“Mises gives a Kantian answer to the question of how the a priori character of praxeological knowledge and its apodictic certainty is to be explained. This knowledge apparently can be reduced to the logical structure of the human mind which is supposed to be the basis for thought and action. ... On the one hand he seems to suggest that he is introducing with his principle of action a synthetic a priori proposition, as he ascribes informational content to the principle. On the other hand, he declares the question of whether the respective propositions are synthetic or analytic to be purely verbal and therefore uninteresting. This seems to show that he was not aware of the connection between analyticity and informational vacuity. He permanently compares his allegedly a priori knowledge with logical and mathematical knowledge and gives such a description of the respective propositions and their mode of derivation that one comes to suspect them to be analytic. He confounds the analytical character of propositions with the logical character of the relationships between propositions in a deduction. But the fact that particular propositions are deducible from particular sets of premises does not render them analytic. For instance, in physics propositions from geometry get an empirical interpretation, and, interpreted in this way, they are synthetic. But propositions which are the result of the ‘logical unfolding’ of certain concepts contain no information. They are analytic not because they are derived, but because they follow from definitions which do not carry information themselves. When Mises tells us that the concept of money already implies all theorems of the theory of money, the alleged certainty of the basis of this derivation does not help him to establish a nonvacuous economic theory. The theory of money as he envisages it here would be without informational content and could not be used to explain anything.” (Albert 1999: 131–132).That is a rather serious error. Another criticism of Human Action was pointed out a long time ago by G. J. Schuller:
“Acceptance of Mises’ stated axioms does not necessarily imply acceptance of the ‘principles’ or ‘applications to reality’ which he has drawn from them, even though his logic may be impeccable. When a logical chain grows beyond the limits set by stated assumptions, it uses unstated assumptions. The number of unstated assumptions (axioms, postulates, or other) in Human Action is enormous. If Mises denies this, let him try to rewrite his book as a set of numbered axioms, postulates, and syllogistic inferences using, say, Russell’s Principia or, closer home, Von Neumann’s Theory of Games as a model” (Schuller 1951: 188).As it happens, Mises seems to have conceded this:
“Every theorem of praxeology is deduced by logical reasoning from the category of action. It partakes of the apodictic certainty provided by logical reasoning that starts from an a priori category. Into the chain of praxeological reasoning the praxeologist introduces certain assumptions concerning the conditions of the environment in which an action takes place. Then he tries to find out how these special conditions affect the result to which his reasoning must lead. The question whether or not the real conditions of the external world correspond to these assumptions is to be answered by experience. But if the answer is in the affirmative, all the conclusions drawn by logically correct praxeological reasoning strictly describe what is going on in reality” (Mises 1978: 44).This concession makes a nonsense of Mises’s assertion that “Every theorem of praxeology is deduced by logical reasoning from the category of action. It partakes of the apodictic certainty provided by logical reasoning that starts from an a priori category.” If there is even some small doubt about the truth of the synthetic stated and hidden assumptions or premises in praxeological arguments, then the apodictic certainty of the inferences vanishes like a puff of smoke.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Albert, H. 1999. Between Social Science, Religion and Politics: Essays in Critical Rationalism, Rodopi, Amsterdam.
Mises, L. 1978 [1962]. The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method (2nd edn), Sheed Andrews & McMeel, Kansas City.
Schuller, G. J. 1951. “Mises’ ‘Human Action’: Rejoinder,” American Economic Review 41.1: 185–190.
Rothbard wrote:
ReplyDeleteTurning from the deduction process to the axioms themselves, what is their epistemological status? Here the problems are obscured by a difference of opinion within the praxeological camp, particularly on the nature of the fundamental axiom of action. Ludwig von Mises, as an adherent of Kantian epistemology, asserted that the concept of action is a priori to all experience, because it is, like the law of cause and effect, part of "the essential and necessary character of the logical structure of the human mind." [12] Without delving too deeply into the murky waters of epistemology, I would deny, as an Aristotelian and neo-Thomist, any such alleged "laws of logical structure" that the human mind necessarily imposes on the chaotic structure of reality. Instead, I would call all such laws "laws of reality," which the mind apprehends from investigating and collating the facts of the real world. My view is that the fundamental axiom and subsidiary axioms are derived from the experience of reality and are therefore in the broadest sense empirical. I would agree with the Aristotelian realist view that its doctrine is radically empirical, far more so than the post-Humean empiricism which is dominant in modern philosophy.
