Showing posts with label Menger. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Menger. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 6, 2016

Quiggin on Cattle Standards and Cattle as Proto-Money

From the anthropologist A. H. Quiggin’s A Survey of Primitive Money: The Beginnings of Currency (London, 1949) on cattle or oxen as a standard of value in ancient and less developed societies:
“Throughout the greater part of the immense region which includes Europe to the West and stretches to Further India in the East, cattle were the chief form of wealth, and, as is seen in Africa, where cattle form the standard of value, varieties of primitive money are undeveloped. .... Cattle, however satisfactory as wealth, as a standard of value, or even as a medium of exchange in the larger affairs of life, cannot properly be called money; and need must often have been felt for some more easily transportable and divisible form.” (Quiggin 1949: 187–188).

“The inclusion of Europe in the cattle-currency-complex has been noted above (p. 187). Ridgeway showed that in the regions of Asia, Europe and Africa, where the system of weight standards which has given birth to all the systems of modern Europe had its origin, the cow was universally the chief object of barter (1892, p. 387).

Cattle were the standard of wealth and unit of value; they had a sacred character and were offered to the gods as well as presented to potentates; they were exchanged for slaves and extorted as tribute. The ‘bride-price’ of a woman and the wergeld of a man were calculated in cattle.

Evidence of the cattle standard can be found in the Rig Veda of India and the Zend Avesta of Persia (as seen above), in the Brehon Laws of Ireland and the Ancient Laws of Wales. We have seen it actively at work in Eastern Asia and in Eastern Africa, and though it has vanished from more progressive Europe, traces are still obvious. There is the familiar literary evidence in the equation of cattle and money, pecus and pecunia. Ulfilas translates pecunia by the Gothic faihu, cattle, whence our word ‘fee’, which meant cattle, wealth or money in King Alfred’s day. Gothic skatts, meaning cattle, tribute or coin, becomes the O.E. coin sceat, or the ‘scat’, still known as a tax in the North.

Ridgeway notes (1892, p. 4) how accounts were kept in cows a generation or so ago in the Caucasus, as they were also in Scotland; in Hungary the prospective bridegroom's conventional opening is ‘Pray tell me if you have a cow to sell?’ (Kovalensky, 1891, p. 27) and ‘bride-price’ is still paid in cattle in Albania (Hasluck, 1933).

Where a cattle standard exists, this is adequate, and discourages the growth of primitive currencies, as has been already seen. It is noteworthy that the largest and most varied collections of primitive money come from cattle-less areas.
‘A traveller once asked a patriarch [in Mongolia] owner of several thousand horses why he did not sell some every year. He replied, “Why sell what I delight in? I do not need money. If I had any I would shut it up in a box where no one would see it. But when my horses run over the plain everyone sees them and knows that they are mine and is reminded that I am rich” (Bureau, 1888, p. 71).
Cattle cannot, however, provide all the requisites for money. They set the standard of value, they are less often units of exchange, and never sufficiently portable or divisible.” (Quiggin 1949: 277).
In many societies, cattle or oxen, then, appear to have been an important form of wealth, but also fundamentally important first as ceremonial or non-commercial money in social customs like marriage and blood money, and they also often had a religious character.

In African societies, for example, cattle and other goods were used for bride-price and fines (Quiggin 1949: 96, 99–100, 102) and were used in an abstract standard of value, but were not, generally speaking, an actual general medium of exchange:
“North, East and South Africa have been for so long the home of cattle-keeping peoples that cattle, whether in the form of camels, sheep, goats or cows, but chiefly cows, are the standard of value. The larger animals are rarely and reluctantly sold, but everything is calculated on a cattle basis. They constitute real wealth, and are parted with only in important transactions such as ‘bride-price’, or under compulsion, as for fines and compensations.” (Quiggin 1949: 92–93).
Such was more or less the situation in ancient Greece in the Dark (or Geometric) Age from c. 1200–800 BC and the early Archaic period (800–480 BC).

The Greeks appear to have had a rudimentary cattle or ox unit of account in these centuries, but the actual means of payment were in kind and tended to be many other types of goods, not just cattle (Peacock 2011: 49–54; Peacock 2013: 81).

In other words, the situation in early Greece was very similar to that in certain tribal African societies: cattle were used to some limited extent as an abstract standard of value, but not an actual general medium of exchange.

This if we define money as a commodity that is generally used as
(1) a common medium of exchange, and

(2) a unit of account, and

(3) store of purchasing power.
then one cannot really speak of cattle as full-bodied money in ancient Greece, nor in other societies. How, then, can the orthodox Mengerian theory of the origin of money explain it?

Even if the origin of such cattle standards of value lay in cattle as the most important barter good, there are still problems with the orthodox barter spot trade theory of the origin of money.

If, for example, cattle had arisen in the Mengerian fashion, then oxen would surely have been used as full-bodied money as the most saleable commodity in real and widespread barter spot trades, but must then, for some reason, have later ceased to have this role in many societies.

Secondly, cattle are of rather high value in an agrarian society and cannot be used for small transactions that are often the basis of trade. Cattle are not physically divisible into smaller units (and even conceptually this presents difficulties).

In many societies, cattle remain an abstract standard of value to some degree, but not a general medium of exchange, and their actual exchange is confined to social events of importance like bride-price, dowry, compensations such as wergeld, ceremonial gifts, or fines. They were often also important as sacrificial animals, as in Greece (Peacock 2013: 89–92).

The high value of cattle as an important source of wealth and also as a prestige good seems more fitted for exchanges in certain social customs, where indeed that exchange was largely maintained, rather than in general commercial life.

And, above all, why did cattle not emerge as a general commercial medium of exchange in such societies? Indeed, why did the cattle standard seem to discourage “the growth of primitive currencies”? (Quiggin 1949: 277).

All of this presents difficulties for the Mengerian theory of the origin of money as applied to cattle.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Peacock, Mark S. 2011. “The Political Economy of Homeric Society and the Origins of Money,” Contributions to Political Economy 30: 47–65

Peacock, Mark S. 2013. Introducing Money. Routledge, London.

Quiggin, A. H. 1949. A Survey of Primitive Money: The Beginnings of Currency. Methuen, London.

Wednesday, March 30, 2016

George Selgin versus David Graeber on the Origin of Money

The blogosphere has recently seen a new debate on the origin of money between George Selgin and David Graeber:
Ilana E. Strauss, “The Myth of the Barter Economy,” The Atlantic, February 26, 2016
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/barter-society-myth/471051/

Though not by Selgin or Graeber, I gather that this article set off the debate.

George Selgin, “The Myth of the Myth of Barter,” Alt-M Ideas for an Alternative Monetary Future, March 15, 2016.
http://www.alt-m.org/2016/03/15/myth-myth-barter/

This is Selgin’s original critique of Graeber.

George Selgin, “Graeber, Once More,” Alt-M Ideas for an Alternative Monetary Future, March 24, 2016
http://www.alt-m.org/2016/03/24/graeber-once-more/

After some debate on Twitter, Selgin posted this reply.
For those of you who don’t know, George Selgin is a monetary economist (whose research includes banking theory, monetary history, and free banking, among other things), and David Graeber is an anthropologist and author of the fascinating book Debt: The First 5,000 Years (2011).

To some extent, we are simply revisiting the debate that David Graeber had with Robert Murphy had in 2012.

I have intellectual respect for both George Selgin and David Graeber. For example, Selgin’s paper “Those Dishonest Goldsmiths” is an excellent refutation of the Rothbardian cult on their history of the origin of fractional reserve banking in England.

But, on this issue, I get the impression that people here are talking past one another. I offer this in the spirit of constructive and friendly criticism of both George Selgin and David Graeber, and hope it is taken in that way.

Let me begin with a positive assessment of Selgin’s analysis.

Selgin argues the following:
(1) that just because there is no modern anthropological evidence for pure barter economies, it does not necessarily follow that these things did not exist in the distant past before money was invented.

(2) Selgin complains:
“What I do deny, and vigorously, is anthropologist David Graeber’s claim that the existence of gift economies undermines ... ‘the entire discourse of economics.’”
(3) there is an irrational hatred of capitalism from some left-wing people, who want to blame slavery and imperialism on the use of money, and even paint “Adam Smith … as an enabler of slavery and imperialism.”

(4) that human societies can have quantified debts in terms of commodities owed without money.

(5) that, if we define value as subjective value, then money is not an objective measure of value, as the Austrians argue. It is also true that, generally speaking, during exchanges one person subjectively values the good he receives more highly than the good he parts with. Exchange is not an exchange of equivalents in that sense when we consider subjective value.
I can grant George Selgin all these points. In fact, I do. He is essentially correct on these points.

Selgin is a highly intelligent man, and he has scored hits against left-wing people here.

On (2), of course the refutation of simplistic models of money emerging from pure barter in neoclassical textbooks doesn’t refute all of neoclassical economics. Such a claim is absurd.

On (3), yes, it is the worst sort of left-wing irrationality to blame slavery and imperialism on money or capitalism.

On (5), I also appreciate Selgin’s complaints about the Aristotelian view of exchange:
“The idea that money is a ‘measure of value,’ like the related idea that exchanges are necessarily exchanges of equivalents, is among the hoariest of economic fallacies. It plays a prominent part in Aristotle’s economics — and, not coincidentally, in Aristotle’s condemnation of all sorts of ‘capitalist’ activity. Smith himself, in subscribing to a modified labor theory of value, was unable to break free of it. It is more than a little ironic that Graeber, in flinging all sorts of undeserved criticism at Smith, cleaves to him when it comes to his one indisputable mistake.

