tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post4738691258040902652..comments2024-03-28T17:08:15.784-07:00Comments on Social Democracy for the 21st Century: A Realist Alternative to the Modern Left: Berkeley’s Idealism: A CritiqueLord Keyneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comBlogger34125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-45766503530838430832014-02-28T08:59:02.431-08:002014-02-28T08:59:02.431-08:00Yes, thank you, good catch. Kindly add "thei...Yes, thank you, good catch. Kindly add "their ideas of" before either of those referents.Hedlundnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-74400065568771034372014-02-28T08:17:39.097-08:002014-02-28T08:17:39.097-08:00"Materialists cannot intuit that which they e..."Materialists cannot intuit that which they experience (matter), and Idealists cannot experience that which they intuit (the overmind as such)."<br /><br />I don't think that's accurate. Materialists don't experience matter. They experience ideas.<br /><br />Matter is just a made up term. It contains nothing descriptive.Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-69111395171283580342014-02-28T07:42:29.179-08:002014-02-28T07:42:29.179-08:00"I don't fully understand the rest. But o..."I don't fully understand the rest. But on the point where you say the idealist/materialist dichotomy doesn't make any difference I'd entirely disagree."<br /><br />I dunno if I'd say it doesn't make a difference per se. I mean, I don't think they are the same, in any substantive sense of the word. It's just that they share a comparable problem: being confronted with something radically other that nevertheless constitutes their reality, including their selves.<br /><br />Here's the most compact and neutral way I can think of to express the difference: Materialists cannot intuit that which they experience (matter), and Idealists cannot experience that which they intuit (the overmind as such).<br /><br />I'm not looking to convert anyone, since my own convictions are not terribly strong. I mostly just signed on to the discussion because I felt particular idealist charges about materialists were unfounded and frankly unfair. <br /><br />I'm not sure there's much more to say about it, though I've enjoyed this discussion.Hedlundnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-7614020949481974622014-02-28T04:40:39.507-08:002014-02-28T04:40:39.507-08:00Yeah sure. It's always open to skeptical doubt...Yeah sure. It's always open to skeptical doubt of the Hume "the I is not real" etc. But so is any doctrine of the coherence of consciousness. I think that there is an "I" -- it encompasses my will, my ability to reason, my ability to imagine and act and so on.<br /><br />Frankly, if you deny the "I" you have a very hard time explaining these things. You also have a very hard time explaining the coherence of consciousness -- the fact that, even if you doubt it, I do experience myself as an "I".Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-33554935403104465502014-02-27T22:13:17.133-08:002014-02-27T22:13:17.133-08:00Thanks for clarifying, but on this:
"Well, ...Thanks for clarifying, but on this: <br /><br /><i>"Well, I guess it depends how you define "me". I would define it as "those ideas over which I have control". I think this overlaps with common sense in that the "I" or "me" is that entity in grammar which I use to designate my actions. So, in that sense the equating is a tautology. But then, a self-stable "me" will always be so."</i><br /><br />Surely you need a better argument than this.<br /><br />To say it is a tautology really doesn't take you very far.<br /><br />For example, even the idealist is subject to the radical skeptical objection: what if even your waking life and even objects over which you have no control are just your own dreams?<br /><br />I will write another post on this later to clarify what I mean here. Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-60358993822228352942014-02-27T17:26:27.248-08:002014-02-27T17:26:27.248-08:00"By invoking likelihood, you've actually ..."By invoking likelihood, you've actually situated us much closer together than may have been immediately apparent. Nobody here is, far as I can tell, making claims to apodicticity."<br /><br />Of course not! I'm an empiricist, as is Berkeley! We base our opinions on evidence and likelihood -- not Truth!<br /><br />But the idealist argument, being logically coherent, it more likely than the materialist on, which is not based on logic or reason.Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-18840575701578457252014-02-27T17:15:28.330-08:002014-02-27T17:15:28.330-08:00It's late but here it goes...
