Friday, April 2, 2010

Japan’s Quantitative Easing (QE), the Yen Carry Trade and QE in the US

I have recently seen two short essays comparing QE in Japan with that in the US:
"Quantitative easing in US and Japan".

Paul Krugman, “Way off Base”.
The monetary base in Japan rose by 70% from 2001–2006 and by 140% in the US from 2008–2010.

The Bank of Japan increased the base money from about 65 trillion yen in March 2001 to 110 trillion yen by 2006.

In the article above, Paul Krugman points out that, just because the monetary base rises rapidly, this does not necessarily mean that higher inflation must occur or is likely to occur – and Japan’s case proves it, as Japan continued to experience deflation down to 2006 despite its QE.

Needless to say, when QE was adopted in the UK and the US in 2009, we had many predicting hyperinflation for 2009 or the near future.

To take one example, the investment analyst and entrepreneur Marc Faber was interviewed by Glenn Beck on 28th May, 2009, and predicted that hyperinflation would happen in the US and that this was 100% certain.

It is obvious that there was no hyperinflation in 2009 and no signs of it now.
Many have correctly pointed out that Japan engaged in QE in the early 2000s, and no hyperinflation ever resulted. One response to this is that much of the money created by the Bank of Japan during QE was simply lent out for the yen carry trade.

The blogger Cynicus Economicus, for example, has argued that Japan did not experience high inflation because the printed money (that is, the excess bank reserves) went to the West via the carry trade (See “Getting carried away…” Trade & Forfaiting Review, 3 Dec 2009; "Easy money?" Trade & Forfaiting Review, 9 April 2009).

However, the view that all or most of the excess reserves created by Japan's QE were simply lent out in the carry trade is actually false.

First, the initial phase of the yen carry trade occurred from 1995 to October 1998 – before Japanese QE even began.

In addition, the second phase of the yen carry trade went from 1999 (again before Japanese QE began) to 2008:
despite the carry trade’s importance, no one knows for sure how large it really is. Mr. Kanno [an economist for JPMorgan Securities] estimates that about 7 trillion yen, or about $58.39 billion, flowed overseas last year [2006] alone. Another way to measure the trade is by the amount of assets now held overseas by all those involved in the trade since it began in 1999, when the Bank of Japan first cut rates to near zero. Mr. Kanno estimates those holdings are worth about 40 trillion yen, or around $330 billion …. Policy makers also seem aware that the carry trade is mostly driven by Japanese individuals trying to improve the return on their savings. Mr. Kanno of JPMorgan estimates that these individuals’ holdings overseas have grown to about 30 trillion yen since 1999, making up about three-quarters of all carry-trade-related investments. Most of the rest is held by foreign investors, he said.
Martin Fackler, “Bank of Japan Raises Short-Term Interest Rates,” New York Times, February 22, 2007.
So in fact that vast majority of all yen carry trade investors were Japanese savers, who were investing their own money that they had saved, not newly created money from QE.

Furthermore, the Bank of Japan rapidly drained the excess reserves and ended QE in March 2006, yet the yen carry trade continued. With the end of QE the Bank of Japan also ended its zero-interest-rate policy, and lifted interest rates slightly, though again the yen carry trade simply continued.

Tadashi Nakamae, in a 2007 article in the International Economy magazine, explains what happened:
The Bank of Japan undertook drastic steps to lower interest rates to save domestic banks and non-financial companies after Japan’s bubble burst. Easing the interest payment burdens of [banks] … was the most effective measure to rescue them. The victim of this policy was the household sector. Their interest income was wiped out. After peaking in 1991 at 39 trillion yen in returns from 600 trillion yen in interest-bearing financial assets (mostly bank deposits), households’ interest income has nose-dived to less than 5 trillion yen from 860 trillion yen in interest-bearing assets …. Zero interest rates also triggered a significant change among Japanese savers. An increasing number, who had traditionally favoured domestic bank deposits, are now looking abroad for better returns …. Japanese households have some 1,500 trillion yen—triple the size of Japan’s GDP—in financial assets (including the 860 trillion in interest-bearing instruments). The 15 trillion yen flowing overseas is just 1 percent of the total.