http://www.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/rothbard38.html
I say that people do not know what other people are thinking (if you can prove what they are indeed thinking, prove it). People act apparently thinking they are improving their situation. No one can really know what economic value people place on things until they actually engage in a voluntary exchange. The prices set forth in those exchanges are the best source of information about economic value. Keynesian policy, especially the creation of funny money out of thin air, distorts that essential process especially for longer term and more complex investments which contain zillions of minute factors that must be subjected to the voluntary pricing and haggling function.
It’s just not that complicated, but you avoid the gist of the theory like it's Kryptonite.
Bob Roddis,
ReplyDeleteIf one argues (following Rothbard) that the human action axiom is true only empirically (a posteriori), then the alleged apodictic certainty of praxeological arguments is further undermined.
No one can really know what economic value people place on things until they actually engage in a voluntary exchange.
This makes a moral judgement - requiring an ethical theory to defend it.
Your definition of "voluntary" requires dismantling of every aspect of government and the anarcho-capitalist theory you use in turn requires an ethical defense.
But for anyone rejecting Rothbard's ethics on the grounds that it is flawed, yours is a wholly flawed argument too:
http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2011/08/rothbards-argument-for-natural-rights.html
Also, "voluntary exchanges" can still exist with a government and government interventions.
What nonsense.
ReplyDelete“Mises gives a Kantian answer to the question of how the a priori character of praxeological knowledge and its apodictic certainty is to be explained. This knowledge apparently can be reduced to the logical structure of the human mind which is supposed to be the basis for thought and action. ... On the one hand he seems to suggest that he is introducing with his principle of action a synthetic a priori proposition, as he ascribes informational content to the principle. On the other hand, he declares the question of whether the respective propositions are synthetic or analytic to be purely verbal and therefore uninteresting.
This is false. The respective propositions that are "unfolded", because they are deduced from the true synthetic a priori action axiom, are themselves synthetic and say something true about reality. They are not "purely verbal". The concept of "analytic" propositions are only "purely verbal" to the positivist. Mises was a rationalist. He rejects the positivist notion.
This seems to show that he was not aware of the connection between analyticity and informational vacuity. He permanently compares his allegedly a priori knowledge with logical and mathematical knowledge and gives such a description of the respective propositions and their mode of derivation that one comes to suspect them to be analytic.
This passage follows from the initial fallacious passage, and so is itself fallacious. The connection between analyticity and informational vacuity is the positivist conception of analytic propositions. Hans Albert is presuming his own epistemology is true when he argues this. He is therefore begging the question. If he is going to refute Mises, then he has to establish an epistemology that is true, and make praxeology impossible. He can't just presume his own epistemology is valid in the course of attempting to refute Mises.
He confounds the analytical character of propositions with the logical character of the relationships between propositions in a deduction.
This isn't a "confounding" if the propositions are based on a priori synthetic axioms.
But the fact that particular propositions are deducible from particular sets of premises does not render them analytic.
That fact alone no, but that doesn't mean that they can't be analytic in the sense of arising from a priori synthetic propositions that experience can never falsify.
For instance, in physics propositions from geometry get an empirical interpretation, and, interpreted in this way, they are synthetic. But propositions which are the result of the ‘logical unfolding’ of certain concepts contain no information.
This is false. Again Albert is just tacitly presuming that all propositions must be analytic and hence devoid of informational content, or empirical and hence hypothetical.
They are analytic not because they are derived, but because they follow from definitions which do not carry information themselves.
They do carry information themselves.
When Mises tells us that the concept of money already implies all theorems of the theory of money, the alleged certainty of the basis of this derivation does not help him to establish a nonvacuous economic theory. The theory of money as he envisages it here would be without informational content and could not be used to explain anything."
Absolutely false. The reason why the concept of money already implies all the theorems of money is because the concept of money is itself based on exchange, which is based on action. It is not an originary concept.
That is a rather serious error.
