Bench) overturned “the then leading case in the law of bailments, Southcote’s Case (1601), which held that a general bailee was strictly liable for any damage or loss to the goods in his possession. … Under the ruling in Coggs v Bernard, a general bailee was only liable if he had been negligent.”

But a careful reading of this case shows us that – despite Sir John Holt’s revision of an earlier principle – bailment law had still actually been very well defined in English law by 1703 and even far earlier than this (since Holt was able to cite medieval authorities on bailment law), and was actually stricter in the earlier period than after 1703.

In short, this case in no sense supports the Rothbardian view that English bailment law was undeveloped or poorly defined until the 18th century (a view in Rothbard 2008: 91).

Furthermore, Coggs v. Bernard did not even explicitly involve banks, and, while it may have had consequences for any bailment services provided by banks, it still does not provide any evidence against the view that the callable mutuum contract was the main and most important contract used by English bankers and goldsmiths.

Finally, here is Sir John Holt’s summary of and judgement on the case:
1. COGGS V. BERNARD,
2 Ld. Raymond 909; 1 8m. Lead. Cas. 199. 1703.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

HOLT, C. J. The case is shortly this. This defendant undertakes to remove goods from one cellar to another, and there lay them down safely; and he managed them so negligently, that for want of care in him some of the goods were spoiled. Upon not guilty pleaded, there has been a verdict for the plaintiff, and that upon full evidence, the cause being tried before me at Guildhall. There has been a motion in arrest of judgment, that the declaration is insufficient because the defendant is neither laid to be a common porter, nor that he is to have any reward for his labor, so that the defendant is not chargeable by his trade, and a private person cannot be charged in an action without a reward.

I have had a great consideration of this case; and because some of the books make the action lie upon the reward, and some upon the promise, at first I made a great question whether this declaration was good. But upon consideration, as this declaration is, I think the action will well lie. In order to show the grounds upon which a man shall be charged with goods put into his custody, I must show the several sorts of bailments. And there are six sorts of bailments. The first sort of bailment is, a bare naked bailment of goods, delivered by one man to another to keep for the use of the bailor; and this I call a depositum, and it is that sort of bailment which is mentioned in Southcote’s case. The second sort is, when goods or chattels that are useful are lent a friend gratis, to be used by him; and this is called commodatum, because the thing is to be restored in specie. The third sort is, when goods are left with the bailee to be used by him for hire; this is called locatio et conductio, and the lender is called locator, and the borrower conductor. The fourth sort is, when goods or chattels are delivered to another as a pawn, to be a security to him for money borrowed of him by the bailor; and this is called in Latin, vadium, and in English, a pawn or a pledge. The fifth sort is, when goods or chattels are delivered to be carried, or something is to be done about them for a reward to be paid by the person who delivers them to the bailee, who is to do the thing about them. The sixth sort is, when there is a delivery of goods or chattels to somebody who is to carry them, or do something about them gratis, without any reward for such his work or carriage, which is this present case. I mention these things, not so much that they are all of them so necessary in order to maintain the proposition which is to be proved, as to clear the reason of the obligation which is upon persons in cases of trust.