The notion that money is a ‘measure of value’ is but a particular instance — albeit one that has managed to linger on in some economics textbooks — of the mistaken belief that economic exchanges are exchanges of equivalents.”
George Selgin, “The Myth of the Myth of Barter,” Alt-M Ideas for an Alternative Monetary Future, March 15, 2016.
One could also add: Marx took over that same idea of exchange as necessarily exchanges of equivalents from the Classical economists and Aristotle, and it is a major reason for the train wreck of illogic and flawed argument in Chapter 1 of volume 1 of Capital.

We get to the crux of Selgin’s counterargument here:
“My concern, though, isn’t with Graeber’s sweeping condemnation of modern economics, or of the economic arrangements for which modern economists are supposedly to blame. It’s with his particular claim that there’s no merit in Smith’s account of the origin of money, or in the later accounts of other economists, including Carl Menger. Despite what these economists have argued, money couldn’t have grown out of barter, Graeber insists, because the ‘fabled land of barter’ that these accounts posit never existed.”
George Selgin, “The Myth of the Myth of Barter,” Alt-M Ideas for an Alternative Monetary Future, March 15, 2016.
Unfortunately, it seems to me that this misunderstands Graeber’s theory.

Graeber, as far as I am aware (I could be wrong), does not say that there is absolutely no merit of any kind to the views of Adam Smith or Carl Menger.

Graeber does not deny that money in some historical circumstances can emerge from barter, especially in long distance trade.

Right on p. 75 of Debt: The First 5,000 Years (2011), Graeber says:
“Throughout most of history, even where we do find elaborate markets, we also find a complex jumble of different sorts of currency. Some of these may have originally emerged from barter between foreigners: the cacao money of Mesoamerica and the salt money of Ethiopia are frequently cited examples. Other arose from credit systems, or from arguments over what sort of goods should be acceptable to pay taxes or other debts. Such questions were often matters of endless contestation.” (Graeber 2011: 75)
This statement requires that, yes, there is some merit to the theories of Smith and Menger, but suitably qualified.

The point is, however, that the Smith, Menger and neoclassical “barter origin” theory of money is not universally true and cannot be in its classical form a correct theory of the origin of money. It’s flawed.

What is needed is an eclectic theory that takes careful account of history and anthropology.

Moreover, even Selgin himself concludes that “notwithstanding the fact that credit is older than barter, Smith’s theory is, after all, not all that far removed from the truth.”

So if Selgin has asserted that
(1) the empirical evidence strongly suggests that gift exchange and debt–credit exchanges without money long preceded the invention of money in human history, and

(2) the classical and orthodox barter spot trade theory of the origin of money needs revision.
then it follows directly that Selgin has conceded something significant to his opponents.

Selgin states:
“So, how true is Graeber’s account, and just how fatal is it to the "fable" that economists like to tell? For answers, we need look no further than the evidence Graeber himself supplies. For on close inspection, that evidence itself suffices to show that, notwithstanding the fact that credit is older than barter, Smith's theory is, after all, not all that far removed from the truth.

A paradox? Nothing of the sort. The simple explanation is that, while subtle forms of credit or outright gift giving may suffice for affecting exchanges within tightly-knit communities, exchange within such communities hardly begins to take advantage of opportunities for specialization and division of labor that arise once one allows for trade, not just within such communities, but between them, that is, for trade between or among strangers. One need only recognize this simple truth to resuscitate Smith's theory from Graeber’s seemingly fatal blow. Simple forms of credit may come first; but such credit only goes so far, because it depends on a repeated interaction, and the trust that such interaction both allows and sustains.”
George Selgin, “The Myth of the Myth of Barter,” Alt-M Ideas for an Alternative Monetary Future, March 15, 2016.
At this point, Selgin cites with approval Graeber’s own views that barter trade, historically speaking, was probably far more important between ethnic groups and different communities, particularly in long distance trade.

Selgin continues:
“The question is, what did Smith really ‘imagine’? His story of the butcher and the baker notwithstanding, his reference to pastoral societies makes it perfectly evident that he understood the difference between conduct among ‘villagers’ and conduct among strangers. His theory of the origins of money ought to be understood accordingly. It is a theory of how, when opportunities for trade arise among strangers, bringing with them further scope for the division of labor, trade will be ‘choked and embarrassed’ if it must occur by means of barter, but will cease to be so once barter gives way to the employment of money. In portraying such cases as exceptions to the rule that ‘credit’ proceeds barter, Graeber simply fails to understand that such ‘exceptions’ are all that matters in assessing Smith’s theory.” ….

In short, a generous reading of Smith, far from making him out to be a right bungler when it comes to matters ethnographic, yields a relatively sophisticated view, according to which kinship and ‘credit’ first predominate, but then give way, as strangers meet, first to barter, but eventually to monetary exchange, which in turn allows for the growth of commerce, which ends up reducing the role of kinship and kin-based credit relationships.”
George Selgin, “The Myth of the Myth of Barter,” Alt-M Ideas for an Alternative Monetary Future, March 15, 2016.
But, in my view, this “generous reading of Smith” is really just reading into Smith things that aren’t there. Selgin has actually re-interpreted Smith from ideas in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, and – at the very least – one would have to admit that the explicit theory as presented in The Wealth of Nations needs revision.

Selgin then goes on to argue that Menger, in particular, was well aware of the importance of gift exchange and debt–credit exchanges in premodern human societies before money. Here there are good points. I agree Graeber is unfair to Menger. For example, Menger’s 1892 article “On the Origin of Money” (at least in its English translation) is mercifully free from mathematics, and clearly not filled with “mathematical equations.”

It is true that Menger on this issue and certainly on his other important economic and political views was far from the dogmatic Misesians and Rothbardian anarcho-capitalists who claim his legacy. Menger was a subtle thinker and made real contributions to economics, and was no extremist libertarian.

Here Selgin notes that “Menger understood perfectly well that ‘credit,’ in Graeber’s loose sense of the term, is older than either monetary exchange or barter,” and cites a passage in Menger’s article “Geld” in the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften (vol. 3), 1892. pp. 730–757. But Selgin cites the 2002 translation of L. B. Yeager and M. Streissler of that article which is actually based on the 3rd edition of 1909, not the original article of 1892.

I have a minor quibble here. I know it is a pedantic point, but did Menger’s views on this evolve over time and move away from his 1890s theory? (see Appendix 1 below).

At any rate, let us put this aside, and move to a much more important point.

If we read Menger’s classical article of 1892 in its English translation by C. A. Foley published in the Economic Journal, we find an interesting qualification that Menger makes to his theory:
It is not impossible for media of exchange, serving as they do the commonweal in the most emphatic sense of the word, to be instituted also by way of legislation, like other social institutions. But this is neither the only, nor the primary mode in which money has taken its origin.” (Menger 1892: 250).
That leaves open the possibility that money can be instituted by a government, though Menger, as far as I can see, clearly did not think that this was the primary and earliest manner by which money had emerged.

But, at the same time, it is also very difficult to see how this isn’t a substantive concession to chartalism by Menger.

That passage by Menger also shows us the divide between Menger’s nuanced view of the origins of money and the stridency of Rothbard:
“[sc. Mises’s] Regression Theorem also shows that money, in any society, can only become established by a market process emerging from barter. Money cannot be established by a social contract, by government imposition, or by artificial schemes proposed by economists.” (Rothbard 2009: 61).
However, Menger remained an advocate of the barter spot trade theory of money’s origins in ancient times, although he was willing to concede what later Austrians have emphatically denied.

But let us return to Selgin’s defence of Menger.

Selgin is essentially arguing the following:
(1) that Menger understood that gift exchange and debt–credit exchanges existed in premodern human societies before money.

(2) that the pure barter economy model from which money emerges is therefore an oversimplification.

(3) that the standard Austrian and neoclassical view on the origins of money can be easily rescued by arguing that it was trade and barter exchange between different communities that was the fundamental origin of money: money emerged in inter-communal barter spot trade as the most saleable good (or goods) became the medium of exchange (as in Menger 1892: 249, though Menger seems to conceive of this happening within communities), and over time money then spread more and more to exchanges within tribes or communities, and internal economies became monetised.
However, I find profound problems with this defence.

For one thing, this is not the mainstream neoclassical view, which does indeed proclaim the naïve theory of the emergence of money from barter spot trade as a universal theory and takes insufficient account of the importance of debt–credit relationships.

Secondly, it is a rather curious state of affairs to see that Selgin is actually proposing a theory that seems very much like the one proposed by Karl Marx in Chapter 2 of volume 1 of Capital:
“Objects in themselves are external to man, and consequently alienable by him. In order that this alienation may be reciprocal, it is only necessary for men, by a tacit understanding, to treat each other as private owners of those alienable objects, and by implication as independent individuals. But such a state of reciprocal independence has no existence in a primitive society based on property in common, whether such a society takes the form of a patriarchal family, an ancient Indian community, or a Peruvian Inca State.

The exchange of commodities, therefore, first begins on the boundaries of such communities, at their points of contact with other similar communities, or with members of the latter. So soon, however, as products once become commodities in the external relations of a community, they also, by reaction, become so in its internal intercourse.
The proportions in which they are exchangeable are at first quite a matter of chance. What makes them exchangeable is the mutual desire of their owners to alienate them. Meantime the need for foreign objects of utility gradually establishes itself. The constant repetition of exchange makes it a normal social act. In the course of time, therefore, some portion at least of the products of labour must be produced with a special view to exchange. ....