Tadashi Nakamae, “Weak Yen Conundrum: Why Japanese households love foreign financial assets,” International Economy, Winter 2007.
Thus there was more than enough money in Japanese household savings to fund most of the yen carry trade (and in 2010 Japanese savers still have about $15 trillion US in savings).

Even foreign investors probably could have borrowed yen for their carry trade operations from the Japanese money markets and the banks' own deposit base rather than massively drawing on excess reserves.

As an aside, the carry trade also caused significant depreciation in the exchange rate of the yen, as you can see in this graph of the trade weighted value of the yen (1980–2009). The fall was very steep.

It is likely that the fall in the yen’s value had a major role in the recovery of Japan’s economy in the 2000s by making its exports much cheaper on international markets. This factor was no doubt important, given that Japan is an export-led growth economy (Lok Sang Ho, “The Moral of Japan's Lost Decade”).

So the yen depreciation was actually beneficial.

With respect to the carry trade and the fall in the yen's value, the relevant policy instrument was the interest rate, which was driven down to zero by the Bank of Japan through QE. The expanding monetary base did this, but those reserves were not all suddenly lent out. When QE ended in 2006, the short term interest rate rose from nearly 0% to 0.25% – which was still a very low rate.

But, during the time of QE, the monetary base had been increased to 110 trillion yen by 2006, so the banks had more than enough money to lend into Japan’s domestic economy if they wanted to, yet domestic Japanese bank loans actually fell during most of the time in which QE was conducted and the broad money supply growth was slow.

The claim that the yen carry trade prevented the injection of the newly created bank reserves into Japan’s economy is obviously false. There were other factors that prevented a rise in bank loans.

Hyperinflation never resulted because bank lending is determined not simply by reserves, but by the number of creditworthy businesses and individuals and the willingness of banks to lend. In the uncertain environment of the lost decade and the slow recovery that followed it, Japanese business confidence was not that high, so borrowing and lending was not either.

Much the same thing has happened in the US. As of February 2010, the US banks were still not lending much:
David Rosenberg from Gluskin Sheff said lending has fallen by over $100bn (£63.8bn) since January, plummeting at an annual rate of 16pc. "Since the credit crisis began, $740bn of bank credit has evaporated. This is a record 10pc decline," he said ... The M3 broad money supply – watched by monetarists as a leading indicator of trouble a year ahead – has been contracting at a rate of 5.6pc over the last three months. This signals future deflation.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “US bank lending falls at fastest rate in history,” The Telegraph, 17 February 2010.
In other words, the situation is similar to what happened in Japan during their experiment with QE.

You can get excellent graphs of the various US money supply measures and growth rates at Shadowstats.com (Monetary Base and Money Supply).

These confirm that the broadest US money supply measure (M3) is falling.

The most recent data from Forbes.com suggest that “for the three weeks between Feb. 24 and March 10, outstanding loan balances were flat. That represents the first three-week period without a decline since early 2008.”

But this doesn’t mean that lending will significantly increase any time soon, as there is still a lack of creditworthy borrowers and non-performing loans are a serious issue, as pointed out in the Forbes article.

One can also point out that even in an upturn banks are likely to return to conservative lending principles – and even if they did increase lending greatly they still only have a limited demand for credit from over-indebted borrowers, not enough to cause hyperinflation.

Sunday, November 15, 2009

Financial Deregulation and Origin of the Financial Crisis of 2008

Many neoliberals, New Classical economists and other defenders of free market economics argue that financial deregulation was not a fundamental cause of the crisis of 2008.

One recent aspect of the debate has been the assertion of Eugene Fama, who is from the University of Chicago and father of the “efficient market hypothesis,” that financial deregulation and international capital flows led to “a period of extraordinary growth” from the early 1980s in the developed world and some parts of the developing world.

Paul Krugman has demonstrated how utterly false this idea is in his New York Times blog.

Financial deregulation is not correlated with better or faster growth. In fact, in the wake of financial deregulation in the 1980s, average GDP growth rates in the Western world fell sharply, as compared with the extraordinary period of post-WWII prosperity now known as the Golden Age of capitalism (1945–1973). This period was the Bretton Woods era of Keynesianism, social democracy, and financial regulation.

Angus Maddison, Emeritus Professor at the Faculty of Economics at the University of Groningen, is widely recognized as a leading scholar on the history of rates of economic growth. In 1995, Maddison published a study called Monitoring the World Economy 1820–1992 (OECD Development Centre, Paris, 1995), the first authoritative study on the effects of globalization and neoliberalism on growth rates in the developing and developed world, as compared with the Bretton Woods era. He compared growth rates both in GDP and per capita GDP in seven major regions of the world from 1950 to 1973 with those in the early era of globalization (1974-1992). He found that there were significant declines in the average annual growth rates in six of the seven areas: in fact the average annual rate of growth of world GDP was only half of what it had been under Bretton Woods. That is, world economic growth was about 50% lower than in the Bretton Woods era.

The only region that showed an increase was East Asia, precisely the region dominated by the protectionist state-led model of industrialization, led by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and (from the early 1990s) China.

Maddison’s study was updated by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in 2001 in the Scorecard on Globalization 1980–2000: 20 Years of Diminished Progress (July 2001).

Since the full effects of the collapse of Bretton Woods were not really felt until after 1979, their updated version which studies economic growth rates from 1980 to 2000 gives us a much more accurate measure of the consequences of orthodox neoliberalism or globalization on the world economy. The era of globalization was a disaster for much of the Third World. In Latin America (where the adoption of neoliberalism was somewhat later than in the West), real capita GDP grew by 82 percent from 1960–1980. But from 1980–2000, per capita GDP grew by only 9 percent.

However, it is correct that global poverty has fallen over the last 20 years: but the overwhelming number of such people are in China and India, where governments largely reject the policy prescriptions of globalization/neoliberalism. In India and China, for instance, there are still capital controls that prevent “hot money” from flowing in and out and destabilizing the economy.

But the devastating proof of the failure of globalization is the fact that those countries that have followed the rules – in Africa, the Caribbean, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union – have seen growth rates collapse to a level lower than the Bretton Woods era, and in some areas poverty rates have got worse.

The era of globalisation between about 1980 and the early 2000s was characterized by extreme financial liberalization in comparison with the 1945–1980 period of tight and effective financial regulation.

One simply cannot deny that in comparison with the 1945-1980 period, the last 20 years have characterized by a major trend towards deregulation.

For instance, from about the 1930s to the 1980s, many countries had policies of financial regulation that included many of the following:
1. Interest rate ceilings
2. Liquidity ratio requirements
3. Higher bank reserve requirements
4. Capital Controls (that is, restrictions on capital account transactions)
5. Restrictions on market entry into the financial sector
6. Credit ceilings or restrictions on the directions of credit allocation
7. Separation of commercial from investment (“speculative”) banks
8. Government ownership or domination of the banks.
(Ito 2009: 431–433).
These were abolished as financial liberalization and capital account liberalization became widely adopted in the 1980s and 1990s.

In the case of the US, we can point to a number of important acts of financial deregulation that were the direct causes of the crisis:
(1) Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (1999)
In the US, the Glass-Steagall Act, initially created in the wake of the Stock Market Crash of 1929, prohibited banks from both accepting deposits and underwriting securities. This led to segregation of investment banks from commercial banks. Glass-Steagall was effectively repealed for many large financial institutions by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999.
Joseph Stigliz has argued that

“The most important consequence of the repeal of Glass-Steagall was indirect—it lay in the way repeal changed an entire culture. Commercial banks are not supposed to be high-risk ventures; they are supposed to manage other people’s money very conservatively. It is with this understanding that the government agrees to pick up the tab should they fail. Investment banks, on the other hand, have traditionally managed rich people’s money—people who can take bigger risks in order to get bigger returns” (Stiglitz 2009).

Deposit insurance does make sense when it protects a commercial banking sector prevented from making highly speculative and risky investments.

(2) Hiding Liabilities on Off-Balance Sheet Accounting
Banks used off-balance sheet operations called special purpose entities (SPEs) or special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to take on toxic asset-backed securities. This allowed banks to escape even the weak regulation of Basel I and II. It is estimated that the top 4 U.S. depository banks put around $5.2 trillion into SIVs.

(3) Commodities Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), 2000
This exempted financial derivatives, including credit default swaps, from regulation.

(4) The SEC’s Voluntary Regulation Regime for Investment Banks, 2004-2008
The SEC's Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE) regime was introduced in 2004. It allowed investment banks to engage in their own net capital requirements in accordance with the standards of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. It was voluntarily administered, and the result was that investment banks pushed borrowing ratios to as high as 40 to 1, as in the case of Merrill Lynch.
One major confirmation of the effectiveness of financial regulation is the state of Canada’s banking system. In 2008, the World Economic Forum ranked Canada's banking system as the soundest in the world. The US system was ranked at number 40, and Germany and Britain ranked 39 and 44. Canada’s banks required no direct government bailouts.

Some commentators blame Basel I and II as a major cause of the financial collapse.
But if Basel I and II led inevitably to asset bubbles and financial collapse, then why has this not occurred in Canada?

The answer is fairly simple: Canada, unlike many other Western countries, still has tight and effective banking regulation.

That the role of Basel I and II in the present crisis is exaggerated is suggested by the fact that
“Canadian banks were the first in the world to adopt risk-management approaches under the new international Basel II capital framework, which sets out rigorous requirements to ensure a bank holds adequate capital reserves appropriate to the risk it is exposed to through its lending and investment practices. Canada's banks offer haven in turbulent sea, Vancouver Sun, Saturday, September 27, 2008
Furthermore, neither investment banks nor hedge funds (essentially the shadow banking sector) were really subject to Basel rules, yet these were the sectors of the financial system where the crisis originated: thus it was the investment banks Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers that first collapsed in 2008. Furthermore, even commercial banks could evade Basel by creating SIVs, which were not subject to Basel I and II capital regulations.

All in all, this crisis was clearly caused by a spectacular failure of regulation.

Bill Mitchell of Billy Blog, a neochartalist economist in the post Keynesian tradition, has proposed set of new financial regulations that command respect. He proposes the following:

– commercial banks should only lend directly to borrowers: all loans would have to be shown and kept on their balance sheets
– an end to third-party commission deals which might involve banks acting as “brokers” and on-selling loans or other financial assets for profit
– banks should not be allowed to accept any financial asset as collateral to support loans. The collateral should be the estimated value of the income stream on the asset for which the loan is being advanced
– banks should be banned from having “off-balance sheet” assets
– banks should be banned from trading in credit default insurance.

Billy Blog, Asset Bubbles and the Conduct of Banks, 2 October, 2009

These policies should be the starting point of any sensible response to the financial crisis of 2008.


BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ito, H. 2009. “Financial Repression,” in K. A. Reinert, R. S. Rajan et al. (eds), Princeton Encyclopedia of the World Economy, Princeton University Press, Oxford and Princeton, N.J.

Wade, R., 2008, “Financial Regime Change?” New Left Review 53 (September-October), http://www.newleftreview.org/?page=article&view=2739

Stiglitz, J. E., 2009, “Capitalist Fools,” Vanity Fair (January)
http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/2009/01/stiglitz200901

Weissman, R., 2009, “Reflections on Glass-Steagall and Maniacal Deregulation” (November 13), http://www.zmag.org/zspace/commentaries/4042