As to the first sort, where a man takes goods in his custody to keep for the use of the bailor, I shall consider for what things such a bailee is answerable. He is not answerable if they are stole without any fault in him, neither will a common neglect make him chargeable, but he must be guilty of some gross neglect. There is, I confess, a great authority against me; where it is held that a general delivery will charge the bailee to answer for the goods if they are stolen, unless the goods are specially accepted to keep them only as you will keep your own. But my Lord Coke has improved the case in his report of it; for he will have it, that there is no difference between a special acceptance to keep safely, and an acceptance generally to keep. But there is no reason or justice, in such a case of a general bailment, and where the bailee is not to have any reward, but keeps the goods merely for the use of the bailor, to charge him without some default in him. For if he keeps the goods in such a case with an ordinary care, he has performed the trust reposed in him. But according to this doctrine the bailee must answer for the wrongs of other people, which he is not, nor cannot be sufficiently armed against. If the law be so, there must be some just and honest reason for it, or else some universal settled rule of law upon which it is grounded; and therefore it is incumbent upon them that advance this doctrine to show an undisturbed rule and practice of the law according to this position. But to show that the tenor of the law was always otherwise, I shall give a history of the authorities in the books in this matter; and by them show, that there never was any such resolution given before Southcote’s case. The 29 Ass. 28 is the first case in the books upon that learning; and there the opinion is, that the bailee is not chargeable, if the goods are stole. As for 8 Bdw. 2, Pitzh. Detinue 59, where goods are locked in a chest, and left with the bailee, and the owner took away the key, and the goods were stolen, it was held that the bailee should not answer for the goods; that case they say differs, because the bailor did not trust the bailee with them. But I cannot see the reason of that difference, nor why the bailee should not be charged with goods in a chest, as well as with goods out of a chest; for the bailee has as little power over them when they are out of a chest, as to any benefit he might have by them, as when they are in a chest; and he has as great power to defend them in one case as in the other. The case of 9 Edw. 4. 40. b. was but a debate at bar; for Danby was but a counsel then; though he had been chief justice in the beginning of Bdw. 4, yet he was removed, and restored again upon the restitution of Hen. 6, as appears by Dugdale’s Chronica Series. So that what he said cannot be taken to be any authority, for he spoke only for his client; and Genney, for his client, said the contrary. The case in 3 Hen. 7. 4. is but a sudden opinion; and that but by half the court; and yet, that is the only ground for this opinion of my Lord Coke which besides he has improved. But the practice has been always at Guildhall, to disallow that to be a sufficient evidence to charge the bailee. And it was practised so before my time, all Chief Justice Pemberton's time, and ever since, against the opinion of that case. When I read Southcote’s case heretofore, I was not so discerning as my brother Powys tells us he was, to disallow that case at first; and came not to be of this opinion till I had well considered and digested that matter. Though, I must confess, reason is strong against the case, to charge a man for doing such a friendly act for his friend; but so far is the law from being so unreasonable, that such a bailee is the least chargeable for neglect of any. For if he keeps the goods bailed to him but as he keeps his own, though he keeps his own but negligently, yet he is not chargeable for them; for the keeping them as he keeps his own is an argument of his honesty. A fortiori, he shall not be charged where they are stolen without any neglect in him.
Agreeable to this is Bracton, lib. 3, c. 2, 99, b. ‘J. 8. apud quern res deponitur, re obligatur, et de ea re, quam accepit, restituenda tenetur, et etiam ad id, si quid in re deposita dolo commiserit; culpae autem nomine non tenetur, scilicet desidiae vel negligentiae, quia qui negligenti amico rem custodiendam tradit, sibi ipsi et propriae fatuitati hoc debet imputare.’ As suppose the bailee is an idle, careless, drunken fellow, and comes home drunk, and leaves all his doors open, and by reason thereof the goods happen to be stolen with his own; yet he shall not be charged, because it is the bailor’s own folly to trust such an idle fellow. So that this sort of bailee is the least responsible for neglects, and under the least obligation of any one, being bound to no other care of the bailed goods than he takes of his own. This Bracton I have cited is, I confess, an old author; but in this his doctrine is agreeable to reason, and to what the law is in other countries. The civil law is so, as you have it in Justinian’s Inst. lib. 3, tit. 15. There the law goes further; for there it is said: ‘Ex eo solo tenetur, si quid dolo commiserit: culpae autem nomine, id est, desidiae ac negligentiae, non tenetur. Itaque securus est qui parum diligenter custoditam rem furto amiserit quia qui negligenti amico rem custodiendam tradit, non ei, sed suae facilitati, id imputare debet.’ So that a bailee is not chargeable without an apparent gross neglect. And if there is such a gross neglect, it is looked upon as an evidence of fraud. Nay, suppose the bailee undertakes safely and securely to keep the goods, in express words; yet even that won’t charge him with all sorts of neglects; for if such a promise were put into writing, it would not charge so far, even then. Hob. 34, a covenant, that the covenantee shall have, occupy, and enjoy certain lands, does not bind against the acts of wrongdoers. 3 Cro. 214, ace, 2 Cro. 425, ace, upon a promise for quiet enjoyment. And if a promise will not charge a man against wrongdoers, when put in writing, it is hard it should do it more so when spoken. Doct. and Stud. 130 is in point, that though a bailee do promise to redeliver goods safely, yet if he have nothing for the keeping of them, he will not be answerable for the acts of a wrongdoer. So that there is neither sufficient reason nor authority to support the opinion in Southcote’s case. If the bailee be guilty of gross negligence, he will be chargeable, but not for any ordinary neglect.