The necessity for a value-form grows with the increasing number and variety of the commodities exchanged. The problem and the means of solution arise simultaneously. Commodity-owners never equate their own commodities to those of others, and exchange them on a large scale, without different kinds of commodities belonging to different owners being exchangeable for, and equated as values to, one and the same special article. Such last-mentioned article, by becoming the equivalent of various other commodities, acquires at once, though within narrow limits, the character of a general social equivalent. This character comes and goes with the momentary social acts that called it into life. In turns and transiently it attaches itself first to this and then to that commodity. But with the development of exchange it fixes itself firmly and exclusively to particular sorts of commodities, and becomes crystallised by assuming the money-form. The particular kind of commodity to which it sticks is at first a matter of accident. Nevertheless there are two circumstances whose influence is decisive. The money-form attaches itself either to the most important articles of exchange from outside, and these in fact are primitive and natural forms in which the exchange-value of home products finds expression; or else it attaches itself to the object of utility that forms, like cattle, the chief portion of indigenous alienable wealth. Nomad races are the first to develop the money-form, because all their worldly goods consist of movable objects and are therefore directly alienable; and because their mode of life, by continually bringing them into contact with foreign communities, solicits the exchange of products.” (Marx 1906: 99–101).

“An adequate form of manifestation of value, a fit embodiment of abstract, undifferentiated, and therefore equal human labour, that material alone can be whose every sample exhibits the same uniform qualities. On the other hand, since the difference between the magnitudes of value is purely quantitative, the money commodity must be susceptible of merely quantitative differences, must therefore be divisible at will, and equally capable of being re-united. Gold and silver possess these properties by nature.” (Marx 1906: 102).
Of course, it is not exactly the same. But, if we just ditch Marx’s mystical labour theory of value nonsense, we actually have a theory here not far different from the one Selgin proposes.

According to Marx, money emerges by necessity from barter exchange of commodities between different communities (Marx 1990: 181–182). Money must be a uniform, portable, fungible and divisible commodity. It is implied that money then spread into communities and it monetised exchanges within tribes or communities.

Something like this was probably also the view proposed by the German Historical School economists of the 19th and early 20th centuries such as Max Weber (1978: 673–674) and Karl Bücher (1901), who argued that money emerged from barter between different societies, not within societies (Karl Polanyi may also have held a position close to this).

But, once again, even if we adopt this revised theory of money’s origins, modern anthropology and history suggest that it has serious problems and is in need of revision.

Our starting point is not – repeat not – that there is nothing of value in Smith’s or Menger’s theories, but (1) that it is not a universally applicable theory, and (2) that there are other important ways by which money can emerge.

Even Graeber does not deny that money in some historical circumstances can emerge from barter between strangers, especially in long distance trade (Graeber 2011: 75).

Now Selgin already admits that primitive money-less societies are frequently dominated by debt/credit transactions, or “gift exchange,” not by barter spot trades.

I assume he also seems to accept that even in cases where goods exchange for goods in spot trades, social relations can complicate matters considerably, and historically barter seems to have been prevalent between one community and another, or, that is to say, between people who were strangers and where relationships were implicitly or explicitly hostile (as in Graeber 2011: 29–30).

While a non-enumerated system of debts/credits or gift exchange might not give rise to money, there is clearly a role for debt in the history of money (Graeber 2011: 40). In the real world, gift exchange and debt/credit arrangements existed long before money, and societies could develop an effective system of exchange in which debt/credit or gift exchange transactions were the predominant system (Graeber 2011: 40).

But, under the theory that Selgin proposes, doesn’t this mean that societies that had no interest in large-scale trade with foreigners had little reason to develop money? Wouldn’t it also imply that the double coincidence of wants problem would be largely overcome in such an early tribal or isolated society?

More likely, such communities would sometimes develop what anthropologists call “non-commercial money” or “ceremonial money,” which is non-commercial in the sense that it is not used for everyday purchases of goods and services, or only rarely for such ordinary goods. It is thus non-commercial in the sense that it is not a universal medium of exchange. The purpose of such non-commercial money is social (see also here).

Graeber calls non-commercial money “primitive monies” and gives examples such as the shell money in the Americas or Papua New Guinea, cattle money in Africa, bead money, feather money, and so on. These are rarely used to buy everyday items in the societies that use them. Instead, they are employed in social relations like marriages and to settle disputes (Graeber 2011: 60).

At this point, we should consider the views of older anthropologists. In 1949, A. H. Quiggin published A Survey of Primitive Money: The Beginnings of Currency (London).

The summary of the author’s views on the origin of money is worth quoting:
“Writers on the origin of the use of money often start with a consideration of barter and its inconveniences. From ‘silent trade’ (a primitive though abnormal form of barter) they trace the evolution of trading and money side by side, relying mainly on literary evidence for probing into the past.

This study relies mainly on the tangible evidence of the actual types of primitive money or money-substitutes used by ‘unrisen’ people and others all over the world, and is concerned with the purposes, when discoverable, for which they were used. The evidence suggests that barter in its usual sense of exchange of commodities was not the main factor in the evolution of money. The objects commonly exchanged in barter do not develop naturally into money and the more important objects used as money seldom appear in ordinary everyday barter. Moreover, the inconveniences of barter do not disturb simple societies. The variety of material and the complexities of uncivilized attitudes towards money preclude generalizations, but the evidence appears to support the following line of argument.

In the beginning Man lived in self-supporting and self-contained groups. Except in an area where provisions are unlimited, a society depending on hunting and food-gathering for its subsistence is necessarily unsociable and ‘has no truck’ with its neighbours. Early exchanges were in the way of present-giving, and were expressions of friendship with no ulterior economic purpose, although the latter – an expectation of an adequate or even improved return – cannot be excluded from human dealings. Present-giving or gift-exchange, seen in simple forms in the Andamans, Torres Straits or New Zealand, may develop into elaborate ceremonial as in Fiji or the North-West of America, but remain distinct from trading with money.

Barter develops between areas of contrasted produce, such as coastal and inland, forested and open country. We see the barter of fish or shells for vegetables, game for bananas, &c., in Melanesia or the Congo, and the establishment of regular markets. Trading voyages such as those of Torres Straits and New Guinea take us a stage further by the introduction of conventional presents. But so far there is no need for any medium of exchange such as is commonly described as money.

This is the state of affairs over about half the world at the present day. Barter suffices for most of the natives of Australia, New Zealand and the islands of the Pacific, and for the less-advanced peoples of Africa, Asia and the Americas, where native economy is not upset by the trader and the missionary.

The use of a conventional medium of exchange, originally ‘full-bodied’ but developing into ‘token’ money, is first noted in the almost universal customs of ‘bride-price’ and wergeld. When sister-exchange is not practicable, some other value must be substituted; where life for life is not demanded, some equivalent must be found. The history of ‘bride-price’ and wergeld (which has yet to be written) shows how formal the customary gifts become, fitted to definite scales of value. It is not without significance that in any collection of primitive currency the majority of the items are described as ‘used in bride-price’.

When once a system of conventional gifts or payments with a definite scale of values has been established (and this is necessary for ‘bride-price’ and for wergeld) the first steps are taken in the evolution of money. It develops thereafter in response to human needs into the accepted medium of exchange. Nutzgeld [viz. “useful money” or useful objects in exchange – LK] still remains Nutzgeld. Cattle may constitute wealth and form a standard of value. They cannot, strictly speaking, be called money. Money, to be generally acceptable, needs more convenient material and finds the four essential qualities (portable, divisible, durable, recognizable) in shells, beads or metals. Two further qualities have been shown to be necessary, one geographical and one more difficult to define.

The objects that come to be used as money are mainly non-local, or if local are the product of a special area or a special class; and they have prestige or essential virtue, religious or magical. Cowries and beads, most universal of all forms of primitive money, have magical as well as monetary value and still hold their own over a large part of the world, though everywhere disappearing now with the advent of the trader and trade tobacco. Metals best illustrate the transition from ‘full-bodied’ to ‘token-’ money. The spears and hoes of Africa, the knives and spades of China, and the spits of Argos are familiar examples. The tools may become amorphous and valued according to their weight in metal, or survive as attenuated imitations of their former selves. Metal, whether gold, silver, copper, iron or tin, is everywhere useful and everywhere valued, and estimated by size, shape or weight. Ingots are preliminary stepping-stones to coins. Ingots, as lumps or bars, develop in response to local needs or whims in special forms, such as manillas, Katanga crosses and Kissi pennies, Malay hats and Siamese bullets, or our own currency bars and ‘ring-money’.

To us, looking backward, the next step appears obvious and inevitable, but it was only in rare spots (possibly only in one rare spot) in the Old World that the final stage was reached, and definite weights of metal, rounded, flattened and stamped, can be called coins. Here the study of primitive money comes to an end.” (Quiggin 1949: 321–322).
It is depressing really how good empirical research like this is often forgotten and ignored in neoclassical economics, and there are two fundamental points to be taken from Quiggin’s analysis:
(1) many primitive people were able to exist without the modern developed form of money, and even where it arose in trade between foreigners it seems to have been largely limited to that sphere.

(2) the origin of money within a society can also be linked to social customs like bride-price and wergild (“man-money” or compensation for murder).
These conclusions seem to have been widely held by early 20th century anthropologists. Paul Einzig, for example, using the anthropological work of his day, argued a long time ago that “money first developed to serve matrimonial, political or religious payments was only later adopted gradually for commercial purposes” (Einzig 1948: 984).

So let us now focus on (2). I rely on Philip Grierson’s The Origins of Money (1977) (see here on that book).

As we have seen, in primitive societies, there often arises non-commercial money or ceremonial money. It is mainly used in social interactions, often formal social events such as marriage, wergild and bloodwealth payments, political relations (e.g., potlatch, moka), and fines and compensations (compensation for adultery, or for things lost), and may only be rarely used, if at all, for everyday purchases or commercial transactions (Grierson 1977: 15–16).

Sometimes this non-commercial money develops into money as a more general medium of exchange in some societies (though often enough it remains in its traditional role in others where no universal medium of exchange arises). So where does the origin of non-commercial money as a general medium of exchange and unit of account come from?