Not at all. It is a rather serious misunderstanding of what Mises argued.
Another criticism of Human Action was pointed out a long time ago by G. J. Schuller:
ReplyDelete"Acceptance of Mises’ stated axioms does not necessarily imply acceptance of the ‘principles’ or ‘applications to reality’ which he has drawn from them, even though his logic may be impeccable. When a logical chain grows beyond the limits set by stated assumptions, it uses unstated assumptions.
Again, "when" is a possibility, not a certainty. That people are capable of making errors, does not imply that errors are guaranteed to be made all the time.
The number of unstated assumptions (axioms, postulates, or other) in Human Action is enormous. If Mises denies this, let him try to rewrite his book as a set of numbered axioms, postulates, and syllogistic inferences using, say, Russell’s Principia or, closer home, Von Neumann’s Theory of Games as a model"
Which assumptions?
Are they in any of Mises' other works like "Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science", or "Epistemological Problems in Economics"?
As it happens, Mises seems to have conceded this:
“Every theorem of praxeology is deduced by logical reasoning from the category of action. It partakes of the apodictic certainty provided by logical reasoning that starts from an a priori category. Into the chain of praxeological reasoning the praxeologist introduces certain assumptions concerning the conditions of the environment in which an action takes place. Then he tries to find out how these special conditions affect the result to which his reasoning must lead. The question whether or not the real conditions of the external world correspond to these assumptions is to be answered by experience. But if the answer is in the affirmative, all the conclusions drawn by logically correct praxeological reasoning strictly describe what is going on in reality"
Of course. It is entirely reasonable to ensure that one's logical deduction does not contradict experience, at a minimum. If any assumptions are empirical assumptions, then OF COURSE experience must be the ultimate judge.
This is not a "concession". This follows from the nature of empirical propositions and assumptions, that is, propositions about the external world that are not a priori synthetic.
This concession makes a nonsense of Mises’s assertion that “Every theorem of praxeology is deduced by logical reasoning from the category of action. It partakes of the apodictic certainty provided by logical reasoning that starts from an a priori category.” If there is even some small doubt about the truth of the synthetic stated and hidden assumptions or premises in praxeological arguments, then the apodictic certainty of the inferences vanishes like a puff of smoke.
Of course. If any errors are made, then yes, the certainty should vanish. How is this in any way a refutation of praxeology?
If one argues (following Rothbard) that the human action axiom is true only empirically (a posteriori), then the alleged apodictic certainty of praxeological arguments is further undermined.
ReplyDeleteNot at all. Not unless you hold propositions based on empirical observations "undermine" certainty, which would actually undermine your own worldview of positivist empiricism!
No one can really know what economic value people place on things until they actually engage in a voluntary exchange.
This makes a moral judgement - requiring an ethical theory to defend it.
No, it is not a moral judgment, it is an informational judgment. It is a statement of epistemological fact. You cannot know what I want, unless you observe me acting without being coerced. Only if you observe what I buy and what I invest in, can you acquire knowledge of my preferences.
Yes, an ethics can arise from this, but it is not necessary to Rothbard's argument about how you come to know individual preference.
Unless you want to claim to be able to read people's minds, then you cannot know what people's preferences are unless you passively observe them making exchanges and acting in general without being coerced. If they are being coerced, then by the nature of coercion their true preferences cannot be manifested in their actions.
Your definition of "voluntary" requires dismantling of every aspect of government and the anarcho-capitalist theory you use in turn requires an ethical defense.
ReplyDeleteNot dismantling it for others, just dismantling it from individuals who do not want to participate in it. But this is not just Roddis' definition. It is the meaning of the concept of voluntary.
Provide a definition of voluntary, and if you are logically consistent, then voluntary human life, when taken to its logical conclusions, and applied to everyone at all times and everywhere, does in fact require the abolition of all violence based actions, including criminal gangs, robbers, looters, and yes, government.
Government would become voluntary, like Wal-Mart. If you want to deal with it, go right ahead. If you don't want to deal with it, then you are not coerced into dealing with it.
