This debate between Robert Taylor and David Ramsay Steele is on praxeology and apriorism.
David Ramsay Steele was a Marxist who converted to libertarianism, and his book analysing Mises’ arguments about economic calculation and socialism is From Marx to Mises: Post-Capitalist Society and the Challenge of Economic Calculation (1992).
This argument is between two people who largely agree with Austrian economics, and often the debate is quite confused, and I should point out that there are plenty of empirical studies showing that a rise in the minimum wage does not cause unemployment, e.g., Card and Krueger (1994 and 1995), Dube and Reich (2010), or the 2006 OECD Employment Outlook report entitled “Boosting Jobs and Incomes” (described here).
However, some of Steele’s comments on empiricism and praxeology are nevertheless interesting.
A further point is that all Steele had to do to deal with Taylor’s mathematics and geometry examples is to explain the difference between (1) pure mathematics and (2) applied mathematics. Just because pure mathematics yields necessary truth, it does not follow that a system like praxeology does, because pure mathematics is analytic a priori and praxeology claims to be synthetic a priori. Aside from the observation that the very existence of synthetic a priori knowledge just is not convincing, pure mathematics is not making necessary statements about reality but about analytic a priori systems.
Just because you may think Mises believed in synthetic a priori knowledge (even though he did not) DOES NOT mean he said praxeology is synthetic a priori. Please reproduce a quote of Mises saying praxeology is synthetic a priori.
ReplyDelete(1) "Just because you may think Mises believed in synthetic a priori knowledge (even though he did not)"
DeleteNo, Hank, Mises very clearly defended the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge in The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method (1962):
“The essence of logical positivism is to deny the cognitive value of a priori knowledge by pointing out that all a priori propositions are merely analytic. They do not provide new information, but are merely verbal or tautological, asserting what has already been implied in the definitions and premises. Only experience can lead to synthetic propositions. There is an obvious objection against this doctrine, viz., that this proposition that there are no synthetic a priori propositions is in itself a — as the present writer thinks, false — synthetic a priori proposition, for it can manifestly not be established by experience." (p. 5).
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You are simply so stupid that you cannot see that Mises tells you here explicitly that
(1) he thinks that the proposition that "there are no synthetic a priori propositions" is false.
That entails that he thinks that the proposition "there are synthetic a priori propositions" is true, and
(2) Mises thinks that the proposition "there are no synthetic a priori propositions" is "in itself [a]... synthetic a priori proposition".
Even Robert Murphy was forced to admit this in his humiliating defeat on this subject:
"UPDATE: Actually LK I re-read that passage from the Ultimate Foundations and you’re right, that looks like Mises is saying he believes that there are true synthetic a priori propositions, because he seems to be saying the statement “there are no true synthetic a priori statements” is false. So, I am backing off my claim that Mises denied there could be such statements."
http://consultingbyrpm.com/blog/2013/09/mises-on-a-priori-reasoning.html#comment-73780
(2) "Please reproduce a quote of Mises saying praxeology is synthetic a priori. "
DeleteMises does not have to say explicitly that "praxeology is synthetic a priori" in exactly those words to believe that it is, for says words to this effect right here in Human Action:
"The theorems attained by correct praxeological reasoning are not only perfectly certain and incontestable, like the correct mathematical theorems. They refer, moreover, with the full rigidity of their apodictic certainty and incontestability to the reality of action as it appears in life and history. Praxeology conveys exact and precise knowledge of real things.” (Mises 2008: 38–39).
Something that is known a priori and that has necessary truth of the real world is synthetic a priori.
I have already dealt with this here:
http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2014/03/david-gordon-on-praxeology-and-austrian.html
http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2014/03/mises-versus-ayer-on-analytic.html
Again, you are simply too stupid and too ignorant to understand this subject.
I don't agree with you, but it's beside the point!!!!
DeleteI said to reproduce a quote of Mises saying PRAXEOLOGY was synthetic a priori.
Not whether or not he thinks the synthetic a priori exists.
Correct. You are admitting that its ONLY POSSIBLE that he thinks praxeology is synthetic a priori.