Grierson (1977: 19) proposes that the social custom of wergeld and wergeld-like customs are the answer. Wergeld (literally, “man-money”) is the paying of compensation for murder or other injuries and even theft of personal property. The object of wergild is to stop blood feuds and violence in revenge, and to provide an adequate measure of the things lost, as well as compensation. The objects that arose as standards of value as non-commercial money in tribal wergild payments did not necessarily arise by barter spot trade of the most saleable commodity (Grierson 1977: 21; 28–29).

Often in tribal societies objects of high social status or conferring “prestige” or even thought to have magical power will function as non-commercial money. Thus such non-commercial money doesn’t necessarily arise by barter spot trade as the most saleable commodity.

Most interesting is the linguistic evidence from many societies which shows how the word for money arose etymologically from concepts related to wergild and debt. The English word “pay” comes via French payer from the Latin word pacare, meaning “to pacify,” “make peace with.” In certain societies, non-commercial money arose as a standard for measuring value related to wergild-like customs and possibly even things like bride-wealth, but did not necessarily develop into general purpose money/commercial money.

Compensation payments are made in various goods, such as cattle, bondmaids, and precious metal, but it is likely a common unit of account was developed to simplify calculation of payments, which later spread to the wider community in economic transactions.

Where commercial money arose from non-commercial money, Grierson makes the following argument:
“… where societies have developed the notion of money as a general measure of value, it will, I believe, most often be found that a system of legal compensation for personal injuries, at once inviting mutual comparison and affecting every member of the community, lay behind them.” (Grierson 1977: 29).
So it is possible that in some societies commercial money arose from its previous role in systems of legal compensation.

But this clearly isn’t the end of the story either. What about ancient advanced civilisations?

The origin of money in ancient Mesopotamia appears to be in the development of an abstract money of account in the temple and palace institutions. These temples and palaces were institutions with large internal centrally planned economies, with complex weights and measurements for internal accounting of the products produced, received and distributed, and rent and interest owed. Many prices were set and administered in the money of account which developed from weight units. The two units of account were (1) the shekel of silver (which was equal to the monthly grain ration) and (2) barley (Hudson 2004). Silver money of account spread to the private economy mostly as a means of reckoning debts to temples and palaces (Hudson 2004: 115). But many ordinary people could pay in commodities, and the administered pricing system in terms of silver/grain that was developed in the temples was to assist in calculation of payments in kind.

In ancient Egypt, money appears as the most important unit of account called the deben (or uten), which was a unit of weight, originally equated to 92 (or 91) grams (Henry 2004: 92; there was also the unit called the khar for measuring wheat or barley, and 1 khar was equivalent to 2 deben of bronze). The measure of value for various goods was thus fixed weight units and historically no doubt these units arose from copper, silver, grain and gold. The unit of account system appears to have been developed by complex palace, government and temple institutions for internal accounting. While goods came to be denominated in terms of deben, in early times during the period of the Old Kingdom there were no physical deben changing hands in the private economy. That is to say, the deben did not function as a physical means of payment, and did not emerge by barter spot transactions as the most saleable medium of exchange. Even though goods and services were measured in a deben unit of account, payment was made in goods.

An important element in both these historical processes was the institution (or institutions) where surplus products were stored from taxation, tribute and gifts. These institutions dealt with complex flows, in and out, of goods: they were palace and temple complexes. Accounting systems, weight measures and writing are connected with just such institutions, and, importantly, some abstract unit of account arose by which to measure relative values of stored goods and inflows or outflows of goods. Since loans were also no doubt made from surplus products stored, repayment of loans in kind was facilitated by a unit of account.

In primitive human societies by the end of the Stone Age (c. 2.9 million years to 4500 BC), before the literate urban civilizations, agricultural communities developed where surpluses were stored, most probably held as a communal resource. The question of how the origins of a unit of account or measure of value could be related to the emergence of stored communal wealth is an interesting research question that deserves further study.

It is quite possible that silver and gold were used as non-commercial money or ceremonial money in ancient societies too before they became abstract units of account.

So even in developed ancient civilisations with cities we have huge collectivist temples and governments (sometimes presided over by god-kings) with large-scale economic and central planning.

So where are they in neoclassical theory and Selgin’s theory?

Given its very scarcity, it is unlikely that silver would have arisen as a unit of account and medium of exchange in, say, Mesopotamia from internal barter trade as the most saleable good precisely because there wasn’t enough of it.

More likely, it was imposed as a unit of account from above, by the collectivist temples and governments. The ancient government–temple complex may well have adopted it because it was important in foreign and international trade, but even here that requires yet more massive revision to Selgin’s theory, taking account of ancient institutions.

But it may well have been adopted merely because it was high-prestige object with a religious significance and from its role as a weight unit. That is, it arose partly because as a weight unit it was easily convertible into an abstract unit of account.

We could also examine the origin of money in ancient Greece, which I have done in detail in this post.

In short, before coins the state of affairs was this:
(1) cattle or oxen functioned as a largely abstract unit of account (but not a common medium of exchange) and

(2) iron spits might have been a very limited or weak medium of exchange.
In Homer’s epics which reflect the social reality of Dark Age and early Archaic period Greece, cattle or oxen are a type of unit of account, but the actual means of payment tend to be many other types of goods, not just cattle (Peacock 2011: 49–54).

Now one might argue that cattle did become the most common medium of exchange but then receded in importance to become a mere unit of account, but there are serious problems with this view. First, the emergence of a “cattle/ox” unit of account in Greece appears to be related to religion and cult offerings, not emergence of cattle as the most saleable good.

While cattle no doubt had value in market trades, they were an important sacrificial animal and offering to the gods. The Greeks appear to have developed a cattle or ox unit of account derived from the value these animals had in ritual and sacrifice (Seaford 2004: 61; the view was originally proposed by Laum 1924). Religious rituals and then temples had a preeminent place in ancient Greek society, and the city government’s major responsibility was to honour, appease and placate the gods by offering sacrifices. In this sense, the ancient Greek temple and city are not separate entities, but really one and the same. So the emergence of an ox unit of account can be seen as another state-based, institutional process affecting economic life.

Metal coinage in Lydia and Greece was an invention of the state, and the first Lydian coinage was struck in electrum and used to pay soldiers and mercenaries. This was most probably a high prestige object and perhaps even non-commercial money. At most, it was simply one of many goods used in conventional barter trades: there is no convincing evidence that it was the reigning medium of exchange (money) that had already emerged as the most saleable good in spot barter trades before it was adopted by the Lydian state.

Instead, electrum was a high prestige commodity selected by the state, standardised and used as a form of payment as wages. Its subsequent rise in market trades on a significant scale as a common medium of exchange was then induced by the exchange of these coins for goods by soldiers, and the need to acquire the coins themselves to pay taxes.

Again, for full analysis of the emergence of money in Greece, see my post here.

So, finally, we have a vast, vast body of empirical evidence that the orthodox Mengerian and neoclassical explanations of the origins of money are deeply flawed and not adequate to describe the full complexity of human history. I am afraid even Selgin’s revised Mengerian theory, curiously similar to that of Karl Marx, suffers from the same limitations.

Appendix 1: Menger’s Writings on the Nature and Origin of Money
The writings of the Austrian economist Carl Menger on money extend well behind his classic article of 1892, and include the following:
Menger, C. 2007. Principles of Economics (trans. Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre [1st edn. 1871] by J. Dingwall and B. F. Hoselitz), Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama. pp. 257–285.

Menger, C. 1892. “Geld,” in Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften (vol. 3). 730–757.

Menger, C. 1892. “On the Origin of Money” (trans. C. A. Foley), Economic Journal 2: 238–255.

Menger, C. 1909. “Geld,” in J. Conrad et al. (eds.), Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften (vol. 4; 3rd edn.), Fischer, Jena. 555–610.

Menger, C. 1923. Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre (2nd rev. edn.), Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna.

Menger, C. 2002 [1909]. “Money” (trans. L. B. Yeager and M. Streissler), in M. Latzer and S. W. Schmitz (eds.), Carl Menger and the Evolution of Payments Systems, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 25–108. [N.B. this is a translation of Menger 1909.].
We must remember that Menger’s treatment of money developed in the course of his life.

Now L. B. Yeager and M. Streissler’s translation of Menger’s article on money from the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften is based on the 3rd edition of 1909, not the original article of 1892.

Was the passage that Selgin cites from Menger (2002 [1909]) actually in Menger’s 1892 article “Geld”? This is a pedantic point, but an interesting one, since Menger may have developed and modified this 1890s views as he got older.

Further Reading
“The Nature, Origin and History of Money 101.”

“A Note on Menger on the Nature and Origin of Money,” July 28, 2012.

“Menger on the Origin of Money,” January 5, 2012.

“Menger’s Nuanced View on the Origin of Money,” November 6, 2012.

“Observations on Non-Commercial Money,” February 18, 2012.

“Philip Grierson on the Origin of Money,” March 21, 2012.

“The Origin of Money and Coinage in Western Civilisation: The Case of Ancient Greece,” April 5, 2013.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bücher, K. 1901. Industrial Evolution (trans. S. Morley Wickett), H. Holt and Co., New York.

Einzig, Paul. 1948. “New Light on the Origin of Money,” Nature 162.4130 (25 December): 983–985.

Graeber, D. 2011. Debt: The First 5,000 Years. Melville House, Brooklyn, N.Y.

Grierson, P. 1977. The Origins of Money. Athlone Press and University of London, London.

Henry, J. F. 2004. “The Social Origins of Money: The Case of Egypt,” in L. R. Wray (ed.), Credit and State Theories of Money: The Contributions of A. Mitchell Innes, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 79–98.

Hudson, M. 2004. “The Archaeology of Money: Debt Versus Barter Theories of Money’s Origins,” in L. R. Wray (ed.), Credit and State Theories of Money: the Contributions of A. Mitchell Innes, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 99–127.