As to the second sort of bailment, viz. commodatum, or lending gratis, the borrower is bound to the strictest care and diligence to keep the goods, so as to restore them back again to the lender; because the bailee has a benefit by the use of them, so as if the bailee be guilty of the least neglect he will be answerable: as, if a man should lend another a horse to go westward, or for a month; if the bailee go northward, or keep the horse above a month, if any accident happen to the horse in the northern journey, or after the expiration of the month, the bailee will be chargeable; because he has made use of the horse contrary to the trust he was lent to him under; and it may be, if the horse had been used no otherwise than he was lent, that accident would not have befallen him. This is mentioned in Bracton ubi supra: his words are: ‘Is autem cui res aliqua utenda datur, re obligatur, quae commodata est, sed magna differentia est inter mutuum et commodatum; quia is qui rem mutuam accepit, ad ipsam restituendam tenetur, vel ejus pretium, si forte incendio, ruina, naufragio, aut latronum vel hostium incursu, consumpta fuerit, vel deperdita, subtracta vel ablata. Et qui rem utendam accepit, non sufficit ad rei custodiam, quod talem diligentiam adhibeat, qualem suis rebus propriis adhibere solet, si alius earn diligentius potuit custodire; ad vim autem majorem, vel casus fortuitos non tenetur quis, nisi culpa sua intervenerit. Ut si rem sibi commodatum domi, secum detulerit cum peregre profectus fuerit, et Mam incursu hostium vel praedonum, vel naufragio, amiserit, non est dubium quin ad rei restitutionem teneatur.’ I cite this author, though I confess he is an old one, because his opinion is reasonable, and very much to my present purpose, and there is no authority in the law to the contrary. But if the bailee put this horse in his stable, and he were stolen from thence, the bailee shall not be answerable for him. But if he or his servant leave the house or stable doors open, and the thieves take the opportunity of that and steal the horse, he will be chargeable; because the neglect gave the thieves the occasion to steal the horse. Bracton says, the bailee must use the utmost care: but yet he shall not be chargeable, where there is such a force as he cannot resist.

As to the third sort of bailment, scilicet locatio, or lending for hire, in this case the bailee is also bound to take the utmost care, and to return the goods when the time of the hiring is expired. And here again I must recur to my old author, fol. 62, b.: ‘Qui pro usu vestimentorum auri vel argenti, vel alterius ornamenti, vel jumenti, mercedem dederit vel promiserit, talis ab eo desideratur custodia, qualem diligentissimus paterfamilias suis rebus adhibet, quam si praestiterit et rem aliquo casu amiserit, ad rem restituendam non tenebitur. Nec sufjficit aliquem talem diligentiam adhibere, qualem suis rebus propriis adhiberit, nisi talem adhibuerit, de qua superius dictum est.’ From whence it appears, that if goods are let out for a reward, the hirer is bound to the utmost diligence, such as the most diligent father of a family uses; and if he uses that, he shall be discharged. But every man, how diligent soever he be, being liable to the accident of robbers, though a diligent man is not so liable as a careless man, the bailee shall not be answerable in this case, if the goods are stolen.