If this means that those wanting a state will have less resources to work with, because the state cannot coercively tax anyone, and can only acquire money from voluntary payments, then so be it. Just like you and I and every other individual is so limited in how much money we can acquire (we can only acquire money through exchange), then so too will the individuals calling themselves state be so limited. This is a universalization of the same ethic that most citizens practice when dealing with other civilians. Peace. Trade. No theft. No violence. No coercion. Voluntarism.
Yes, this will also mean that Keynesianism as an orthodoxy would collapse, but that's expected, because Keynesianism is politics, not economics.
Austrian economics will be able to fully explain all economic phenomena in a free market. Keynesians won't have inflation, and they won't have taxation, and they won't have government deficits. They'd have nothing. Austrians would not be compromised in any way, because Austrian economics is based on individual action. Not the state like Keynesianism.
If my interaction with individuals calling themselves a state was purely voluntary, then I would of course have the choice not to deal with them at all and not be coerced into dealing with them. If I am coerced, then it is not voluntary, but involuntary.
If it is voluntary, then the state cannot tax me, and they cannot impose any of their rules on me that are themselves initiations of violence. If I want to deal with another individual where I pay them money and they give me healthcare, then the government cannot interfere. Even if the doctor is not licensed by the state, they still cannot interfere. As long as I am willing to pay the doctor, and accept their healthcare services, then nobody else on the planet has any right to threaten either of us, for "practicing medicine without a license" or "soliciting an unlicensed doctor."
And this principle will apply in EVERYTHING else, INCLUDING security and protection. Voluntarism would have individuals being free to opt out of the state system altogether.
We have (had) an pre-existing English common law tradition of private property, contract and voluntary exchanges within that system. People already understand "my house" and "my car" and "my bank account" and "my dog". I'm not recreating the wheel here. KNOWLEDGE of economic value can only come from voluntary exchanges and the prices resulting therefrom. Austrian ideas are based upon this VERY stripped down concept of action and this VERY stripped down concept of limited knowledge. You need to prove that there is more to the action and more knowledge about than we claim there can be. Stick to the point. Also remember that your SWAT team overseers are humans too and are subject to the same limitations as normal humans.
ReplyDeleteYou demand some perfect philosophical explanation for the most basic and self-evident facts of human existence but cannot even begin to suggest a theory or evidentiary proof for your mechanical and a priori claim of "lack of aggregate demand". Ever read that nitwit Minsky? Now there is some DEEP philosophy of mindreading on speculative euphoria (financed by funny money which he conveniently ignores).
"We have (had) an pre-existing English common law tradition of private property, contract and voluntary exchanges within that system."
ReplyDeleteA system perfectly compatible with the state, and even state interventions in the economy.
Tell me how does cutting taxes in a recession, and running a deficit that investors freely and voluntarily choose to cover $for$ by buying government bonds consitute a violation of "contract and voluntary exchanges" within the pre-existing English common law tradition?
"We have (had) an pre-existing English common law tradition of private property, contract and voluntary exchanges within that system."
ReplyDeleteA system perfectly compatible with the state, and even state interventions in the economy.
False. A society of respect for private property rights is incompatible with the state, because the state systematically violates private property rights (taxation, eminent domain, etc).
Running a deficit requires taxing or inflation, both of which are based on violations of private property rights.
Taxation is a violation of private property rights, because it is based on violence. The rightful owners are those who earned the money, not the state.
Inflation is based on a violation of property rights, because the state threatens individuals through legal tender laws to use the government's money, and the government used violence to squash competing currencies (see Liberty Dollars), as well as taxing "capital gains" on precious metal price appreciation, thus nullifying the monetary character of precious metals.
The bonds that the investors "voluntarily buy" are not FINANCED voluntarily. It is lending to a thief, where the thief finances the debt by stealing other people's money.
If the state did not tax at all, and did not coerce anyone into using its paper currency, and someone lent money to it, THEN it would be voluntary, because the state would have to use voluntary means to acquire money to pay it back, namely, the state would have to produce goods and services for the market, on an individually based framework, where each individual has the choice to deal with the state and pay it, or not, just like they do with Wal-Mart.
Oh, please stop with that libertarian rubbish. Voluntaryism is not only embodied in private property rights, as many people never consented to those rights in the first way. Nor they are natural. They are useful, for sure, no one denies that, but at many different levels of acceptance. That distinction between "voluntary" and "involuntary" does not make sense even intuitively.
ReplyDeleteOn the Mises issue, he was wrong quite a few times, but praxeology still retains it's value. The idea of following an abstract model of the economy is still the main tool of economics understanding. What is obvious is that praxeology can't say anything about economic policy or moral judgments.
"That distinction between "voluntary" and "involuntary" does not make sense even intuitively."
DeleteI think the more involved question is, what is the definition of violent action and what is its legitimate sphere of use, and is this sphere equal for all people or do some people get a different and privileged sphere for the use of violence."
"If any errors are made, then yes, the certainty should vanish. How is this in any way a refutation of praxeology? "
ReplyDeleteThe issue is whether the inferences/theories arrived at by praxeological arguments in Human Action are sound.
The valildity of the deductive method in argument per se is NOT the issue I am talking about. Deductive reasoning is valid.
Many of the actual inferences of Misesian praxeology are not.
Do not confuse these 2 separate things.
"A society of respect for private property rights is incompatible with the state, because the state systematically violates private property rights (taxation, eminent domain, etc). etc etc
ReplyDeleteAll based on the flawed natural rights ethics, or in your case the flawed argumentation ethic of Hoppe, which doesn't even overcome the is-ought problme.
Just because you require the use of certain body parts in debate, it does not follow that you have any absolute moral right to the use of them or of external property.
How the hell can the state 'violate' property rights just by existing if property rights don't exist without a state?
ReplyDeleteI'm losing my patience with libertarians.
Easily. Just as a gun can be turned against its owner.
DeleteVoluntarism is my favorite libertarian fairy tale. Way back when, there were no States - just tribes, and of course anyone was free to strike out on their own, and many people did. Then along comes agriculture, and instead of having to live nomadically, people could stay in one place and have a predictable, stable source of food. The problem was that now everyone knew where you were, so you had to develop more robust systems of protection. This led to a more pronounced division of labor and more dependence on society, because when you have people spending their days keeping watch, other people have to spend their time growing food, making pottery, and all of the other things people need. The added efficiency of a city also left people with time to develop more sophisticated arts, crafts, storytelling, social relationships - the things which make life better. In order for that to work, though, people had to stop doing what they would naturally do - the only real 'natural rights' - raping, killing, pillaging. Some people didn't want to give up their natural rights to the rest of the group, so they were banished or killed. That's fine, because people who can't get along in a society aren't likely to come together voluntarily to form a larger and more powerful society, so there's little risk in just killing them. Rinse and repeat, and we have the modern world. Good luck with that voluntarism idea - even if every state were abolished this instant, syndicates will form, fight over resources, eventually accumulate power and become de facto states, and those bootstrappy libertarians who just want to be left alone will rightfully be up against the wall again, along with their voluntary-exchange supported judiciary and police force. The only reason any of us aren't murdering, raping, and pillaging is because we're willing to accept state power in exchange for a comfortable society, and because we can be reasonably sure that everyone will pay their fair share to make society work, whether it's 'voluntarily' or by force. You think you have a natural right to be left alone? What exactly are you going to do about it? How are you going to enforce that? What is the plan for abolishing the power of the state forever and ever, my dear, wonderful Modern Major General Freedom? Hanging out on mises.org all day and rubbing out long missives about how glorious it would be to have Real True Freedom? Why don't you try being productive for a change, like the rest of us?
ReplyDeleteAre you supporting 'collective might makes right' here or just saying that it will never go away so just live with it?
DeleteThe issue is whether the inferences/theories arrived at by praxeological arguments in Human Action are sound.
ReplyDeleteThe valildity of the deductive method in argument per se is NOT the issue I am talking about. Deductive reasoning is valid.
Many of the actual inferences of Misesian praxeology are not.
Such as?
"A society of respect for private property rights is incompatible with the state, because the state systematically violates private property rights (taxation, eminent domain, etc). etc etc
ReplyDeleteAll based on the flawed natural rights ethics, or in your case the flawed argumentation ethic of Hoppe, which doesn't even overcome the is-ought problme.
You haven't shown how Rothbard's natural rights theory is flawed, nor have you shown how Hoppe's argumentation ethic is flawed.