Laum, B. 1924. Heiliges Geld: eine historische Untersuchung über den sakralen Ursprung des Geldes. Mohr, Tübingen.

Marx, Karl. 1906. Capital. A Critique of Political Economy (vol. 1; rev. trans. by Ernest Untermann from 4th German edn.). The Modern Library, New York.

Marx, Karl. 1990. Capital. A Critique of Political Economy. Volume One (trans. Ben Fowkes). Penguin Books, London.

Menger, C. 1892. “On the Origin of Money,” Economic Journal 2: 238–255.

Peacock, M. S. 2011. “The Political Economy of Homeric Society and the Origins of Money,” Contributions to Political Economy 30: 47–65.

Quiggin, A. H. 1949. A Survey of Primitive Money: The Beginnings of Currency. Methuen, London.

Rothbard, M. N. 2009. The Essential von Mises. Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama.

Seaford, R. 2004. Money and the Early Greek Mind: Homer, Philosophy, Tragedy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Selgin, G. “Those Dishonest Goldsmiths,” revised January 20, 2011
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589709

Weber, M. 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (eds. G. Roth and C. Wittich; trans. E. Fischoff et al.), University of California Press, Berkeley and London.

Thursday, December 19, 2013

Supply and Demand Equilibrium and Menger’s Price Theory

Carl Menger’s price theory can be read in an English translation in Principles of Economics (2011 [1st edn. 1871]; Eastbourne, UK), pp. 191–225.

But a debate has raged about whether Menger had a clear notion of economic equilibrium and tendencies to equilibrium (Tieben 2012: 315).

Some few have that held that Menger had some notion of supply and demand equilibrium via price coordination (Moss 1978), but most argue that Menger did not have any such theory (Streissler 1972, Kirzner 1978; Endres 1995). Indeed, even Hayek remarked on “the absence in Menger’s work of the conception of a general equilibrium” (Hayek 1992: 104).

So, fundamentally, compared to both modern neoclassical and modern Austrian price theory, Menger’s price theory appears undeveloped (and it is also different from Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis).

Streissler (1972: 276) contends that “market clearing by price adjustment was inessential to … [sc. Menger’s] theory of price formation.” (And, as an aside, nor does Menger seem to conceive of the competitive entrepreneurial process as operating with a tendency to drive profits to zero [Kirzner 1978: 33].)

Indeed, Tieben contends that
“[sc. Menger] … rejected the static notion of economic equilibrium – the equality between quantities supplied and demanded – as a starting point for theoretical analysis.

But also as a dynamic conception there was no role for the conception of economic equilibrium in Menger’s theory of prices. Menger addressed the relationship between competition and prices as a secular trend, but there is hardly any reference in his theory of price to the capacity of competitive markets to establish equilibrium between supply and demand. Surprisingly, Menger never stressed the capacity of the market process to safeguard the relative harmony of the exchange mechanism, a function that is usually associated with the tendency of prices to move towards a supply and demand equilibrium.” (Tieben 2012: 319).
Furthermore, Menger’s own analysis of multilateral exchange shows that negotiated prices can cause excess demand to persist (Tieben 2012: 322) – which is contrary to modern price theory in which flexible prices cause equilibration of supply and demand.

Moss argues that Menger thought of true “equilibrium prices” as the price that emerges when completely determined by the preferences of economic agents and not influenced by their relative bargaining strengths (Moss 1978: 28; Tieben 2012: 320) – a definition contrary to the usual idea of an “equilibrium price” as a price that equates quantity demanded with total quantity supplied for sale.

Menger’s actual process of market “equilibration” is also quite different from modern Walrasian general equilibrium theory or even Mises’s market coordinating tendency towards the “final state of rest”: Menger thinks that economic progress consists in transformation of monopolistic markets into competitive ones, which boosts economic welfare via greater supply, less abuse of market power, and a more equitable distribution of wealth (Tieben 2012: 323). (Menger, it should be noted, held that monopoly was a quite significant market phenomenon, perhaps even the rule rather than the exception [Kirzner 1978: 41; Streissler 1973: 168].)

Arguably, it was Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk who extended Menger’s price theory to stress the idea of demand and supply equilibrium in prices (a concept which was called Gleichgewicht in German), and the (alleged) tendency of the market process via price formation to equilibrate demand and supply in auction-like markets (Endres 1996: 96; Tieben 2012: 323), even if Böhm-Bawerk’s view is that market clearing in this sense occurs in a given range of possible equilibrium prices rather than a unique Walrasian point price (Endres 1996: 96).

This concept of market clearing is central to modern Austrian economics: it cannot be stressed how dependent modern Austrian theory is on this idea. Without a tendency towards demand and supply equilibrium via flexible prices, so much of Austrian economics – such as the belief in rapid and smooth recovery from recessions and Misesian economic coordination – is undermined and left without foundation.

But it is strange indeed that Menger – the founder of Austrian theory – did not conceive of the price system as equilibrating supply and demand.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Endres, A. M. 1995. “Carl Menger’s Theory of Price Formation Reconsidered,” History of Political Economy 27.2: 261–287.

Endres, A. M. 1996. “Some Microfoundations of Austrian Economics: Böhm-Bawerk’s Version,” European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 3.1: 84–106.

Endres, Anthony. 1997. Neoclassical Microeconomic Theory: The Founding Austrian Vision. Routledge, London. 60–84.

Hayek, Friedrich A. von. 1992. “Carl Menger (1840–1921),” in P. G. Klein (ed.), The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek. Volume IV. The Fortunes of Liberalism: Essays on Austrian Economics and the Ideal of Freedom. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 61–107.

Jaffé, William. 1976. “Menger, Jevons and Walras De-homogenized,” Economic Inquiry 14: 511–524.

Kirzner, I. 1978. “The Entrepreneurial Role in Menger’s System,” Atlantic Economic Journal 6.3: 31–45.

Menger, C. 2011. Principles of Economics (trans. Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre [1st edn. 1871] by J. Dingwall and B. F. Hoselitz), Terra Libertas, Eastbourne, UK. pp. 191–225.

Moss, L. S. 1978. “Carl Menger’s Theory of Exchange,” Atlantic Economic Journal 6: 17–29.

Streissler, Erich. 1972. “To What Extent was the Austrian School Marginalist?,” History of Political Economy 4.2: 426–461.

Streissler, Erich. 1973. “Menger’s Theories of Money and Uncertainty—A Modern Interpretation,” in J. R. Hicks and W. Weber (eds.), Carl Menger and the Austrian School of Economics. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 164–189.

Streissler, Erich. 1990. “The Influence of German Economics on the Work of Menger and Marshall,” in Bruce J. Caldwell (ed.), Carl Menger and His Legacy in Economics. Duke University Press, Durham.

Tieben, Bert. 2012. The Concept of Equilibrium in Different Economic Traditions: An Historical Investigation. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA. pp. 315–319.

Tomo, S. 1987. Early Lectures on Economics by Böhm-Bawerk. Series no. 13, Centre for Historical Social Science Literature, Hitotsubashi University.

Monday, June 24, 2013

Marshall on Menger’s Orders of Capital Goods

Carl Menger and Austrians generally classify goods into various orders, as follows:
(1) first order goods: consumption goods, which provide direct utility to consumers;

(2) second order goods: capital goods which are used to produce consumer goods (first order goods);

(3) third order goods: capital goods which are used to produce second order capital goods;

(4) fourth order capital goods: capital goods which are used to produce third order capital goods, and so on.
That is, consumer goods are “first order goods,” and capital goods are “higher order” goods, and in various orders as removed from the final consumer goods output.

How useful is this classification system for capital goods?

Alfred Marshall was sceptical:
“Goods have been divided into Consumers’ goods (called also Consumption goods, or again goods of the first Order), such as food, clothes, &c., which satisfy wants directly; and Producers goods (called also Production goods, or again Instrumental, or again Intermediate goods), such as ploughs and loom’s and raw cotton, which satisfy wants indirectly by contributing towards the production of the first class of goods. The line of division between the two classes is however vague, is drawn in different places by different writers; and the terms can seldom be used safely without special explanation.(1)

[Footnote]
(1) Thus flour to be made into a cake when already in the house of the consumer, is treated by some as a Consumers’ good; while not only the flour, but the cake itself is treated as a Producers’ good when in the hand of the confectioner. Prof. Carl Menger (Volksivirthschqftslelire, ch. i. § 2) says bread belongs to the first order, flour to the second, a flour mill to the third order and so on. It appears that a railway train carrying people on a pleasure excursion, also some tins of biscuits, and milling machinery and some machinery that is used for making milling machinery, is at one and the same time a good of the first, second and fourth orders. But such subtleties are of little use. (Marshall 1895: 133–134, with n. 1, Chapter III).
On the one hand, I think Marshall was too extreme in implying that there was no useful distinction between (1) consumption goods and (2) capital goods generally, but his last point in the footnote (highlighted in yellow) was a sound one.

When capital goods are divided into different orders (as by Austrians), many can simultaneously belong to multiple orders at once. Alternatively, a capital good might belong to one order in the morning and another in the afternoon, or might be easily switched between orders.

While some capital goods might be capable of falling into one order or another, how many exceptions are there?

The Austrian system of classification of capital goods cannot be considered a universal, clear cut, or strictly useful one, if many capital goods’ classification is simultaneously to be included under different orders.

Also, the classification system obscures another point about capital: while capital goods are heterogeneous, many can have a significant degree of substitutability, flexibility and durability. A capitalist economy in which we find some important degree of adaptability, versatility and durability in the nature of capital goods also means that the Austrian capital theory underlying the Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) is not a realistic vision of modern economies.

Vienneau (2006 and 2010) provides further discussion of this topic.