As to the fourth sort of bailment, viz. vadium, or a pawn, in this I shall consider two things; first, what property the pawnee has in the pawn or pledge; and secondly, for what neglects he shall make satisfaction. As to the first, he has a special property, for the pawn is a securing to the pawnee, that he shall be repaid his debt, and to compel the pawnor to pay him. But if the pawn be such as it will be the worse for using, the pawnee cannot use it, as clothes, &c.; but if it be such as will be never the worse, as if jewels for the purpose were pawned to a lady, she might use them: but then she must do it at her peril, for whereas, if she keeps them locked up in her cabinet, if her cabinet should be broke open, and the jewels taken from thence, she would be excused; if she wears them abroad, and is there robbed of them, she will be answerable. And the reason is, because the pawn is in the nature of a deposit, and, as such, is not liable to be used. And to this effect is Ow. 123. But if the pawn be of such a nature, as the pawnee is at any charge about the thing pawned, to maintain it, as a horse, cow, &c, then the pawnee may use the horse in a reasonable manner, or milk the cow, &c, in recompense for the meat. As to the second point, Bracton, 99. b. gives you the answer:—‘Creditor, qui pignus accepit, re obligatur, et ad Mam restituendam tenetur; et cum hujusmodi res in pignus data sit utriusque gratia, scilicet debitoris, quo magis ei pecunia crederetur, et creditoris quo magis [ei] in tuto sit creditum, sufficit ad ejus rei custodiam diligentiam exactam adhibere, quam si praestiterit et rem casu amiserit, securus esse possit, nec impedietur creditum petere.’ In effect, if a creditor takes a pawn, he is bound to restore it upon the payment of the debt; but yet it is sufficient, if the pawnee use true diligence, and he will be indemnified in so doing, and notwithstanding the loss, yet he shall resort to the pawnor for his debt. Agreeable to this is 29 Ass. 28, and Southcote’s case. But, indeed, the reason given in Southcote’s case, is, because the pawnee has a special property in the pawn. But that is not the reason of the case; and there is another reason given for it in the book of Assize, which is indeed the true reason of all these cases, that the law requires nothing extraordinary of the pawnee, but only that he shall use an ordinary care for restoring the goods. But, indeed, if the money for which the goods were pawned be tendered to the pawnee before they are lost, then the pawnee shall be answerable for them: because the pawnee, by detaining them after the tender of the money, is a wrongdoer, and it is a wrongful detainer of the goods, and the special property of the pawnee is determined. And a man that keeps goods by wrong must be answerable for them at all events; for the detaining of them by him is the reason of the loss. Upon the same difference as the law is in relation to pawns, it will be found to stand in relation to goods found.

As to the fifth sort of bailment, viz. a delivery to carry or otherwise manage, for a reward to be paid to the bailee, those cases are of two sorts; either a delivery to one that exercises a public employment, or a delivery to a private person. First, if it be to a person of the first sort, and he is to have a reward, he is bound to answer for the goods at all events. And this is the case of the common carrier, common hoyman, master of a ship, &c.: which case of a master of a ship was first adjudged, 26 Car. 2, in the case of Mors v. Slue, Raym. 220, 1 Vent. 190, 238. The law charges this person thus entrusted to carry goods, against all events, but acts of God, and of the enemies of the king. For though the force be never so great, as if an irresistible multitude of people should rob him, nevertheless he is chargeable. And this is a politic establishment, contrived by the policy of the law for the safety of all persons, the necessity of whose affairs oblige them to trust these sorts of persons, that they may be safe in their ways of dealing; for else these carriers might have an opportunity of undoing all persons that had any dealings with them, by combining with thieves, &c, and yet doing it in such a clandestine manner as would not be possible to be discovered. And this is the reason the law is founded upon in that point. The second sort are bailies, factors, and such like. And though a bailie is to have a reward for his management, yet he is only to do the best he can; and if he be robbed, &c, it is a good account. And the reason of his being a servant, is not the thing; for he is at a distance from his master, and acts at discretion, receiving rents and selling corn, &c. And yet if he receives his master’s money, and keeps it locked up with a reasonable care, he shall not be answerable for it, though it be stolen. But yet this servant is not a domestic servant, nor under his master’s immediate care. But the true reason of the case is, it would be unreasonable to charge him with a trust; farther than the nature of the thing puts it in his power to perform it. But it is allowed in the other cases, by reason of the necessity of the thing. The same law of a factor.

As to the sixth sort of bailment, it is to be taken, that the bailee is to have no reward for his pains, but yet that by his ill management the goods are spoiled. Secondly, it is to be understood, that there was a neglect in the management. But thirdly, if it had appeared that the mischief happened by any person that met the cart in the way, the bailee had not been chargeable. As if a drunken man had come by in the streets, and had pierced the cask of brandy; in this case the defendant had not been answerable for it, because he was to have nothing for his pains. Then the bailee having undertaken to manage the goods, and having managed them ill, and so by his neglect a damage has happened to the bailor, which is the case in question, what will you call this? In Bracton, lib. 3. 100, it is called mandatum. It is an obligation which arises ex mandato. It is what we call in English an acting by commission. And if a man acts by commission for another gratis, and in the executing his commission behaves himself negligently, he is answerable. Vinnius, in his commentaries upon Justinian, lib. 3. tit. 27, 684, defines mandatum to be contractus quo aliquid gratuito gerendum committitur et accipitur. This undertaking obliges the undertaker to a diligent management. Bracton, ubi supra, says, ‘Contrahitur etiam obligatio non solum scripto et verbis, sed et consensu, sicut in contractibus bonae fidei; ut in emptionibus, venditionibus, locationibus, conductionibus, societatibus et mandatis.’ I don’t find this word in any other author of our law, besides in this place in Bracton, which is a full authority, if it be not thought too old. But it is supported by good reason and authority.