DeleteIn order for you to say that Mises thought it was synthetic a priori, you will need to reproduce a quote. You cannot do this, thus you cannot know if he thought this.
"I said to reproduce a quote of Mises saying PRAXEOLOGY was synthetic a priori. "
DeleteI have already showed you that I do not need to do that to show that Mises thought praxeology is synthetic a priori.
All I need to do is show passages where Mises says words to that effect:
"The theorems attained by correct praxeological reasoning are not only perfectly certain and incontestable, like the correct mathematical theorems. They refer, moreover, with the full rigidity of their apodictic certainty and incontestability to the reality of action as it appears in life and history. Praxeology conveys exact and precise knowledge of real things.” (Mises 2008: 38–39).
"You are admitting that its ONLY POSSIBLE that he thinks praxeology is synthetic a priori."
DeleteSo do you now admit that Mises thought that synthetic a priori knowledge exists? Yes or no?
Also, Hank, your idiot position on Mises also requires that virtually all previous Austrians were totally wrong on this point, because virtually all are on the record saying that Mises thought that praxeology was synthetic a priori:
DeleteE.g., Robert Murphy:
“Mises affirms Hoppe’s interpretation regarding synthetic a priori truths (though not in these terms) when he writes,
‘It is consequently incorrect to assert that
aprioristic insight and pure reasoning do
not convey any information about reality
and the structure of the universe. (p. 86)’”
Murphy Study Guide to Human Action A Treatise on Economics, p. 26.
Hoppe:
“The characteristic mark of Kantian philosophy is the claim that true a priori synthetic propositions exist and it is because Mises subscribes to this claim that he can be called a Kantian. “
Economic Science and the Austrian Method, p. 18.
Selgin:
“In countering positivism Mises took refuge in Kantian epistemology and especially in Kant’s defense of the category of the synthetic a priori”
Selgin, George, Praxeology and Understanding, p. 13.
Thomas Woods:
“Much has been written about how Mises and Rothbard justified the action axiom. Mises did so on Kantian grounds, arguing that this truth about human action was an example of the Kantian synthetic a priori: a statement which, made prior to experience, is both substantive and true.”
Thomas E. Woods, The Church and the Market: A Catholic Defense of the Free Economy, p. 16.
“Mises drew his inspiration from … the Neo-Kantian philosophy that dominated academic Germany in the first decade of … [the 20th century]”
Lachmann, L. M. 1976. “From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society,” p. 56.
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I will come right out and tell you that I personally don't think Mises believed that synthetic a priori propositions exist. However, like I have expressed numerous time, it doesn't even matter! We don't need to talk about it for these reasons:
Delete1) I agree with you that they don't exist
2) He doesn't EXPLICILY base his system on synthetic a priori knowledge. In fact, I think it would be more accurate to say he had no interest in addressing that topic.
3) Since he makes no explicit statement, this view I hold isn't based on anything other than the fact I like Mises. However, like I said, it's beside the point.
You only deduce that he *must* base it on synthetic a priori knowledge because that is how YOUR logical system is constructed. There are those you disagree with your logical system.
Who cares what any these guys, who you have no respect for in the first place, say?
DeleteYou have no objections to praxeology being an analytic apriori system like pure mathematics. Therefore, I don't see what your problem is.
"I will come right out and tell you that I personally don't think Mises believed that synthetic a priori propositions exist.
DeleteI see. Mises tells you explicitly:
Only experience can lead to synthetic propositions. There is an obvious objection against this doctrine, viz., that this proposition that there are no synthetic a priori propositions is in itself a — as the present writer thinks, false — synthetic a priori proposition, for it can manifestly not be established by experience." (p. 5).
He tells you:
(1) that he thinks that the proposition that "there are no synthetic a priori propositions" is false.
That entails that he thinks that the proposition "there are synthetic a priori propositions" is true.
But you persist in thinking Mises did not accept their existence?
Thank you very much, Hank, you have demonstrated for us the pathetic, irrational, utter idiot stupidity of internet Austrians.