BIBLIOGRAPHY
Marshall, Alfred. 1895. Principles of Economics (3rd edn.). Macmillan, London.

Menger, C. 2011. Principles of Economics (trans. Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre [1st edn. 1871] by J. Dingwall and B. F. Hoselitz), Terra Libertas, Eastbourne, UK.

Vienneau, R. L. 2006. “Some Fallacies of Austrian Economics,” September
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921183

Vienneau, R. L. 2010. “Some Capital-Theoretic Fallacies in Garrison’s Exposition of Austrian Business Cycle Theory,” September 4
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1671886

Sunday, June 23, 2013

Vaughn on the Early History of the Austrian School

Karen I. Vaughn’s book Austrian Economics in America: The Migration of a Tradition (Cambridge and New York, 1994) provides an accessible history of the early Austrian school.

I summarise that early history in what follows. Carl Menger (1840–1921) was the founder of the school, and Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk (1851–1914) and Friedrich von Wieser (1851–1926) were the two most important followers of Menger, although they were not Menger’s students, but colleagues.

The early Austrians are usually divided into two generations, as follows:
First Generation of the Austrian School
Carl Menger 1840–1921
Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk 1851–1914
Friedrich von Wieser 1851–1926
Eugen von Philippovich 1858–1917

Second Generation of the Austrian School
Ludwig von Mises 1881–1973
Joseph Schumpeter 1883–1950 (who became a neoclassical)
Karl Schlesinger 1889–1938
Hans Mayer 1879–1955, professor at Vienna
Richard von Strigl 1891–1942
Leo Illy (Leo Shönfeld) 1888–1952
Carl Menger made his mark as an economist with his book Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Principles of Economics; 1871). This was intended to be a four-part series on economics, but the other three volumes were never written (Vaughn 1994: 27). A posthumous second and expanded edition of the Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre was published by his son, but this has never been translated into English (Vaughn 1994: 12, n. 2). Even more surprising is that Menger refused to allow reprintings of his Grundsätze to be published during his lifetime, and many economists did not read his treatise, and his ideas were mainly transmitted by his followers (Vaughn 1994: 12–13).

Menger’s main contribution to economics was the development of a subjective value and diminishing marginal utility theory (Vaughn 1994: 13), along with other neoclassical founders such as William Stanley Jevons and Leon Walras. To this extent, his project, like that of Jevons and Walras, was to refute the Classical labour theory of value.

Other contributions were more original, such as Menger’s theory of higher and lower orders of goods, which was later developed in Austrian capital theory.

From the 1970s, there was a reassessment of Menger’s originality and relation to neoclassical theory (Hicks and Weber 1973; Lachmann 1978; Jaffé 1976). Some would see Menger as an “incomplete neoclassical” (Vaughn 1994: 17–19). Indeed, Menger’s notion of an “economic price” is analogous to the neoclassical concept of an “equilibrium price,” even though Menger thought that it was doubtful that “economic prices” will be seen in the real world (Vaughn 1994: 29).

Menger’s views on economic methodology set him at loggerheads with the German Historical School. Menger held that there are laws of economics (not in the same category as scientific laws) but that these cannot be refuted by pointing to contrary empirical evidence (Vaughn 1994: 28). Indeed, by the time of the Methodenstreit (Menger’s debate with Gustav Schmoller), Menger was associated with an extreme a priorist theorising (Vaughn 1994: 32).

Menger’s followers continued the Austrian tradition. Friedrich von Wieser (1851–1926) expanded Menger’s subjective theory of value into a more detailed diminishing marginal utility theory and a theory of opportunity cost (Vaughn 1994: 34).

Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk (1851–1914) developed a time preference conception of interest and an extended theory of capital. Strangely, Menger is reported to have said that Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of capital and interest was “one of the greatest errors ever committed” (Vaughn 1994: 35, quoted from Schumpeter).

What is most interesting of all is that by the 1920s,
“[m]ost economists, including the Austrians themselves, believed that there was no longer any discernibly different Austrian school … All of the major contributions of the Austrians were either easily absorbed into the mainstream of neoclassical thought or served as topics for family feuds.” (Vaughn 1994: 37).
Clearly, then, the controversies and developments by which Austrians distinguished themselves from mainstream neoclassical theorists happened at a later period.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hicks, J. R. and W. Weber (eds.). 1973. Carl Menger and the Austrian School of Economics. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Jaffé, William. 1976. “Menger, Jevons, and Walras Dehomogenized,” Economic Inquiry 14.4: 511–524.

Lachmann L. 1978. “Carl Menger and the Incomplete Revolution of Subjectivism,” Atlantic Economic Journal: 6.3: 57–59.

Menger, C. 2011. Principles of Economics (trans. Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre [1st edn. 1871] by J. Dingwall and B. F. Hoselitz), Terra Libertas, Eastbourne, UK.

Vaughn, K. I. 1994. Austrian Economics in America: The Migration of a Tradition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.

Sunday, January 20, 2013

Lachmann and Menger on the Law of Demand

Isaac Marmolejo draws attention to Ludwig Lachmann’s views on the law of demand in an interesting post here (“Law of Demand and Austrian Economics,” The Radical Subjectivist, January 18, 2013).

Lachmann discusses Menger’s attitude to “economic laws” and the law of demand:
“For a long time students of Menger have been puzzled by the precise meaning of his notion of ‘exact laws’. He regards it as the prime task of economic science to formulate such laws. In Appendix V of the Untersuchungen we are told that ‘in the field of human phenomena exact laws (so-called ‘laws of nature’) are attainable under the same conditions as in that of natural phenomena.’ In this regard, then, there is no difference at all between social and natural sciences. On the other hand, Menger distinguishes sharply between these ‘exact laws’, i.e. ‘laws of the phenomena which are not only valid without exception but which, according to the laws of our thought simply cannot be thought of in any other way but as without exceptions’ (Menger 1963: 42), and ‘empirical laws’ which rest on observation and admit of exceptions.

Menger uses the ‘law of demand’ as an example for this distinction. According to him the exact law tells us not merely that a rise in demand will lead to a rise in price, but that, under certain conditions, the extent of this price rise is quantitatively exactly determinable (‘dem Masse nach genau bestimmbar’). But he goes on to warn us that these conditions require not only that all participants maximize their satisfaction in the pursuit of which they must be free of all external coercion, but also the absence of error and ignorance. Hence we must not expect to find instances of the exact law in the real world. It is [sc. according to Menger – LK]
unempirical when tested by reality in its full complexity. But what else does this prove than that the results of exact research do not find their criteria in experience in the above sense? The above law is, in spite of everything, true, completely true, and of the highest significance for the theoretical understanding of price phenomena as soon as one looks at it from that standpoint appropriate for exact research. If one looks at it from the point of view of realistic research, to be sure, one arrives at contradictions … but in this case the error lies not in the law, but in the false perspective. (Menger 1963: 57).
These views will no doubt strike many of us as odd, but the main reason for it is that we have come to take it for granted that ours is a world of relentless positivism. There will be few natural scientists today ready to acknowledge that their prime task is to find exact laws of the kind Menger describes. For the most of us ‘laws of nature’ are empirical laws, in principle falsifiable.” (Lachmann 1994: 209–210).
Menger’s views on the law of demand are quite peculiar. On the one hand, the law of demand is “unempirical when tested by reality in its full complexity,” but at the same time, “in spite of everything, true, completely true”!

That Menger could seriously believe and write those words demonstrates that he formulated the law of demand at a level so abstract that it could only be true in that almost imaginary world. It is as if we were to formulate a law that must be necessarily true in the Land of Oz, admit that such a law is not universally true in our world, but nevertheless contend that such a law is always and universally true in Oz, the world of our imagination.

That all this bespeaks a deeply flawed, even deluded, approach to the social sciences goes without saying.

Menger conceded that when related to the empirical real world of experience, the law of demand” arrives at contradictions.” That is quite clearly a continuing problem with the law of demand even in neoclassical economics.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lachmann, L. M. 1994. “Carl Menger and the Incomplete Revolution of Subjectivism,” in D. Lavoie (ed.), Expectations and the Meaning of Institutions: Essays in Economics, Routledge, London. 207–212.

Menger, Carl. 1963 [1883]. Problems of Economics and Sociology (trans. F. J. Nock). University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois.

Tuesday, November 6, 2012

Menger’s Nuanced View on the Origin of Money

Carl Menger’s writings on the origin of money contain a curious, but undeveloped, concession to chartalism.

First, there was this concession in Menger’s 1892 paper:
“It is not impossible for media of exchange, serving as they do the commonweal in the most emphatic sense of the word, to be instituted also by way of legislation, like other social institutions. But this is neither the only, nor the primary mode in which money has taken its origin.” (Menger 1892: 250).
Secondly, in Menger’s revised essay on money, published later in 1909, we have this:
“Commodities that have become generally used intermediaries of exchange, if only within certain geographical boundaries and possibly even only within certain segments of the population of a territory, are called money (livestock money, shell money, salt money, etc.) in scientific usage (not necessarily in everyday life!).

Like other social institutions, the institution of intermediaries of exchange, which serves the common good in the fullest sense of the term, may, as I shall explain later, emerge or be promoted, but also impeded, in its automatic development by the influence of authority (for example, public or religious) and especially by legislation. This manner of emergence of media of exchange, however, is neither the only nor the earliest one. Here, a relation exists similar to that between statute law and common law: media of exchange originally emerged and eventually, through progressive imitation, became generally used not by way of law or agreement but by way of 'custom', that is, through similar actions, corresponding to similar subjective impulses and similar intellectual progress, of individuals living together in society (as the unreflective result of specific individual strivings of the members of society) – a circumstance which subsequently, as with other institutions that arose in like manner, does not rule out, of course, their being established or influenced by government.” (Menger 2002: 33).
It would be a mistake, however, to press these cautious statements too far: Menger remained an advocate of the barter spot trade theory of money’s origins, although he was willing to concede what later Austrians have emphatically denied.