The reasons are, first, because, in such a case, a neglect is a deceit to the bailor. For, when he entrusts the bailee upon his undertaking to be careful, he has put a fraud upon the plaintiff by being negligent, his pretense of care being the persuasion that induced the plaintiff to trust him. And a breach of a trust undertaken voluntarily will be a good ground for an action. 1 Roll. Abr. 10. 2 Hen. 7. 11. a strong case to this matter. There the case was an action against a man who had undertaken to keep an hundred sheep, for letting them be drowned by his default. And there the reason of the judgment is given, because when the party has taken upon him to keep the sheep, and after suffers them to perish in his default; inasmuch as he has taken and executed his bargain, and has them in his custody, if, after, he does not look to them, an action lies. For here is his own act, viz., his agreement and promise, and that after broke of his side, that shall give a sufficient cause of action.

But, secondly, it is objected, that there is no consideration to ground this promise upon, and therefore the undertaking is but nudum pactum. But to this I answer, that the owner’s trusting him with the goods is a sufficient consideration to oblige him to a careful management. Indeed if the agreement had been executory, to carry these brandies from the one place to the other such a day, the defendant had not been bound to carry them. But this is a different case, for assumpsit does not only signify a future agreement, but in such a case as this it signifies an actual entry upon the thing, and taking the trust upon himself. And if a man will do that, and miscarries in the performance of his trust, an action will lie against him for that, though nobody could have compelled him to do the thing. The 19 Hen. 6. 49. and the other cases cited by my brothers, show that this is the difference. But in the 11 Hen. 4. 33. this difference is clearly put, and that is the only case concerning this matter which has not been cited by my brothers. There the action was brought against a carpenter, for that he had undertaken to build the plaintiff a house within such a time, and had not done it, and it was adjudged the action would not lie. But there the question was put to the court—what if he had built the house unskilfully ?—and it is agreed in that case an action would have lain. There has been a question made, If I deliver goods to A., and in consideration thereof he promise to re-deliver them, if an action will lie for not re-delivering them; and in Telv. 4, judgment was given that the action would lie. But that judgment was afterwards reversed; and, according to that reversal, there was judgment afterwards entered for the defendant in the like case, Yelv. 128. But those cases were grumbled at; and the reversal of that judgment in Yelv. 4, was said by the judges to be a bad resolution; and the contrary to that reversal was afterwards most solemnly adjudged in 2 Cro. 667. Tr. 21 Jac. 1. in the King’s Bench, and that judgment affirmed upon a writ of error. And yet there is no benefit to the defendant, nor no consideration in that case, but the having the money in his possession, and being trusted with it, and yet that was held to he a good consideration. And so a bare being trusted with another man’s goods must be taken to be a sufficient consideration, if the bailee once enter upon the trust, and take the goods into his possession. The declaration in the case of Mors v. Slue, was drawn by the greatest drawer in England in that time; and in that declaration, as it was always in all such cases, it was thought most prudent to put in, that a reward was to be paid for the carriage. And so it has been usual to put it in the writ, where the suit is by original. I have said thus much in this case, because it is of great consequence that the law should be settled in this point; but I don’t know whether I may have settled it, or may not rather have unsettled it. But however that happen, I have stirred these points, which wiser heads in time may settle. And judgment was given for the plaintiff.” (quoted in Goddard 1904: 1–10).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Goddard, Edwin C. 1904. Selected Cases on the Law of Bailments and Carriers: Including the Quasi-Bailment Relations of Carriers of Passengers and Telegraph and Telephone Companies as Carriers. Callaghan, Chicago.

Rothbard, Murray N. 2008. The Mystery of Banking (2nd edn.). Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Ala.

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