LK: (1) is an e...It's late but here it goes...<br /><br />LK: (1) is an empirical statement, yes. It says that there are certain ideas (perceptions etc.) over which I have no control. (2) states that therefore these uncontrollable ideas (perceptions etc.) must have a source outside of me. I see no problem with this. But you ask why. I'm not sure why you ask this.<br /><br />BUT I guess you could mean: how do I conclude that the ideas over which I have no control have a source external to me? Well, I guess it depends how you define "me". I would define it as "those ideas over which I have control". I think this overlaps with common sense in that the "I" or "me" is that entity in grammar which I use to designate my actions. So, in that sense the equating is a tautology. But then, a self-stable "me" will always be so.<br /><br />Hedlund: "Don't you see how that begs the question, though?"<br /><br />Not really...<br /><br />"How do we define "contents" or "mind"? Are these not ideas, too? I expect you see where I'm going with this."<br /><br />Contents = that which is internal to. This is an idea/concept. <br /><br />Mind = that entity that I think of as self-same and which acts and reacts to ideas. This is not an idea because it is that which reacts to ideas.<br /><br />I don't fully understand the rest. But on the point where you say the idealist/materialist dichotomy doesn't make any difference I'd entirely disagree. I've written a lot on this. Eg:<br /><br />http://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/2013/10/06/matter-and-models/Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-45254471167039394042014-02-27T11:57:02.715-08:002014-02-27T11:57:02.715-08:00In fact, to extend that last bit, I don't thin...In fact, to extend that last bit, I don't think it's right to charge anyone in this debate with "mysticism," so long as they're willing to accept their position as inherently fallible.<br /><br />As you said right at the top: "Berkeley's argument is that a belief in God -- i.e. an uber-consciousness -- is less abstract and less likely to be incorrect." <br /><br />By invoking likelihood, you've actually situated us much closer together than may have been immediately apparent. Nobody here is, far as I can tell, making claims to apodicticity.Hedlundnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-55271381508361943222014-02-27T11:42:30.195-08:002014-02-27T11:42:30.195-08:00"That's not true. We apprehend it through..."That's not true. We apprehend it through the fact that I have sensations. I'm apprehending it right now."<br /><br />Don't you see how that begs the question, though?<br /><br />"Anything that appears in a mind. Alternatively: the contents of a mind."<br /><br />How do we define "contents" or "mind"? Are these not ideas, too? I expect you see where I'm going with this.<br /><br />"Because all we experience is minds and ideas. Some ideas are not under control of our minds, so they must be controlled by another mind."<br /><br />But here's where it no longer follows. Even if we permit the very reasonable position that only minds produce ideas (I'm with you here!) and that all we perceive is ideal (ditto!), we still don't have any way of distinguishing a "better" choice between a) someone else made the idea and b) I made the idea based on an intransitive reality. Either way we're hanging everything on an assumption of an intransitive reality that is a) governed by a mind or b) not governed by a mind. If there's a knockdown argument one way or the other, apparently no one here (or, it would seem, in all of history) has made it.<br /><br />The only evidence we can suggest points us in one direction or the other is highly inconclusive. We've got, on one hand, a view of the world exclusively from the perspective of mind; were it not so, then our new vantage point would also be termed "mind." It's unavoidable. But on the other hand, we don't perceive any supposed thinker in and of itself, and most of what we perceive is not obviously mind; rocks and clouds and so on. To say otherwise calls for a derivation based on some premises that are indisputable ("only minds produce ideas") and some that assume the very thing they set out to prove ("there is no world independent of mind").<br /><br />While I'm much more sympathetic to the idealist perspective now, it still seems like a monumental leap to be more than agnostic about it -- especially if it doesn't actually have any implication for how we conduct our investigations of what we understand to be reality.Hedlundnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-24947872763334337082014-02-27T11:36:23.522-08:002014-02-27T11:36:23.522-08:00"We could posit that something else is going ...<i>"We could posit that something else is going on here (i.e. matter etc.) but there would be ZERO evidence. "</i><br /><br />Philip Pilkington, <br /><br />Just to clarify things: Can you explain or confirm how you justify these statements:<br /><br />(1) "There are ideas over which I have no control (perceptions)."<br /><br />This is a synthetic a posteriori statement.<br /><br />I assume you would justify it by appeal to direct personal experience, yes?<br /><br />(2) "there are ideas over which I have no control (perceptions) with a causal origin external to me"<br /><br />You must also believe this even as an idealist, because to invoke an "super-mind" or god to explain these ideas logically entails an external source of the ideas over which we have no control.<br /><br />But how do you justify this statement?Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-68390609955875295892014-02-27T10:46:21.873-08:002014-02-27T10:46:21.873-08:00"But then again, other minds assist in our ap..."But then again, other minds assist in our apprehension of them. As LK has been pointing out, we can't inductively apprehend the overmind."