Friday, October 8, 2010

Rothbard on Mises’ Utilitarianism: Why the Systems of Mises and Rothbard both Collapse

In a previous post (see “Was Mises a Socialist?: Why Mises Refutes Himself on Government Intervention”), I reviewed the critique of Mises’s Human Action by George J. Schuller (1950; 1951) and his exchange with Rothbard (1951).

It appears that, after George J. Schuller’s (1951) reply to Rothbard, the latter realised that there was a devastating contradiction in Mises’ thought. In Rothbard’s book The Ethics of Liberty (first published in 1982), Rothbard makes a remarkable concession on government intervention:
“What can Mises reply to a majority of the public who have indeed considered all the praxeological consequences, and still prefer a modicum–or, for that matter, even a drastic amount—of statism in order to achieve some of their competing goals? As a utilitarian, he cannot quarrel with the ethical nature of their chosen goals, for, as a utilitarian, he must confine himself to the one value judgment that he favors the majority achieving their chosen goals. The only reply that Mises can make within his own framework is to point out that government intervention has a cumulative effect, that eventually the economy must move either toward the free market or toward full socialism, which praxeology shows will bring chaos and drastic impoverishment, at least to an industrial society. But this, too, is not a fully satisfactory answer. While many or most programs of statist intervention—especially price controls—are indeed cumulative, others are not. Furthermore, the cumulative impact takes such a long time that the time-preferences of the majority might well lead them, in full acknowledgment of the consequences, to ignore the effect.” (Rothbard 2002: 211–212)
Rothbard comes dangerously close to conceding that government intervention does not necessarily lead to chaos or socialism, just as Schuller (1951: 190) had argued. One might also note that Rothbard states that the “cumulative impact” of some intervention takes a long time, which makes his case even weaker. For example, how long does it take? (5 years? 10 years? 50? 100? 200?).

But Rothbard makes a perfectly valid point against Mises’ utilitarianism as well, and how Mises cannot possibly provide a convincing counterargument against state intervention once the cost and benefits are weighed and such interventions have been endorsed by democratic vote:
The point here is that Mises, not only as a praxeologist but even as a utilitarian liberal, can have no word of criticism against these statist measures once the majority of the public have taken their praxeological consequences into account and chosen them anyway on behalf of goals other than wealth and prosperity. Furthermore, there are other types of statist intervention which clearly have little or no cumulative effect, and which may even have very little effect in diminishing production or prosperity (Rothbard 2002: 213) ….

“Thus, while praxeological economic theory is extremely useful for providing data and knowledge for framing economic policy, it cannot be sufficient by itself to enable the economist to make any value pronouncements or to advocate any public policy whatsoever. More specifically, Ludwig von Mises to the contrary notwithstanding, neither praxeological economics nor Mises’s utilitarian liberalism is sufficient to make the case for laissez faire and the free-market economy. To make such a case, one must go beyond economics and utilitarianism to establish an objective ethics which affirms the overriding value of liberty, and morally condemns all forms of statism” (Rothbard 2002: 214).
The full implications of this passage are profound. Rothbard is rejecting Mises’ utilitarian case for laissez faire, and saying that Mises’ praxeology does not in itself allow any Austrian to advocate any public policy whatsoever. A Misesian cannot justify an economic policy as an actual public policy just because it can (allegedly) be shown to be an inference of praxeology.

So Rothbard abandoned Mises’ utilitarianism and instead made the case for anarcho-capitalism and laissez faire a moral issue, which could be justified by an objective moral theory. This was a fundamentally important difference between Rothbard and Mises.

Now Rothbard called himself an Aristotelian neo-Thomist, and held an objective natural law/natural rights view of ethics. He proceeded to make the case for a free market economy on objective moral grounds based on natural law (for example, his nonaggression axiom was justified by appealing to natural law).

So we can easily and totally refute Rothbard simply by showing his objective natural law/natural rights theory is untenable.

Frankly, that is not difficult. I will devote a larger post to it soon. Here philosophy of ethics is important, and there are very powerful arguments against the idea of natural law or natural rights, which even some libertarians accept (indeed Mises himself rejected natural law precisely because the case for it is utterly unconvincing). I will note here that one of the serious objections to natural law theory is that its main historical justification was the belief in a “divine order” and a divinely-created human nature that makes us conform to “natural law.” In the early modern period, rationalist European philosophers like Grotius tried to defend natural law theory by removing God and the previous supernatural justification for it. However, in doing so, they destroyed the only convincing explanation for belief in natural law (Tawney 1998: xxv-xxvi).

Anyone who rejects natural law has no reason to accept Rothbard’s ethics or his moral case for anarcho-capitalism derived from it. And, once the ethical case for Rothbard’s system is destroyed, that leaves Mises’ severely flawed system which must also be rejected, as it simply cannot provide any rational objection to intervention on moral or pragmatic grounds.

The case for the praxeological Austrian economics of Mises or Rothbard is a house built on sand.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Rothbard. M. N. 1951. “Mises’ ‘Human Action’: Comment,” American Economic Review 41.1: 181–185.

Rothbard, M. N. 2002. The Ethics of Liberty, New York University Press, New York, N.Y. and London.

Schuller, G. J. 1950. Review of Human Action: A Treatise on Economics by Ludwig von Mises, American Economic Review 40.3: 418–422.

Schuller, G. J. 1951. “Mises’ ‘Human Action’: Rejoinder,” American Economic Review 41.1: 185–190.

Tawney, R. H. 1998. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, Transaction, New Brunswick, N.J. and London.

9 comments:

  1. The sun rising in the east is not sufficient to prove that the earth rotates and orbits the sun. That insufficiency does not prove that the sun does not rise in the east, or that the earth does not rotate or orbit the sun.

    Your argument is very unconvincing. It treats Austrian economics and libertarianism as one and the same, which they are certainly not. Saying you or anyone else has refuted anything does not mean you actually did refute it.

    However right or wrong a particular argument of Mises, Rothbard, Keynes, Aristotle, or anyone else, it has no effect on the correctness of other arguments or other theories. Because they were important Austrian economists and libertarians does not mean that refuting one of their arguments, which neither you nor Schuller have actually done, refutes the entirety of Austrianism or libertarianism.

    Whether or not you believe in any moral arguments, unless you believe that slavery is acceptable, you must certainly believe that every person is the owner of his or her own life and body. Slavery is the forcible imposition of ownership claims on the life of another human being. Libertarianism is predicated on self-ownership and nobody can argue against it without also making the case for slavery.

    To me, it is certainly true that libertarians can advocate no public policy other than the protection of the life, liberty and property of every individual. In order to enact any other public policy, it is necessary to violate one or more of those rights and enslave some person or group to the extent of the violation. Laissez Fair and free markets are simply the recognition that people have a right to their lives and their property and the right to engage in voluntary transactions with others. That doesn’t, in any way, give any person or organization, political or otherwise, the right to use coercion, violence or fraud to force people to transact with them involuntarily. That is necessarily a violation of the terms “free market” and “libertarianism.”

    You can call it anarcho-capitalism or any other term and it makes no difference. I cannot see how someone can coherently argue for political manipulation of society, whether it be through tyranny of democracy, theocracy, communist dictatorship or any other form of oppression, and still claim to adhere to a philosophy of freedom.

    ReplyDelete
  2. It treats Austrian economics and libertarianism as one and the same

    I do no such thing. My critique of Mises and Rothbard applies only to Mises and Rothbard. I am perfectly well aware that Austrian economics and libertarianism are not one and the same. If you read this earlier post:

    http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2010/10/mises-praxeology-critique.html

    you will see I distinguish between Misesian praxeologists and other Austrians like Israel Kirzner, D. Lavoie, and Gerald P. O’Driscoll and Mario J. Rizzo. My opinion is that O’Driscoll and Rizzo do actually have some serious things to say about economics: I don’t agree with them, but their work is worth reading.

    I also know perfectly well that there are non-Austrian libertarians like the Randians, public choice theorists like James M. Buchanan and the libertarians following Robert Nozick.

    The Friedmanite monetarists are to be considered yet another group of free marketeers.

    However right or wrong a particular argument of Mises, Rothbard, Keynes, Aristotle, or anyone else, it has no effect on the correctness of other arguments or other theories.

    Correct. Why have have I said that that it does?

    Whether or not you believe in any moral arguments, unless you believe that slavery is acceptable, you must certainly believe that every person is the owner of his or her own life and body …. Libertarianism is predicated on self-ownership and nobody can argue against it without also making the case for slavery.

    This is utterly false. There are perfectly adequate rule utilitarian arguments against slavery, as R. M. Hare showed. One does not need to accept natural rights theory to reject slavery.

    The case against natural rights/natural law is a powerful one:

    Kai Nielsen, “The Myth of Natural Law,” in S. Hook (ed.), Law and Philosophy: A Symposium, University Press, New York. 1963.

    L. A. Rollins, The Myth of Natural Rights(Loompanics Unlimited, 1983).

    You might know that Rollins refutes Rand and Rothbard on natural rights.

    ReplyDelete
  3. A great case against Natural Law can also be found in Hans Kelsen's "The Problem of Justice". Nielsen and Rollins are good, but I think that a renowned philosopher of law - as opposed to the philosophical lightweight that is Murray Rothbard - should pretty much seal the deal. Kelsen utterly massacres the natural law doctrine there and in some of his other works, it's good stuff.

    As another problem, even assuming that there is such thing as "natural law", nothing points out for it being the natural law expressed in "The Ethics of Liberty". John Finnis in his "Natural Law and Natural Rights", for example, argues for something which is by no means close to the anarcho-capitalist ideal. And hell, even if there were such thing as "natural law", and if such thing were exactly what Rothbard envisions, there is nothing saying that because it is the "natural" law it is the correct one or that one should follow it. To argue otherwise is to commit the naturalistic fallacy.

    And "The Ethics of Liberty" is a ridiculous book anyway. Rothbard's case for "natural law" is expressed in such gems as saying that an apple's "nature" is demonstrated in that it falls to the ground when let go and appeals to idealized concepts such as "man", and that the only problem with the state - remember, we are talking about someone who calls himself an anarchist here - is that it didn't acquire its territory legitimately (in other words: according to his arbitrary criteria)! Some anarchist. The Anarchist FAQ provides a nice rebuttal of it here: http://anarchy.be/faq/secF7.html

    Natural law is to the social sciences as creationism is to biology.

    ReplyDelete
  4. Anonymous,
    Many thanks for your comment and the reference to What is justice? by Hans Kelsen.
    I'll read that as soon as I can.

    ReplyDelete
  5. Rothbard's ethics are weak, indeed. Neither were very sophisticated in their positions. Mises's utilitarianism was a weakness, too, but not to the bulk of what he set out in Human Action.

    Interesting post. I agree with a lot of it. I agree with much the commenters say, as well, particularly that Austrian economics and libertarianism shouldn't be conflated, even though they have some overlaps. The Austrian school can do just fine grounding itself in contractarian and/or pragmatist thought--and that goes for Mises. Natural rights theory is weak. My subjectivism runs to the core, though, which bothers many Rothbardians.

    ReplyDelete
  6. The Austrian school can do just fine grounding itself in contractarian and/or pragmatist thought--and that goes for Mises

    Max, thanks for your comments.
    Yes, contractarianism may well do it - this is an intelligent position to take, worthy of respect.

    ReplyDelete
  7. Lord Keynes,

    "But Rothbard makes a perfectly valid point against Mises’ utilitarianism as well, and how Mises cannot possibly provide a convincing counterargument against state intervention once the cost and benefits are weighed and such interventions have been endorsed by democratic vote."

    But can't people be wrong?

    I mean, if everybody wants A, but they only want it because they want B, but A and B aren't compatible, isn't it legitimate to step in and tell them that they're misguided? It's possible that the majority could be wrong about something. I mean, it's happened before, right?

    (In other words, that argument would only work if you assume that the democratic process is infallible, and the majority can't ever be wrong. I mean, if that were true, Mises probably would have just stuck to philosophy or something. But instead he tried to use his economics to weigh those costs/benefits, and his conclusion was pretty anti-statist/anti-interventionist. He didn't think that the democratic process was infallible, but unlike a lot of current Austrian School economists, he thought that the process was fine, but that the people were misguided.)

    And that's not even to mention the obvious ridiculousness in democratic voting.

    Nobody has any stake in it whatsoever except in terms of making friends and whatever.

    When somebody says that there's no point in voting because the probability that one vote would change the outcome is vanishingly low, people call them cynics, and say that, if everybody were like them, society would fall apart. But there's a lot more to their criticism than most people realize. If one vote can't change anything (or has a ridiculously low probability of altering anything), there's no profit/loss test for their vote. If they vote like an idiot, nothing changes in terms of the policy. No profit/loss test, no rationality in their decisions.

    But wait. There is a profit/loss test! It's called whether people like you or not. Most people choose their political arrangement based on whether other people would like them for it or not. Maybe they want to seem like a radical; maybe they wish to appear as very compassionate; and so on. But, whatever the reason, that can't lead to good outcomes in terms of policy.

    If you're a big supporter of democracy, please focus more on my first criticism. I think that it stands alone, and I don't want to turn this into nothing but an argument about democracy. (That's not to say that I won't welcome criticism against the idea that I just threw out there.)

    Sincerely,

    Ian Ryan

    ReplyDelete
  8. Terrible article.

    Your only criticism of natural law ethics seems to be that natural law has allegedly historically been the realm of providence and religion, and thus if one rejects religion, then one must reject natural law. That is not true. There are many natural law philosophers who held that God is not necessary for natural law to be valid. Furthermore, you completely ignored Hans-Hermann Hoppe's arguments, which provide a totally secular proof of a private property, natural law ethic.

    The fact that Rothbard abandoned Mises does not mean that Rothbard no longer has any defense.

    ReplyDelete
  9. You just didnt include the part where Rothbard show there is no contradiction in what Mises say.
    Mises did not defend liberalism as value-less economist, but as person making most general value judgement that people prefer wealth and life before death and poverty. This is actually all he had to do to make sound utilitarist argument for liberalism.

    Rothbard just tought this isn't enough so he made moral case.

    You may reject natural law as arbitrary ethics, but you still cannot dismiss Mises's argument unless you challange the general value judgement or show faults in his praxeology.

    See:
    http://mises.org/daily/3380

    ReplyDelete