Honest question:
ReplyDeleteWhy not just conceive praxeology as analytic a priori?
I don't understand why you are so adamant in putting praxeology into the 'synthetic a priori' box.
Lets just push the synthetic a priori to the side and accept praxeology as analytic a priori (like pure mathematics).
Would you have any objections to doing this?
Also, you have said in the past the you DON'T think analytic a priori systems yield necessary truth.
Your system does not allow for necessary truths that apply to any outside, objective reality.
If I am wrong, please give me an example of a necessary truth (in your logical system) that has this criteria.
(1) "Also, you have said in the past the you DON'T think analytic a priori systems yield necessary truth. "
DeleteI have never said that, Hank. You are an idiot.
Analytic a priori propositions do have necessary truth -- but limited to their analytic a priori systems.
E.g., a pure mathematical a priori probability of rolling a 6 in an abstract fair game of dice is 1/6. That has necessary truth -- but limited only to the "abstract fair game of dice" one is imagining.
As soon as you move to the real world and any real world dice, you cannot have apodictic certainty that the dice is not loaded and that the probability 1/6 really applies to any number coming up. You need empirical evidence to show that the dice is fair and ultimately -- for good measure -- the empirical relative frequency approach to really show the probabilities of the outcomes.
I have said -- as is widely accepted in modern analytic philosophy and is illustrated by the that a priori probability example -- that analytic a priori propositions/ systems do not give you necessary truth of the real world. And that is true.
(2) If praexology is analytic a priori, then it tells you NOTHING that is necessarily true of the real world.
It is like an a priori probability -- an elaborate thought experiment, but worse than that for many of its assumptions and hypotheses about how the real world works often do not hold at all. You might as well write a praxeological system about the economic "laws" in the land of Oz or Narnia.
Yes, this is exactly what I said when I said:
Delete"Your system does not allow for necessary truths that apply to any outside, objective reality."
I would like you to take a deep breath and calm down LK. Please call me an idiot if it helps you relax.
There are many philosophers who DISAGREE with you. There are those who believe, for example, that the law of non-contradiction is a necessary truth that applies to the outside world, along with pure mathematics.
This is where your disagreement lies. WHO CARES IF MISES THOUGHT IT WAS SYNTHETIC A PRIORI.
This debate about realism has been going on for centuries.
(1) "There are many philosophers who DISAGREE with you."
DeleteNo, Hank, your knowledge of modern philosophy is bloody abysmal and embarrassing.
Kantian synthetic a priori knowledge was discredited in the early 20th century.
(2) "There are those who believe, for example, that the law of non-contradiction is a necessary truth that applies to the outside world, along with pure mathematics. "
On the contrary, the laws of logic are either analytic a priori or (2) simply extremely well verified contingent empirical statements about the macroscopic reality we live in.
The law of identity, for example, looks very much like a tautology: any entity x is identical with itself. That reduces to x = x, an explicit tautology, an analytic statement.
Also, you are clearly so ignorant that you are unaware that a number of philosophers have disputed that the law of excluded middle even applies to certain quantum mechanical phenomena (Quine, W. V. 1986. Philosophy of Logic [2nd edn.] Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.pp. 86–87).
If that is so, it follows clearly that the law of excluded middle is a contingent, empirical statement. It does not have necessary truth of all of reality: it is true, but just an extremely well verified empirical truth about the non-quantum, macroscopic world.
As for the law of non-contradiction, it is in the same boat as the law of excluded middle: it is possible that the law of non-contradiction does not apply to quantum mechanical phenomena.
That means that it may well be just an extremely well verified but contingent, empirical truth about that macroscopic reality we live in.
"You have no objections to praxeology being an analytic apriori system like pure mathematics. Therefore, I don't see what your problem is. "
ReplyDeleteSure, Hank, you cannot see how, if praxeology is merely analytic a priori, such an analytic system that is grossly unrealistic and that does not describe real world economies is a problem?