<br /><br />That's not true. We apprehend it through the fact that I have sensations. I'm apprehending it right now.<br /><br />We cannot understand its scope and reach -- i.e. we cannot share its experiences. But that is true of other finite minds also.<br /><br />"Honest aside, what is your preferred, most-complete definition of "idea"?"<br /><br />Anything that appears in a mind. Alternatively: the contents of a mind.<br /><br />"Why, therefore, do we view the mechanism of our finite consciousness as in any way adequate as an analogy for the far, far more fundamental mechanism at work in the overmind?"<br /><br />Because all we experience is minds and ideas. Some ideas are not under control of our minds, so they must be controlled by another mind. <br /><br />All the evidence indicates that only minds produce ideas, so we take from this evidence that ideas that are not produced in our minds are produced in another.<br /><br />We could posit that something else is going on here (i.e. matter etc.) but there would be ZERO evidence. If I'm faced with an explanation that has some evidence in its favor and another which has none I choose the former. That is hardly a controversial way of reasoning and I am not sure why any rational person would debate this point.Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-8516954658521991472014-02-27T10:19:59.245-08:002014-02-27T10:19:59.245-08:00"'Matter' then becomes an unknown X w..."'Matter' then becomes an unknown X with no known properties."<br /><br />I would describe it more like: "Matter" becomes the object of our inquiry -- the intransitive object, whereas the various ideas we generate about it are the transitive objects of our intellectual labor.<br /><br />"If you consider this 'mysticism' then you also largely consider me saying that other finite minds exist 'mysticism'. I don't think it is. I think it is a logical induction."<br /><br />Interesting angle! But then again, other minds assist in our apprehension of them. As LK has been pointing out, we can't inductively apprehend the overmind. Thus, as you say, we use an analogy to our own minds, which brings me to the point you've asked me to restate.<br /><br />I'll expand it a bit: Let us accept "ideas" as the fundamental constituent of reality, in place of the vacuous "matter." (Honest aside, what is your preferred, most-complete definition of "idea"?) <br /><br />We know from our perceptions that things are comprised of other things -- thus, there is a structuring to ideas, and ideas are made up of other, more fundamental ideas that operate along different functional principles. Thus the idea of biology is constituted by ideas of chemistry, but it is not wholly reducible to chemistry, as a reductionist materialist might try to assert; rather, life events may be composed of, e.g., biological and chemical mechanisms in no fixed proportion.<br /><br />However, chemical mechanisms nevertheless underpin biological mechanisms, and in this way the laws of biology are non-reciprocally dependent on the laws of chemistry.<br /><br />Thus, we can say that some strata of reality "emerge" from more fundamental ones. The recognition of this enables us to see the fallacy at work in the methodological individualism of economists, for example; we can no more determine the motion of the economy from individual actors than we can the movements of large bodies from the interactions of their constituent subatomic particles, even if the former cannot occur independently of the latter.<br /><br />As P.W. Anderson famously put it: <a href="http://robotics.cs.tamu.edu/dshell/cs689/papers/anderson72more_is_different.pdf" rel="nofollow">"More is different."</a><br /><br />Now, I know from other discussions and sources that this structuring of reality is nothing an idealist would scoff at -- in fact, it seems a natural fit. But herein lies the problem. <br /><br />We reject dualism, and thus we recognize that our bodies and our minds are not separable. Our minds, rather, emerge from the idea of our biology in a non-reciprocal fashion similar to that described above. So, to cut the brain can change memory, preferences, behavior, etc., but adopting such behavioral changes voluntarily doesn't lead to brains with cuts in them.<br /><br />It's clear that our minds are part of the same continuum in which these different strata of reality make use of different mechanisms. If this were not the case, the sort of reductionism that leads some materialists to hard determinism would be unavoidable.<br /><br />Why, therefore, do we view the mechanism of our finite consciousness as in any way adequate as an analogy for the far, far more fundamental mechanism at work in the overmind -- which not only presents us with the ideas of our perceptions, but the objective existence of the very bodies fundamental to our own ideation?<br /><br />We wouldn't expect the mechanisms responsible for a basketball bouncing off the backboard would provide us with a coherent glimpse into the workings of quarks or gluons. So: Why would we assume our finite, constituted consciousnesses would yield any analogical insight into the mind whose thoughts constitutes them at the most fundamental level possible and therefore operates according to entirely different mechanisms and principles? <br /><br />As someone once said: "My thoughts are not your thoughts," eh?<br /><br />I hope that's clearer!Hedlundnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-88995178532523460932014-02-27T09:10:11.357-08:002014-02-27T09:10:11.357-08:00"But this isn't a problem, since the conc..."But this isn't a problem, since the concept still refers to just that, in the sense of a placeholder that signifies something that we can't directly access at this time but may in the future."<br /><br />That is mysticism. 'Matter' then becomes an unknown X with no known properties. This is fine if you want a mystical metaphysics and if you are happy with mysticism. Personally, I am not comfortable with this. <br /><br />(Although, if you are familiar with the work of Lacan you can equate this X with his 'object small a' and you have a good starting principle for a psychological doctrine... That I am happy with if it is subordinate to a less mystical metaphysics).<br /><br />"You yourself have said as much: "Is the uber-consciousness the God of classical theism? Not necessarily." Why not necessarily?"<br /><br />Depends what you mean by classic theism...<br /><br />"Can it be conceived of in a variety of ways?"<br /><br />Sure. Benevolent. Vengeful. Neutral. Omnipotent. Unable to intervene in the world. And so on... These are theological questions. They don't interest me greatly.<br /><br />"Then how can we make the kinds of definite and content-rich claims about it that you're describing?"<br /><br />Because I can describe the uber-conciousness by using analogy to my own mind. The process is very similar to inducing that other finite minds exist in other people.<br /><br />If you consider this 'mysticism' then you also largely consider me saying that other finite minds exist 'mysticism'. I don't think it is. I think it is a logical induction.<br /><br />"Any analogy to a fundamental constituent must necessarily be to something constituted thereby. In light of the principle of emergence, which I know idealists embrace, how can we justify this contradictory assumption of consistency across different strata of reality?"<br /><br />I don't understand. Can you restate?Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-37826365931403162312014-02-27T08:57:53.369-08:002014-02-27T08:57:53.369-08:00Ok, that makes sense. So let's leave behind t...Ok, that makes sense. So let's leave behind that part of my comment and just focus on the last three paragraphs, which is where lies all the stuff I am actually excited to see argued.<br /><br />Your thoughts?Hedlundnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-4690810816530933192014-02-27T08:45:36.956-08:002014-02-27T08:45:36.956-08:00"..."matter" expresses something ve..."..."matter" expresses something very distinct -- again, the constituent of reality, that which exists independently of (and also makes up) mind, as structures of particulate mass and energy."<br /><br />That matter makes up the "constituent of reality" is a tautology given that it is this constituent that you are trying to explain by using the word "matter".<br /><br />Particulate mass and energy are just ideas. If matter = particulate mass and energy, then matter is just another word for "idea" because we only know the latter through the senses.Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-41722521038414510252014-02-27T07:02:15.397-08:002014-02-27T07:02:15.397-08:00I think I have a better sense of where you're ...I think I have a better sense of where you're coming from, now. And if you really and truly believe that "matter" and "tuyaleenago" are equivalents, then I suspect that maybe I've given too much ground by allowing that "matter" is devoid of content. Far from a word that I just made up and on which I cannot elaborate (speaking of weak analogies), "matter" expresses something very distinct -- again, the constituent of reality, that which exists independently of (and also makes up) mind, as structures of particulate mass and energy.<br /><br />Tuyaleenago can mean this, too, but only (and tellingly!) if we set its meaning equal to "matter." In that case I would be more disposed towards accepting it as a fundamental principle, as per your question. But absent that correspondence, no, I wouldn't.<br /><br />Maybe we can't point our finger at something and say "this, this right here is matter in its most fundamental form: ur-matter." But this isn't a problem, since the concept still refers to just that, in the sense of a placeholder that signifies something that we can't directly access at this time but may in the future. Similarly, to restate a point that kind of slipped by, the ubermind is also a placeholder. You yourself have said as much: <i>"Is the uber-consciousness the God of classical theism? Not necessarily."