Nevertheless, there is a divide between Menger’s nuanced view of the origins of money and the stridency of Rothbard:
“[sc. Mises’s] Regression Theorem also shows that money, in any society, can only become established by a market process emerging from barter. Money cannot be established by a social contract, by government imposition, or by artificial schemes proposed by economists.” (Rothbard 2009: 61).
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Menger, C. 1892. “On the Origin of Money” (trans. C. A. Foley), Economic Journal 2: 238–255.

Menger, C. 1909. “Geld,” in J. Conrad et al. (eds.), Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften (vol. 4; 3rd edn.). Fischer, Jena. 555–610.

Menger, C. 2002 [1909]. “Money” (trans. L. B. Yeager and M. Streissler), in M. Latzer and S. W. Schmitz (eds.), Carl Menger and the Evolution of Payments Systems. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 25–108. [N.B. this is a translation of Menger 1909.].

Rothbard, M. N. 2009. The Essential von Mises. Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama.

Monday, August 27, 2012

Rescuing Menger from the Austrians

I have written before of Carl Menger’s Lectures to Crown Prince Rudolf of Austria (trans. Monika Streissler and David F. Good; Aldershot, 1994).

That book shows that the founder of Austrian economics was worlds apart from the modern cult of anarcho-capitalism.

In chapter VII of Menger’s book, we find him endorsing the following:
(1) public works constructed by the state such as roads, railways and canals:
“Important roads, railways and canals that improve the general well-being by improving traffic and communication are special examples of this kind of enterprise and lasting evidence of the concern of the state for the well-being of its parts and thereby its own power; at the same time, they are/constitute major prerequisites for the prosperity of a modern state.” (Menger 1994: 121).
(2) government established agricultural and vocational training institutions (Menger 1994: 123).

(3) government subsidies to certain sectors:
“The state may also well support the various sectors of the national economy by actual subsidies, of course only when it is useful to the citizens but surpasses their individual means: strictly speaking, such subsidies are intended to become a useful public good, owned by the community as a whole.

This will occur, for example, if the state wants to promote agriculture and especially cattle breeding by purchasing prime quality breeding animals whose price exceeds most people's means; by becoming public property, the animals best serve their purpose, to serve all alike.” (Menger 1994: 123).
(4) state intervention to stop clearing of forests on private property in the mountains of Austria when this clearing had serious and bad effects on agriculture, such as soil erosion and floods on the plains:
“The Southern Tyrol, Istria, Dalmatia are sad object lessons of the blind greed of individuals and thoughtless negligence of former governments”. (Menger 1994: 131).
(5) government intervention to stop child labour (Menger 1994: 129).
All in all, the founder of Austrian economics appears to have accepted the existence of the state and a number of interventions, perhaps on utilitarian grounds.

The progressive liberalism and Fabian socialist sympathies of later Austrians like Eugen von Philippovich, Friedrich von Wieser and Richard von Strigl were not deviations from Menger’s ideas on the state, but a development of them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Menger, Carl. 1994. Carl Menger’s Lectures to Crown Prince Rudolf of Austria (ed. by Erich W. Streissler and Monika Streissler; trans. Monika Streissler and David F. Good), E. Elgar, Aldershot.

Saturday, July 28, 2012

A Note on Menger on the Nature and Origin of Money

The writings of the Austrian economist Carl Menger on money extend well behind his classic article of 1892, and include the following:
Menger, C. 2007. Principles of Economics (trans. Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre [1st edn. 1871] by J. Dingwall and B. F. Hoselitz), Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama. pp. 257–285.

Menger, C. 1892. “Geld,” in Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften (vol. 3). 730–757.

Menger, C. 1892. “On the Origin of Money” (trans. C. A. Foley), Economic Journal 2: 238–255.

Menger, C. 1909. “Geld,” in J. Conrad et al. (eds.), Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften (vol. 4; 3rd edn.), Fischer, Jena. 555–610.

Menger, C. 1923. Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre (2nd rev. edn.), Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna.

Menger, C. 2002 [1909]. “Money” (trans. L. B. Yeager and M. Streissler), in M. Latzer and S. W. Schmitz (eds.), Carl Menger and the Evolution of Payments Systems, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 25–108. [N.B. this is a translation of Menger 1909.].
Menger’s treatment of money developed in the course of his life, and I have always had the impression that his view of the origin of money was not as extreme and dogmatic as later Austrians like Mises and Rothbard.

Even in 1892, Menger made a most curious concession at the beginning of this crucial passage (highlighted in yellow):
“It is not impossible for media of exchange, serving as they do the commonweal in the most emphatic sense of the word, to be instituted also by way of legislation, like other social institutions. But this is neither the only, nor the primary mode in which money has taken its origin. This is much more to be traced in the process depicted above, notwithstanding the nature of that process would be but very incompletely explained if we were to call it ‘organic,’ or denote money as something ‘primordial,’ of ‘primaeval growth,’ and so forth. Putting aside assumptions which are historically unsound, we can only come fully to understand the origin of money by learning to view the establishment of the social procedure, with which we are dealing, as the spontaneous outcome, the unpremeditated resultant, of particular, individual efforts of the members of a society, who have little by little worked their way to a discrimination of the different degrees of saleableness in commodities.” (Menger 1892: 250).
Of course, Menger’s main theory is that precious metals have arisen as a medium of exchange among many peoples because “their saleableness is far and away superior to that of all other commodities” (Menger 1892: 252). Yet he also recognised the “important functions of state administration” in creating coinage and creating public confidence in the “genuineness, weight, and fineness” of coined money (Menger 1892: 255). Another important point is that Menger held that the government reduces the uncertainty associated with “several commodities serving as currency” by official legal recognition of some commodities as money, or where more than one commodity money exists by fixing a definite exchange ratio between them (Menger 1892: 255). In this way, governments have perfected precious metals in their function as money (Menger 1892: 255).

It is curious that the 2nd edition of Menger’s Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Vienna, 1923) has apparently never been translated into English, so his final thoughts on the nature of money require a reading of that book in the original German.

In 1892, Menger published an article on money (or “Geld” in German) for the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, and this was revised in 1900 and 1909.

By the time of the 1909 article on money, Menger had expanded and rewritten his comments and had added a section called “The Perfecting of the Monetary and Coinage System by the State” (Menger 2002 [1909]: 45–48). In discussing the advantages of a uniform state minted coinage, Menger even remarks that “in recent times, private coinages have met the general requirements of trade only imperfectly” (Menger 2002 [1909]: 46). And while opposing legal tender law as necessary from an economic point of view, nevertheless “in certain cases the needs of trade seem to permit and occasionally downright to require not only some sort of government intervention but specifically the declaring of particular kinds of money as legal tender” (Menger 2002 [1909]: 82). Menger uses decidedly utilitarian ethical reasoning in concluding that legal tender law can be justified (Menger 2002 [1909]: 82–83).

All this suggests that Menger’s thought on money was more subtle and less extreme than that of some modern Austrians.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Menger, C. 2007. Principles of Economics (trans. Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre [1st edn. 1871] by J. Dingwall and B. F. Hoselitz), Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama. pp. 257–285.

Menger, C. 1892. “Geld,” in Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften (vol. 3). 730–757.

Menger, C. 1892. “On the Origin of Money” (trans. C. A. Foley), Economic Journal 2: 238–255.

Menger, C. 1909. “Geld,” in J. Conrad et al. (eds.), Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften (vol. 4; 3rd edn.), Fischer, Jena. 555–610.

Menger, C. 1923. Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre (2nd rev. edn.), Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna.

Menger, C. 2002 [1909]. “Money” (trans. L. B. Yeager and M. Streissler), in M. Latzer and S. W. Schmitz (eds.), Carl Menger and the Evolution of Payments Systems, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 25–108.

Thursday, January 5, 2012

Menger on the Origin of Money

Carl Menger (1840-1921), the founder of Austrian economics, wrote this classic paper:
Menger, C. 1892. “On the Origin of Money,” Economic Journal 2: 238–255.
Menger imagines a world without money. In this world, people exchange goods for goods in spot transactions (barter). What happens when person A wants a good from person B, but the latter does not want the goods the former has to trade? This is the famous problem of the double coincidence of wants.

Menger notes that commodities have “different degrees of saleableness,” and that money has a virtually unlimited saleableness (Menger 1892: 242–243). Yet the differences of degrees of saleableness apply to many other commodities. Many goods once bought cannot be sold again except at a loss (Menger 1892: 244).

What do you do with your excess goods once you have obtained what you immediately want in a barter exchange? What do you do if you are unable to obtain what you want through a direct barter spot transaction? It makes sense for you to obtain goods with a high degree of saleableness, and then exchange these in the wider community at present or in the future. By this process, the most saleable good (or goods) becomes the medium of exchange (Menger 1892: 249).

I find it curious that even Menger makes this concession at the beginning of the following important paragraph:
“It is not impossible for media of exchange, serving as they do the commonweal in the most emphatic sense of the word, to be instituted also by way of legislation, like other social institutions. But this is neither the only, nor the primary mode in which money has taken its origin. This is much more to be traced in the process depicted above, notwithstanding the nature of that process would be but very incompletely explained if we were to call it ‘organic,’ or denote money as something ‘primordial,’ of ‘primaeval growth,’ and so forth. Putting aside assumptions which are historically unsound, we can only come fully to understand the origin of money by learning to view the establishment of the social procedure, with which we are dealing, as the spontaneous outcome, the unpremeditated resultant, of particular, individual efforts of the members of a society, who have little by little worked their way to a discrimination of the different degrees of saleableness in commodities.” (Menger 1892: 250).
Menger concludes that precious metals have arisen as a medium of exchange among many peoples because “their saleableness is far and away superior to that of all other commodities” (Menger 1892: 252). Yet Menger also recognises the “important functions of state administration” in creating coinage and creating public confidence in the “genuineness, weight, and fineness” of coined money (Menger 1892: 255). Another important point is that Menger held that the government reduces the uncertainty associated with “several commodities serving as currency” by legal recognition of some commodities as money, or where more than one commodity money exists by fixing a definite exchange ratio between them (Menger 1892: 255). In this way, governments have perfected precious metals in their function as money (Menger 1892: 255).