This is just a comment to recommend Steele's book. From Marx to Mises is THE best book on the subject of the calculation/knowledge problem for non Austrians. There are other good books such as Don Lavoie's Rivalry and Central planning & National Economic Planning: What's left? But Steele's book has a clarity of presentation and lack of historical and terminological baggage suited to someone unfamiliar with the subject. It is a shame this book and Lavoie's are so often unknown or forgotten by by academic writers on the subject.
ReplyDeleteOkay so I don't know if you ended up being completely turned off the subject and will not accept any of my comments, but I wrote a real, though out consideration of what we talked about. I am unsure why I made you so upset last time.
ReplyDeletehttp://hanktheblog.wordpress.com/2014/06/07/mises-synthetic-a-priori-quote-overplayed/
All those words to deny the plain fact right in front of your eyes: "this proposition that there are no synthetic a priori propositions is in itself a — as the present writer thinks, false — synthetic a priori proposition".
DeleteAny reasonable person can see Mises by implication must think that the statement "there are synthetic a priori propositions" is true.
You are simply a shining example of the intellectual bankruptcy of internet Austrians.
Hello Lord Keynes, I'm Siegfried from Germany.
ReplyDeleteI studied physics some decades ago and became interested in economical questions
through the financial crisis in 2008.
I've been following this blog for a while because I stumbled over some
"austrian economics videos" (mainly from mises.org) on youtube some time ago.
The more Videos I watched, the more i was surprised about the (at least in my opinion)
strange conclusions the austrians came to.
I find the discussion here very fruitful, but what I do not understand:
Why is this a priory/a posteriory annalytic/synthetic thing so important?
Here is my point of view:
I would say that most scientists (especially natural sciences like physics etc.)
work with models.
These models consist of some axioms, and both analytic and synthetic propositions.
In principle, axioms can be choosed arbitrarily, as long they do not contradict each other.
This model is a pure imaginery world, and has generally nothing in common with the real world.
(Some mathematicians even proudly commit, that they never ever "constructed something useful".)
But the more interesting models are those which have a connection to the real world,
one could also say that the model tells us something about the world.
So there must be some kind of method to find out if the chosen model fits to some properties of the real world.
This is for physics the experiment, but in general this could be any method to ensure the scientist
about the connection mentioned above.
So in this context, the austrian method of choosing some axioms is valid, I would say.
Also to state that some axioms are true a priory should be O.K., because a model is always true as long it has no internal contradictions.
Some of these models can be very convincing, so one could say at least say that the world could be like in the model stated.
As long the creators of such a model do not try to transfer some propositions of the model world into the real world, everything is fine.
But as soon they try to make statements about the real world, the should be forced to give a proof or at least some evidence that the model is describing an aspect of the real world.
In this aspect, the austrians fail totally in my opinion, they state repeatedly that their model is consistent and that their axioms are "true".
For example, in the discussion about the minimum wage,
the austrians have to proof that every precondition, which they have used to come to their conclusion is fulfilled. (By the way: this holds for all schools of economic thought).
The funny thing is: Very often Austrians say in a discussion:
"This is not capitalism"
What they really mean here is, that some of the Austrian precoditions are not fulfilled.
The discussion between Steele and Taylor I found very interesting.
When they discussed minimum wages they came to the point where Steele says,
that it might be that some employers do not pay the wages they should pay according to the austrians.
Then Steele went into the trap to find some examples or causes why this could be the case.
This is the problem: Taylor has to proove that the wages payed to employees are the ones that
are stated by austrian theory.
Best Regards from Germany
Siegfried
Siegfried,
Delete(1) "But the more interesting models are those which have a connection to the real world, one could also say that the model tells us something about the world."
Yes, that is true.
And there is nothing wrong in principle with using abstract or analytical models.
The problem is when people use grossly unrealistic and useless models that do not explain the real world.
(2) the problem with the Austrian economic method is that they claim that they are using Kantian synthetic a priori knowledge (this is point is crucial), and that therefore the inferences of their praxeological model have necessary truth of the real world without any empirical verification.
That is nonsense, because Kantian synthetic a priori knowledge does not exist: it is an intellectually bankrupt epistemology.