</i> Why not necessarily? Can it be conceived of in a variety of ways? Then how can we make the kinds of definite and content-rich claims about it that you're describing? <br /><br />On the contrary, uber-consciousness and matter are here once again shown to be of a kind -- fundaments for which we cannot fully account, by dint of which we nevertheless proceed to explain other things. Incidentally, and a bit ironically, this also provides an analogy for matter, and a jumping point to others -- e.g., "Matter is that which has the same function, and occupies the same place grammatically, as uberthought, except that it doesn't presuppose an uberthinker."<br /><br />Also, I notice you also didn't respond to the real thrust of my last comment, contained in its second paragraph. Quick restatement: Any analogy to a fundamental constituent must necessarily be to something constituted thereby. In light of the principle of emergence, which I know idealists embrace, how can we justify this contradictory assumption of consistency across different strata of reality?Hedlundnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-78343182677474975432014-02-27T02:04:29.937-08:002014-02-27T02:04:29.937-08:00Bad analogy. (Yes, you just used an analogy to est...Bad analogy. (Yes, you just used an analogy to establish an argument by the way...). In modern physics they are still using analogical reasoning to discuss virtual particle and all that sort of thing. They are not using words devoid of content.<br /><br />If we can use words devoid of content to account for the constancy of ideas then what stops me from claiming that the constancy of ideas is caused by 'tuyaleenago'? I just made that word up. It means nothing and I cannot further elaborate on it. Would you accept it as a fundamental metaphysical principle? If not then why not?Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-45779464168904798592014-02-26T23:31:16.984-08:002014-02-26T23:31:16.984-08:00I guess I just don't see why that's such a...I guess I just don't see why that's such an important point. "Ease of analogy" may be useful in some cases as a pedagogical tool, but as a criterion for our entire understanding of reality, it can just as easily be an impediment -- especially in those cases where the behavior of reality moves further and further away from the mechanisms we're hard-wired to perceive or otherwise intuit. Cutting-edge physics these days is all "virtual particle this" and "quantum foam that" -- it's utterly alien, and yet it may also prove to be an apt description of reality. To speak intelligently on it calls for years of intense study to adapt oneself to a subject that bears no resemblance to the reality we confront, e.g., on our way to work every day.<br /><br />More to the point: If you're dealing with the stuff that is, as I said, a fundamental constituent in a monistic world, then any analogy must necessarily be to something constitut<i>ed</i>. If we're going to be consistent in our claims that emergent properties are distinct from those of the stratum of reality constituting them, then starting off looking for consistency across strata seems a prima facie folly.<br /><br />The "it" that we often say "is raining" has no distinct meaning, and yet it is at the same time perfectly comprehensible to any speaker of English. I don't for a moment think you'd argue that describing rain as some anthropomorphic deity's tears enriches our understanding of weather. So why insist upon the personification here?Hedlundnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-16857421280055343362014-02-26T17:37:44.353-08:002014-02-26T17:37:44.353-08:00The other day I walked into a glass door. It was e...The other day I walked into a glass door. It was embarrassing. Would Idealists and Non-Idealists interpret this event differently?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-11966808467406111032014-02-26T15:37:22.896-08:002014-02-26T15:37:22.896-08:00I walked into a glass door the other day. It was e...I walked into a glass door the other day. It was embarassing.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-41670667396523450552014-02-26T15:25:45.382-08:002014-02-26T15:25:45.382-08:00I strongly disagree Hedlund. As I keep saying. The...I strongly disagree Hedlund. As I keep saying. The uber-consciousness is something that I can describe through the use of analogy. It is a word with explanatory content. Matter, on the other hand, cannot be described at all -- even through analogy. It is a word empty of content.<br /><br />If this is a "question of words", ala Gene Callahan, then it is a question of words with explanatory content versus words with no explanatory content. It is not for aesthetic reasons but rather for logical reasons that I opt for the former.Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-55461771682955359582014-02-26T07:25:51.622-08:002014-02-26T07:25:51.622-08:00It is easy to say that the differences between a s...It is easy to say that the differences between a sufficiently refined idealism and a sufficiently refined materialism boil down to aesthetics -- whether we call the substance of reality "matter" or "God-thoughts," etc.<br /><br />Gene Callahan <a href="http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?articleid=1885708" rel="nofollow">wrote a paper</a> a few years ago illustrating some synergies and overlaps between idealism and critical realism (taking Lawson as his chief expositor, though in my opinion <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Critical-Realism-Introduction-Bhaskars-Philosophy/dp/0860916022" rel="nofollow">Collier</a> wrote the best introduction). In the paper, he pulls this handy quote from Collingwood: <br /><br /><i>"To ask whether mind is a form of matter or matter a form of mind is very largely a question of words. The important thing is that we should be able to bring the two into relation at all; that we should hold such a conception of matter as does not prevent us from admitting truth, morality, and life as a whole to be real facts, and that we should hold such a conception of mind, as does not reduce the world to an illusion and experience to a dream. The first of these errors is that of crude materialism, and the second that of an equally crude idealism. The view for which we are contending would claim the title of idealism rather than materialism, but only because the current conception of mind seems a more adequate description of the world than the current conception of matter."</i><br /><br />This seems to jive with the above comment, but I don't find that last point convincing. Saying that 'we understand how we can imagine things, and then we extend that to our explanation of how things come to be externally' recognizes the limits of our understanding, and then does nothing to attempt to correct for them. It's a bit like that old gag: <br /><br />"I could have lost my wallet anywhere in this stadium."<br /><br />"Then why are you only searching in the lobby?"<br /><br />"Light's better in here." <br /><br />And for all the content supposed, it doesn't actually advance our understanding any further. After admitting that we can't explain matter, an idealist appears to attempt to explain it anyway by asserting another entity that we can't explain. This is important; if the primary objection is that one's fundamental entity is ill-defined, then the same critiques directed at materialist's matter must be leveled not at the idealist's uber-thought, but rather the idealist's uber-thinker.<br /><br />On that note, there seems to be a certain epistemic immodesty, especially considering what we know of brain-mind causality, in assuming that the world MUST be constituted along the lines of our own phenomenology. Who's to say an "uber-mind" would be comprehensible to our minds, even in the simple ways expressed? If our god-entity is "radically one" in the sense of being non-relational and thereby containing no categories (just a ferinstance, as I'm not looking to turn this into a whole scholasticism retread), then what worth is there in this all-important "content" demanded of our matter/uberthought definitions?<br /><br />In either case, whatever signifier we attach to our monistic substance, we've got enough of a working definition to start: "the fundamental constituent of our intransitive reality." For philosophy to go further than that, it'll need more input from science.Hedlundnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-39616719654779857982014-02-26T07:15:23.450-08:002014-02-26T07:15:23.450-08:00I feel a bout of Pantheism coming on.I feel a bout of Pantheism coming on.Olivernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-87336823411192043892014-02-26T03:07:21.655-08:002014-02-26T03:07:21.655-08:00I agree. But this is still a dualist argument. It&...I agree. But this is still a dualist argument. It's analogous to what I said in the comments of the last piece: for a dualist, consciousness is dependent on the brain but it is not determined by the brain.<br /><br />The idealist argument is more radical and simpler. We would say: the brain? But that's just an idea that we have in our minds. There is no "matter" underlying the brain. It is just a perception that we have.<br /><br />Now, we know that if we damage this perception we alter consciousness. But that is no different from saying that if we take the perception of fire and move it to the perception I have of my hand then I feel heat. This is all fine. We know all this already. What we are saying is that these are just ideas/perceptions. We can establish relations and even laws between these ideas/perceptions. That's fine. We just say that there is no "matter" underlying these because the word is without meaning and cannot be given meaning.Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-11236756183555455452014-02-26T00:01:06.443-08:002014-02-26T00:01:06.443-08:00"For the materialist, one strong and straight..."For the materialist, one strong and straightforward argument is that we have a strong degree of empirical evidence that human minds are causally dependent on brains,"<br /><br />The non-materialist, however, might argue that this apparently "causal" link between brains and minds can be alternatively explained as follows. Rather than being the cause of mind/consciousness, the brain simply act as a transmitter between mind and body, analogues to a radio-antenna.<br /><br />Hence a non-materialist might argue that brain damage (the principal argument in favour of the materialist position on the mind) does not in fact alter one's mind, but it in reality just hinders the communication between mind and body.Mordanicushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02555552511541697014noreply@blogger.com