There are a number of problems with Menger’s paper, as follows:
(1) The flawed assumption running through the paper is that a money-less human society would be one where goods are obtained to a significant extent by barter spot transactions. This is clear in the hypothetical scenario Menger (1892: 241–243) envisages early in his paper.

It is perfectly possible that money might have arisen this way, but it is quite another thing to say that it can only ever have arisen in this way, and in no other way. The Austrians have a militant position on the origin of money that appears to me to go well beyond what Menger said in this 1892 article. For modern Austrians,
“[sc. Mises’s] Regression Theorem also shows that money, in any society, can only become established by a market process emerging from barter. Money cannot be established by a social contract, by government imposition, or by artificial schemes proposed by economists.” (Rothbard 2009: 61).
Yet it appears to me that Menger explicitly rejects this idea here:
“It is not impossible for media of exchange, serving as they do the commonweal in the most emphatic sense of the word, to be instituted also by way of legislation, like other social institutions. But this is neither the only, nor the primary mode in which money has taken its origin.” (Menger 1892: 250).
That seems to leave some room in Menger’s view for government law to establish money.

It is obvious that the historical origin of money cannot be traced to one moment of invention in the past: for there have undoubtedly been multiple independent instances in history where things have emerged as a unit of account and medium of exchange in different societies in different times. It is far more likely that the origins of money are complex. Here history and anthropology matter: the idea that you can sit in an armchair and use deduction to obtain apodictic certainty about how some complex social practice arose in the past is nonsensical. Empirical evidence and inductive reasoning are clearly important.

The obsession with barter spot transactions seen in Menger ignores another fundamental relation: the existence of debt/credit transactions (which might even be construed as reciprocal gift giving). As David Graeber argues,
“[the] great flaw of the economic model is that it assumed spot transactions. I have arrowheads, you have beaver pelts, if you don’t need arrowheads right now, no deal. But even if we presume that neighbors in a small community are exchanging items in some way, why on earth would they limit themselves to spot transactions? If your neighbor doesn’t need your arrowheads right now, he probably will at some point in the future, and even if he won’t, you’re his neighbor—you will undoubtedly have something he wants, or be able to do some sort of favor for him, eventually. But without assuming the spot trade, there’s no double coincidence of wants problem, and therefore, no need to invent money.

... What anthropologists have in fact observed where money is not used is not a system of explicit lending and borrowing, but a very broad system of non-enumerated credits and debts. In most such societies, if a neighbor wants some possession of yours, it usually suffices simply to praise it (‘what a magnificent pig!’); the response is to immediately hand it over, accompanied by much insistence that this is a gift and the donor certainly would never want anything in return. In fact, the recipient now owes him a favor. Now, he might well just sit on the favor, since it’s nice to have others beholden to you, or he might demand something of an explicitly non-material kind (‘you know, my son is in love with your daughter...’) He might ask for another pig, or something he considers roughly equivalent in kind. But it’s almost impossible to see how any of this would lead to a system whereby it’s possible to measure proportional values.”
David Graeber, “On the Invention of Money – Notes on Sex, Adventure, Monomaniacal Sociopathy and the True Function of Economics. A Reply to Robert Murphy’s ‘Have Anthropologists Overturned Menger?,’” September 13, 2011.
In theory, one could even transfer debts/IOUs and obtain commodities in this way.

Most probably, money has emerged in complex ways:
(1) from debt/credit transactions and transfers of IOUs;

(2) from wergild-like social practices (e.g., some Medieval societies),

(3) from government-based designation of a unit of account and the demand for taxes measured in that unit of account (e.g., ancient Mesopotamia; see below), and

(4) barter between strangers and in international trade. The cacao money of Mesoamerica and the salt money of Ethiopia may well be instances of money emerging through barter (Graeber 2011: 75). However, in long distance trade, barter transactions might have led to the origin of money in the sense of a money of account (to measure the value of other commodities), but even here may not have widely functioned as a medium of exchange.
As Graeber notes, money in the sense of a money of account (as a measure of value of commodities) can very probably emerge before the medium of exchange role.

And in actual human societies (whether small hunter gatherer or agricultural communities, or larger tribe/group communities with more complex economic organisation with greater division of labour), the way goods are obtained and distributed may be by open-ended sharing, centralized allocation (e.g., Iroquoi allocation of goods by women’s councils), “gift exchange,” where a present good is exchanged for the social obligation of a future “gift,” even though there does not need to be exact value equivalence. Social relations complicate even this “gift exchange” economy: some people may not even bother to call in the gifts owed to them, they might accept something of lesser value in the end. Such money-less societies can persist for centuries, with barter spot transactions remaining insignificant or confined to external transactions with strangers.

The emergence of money from such arrangements appears to have much to do with the legal or social systems of penalties and fines for crimes, injuries or slights. It was here that things – prized things – were used to measure value, in the sense of compensation for injury.

The origin of money in ancient Mesopotamia appears to be in the development of an abstract money of account in the temple and palace institutions: these temples and palaces represented state institutions with large internal centrally planned economies, with complex weights and measurements for internal accounting of the products produced, received and distributed, and rent and interest owed. Many prices were set and administered in the money of account which developed from weight units. The two units of account were (1) the shekel of silver (which was equal to the monthly grain ration) and (2) barley. In the private economy, exchange involved a high degree of credit/debt transactions or “gift exchange,” not simply barter in spot transactions (Hudson 2004: 102). Silver money of account spread to the private economy mostly notably as a means of paying debts to temples and palaces (Hudson 2004: 115). But many ordinary people could pay in commodities, and the administered pricing system in terms of silver/grain developed in the temples was to assist in calculation of payments in kind.

(2) Menger holds that precious metals emerged as the medium of exchange for their “special saleableness.” He thinks that no “accident, nor the consequence of state compulsion, nor voluntary convention of traders effected this” (Menger 1892: 254). This seems to contradict his statement on p. 250 (cited above).

In fact, Menger’s view is highly questionable, since metals were not especially divisible or used in uniform divisible units until the invention of coinage. Most bullion and metal would have been of too high a value for ordinary transactions. The historical origin of coinage in Western civilization lies with the state:
“the state’s role in the development of coinage is undisputed … Coinage was not an endogenous development of the economic sphere, as Menger held, nor was it created merely in order to facilitate trade which had existed thousands of years before money and was in no need of facilitation” (Peacock 2006: 642).
To be fair to Menger, he did not assert that coinage “was an endogenous development of the economic sphere.” What Menger believed is that precious metal as commodity money (not necessarily coined) emerged because of its “special saleableness.” But this is not necessarily true, because precious metal was unlikely to have been used in daily, ordinary transactions by common people before small unit coins. Coins were the creation of the state, and even the early coins were minted in denominations far too high for small transactions (Kraay 1964). The reason that coinage eventually became a widely-accepted medium of exchange and unit of account was that the state demanded its issued coin back for payment of taxes and other payments to the state, such as harbour dues and fines. This process is what monetized the economy and encouraged the use of coinage as a medium of exchange. This is essentially the Chartalist explanation of monetised economies.
We can end by noting that, in contrast to the cultish, dogmatic assertions of Rothbard (2009: 61), Menger recognised that the state improved the effectiveness of money through issuing coinage, and in fixing exchange ratios between commodity money. He also allowed that a medium of exchange might be instituted by way of government legislation (Menger 1892: 250).

UPDATE
I will also look at Menger’s Principles of Economics (1st edn. 1871) in the section on money, but I think most of the criticisms above will also apply to it.

DAVID GRAEBER LINKS

Graeber, David, 2009. “Debt: The First Five Thousand Years,” Eurozine.com, 20th August.

“What is Debt? – An Interview with Economic Anthropologist David Graeber,” August 26, 2011.

Robert Murphy, “Murphy Replies to David Graeber on Menger and Money,” Mises.org, September 8, 2011.

David Graeber, “On the Invention of Money – Notes on Sex, Adventure, Monomaniacal Sociopathy and the True Function of Economics. A Reply to Robert Murphy’s ‘Have Anthropologists Overturned Menger?,’” September 13, 2011.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Graeber, David. 2011. Debt: The First 5,000 Years, Melville House, Brooklyn, N.Y.

Hudson, M. 2004. “The Archaeology of Money: Debt Versus Barter Theories of Money’s Origins,” in L. R. Wray (ed.), Credit and State Theories of Money: the Contributions of A. Mitchell Innes, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 99–127.

Kraay, C. M. 1964. “Hoards, Small Change and the Origin of Coinage,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 84: 76–91.

Menger, Carl, 2007. Principles of Economics (trans. Grundsätze der Volkwirthschaftslehre [1st edn. 1871] by J. Dingwall and B. F. Hoselitz), Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama.

Menger, C. 1892. “On the Origin of Money,” Economic Journal 2: 238–255.

Murphy, Robert P. 2003. “The Origin of Money and Its Value,” Mises Daily, September 29, 2003
http://mises.org/daily/1333


Peacock, M. S. 2006. “The Origins of Money in Ancient Greece: The Political Economy of Coinage and Exchange,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 30: 637–650.

Rothbard, M. N., 2009, The Essential von Mises, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama.