Showing posts with label ABCT. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ABCT. Show all posts

Saturday, August 29, 2015

Where in the ABCT are Stock Market Bubbles supposed to be the Mechanism by which Capitalist Economies are destabilised?

It is a crucial point: Austrians complain about asset bubbles, but their Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) or economic theory in general does not focus on stock market speculation or asset bubbles as a fundamental and inherent means by which an economy is destabilised.

For example, in the ABCT it is real and unsustainable higher-order capital investment that is supposed to wreck the economy, not debt-financed asset speculation.

The Austrians today are falsely claiming that they have some kind of prescient theory explaining the recent stock market gyrations or asset bubbles. This is rubbish.

Karen I. Vaughn in her excellent book Austrian Economics in America: The Migration of a Tradition hits the nail on the head:
“Mises never discusses the possibility of systematic speculative error except in the context of his trade cycle theory, in which speculators-investors are misled by improper monetary signals emanating from a fractional reserve banking. Yet if the future cannot be predicted, or as Shackle would say, if the future is created out of the actions of the past, why is it not least conceivably possible for speculative activity to be on net incorrect at least some of the time? Certainly, we have the empirical evidence of speculative bubbles that are endogenous to markets as an example of market instability. One would think that the extent and potential limiting factors that affect such endogenous instabilities would be of great importance for fully understanding market orders, yet it is an issue surprisingly missing in the Austrian literature. Hence, although, we can appreciate the force of Mises’ argument as far as it goes, it seems that a crucial part of the case for the effective functioning of a market economy is missing.” (Vaughn. 1994: 87–88).
Vaughn is entirely correct: the Austrians’ trade cycle theory is flawed by failing to take into account asset bubbles in a systemic theoretical way.

When we add to this the failure to understand and apply to economic theory the concepts of fundamental uncertainty, subjective expectations, debt deflation, and wage and price rigidities, as well as their commitment to bankrupt ideas like loanable funds theory, we have one deeply defective and unsound theory.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Vaughn, K. I. 1994. Austrian Economics in America: The Migration of a Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.

Tuesday, September 30, 2014

A Brief Outline of Mises’ ABCT

A quick summary following on from the last post of Mises’ Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) in its successive stages, but with the version in Human Action included:
(1) a fall in the bank rate below the unique Wicksellian natural rate induces unsustainable, roundabout capital projects (Mises 2009 [1953]: 355, 360–361; Mises 2006 [1978]: 107–108). By the time of Human Action Mises replaces the unique Wicksellian natural rate with the single originary interest rate (apparently on capital goods) (Mises 2008: 547–548), but the two concepts are functional equivalents;

(2) but the new investment increases wages/aggregate income and non-labour factor prices (Mises 2008: 550), and so consumption increases in early and middle stages of the boom, and the prices of consumer goods rise (Mises 2008: 550). This increase in consumption is made more intense by the falling money rate of interest discouraging saving;

(3) the rising consumption also encourages consumer goods industries to expand production (Mises 2008: 558), further increasing demand for factor inputs.

(4) but, according to Mises (2009 [1953]: 362–363), as scarce factor inputs are bid away by the new firms engaged in more roundabout capital projects, raising the price of factor inputs, then the mature firms producing consumer goods in the last stages of production see their total quantity of output of consumer goods fall, even as inflation in consumer goods’ prices increases, and investment continues to increase. Presumably this is the point where investment and real consumption move in opposite directions.

(5) if the banks were to continue to expand the money supply indefinitely, the result will be hyperinflationary collapse of the currency, but normally banks end the process well before this (Mises 2008: 559). The boom reaches its end point when banks raise the money rate on loans, then investment falls. The capital projects that were unsustainable are folded up and liquidated, and this drives the bust (Mises 2008: 560–561; Mises 2006 [1978]: 115). The bust sees further falls in consumption and rises in saving, and liquidation of capital until bank rate and natural rate coincide and intertemporal coordination of saving and investment begins again, and investment rises.
An interesting question: did Hayek agree with point (4), that at some stage of the boom investment will continue to rise as real consumption falls?

Yet another question is: why does the law of demand (apparently) mysteriously stop working in the boom? Why doesn’t the relative degree of wage and price flexibility assumed in the theory (which, admittedly, is not perfect, but still reasonably strong) cause the Wicksellian natural rate to adjust and actually fall to the bank rate, as rising prices for consumer goods cause falls in the quantity demanded of consumer goods? Why don’t the rising prices of factor inputs cause falls in the quantity demanded of factors, so that investment is dampened?

If I am not mistaken, John Hicks (1967) wondered the same thing, and other neoclassical economists, citing Hicks, bring up the same objection (Vasséi 2010). Vasséi (2010: 213) points out that Mises (2008: 550) assumes no significant lag between the additional consumption through rising wages and the rise in the prices of consumer goods. So a serious time lag and “sticky” consumer goods’ prices cannot account for the lack of a tendency to market clearing.

Hayek’s answer, at least with respect to his version of the ABCT, was that disequilibrium in relevant product markets is not corrected because of the continuous “inflow of new money” into the system “at a given point and at a constant percentage rate” (Hayek 1969: 279). This doesn’t seem entirely convincing to me. It seems like the law of demand is asserted as a universally true law, but conveniently pushed aside when it contradicts the theory.

This also illustrates how the Austrians see market economies as incredibly feeble, fragile, unstable systems, which are thrown out of balance even by fundamental institutions of capitalism like fractional reserve banking and indeed any excessive credit money creation by private sector agents.

Under Austrian theory, capitalism isn’t some powerful Atlas, but is transformed into some hapless, puny weakling, liable to stumble and fall over at any time.

Further Reading
“Daniel Kuehn on the Austrian Business Cycle Theory,” December 5, 2013.

“John Hicks on Hayek’s Business Cycle Theory,” July 18, 2014.

“A Candid Admission from Hayek?,” Sunday, July 20, 2014.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hayek, F. A. von. 1969. “Three Elucidations of the Ricardo Effect,” Journal of Political Economy 77.2: 274–285.

Hicks, J. R. 1967. “The Hayek Story,” in J. R. Hicks, Critical Essays in Monetary Theory. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 203–215.

Mises, L. von. 2006 [1978]. The Causes of the Economic Crisis and Other Essays Before and After the Great Depression, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Ala.

Mises, L. von. 2008. Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. The Scholar’s Edition. Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Ala.

Mises, L. von. 2009 [1953]. The Theory of Money and Credit (trans. J. E. Batson), Mises Institute, Auburn, Ala.

Vasséi, Arash Molavi. 2010. “Ludwig von Mises’s Business Cycle Theory: Static Tools for Dynamic Analysis,” in Harald Hagemann, Tamotsu Nishizawa, Yukihiro Ikeda (eds.). Austrian Economics in Transition: From Carl Menger to Friedrich Hayek. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 196–217.

Friday, December 6, 2013

Critics of the Classic Hayekian Business Cycle Theory (Updated)

This list is updated in light of Kuehn (2013), a great overview of the subject.

My list:
(1) Piero Sraffa:
He was really the first and possibly the most important in these articles:
Sraffa, P. 1932. “Dr. Hayek on Money and Capital,” Economic Journal 42: 42–53.

Sraffa, P. 1932. “A Rejoinder,” Economic Journal 42 (June): 249–251.
See also:
Kurz, H. D. 2000. “Hayek-Keynes-Sraffa Controversy Reconsidered,” in H. D. Kurz (ed.), Critical Essays on Piero Sraffa’s Legacy in Economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 257-302.

Lawlor, M. S. and Horn, B. 1992. “Notes on the Hayek-Sraffa exchange,” Review of Political Economy 4: 317–340.

Lachmann, L. M. 1986. “Austrian Economics under Fire: The Hayek-Sraffa Duel in Retrospect,” in W. Grassl and B. Smith (eds.), Austrian Economics: Historical and Philosophical Background, Croom Helm, London. 225–242.
(2) Karl Gunnar Myrdal:
Myrdal, G. 1933. “Der Gleichgewichtsbegriff als Instrument der geld-theoretischen Analyse,” in F. A. Hayek (ed.), Beitrage zur Geldtheorie, Vienna. 361–487.
(3) Paul Rosenstein-Rodan:
However, I don’t think his criticisms were ever published (I could be wrong), but were certainly conveyed to Ludwig Lachmann in conversations in the 1930s as reported in this Austrian Economics Newsletter (AEN) (an interview with Lachmann):
AEN: You have talked a number of times about the importance of expectations in business cycle theory. What first drew your interest to expectations as far as the business cycle question was concerned.

Lachmann: Talking to Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, who was then a lecturer at University College, London – not technically in the London School of Economics – but he gave a course on the history of economic thought to which all of us who were research students then went.
It was Rosenstein-Rodan who in discussing Austrian trade cycle theory with me said, ‘Ah yes, but whatever happens in the business cycle is in the first place determined by expectations.’ And then he told me of the work that had been done in Sweden.”
Ludwig Lachmann, “An Interview with Ludwig Lachmann,” The Austrian Economics Newsletter, Volume 1, Number 3 (Fall 1978), Mises.org.
http://mises.org/journals/aen/lachmann.asp
Rosenstein-Rodan was possibly referring to Gunnar Myrdal’s work listed in (2) above.

(4) John Maynard Keynes:
Keynes’s criticisms were in a response to Hayek’s review of his earlier work, and mostly in his private correspondence with Hayek:
Keynes, J. M. 1931. “The Pure Theory of Money. A Reply to Dr. Hayek,” Economica 34 (November): 387–397.

Ingrao, B. 2005. “When the Abyss Yawns and After. The Correspondence between Keynes and Hayek,” in M. C. Marcuzzo and A. Roselli (eds.), Economists in Cambridge. A Study Through their Correspondence, 1907–1946. Routledge, London. 236-256.

Ingrao, B. and F. Ranchetti. 2005. “Hayek and Cambridge: Dialogue and Contention,” in M. C. Marcuzzo and A. Roselli (eds.), Economists in Cambridge. A Study Through their Correspondence, 1907–1946. Routledge, London. 392-413.

Moggridge, D. (ed.). 1973. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (vol. 13). Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, London.
It was in Keynes (1931) that he delivered his rather harsh verdict on Prices and Production:
“The book, as it stands, seems to me to be one of the most frightful muddles I have ever read, with scarcely a sound proposition in it beginning with page 45 … It is an extraordinary example of how, starting with a mistake, a remorseless logician can end up in Bedlam.” (Keynes 1931: 394).
(5) Ludwig M. Lachmann:
Lachmann, L. M. 1943. “The Role of Expectations in Economics as a Social Science,” Economica n.s. 10.37: 12–23.
(6) Frank H. Knight:
Knight, Frank H. 1935. “Professor Hayek and the Theory of Investment,” Economic Journal 45.177 (March): 77-94.
Here is one of Hayek’s responses to Knight:
Hayek, F. A. von. 1936. “The Mythology of Capital,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 50.2: 199-228.
See also:
Boettke, P. and K. Vaughn. 2002. “Knight and the Austrians on Capital and the Problem of Socialism,” History of Political Economy 34: 155–176.

Cohen, A. J. 2003. “Hayek/Knight Capital Controversy: The Irrelevance of Roundaboutness, or Purging Processes in Time?,” History of Political Economy 35.3: 469-490.
(7) Nicholas Kaldor:
Kaldor, N. 1939. “Capital Intensity and the Trade Cycle,” Economica n.s. 6.21: 40–66.

Kaldor, N. 1940. “The Trade Cycle and Capital Intensity: A Reply,” Economica n.s. 7.25: 16–22.

Kaldor, N. 1942. “Professor Hayek and the Concertina-Effect,” Economica n.s. 9.36: 359–382.
(8) George L. S. Shackle:
Shackle, George L. S. 1981. “F. A. Hayek, 1899– ,” in D. P. O’Brien and J. R. Presley (eds.), Pioneers of Modern Economics in Britain. Macmillan, London. 234–261, at p. 240.
(9) Gottfried von Haberler:
Haberler, G. 1986. “Reflections on Hayek’s Business Cycle Theory,” Cato Journal 6: 421–435.

Reprinted in Haberler, G. 1991. “Reflections on Hayek’s Business Cycle Theory,” in John Cunningham Wood and Ronald N. Woods (eds.), Friedrich A. Hayek: Critical Assessments (vol. 4). Routledge, London. 249–262.
(10) Gordon Tullock:
Tullock, G. 1988. “Why the Austrians are Wrong About Depressions,” The Review of Austrian Economics 2: 73–78.
(11) David Ramsay Steele
His views (quite insightful) are described in this comment:
http://consultingbyrpm.com/blog/2012/05/federal-government-outlays-and-receipts-as-of-nominal-gdp.html#comment-39021
(12) Allin Cottrel:
Cottrell, A. 1993. “Hayek’s Early Cycle Theory Re-examined,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 18: 197–212.
(13) Ulrich Witt:
Witt, U. 1997. “The Hayekian Puzzle: Spontaneous Order and the Business Cycle,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy 44: 44–58.
(14) Tyler Cowen:
Cowen, Tyler. 1997. Risk and Business Cycles: New and Old Austrian Perspectives. Routledge, London.
(15) Robert P. Murphy:
Although I suppose Murphy sees himself as a defender of the ABCT, nevertheless his work here is nothing but a critique of the classic Hayekian theory (where Hayek uses the Wicksellian natural rate of interest):
Murphy, Robert P. 2003. Unanticipated Intertemporal Change in Theories of Interest, PhD dissert., Department of Economics, New York University.

Murphy, Robert P. “Multiple Interest Rates and Austrian Business Cycle Theory.”
http://consultingbyrpm.com/uploads/Multiple%20Interest%20Rates%20and%20ABCT.pdf
(16) Robert L. Vienneau:
Vienneau, R. L. 2006. “Some Fallacies of Austrian Economics,” September
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921183

Vienneau, R. L. 2010. “Some Capital-Theoretic Fallacies in Garrison’s Exposition of Austrian Business Cycle Theory,” September 4
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1671886
(17) Daniel Kuehn:
Kuehn, Daniel. 2013. “Hayek’s Business-Cycle Theory: Half Right,” Critical Review 25.3–4: 497–529.
Another very good work on this issue is Constatinos Repapis, “Hayek’s Business Cycle Theory during the 1930s: A Critical Account of its Development,” History of Political Economy 43 (2011): 699–742.

In addition, here are some criticisms of Mises’s version of the ABCT:
Vasséi, Arash Molavi. 2010. “Ludwig von Mises's Business Cycle Theory: Static Tools for Dynamic Analysis,” in Harald Hagemann, Tamotsu Nishizawa, Yukihiro Ikeda (eds.). Austrian Economics in Transition: From Carl Menger to Friedrich Hayek. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 196–217.

Vasséi, Arash Molavi. 2010. “The Foundation of Ludwig von Mises’s Business Cycle Theory: Real Analysis as a Chain of Tautologies,” SSRN paper, June 5, 2012.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2077604


Wednesday, September 25, 2013

Wicksell’s Natural Rate and Homogenous Capital

Colin Rogers points out an interesting assumption of Wicksell’s natural rate.

The concept of capital can be divided into two ideas:
(1) real capital, or the physical goods themselves, e.g., machines, tools, or raw materials, or
(2) capital defined in terms of a sum of exchange value (or in monetary terms). (Rogers 1989: 27).
Real capital in sense (1) can be measured in technical units, but that would mean that there would be as many technical units as there are types of capital goods (Rogers 1989: 28).

But in order to calculate the rate of interest (the return on capital), capital has to be measured in monetary terms.

Rogers continues:
“Apart from pointing out the technical necessity of defining capital in value terms, Wicksell also suggests that it is necessary for theoretical reasons; namely, that in equilibrium the rate of interest must be the same on all capital. This condition is, of course, the classical condition of long-period equilibrium defined in terms of a uniform rate of return on all assets. It is the notion of equilibrium employed by Wicksell to define the natural rate of interest. To define such an equilibrium, however, capital must be treated as a mobile homogeneous entity so that it may move between sectors to equalize the rate of interest/profit. Capital defined as value capital (financial capital) can fulfil this role but capital defined in technical or quantity terms cannot.” (Rogers 1989: 28).
It well known that Wicksell’s unique “natural rate of interest” was taken over by Mises and Hayek in their early formulations of the Austrian business cycle theory. In essence, the classic Austrian business cycle theory borrowed the “real” natural rate idea from Wicksell that required an assumption of homogeneous capital: something that modern Austrians are at pains to deny, since they accept (as Post Keynesians do) that capital is heterogeneous.

This is serious problem for Austrians. Austrians use a concept – the Wicksellian natural rate of interest – that is incompatible with their heterogeneous capital theory.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rogers, C. 1989. Money, Interest and Capital: A Study in the Foundations of Monetary Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Friday, May 31, 2013

Minsky versus ABCT

Two posts here attempt to link Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis and the Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) in terms of their views on credit and business cycles:
Daniel Kuehn, “A Thought on Minsky and Rothbard that Would Probably Make neither Happy,” Facts and Other Stubborn Things, May 29, 2013.

Jonathan Finegold Catalán, “Minsky v. Mises–Hayek,” Economic Thought, 30 May, 2013.
While both were concerned with the destabilising role of endogenous credit money, I remain sceptical about the attempts to link them.

The Austrian business cycle theory is an equilibrium theory whose concern is with (alleged) real distortions in the capital goods sector of the economy caused by the deviation of the bank rate of interest from the imaginary unique Wicksellian natural rate of interest. The theory also requires unrealistic assumptions about the nature of capital. First, it is doubtful whether most capital goods can be usefully categorised into clear higher and lower “orders” at all, and, secondly, heterogeneous capital can also have a significant degree of durability and substitutability. A capital structure in a capitalist economy where we find some important degree of adaptability, versatility and durability in the nature of capital goods means that the “bust” phase of the Austrian business cycle theory is a grossly unrealistic and unconvincing explanation of any real world contraction.

Furthermore, the ABCT is dependent on a tendency to equilibrium by which the bank rate will return to the imaginary natural rate of interest, and thus clear the real capital goods markets. All these things are simply worthless equilibrium theorising, irrelevant to the real world.

But what is even worse is that the ABCT has little concern with financial crises or asset bubbles, the real world economic phenomena associated with credit booms in poorly regulated financial systems.

In contrast, Minsky’s theory takes account of both financial crises and asset bubbles, and is the superior theory without any doubt. Despite some influence from Schumpeter’s equilibrium theories, Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis does not really require general equilibrium assumptions or effects.

Karen I. Vaughn identified the major failing of modern Austrian theory in this respect:
“Mises never discusses the possibility of systematic speculative error except in the context of his trade cycle theory, in which speculators-investors are misled by improper monetary signals emanating from a fractional reserve banking. Yet if the future cannot be predicted, or as Shackle would say, if the future is created out of the actions of the past, why is it not least conceivably possible for speculative activity to be on net incorrect at least some of the time? Certainly, we have the empirical evidence of speculative bubbles that are endogenous to markets as an example of market instability. One would think that the extent and potential limiting factors that affect such endogenous instabilities would be of great importance for fully understanding market orders, yet it is an issue surprisingly missing in the Austrian literature. Hence, although, we can appreciate the force of Mises’ argument as far as it goes, it seems that a crucial part of the case for the effective functioning of a market economy is missing.” (Vaughn. 1994: 87–88).
Finally, I find Jonathan Finegold Catalán statement here to be priceless:
“From what I understand, Minsky’s position is that credit cycles are self-feeding, as continuing credit expansion is needed to maximize profit. Greater credit expansion implies falling lending standards, in turn increasing the risk of banks’ loan portfolio. From a macro perspective, the greater the credit expansion, the greater the risk of a financial shock. The banking system cannot self-regulate, because there’s no incentive to do so, and therefore the government needs to regulate the industry in a way to achieve an optimal amount of risk.

I don’t find the theory, at least framed in that way, very convincing. First, it’s not clear why growing risk (e.g. a growing probability of loss) doesn’t act as an incentive to restrict a loan portfolio. Second, empirically, there is little evidence that banks disregarded risk.
What? Is there really “little evidence that banks disregarded risk” in the most recent housing market bubble?

I can only conclude that the liar’s loans and NINJA (no income, no job or assets) loans slipped his mind.

As for “growing risk (e.g. a growing probability of loss)” acting as “an incentive to restrict a loan portfolio” one wonders why we have numerous financial crises in history in which banks loaded up on bad assets or pumped out loans to speculators without much interest in restricting their loan portfolios. Australia’s property bubble in the 1880s immediately comes to mind.


BIBLIOGRAPHY
Vaughn, K. I. 1994. Austrian Economics in America: The Migration of a Tradition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

The Natural Rate of Interest in the ABCT: A Definition and Analysis

This seems appropriate in light of this post at Robert Murphy’s blog.

It is well known that Wicksell’s unique “natural rate of interest” was taken over by Mises and Hayek in their early formulations of the Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT).

Consider this passage from Hayek’s Prices and Production (2nd edn.; 1935):
“Put concisely, Wicksell’s theory is as follows: If it were not for monetary disturbances, the rate of interest would be determined so as to equalize the demand for and the supply of savings. This equilibrium rate, as I prefer to call it, he christens the natural rate of interest. In a money economy, the actual or money rate of interest (“Geldzins”) may differ from the equilibrium or natural rate, because the demand for and the supply of capital do not meet in their natural form but in the form of money, the quantity of which available for capital purposes may be arbitrarily changed by the banks.

Now, so long as the money rate of interest coincides with the equilibrium rate, the rate of interest remains “neutral” in its effects on the prices of goods, tending neither to raise nor to lower them. When the banks, however, lower the money rate of interest below the equilibrium rate, which they can do by lending more than has been entrusted to them, i.e., by adding to the circulation, this must tend to raise prices; …” (Hayek 2008 [1935]: 215).
Let us set out the analysis in the following points:
(1) The “natural rate of interest” is a non-monetary theory of the interest rate, and is independent of money and credit (Rogers 1989: 27). It is supposedly the centre of gravity towards which the monetary rate converges (Rogers 1989: 27).

(2) The condition where loans are made in natura is a barter state (or, more correctly, a credit/debt transaction where real goods are lent out, and then repayed with interest in terms of other goods later). What would a rate of interest be when loans are made in goods?

The “natural rate of interest” would be the rate on loans of a physical commodity or commodities (Sraffa 1932: 49–51). In a world of heterogeneous capital goods which is out of general equilibrium, there could be as many natural rates on each commodity considered as a capital good as there as such commodities (Barens and Caspari 1997: 288).

(3) The significant thing is that the “natural rate” is an “equilibrium rate” for Hayek: it is the rate that clears the various loan markets for real goods lent out as capital goods (whether durable or non-durable capital). These capital loan markets in natura – the markets in real capital goods lent out without money – will have market clearing with a natural rate.

This point is brought out by Lachmann in his observations on the Hayek–Sraffa debate:
“One thing is clear: when Hayek and Sraffa use the word ‘equilibrium’ they use it to denote quite different things. For Hayek it means market-clearing demand-and-supply equilibrium, for Sraffa long-run cost-of-production equilibrium.” (Lachmann 1994: 153).
(4) Therefore real savings and investment are equated: no intertemporal discoordination (or future lack of capital goods in relation to current plans) will result.

But the natural rate of interest can only be a single rate inside general equilibrium (or in some other equilibrium state such as Mises’s “final state of rest” or the ERE). Outside of general equilibrium, there can be as many natural rates as there are capital goods commodities lent out.

(5) therefore (by the internal logic of Hayek’s theory) no monetary system where capital goods investments are made by means of money can hit the right equilibrium natural interest rate on each in natura loan of various capital goods, because there is no such thing as a unique “natural rate.”

(6) therefore (by the internal logic of Hayek’s theory) no monetary system where capital goods investments are made by means of money can hit the right multiple natural interest rates either on each in natura loan of various capital goods, because the banks’ monetary interest rates – even in a free banking system – converge in a spread, yet there could be vast differences between the spread of banks rates and many individual commodity natural rates.

(7) According to the logic of Hayek’s theory, it follows that there is therefore no way in principle for a monetary system of lending for capital goods purposes to achieve ideal or consistent intertemporal coordination.

The only way is: to abolish money and return to a barter system (but even then there is no reason why “own commodity equilibrium rates” must exist on each type of capital good available for investment).

(8) Furthermore, the whole theory is dependent on unrealistic assumptions about real world tendencies to general equilibrium. There is no reason to think that there are equilibrium interest rates that will clear all loan markets just waiting to be discovered by entrepreneurial activity.

A possible and likely mismatch between planned investment and available real future savings is perfectly possible in a world of uncertainty, subjective expectations, entrepreneurial error, and even investment financed via retained earnings.

But question is: do these possible intertemporal discoordination problems really cause severe economic problems in real world market economies, and do they produce the type of trade cycle imagined in the Austrian business cycle theory?

The Austrian business cycle theory requires that booms develop with full employment and a lack of resources, but ignores the fact that virtually all modern economies are open to international trade and even at full employment still have idle capacity in many sectors (which overcome scarcity problems for many investments made in the past).

The theory requires a full use of resources (modelled in a closed economy) that only really occurs in fictitious states of general equilibrium.

The theory also requires a real world tendency to general equilibrium that does not exist in modern market economies.
FURTHER READING
“The Natural Rate of Interest: A Wicksellian Fable,” June 6, 2011.

“Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) and the Natural Rate of Interest,” June 18, 2011.

“Austrian Business Cycle Theory: The Various Versions and a Critique,” June 21, 2011.

“Hayek on the Flaws and Irrelevance of his Trade Cycle Theory,” June 29, 2011.

“Robert P. Murphy on the Sraffa-Hayek Debate,” July 19, 2011.

“Bibliography on the Sraffa-Hayek Debate,” July 20, 2011.

“Robert P. Murphy on the Pure Time Preference Theory of the Interest Rate,” July 13, 2011.

“Lachmann on Trade Cycle Models,” August 27, 2011.

“ABCT without a Unique Natural Rate of Interest?,” September 22, 2011.

“ABCT and the Flow of Credit,” October 6, 2011.

“Hayek’s Natural Rate on Capital Goods, Sraffa and ABCT,” December 27, 2011.

“Hayek’s Trade Cycle Theory, Equilibrium, Knowledge and Expectations,” January 4, 2012

“Equilibrium Amongst the Austrians,” January 28, 2012.

“Hülsmann on Mises’s Business Cycle Theory,” February 11, 2012.

“Why Isn’t the Boom of 1946-1948 a Problem for Austrians?,” June 2, 2012.

“Bruce Caldwell on the Flaw in Hayek’s Early Business Cycle Theory,” July 8, 2012.

“Repapis on Hayek’s Business Cycle Theory,” October 10, 2012.

“Hayek on his Simplified Capital Theory Assumptions in Prices and Production,” October 15, 2012.

“Critics of the Classic Hayekian Business Cycle Theory,” December 13, 2012.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barens, I. and V. Caspari, 1997. “Own-Rates of Interest and Their Relevance for the Existence of Underemployment Equilibrium Positions,” in G. C. Harcourt and P. A. Riach (eds.), A “Second Edition” of The General Theory (vol. 1). Routledge, London. 283–303.

Hayek, F. A. von, 2008. Prices and Production and Other Works: F. A. Hayek on Money, the Business Cycle, and the Gold Standard. Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Ala.

Lachmann, L. M. 1994. Expectations and the Meaning of Institutions: Essays in Economics (ed. by D. Lavoie), Routledge, London. 141–158.

Rogers, C. 1989. Money, Interest and Capital: A Study in the Foundations of Monetary Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Rogers, C. 2001. “Interest Rate: Natural,” in P. Anthony O’Hara (ed.), Encyclopedia of Political Economy. Volume 1. A–K. Routledge, London and New York. 545–547.

Sraffa, P. 1932. “Dr. Hayek on Money and Capital,” Economic Journal 42: 42–53.

Monday, October 15, 2012

Hayek on his Simplified Capital Theory Assumptions in Prices and Production

Consider the following correspondence between Keynes and Hayek that occurred in late 1931 and early 1932 on Prices and Production (1931):
To F. A. HAYEK, 25 December 1931

That is what I thought you meant and that is just my difficulty. For by the ‘effective circulation M’ in your first letter of Dec. 15 you seemed, judging by the context, to mean something which corresponded in some sense to what one might call ‘aggregate income’, which is not the same thing as aggregate money turnover. If M means money turnover, why must ‘a certain proportion pM be constantly reinvested in order to maintain the existing capital constant'? I am not able to perceive any particular relation between aggregate money turnover and the amount of capital replenishment required to keep capital constant.

J.M.K.

___________


From F. A. HAYEK, 7 January 1932

Dear Keynes,
Returning from the meeting in Reading and a few days stay in [the] country I find your letter of December 25th. The question which you put in it is, indeed, of the most central importance and if I had thought that you had any difficulties about this point I should have long ago tried to make it clearer. When, however, you wrote on p. 397 of your Economica article that you consider the replacement of ‘disinvestment’ as ‘investment’ I thought you saw the point.

If we take a stationary society where there is no saving and no net investment (in your sense) a constant process of reproduction of existing capital will go on which is necessary in order to maintain its amount constant. In the case of circulating capital this will mean that its total amount will have to be replaced at least once during every year, and in the case of fixed capital that a certain proportion of the total existing capital which wears out during each year will have to be replaced. If we take the simplest case to which I have unfortunately confined myself too much in Price[s] and Production, i.e. the case where, all the existing capital owes its existence to one of the reasons which make the existence of capital necessary, namely to the duration of the process of production—the other cause being the durability of many instruments of production—and where, therefore all capital is ‘circulating capital’ in the usual sense of this word—which is very misleading because this circulating capital is different from fixed capital only from the point of view of an individual and not for society as a whole—it is fairly clear that a continuous process of production requires in every stage a constant disinvestment and reinvestment so that, if we assume that goods pass from one stage of production to the next every period of time, there will be a constant stream of money directed to intermediate products which will be roughly as many times greater than the stream of money directed against consumption goods as the average number of periods of time which elapse between the application of the original factors of production and the completion of the consumption goods. (I apologise for this terrible ‘German’ sentence.) The proportion between the demand for consumption goods and the demand for intermediate products will however exactly correspond to the average length of the production process only on the assumption that the goods pass from one stage to the next in equal intervals corresponding to the unit period. What it will actually be depends upon the given organisation of industry, but given this organisation it will change with every change in the amount of capital existing—or, what means the same thing, the average length of the production period—and will remain different so long as the amount of capital remains at its new level (and not only so long as the amount of capital is changing).

The situation is not fundamentally different if we take the other ideal case where the existence of capital is entirely due to the other of the two causes, the durability of the instruments. If we assume that the actual process of production of the instruments as well as of the finished consumption goods takes no appreciable time so that only ‘fixed’ capital and no 'circulating' capital is existing, then it is again clear that, in order to maintain capital constant, such proportion of the existing machinery as wears out during a period will have to be replaced. In a stationary society this proportion will be determined by the amount of capital and its lifetime, and since the amount of capital existing at a moment of time will itself of necessity be equal to the discounted value of a year’s output of consumers’ goods times the average lifetime of the machines, the annual demand for machines will stand in a proportion to the annual output of consumers’ goods which is determined by the average duration of the machines.

The problem becomes, of course, a little more complicated if one combines, as one has to do to come nearer to reality, the two factors determining the existence of capital. The simplest way out seems to me to be to reduce both factors, ‘duration of the process’ in the narrower sense and the duration of the instruments, to the concept of the average length of the production process in a wider sense as the common denominator. I am conscious that I have treated the durability factor lightly too in Prices and Production, but I did so because I hoped to make it less difficult and because I assumed a greater familiarity with Bohm-Bawerk’s concepts of the average length of production than I ought obviously have done. I have, however, treated these problems at somewhat greater length in sections IX–XI of my ‘Paradox of Saving’.

Yours very truly,
F. A. HAYEK
(Moggridge 1973: 260–262).
These letters concern Hayek’s assumptions about the nature of capital goods in Prices and Production.

Repapis (2011: 721) argues that Prices and Production contains a serious oversimplification: that capital depreciates entirely after becoming productive – or all capital is circulating capital and fixed capital is ignored.

That assumption about real world capitalist economies is unrealistic, and Hayek admitted as much in these words in his letter to Keynes:
“The problem becomes, of course, a little more complicated if one combines, as one has to do to come nearer to reality, the two factors determining the existence of capital. The simplest way out seems to me to be to reduce both factors, ‘duration of the process’ in the narrower sense and the duration of the instruments, to the concept of the average length of the production process in a wider sense as the common denominator. I am conscious that I have treated the durability factor lightly too in Prices and Production, but I did so because I hoped to make it less difficult and because I assumed a greater familiarity with Bohm-Bawerk’s concepts of the average length of production than I ought obviously have done.”
Post Keynesian economics agrees with Austrian economics that capital goods are heterogeneous.

But heterogeneous capital can also have a significant degree of durability and substitutability. A capital structure in a capitalist economy where we find some important degree of adaptability, versatility and durability in the nature of capital goods means that the Austrian business cycle theory of Hayek, as propounded in Prices and Production, is not a realistic vision of modern economies.

George L. S. Shackle also pointed to this problem in Hayek’s business cycle theory:
“Hayek’s argument, viewing ‘capital goods’ as materials which only retain their physical identity through a process of fabrication into consumable form, overlooks the grip that durability has in constraining the business man’s choice of productive methods. The span of the nine-year business cycle, to which his theory was meant to apply, is not long enough for a wholesale discarding of existing equipment during the latter half of its upward phase, say two or three years.” (Shackle 1981: 240).
All in all, this problem with capital theory is yet another flaw in Hayek’s theory of economic cycles.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hayek, Friedrich August von. 1931. Prices and Production. G. Routledge & Sons, London.

Moggridge, D. (ed.). 1973. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (vol. 13). Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, London.

Repapis, Constatinos. 2011. “Hayek’s Business Cycle Theory During the 1930s: A Critical Account of its Development,” History of Political Economy 43: 699–742.

Shackle, George L. S. 1981. “F. A. Hayek, 1899– ,” in D. P. O’Brien and J. R. Presley (eds.), Pioneers of Modern Economics in Britain. Macmillan, London. 234–261.

Wednesday, October 10, 2012

Repapis on Hayek’s Business Cycle Theory

C. Repapis has the following critical article on Hayek’s Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT):
Repapis, Constatinos. 2011. “Hayek’s Business Cycle Theory during the 1930s: A Critical Account of its Development,” History of Political Economy 43: 699–742.
I provide a summary below, and my own thoughts on the Hayekian ABCT.

I will divide the discussion into two sections: problems with Hayek’s use of (1) general equilibrium theory and the role of expectations, and (2) Austrian capital theory.

I. General Equilibrium Theory and Expectations
Repapis notes that Hayek used general equilibrium theory as the fundamental theoretical framework for his business cycle research (Repapis 2011: 702–703).

Hayek is quite clear that a tendency to general equilibrium in the real world is an assumption of his work:
“… it is my conviction that if we want to explain economic phenomena at all, we have no means available but to build on the foundations given by the concept of a tendency toward an equilibrium. For it is this concept alone which permits us to explain fundamental phenomena like the determination of prices or incomes, an understanding of which is essential to any explanation of fluctuation of production. If we are to proceed systematically, therefore, we must start with a situation which is already sufficiently explained by the general body of economic theory. And the only situation which satisfies this criterion is the situation in which all available resources are employed.” (Hayek 2008: 34–35).
Yet the existence of equilibrium is “not an empirically relevant state of affairs” (Repapis 2011: 703). The idea of equilibrium and a tendency to equilibrium requires that agents have expectations that are fulfilled and nothing is unforeseen (Repapis 2011: 703–704). That is to say, the agents in Hayek’s model of the cycle live in a world of “certain outcomes” (Repapis 2011: 713). But obviously this ignores the reality of fundamental uncertainty in the world and economic life.

Karl Gunnar Myrdal (1898–1987) had already criticised Hayek’s ABCT by drawing attention to the problematic role of expectations in a 1933 paper (Myrdal 1933: 385; Repapis 2011: 713). Importantly, the problematic role of expectations for Hayek’s trade cycle theory was also being raised within the Austrian school in the 1930s, as Ludwig Lachmann related in an Austrian Economics Newsletter (AEN) interview:
AEN: You have talked a number of times about the importance of expectations in business cycle theory. What first drew your interest to expectations as far as the business cycle question was concerned.

Lachmann: Talking to Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, who was then a lecturer at University College, London – not technically in the London School of Economics – but he gave a course on the history of economic thought to which all of us who were research students then went. It was Rosenstein-Rodan who in discussing Austrian trade cycle theory with me said, ‘Ah yes, but whatever happens in the business cycle is in the first place determined by expectations.’ And then he told me of the work that had been done in Sweden.”
Ludwig Lachmann, “An Interview with Ludwig Lachmann,” The Austrian Economics Newsletter, Volume 1, Number 3 (Fall 1978), Mises.org.
Therefore the expectations of entrepreneurs in disequilibrium (always the real state of the economy) do not in reality work in the way Hayek required in his theory.

Although Hayek came to realise that his use of general equilibrium theory and assumptions about expectations were unsatisfactory, nevertheless even in Profits, Interest and Investment (1939) he had still not properly addressed these criticisms or modified his trade cycle theory to deal with them, a charge later levelled against him by G. L. S. Shackle (Repapis 2011: 716; see Shackle in O’Brien and Presley 1981: 241).

To return to the general question of general equilibrium theory, if this theory is false and the assumption of a market tendency to equilibrium is not a description of the real world, as Post Keynesians and even some Austrians in the tradition of Ludwig Lachmann argue, then it follows that the ABCT cannot be considered an accurate theory of actual business cycles. It is a further shortcoming of Austrian economics that certain Austrians can deny the usefulness or truth of general equilibrium theory but continue to use the ABCT (I am thinking of Austrians influenced by Lachmann and even Rizzo and O’Driscoll).

The use of general equilibrium theory by Hayek as the foundation of his business cycle research already throws up insuperable problems for the ABCT.

Repapis (2011: 717) contends that by the time of Hayek’s book The Pure Theory of Capital (1941) his analysis and understanding of equilibrium was far from the way he had defined it in Prices and Production, so that his business cycle theory now needed to be thoroughly revised. But Hayek never did this.

I would conclude that this is why it is perfectly legitimate to say that Hayek’s business cycle theory was ultimately a failure, a view essentially also taken by Witt (1997: 46–48) and Caldwell (2004: 228).

II. Austrian Capital Theory
Another problem with the ABCT is certain aspects of its capital theory. As is well known, Austrian capital theory categorises capital goods into higher or lower orders, as removed from the final consumption goods. But the notion that every capital good can be classified into such a higher or lower class is open to question (Repapis 2011: 706, n. 15; Marshall 1961 [1890]: 64–65, n. 3).

Repapis points to another problem with Hayek’s capital theory as assumed in Prices and Production:
“… [sc. there is] a central simplification in Hayek’s capital structure in Prices and Production. This is that capital depreciates completely once it becomes productive, or to put it another way, all capital is ‘circulating’ capital and there is no discussion of ‘fixed’ capital. However, this is a highly unrealistic assumption and Hayek knew it. In a letter to Keynes on 7 January 1932 he writes that ‘I am conscious that I have treated the durability factor lightly too in Prices and Production, but I did so because I hoped to make it less difficult and because I assumed a greater familiarity with Böhm-Bawerk’s concept of the average length of production than I ought obviously have done’ (Keynes 1987, 262). In the same letter he distinguished between two different ways to represent the capital process: one is on the ‘duration of the process of production,’ which is what Prices and Production was based on; the other is on the ‘durability of many instruments of production,’ which his analysis so far ignored. He concludes that ‘the problem becomes, of course, a little more complicated if one combines, as one has to do to come nearer to reality, the two factors determining the existence of capital’.” (Repapis 2011: 720–721).
In the real world, capital is heterogeneous, but also has a degree of durability and substitutability.

While the neoclassical view of capital as homogenous (or as a sort of transformable putty) is wrong, just because capital is heterogeneous and sometimes non-substitutable, it does not mean all throughout the economy one will also find quite durable, adaptable and substitutable capital goods.

Repapis draws the following conclusions:
“Where does this leave Hayek’s business cycle theory? Whereas one of Hayek’s most insightful critiques of contemporary business cycle theories was that they regarded capital as an absolute ‘datum’ that is given for short-period analysis, and therefore capital theory was separated from business cycle theory,
he finds his theory occupying the opposite extreme, one in which capital is a flow, and has nothing to say about the changing uses of fixed capital. However, the changing use, and future use, of durable goods in the business cycle is a central preoccupation of the capitalist and cannot be ignored in any theory of the cycle. As G. L. S. Shackle (1981, 240) writes, ‘Hayek’s argument, viewing “capital goods” as materials which only retain their physical identity through a process of fabrication into consumable form, overlooks the grip that durability has in constraining the business man’s choice of productive methods.’” (Repapis 2011: 723).

“Hayek considers capital a fragile, perishable good, constructed for a particular purpose whose value substantially diminishes once its specific usefulness is surpassed. Minor changes in the interest rate or changes in demand may lay waste machines built over time and dearly paid for.” (Repapis 2011: 724).

“In the other extreme, Hayek underplays the malleability of existing capital and its ability to be transformed into something profitable if the economic conditions of the cycle so demand. His insistence that investment must start again almost from scratch is an extreme position, but again it underlines what other contemporary theories of the 1930s underplay, the real loss of capital in the cycle due to unforeseen demand changes.” (Repapis 2011: 725).
No doubt there is a real loss of capital when demand changes or the interest rate rises, but is it as catastrophic and sweeping as imagined in the ABCT? Hardly. The capital structure also has a degree of adaptability, versatility and durability that means that the Austrian policy prescription of liquidationism in a recession does not logically follow either.

These problems with the Austrian capital theory and its assumptions underlying Prices and Production are yet another severe blow to the ABCT.

The criticisms of Austrian capital theory as raised by Repapis also mirror the comments of David Ramsay Steele (as quoted on Robert Murphy’s blog). I end by reproducing his remarks:
“The distinctive thing about Austrian trade cycle theory is its view of ‘real’ factors in the onset of the slump. Of course, much of what Mises and Hayek say overlaps with the ‘purely monetary’ theories of people like Milton Friedman, and long before that, of people like Hawtrey. So there is no dispute that inflation of credit may create a phoney boom, followed by an uncomfortable period of adjustment. What is distinctive about the Austrian theory is that it says the specific physical form of the capital which is malinvested plays a crucial role in the onset of the slump. So, for example, if lengthening the production structure requires a particular type of big, expensive machine that has no use with a shorter production structure, then that machine will have to be written off as a loss, since it is not suitable to the ‘return to reality’ when the boom is over.

What struck me very early about this (I think it crossed my mind when I read Rothbard’s book on the 1930s depression, around 1971) was that it’s an empirical claim, and at a quick glance, such physical incongruities don’t seem to loom all that large. So, if the production structure lengthens, you change the shape of investment into something more appropriate to a lower time-preference. Fair enough. But what does this really mean? Let’s say you have a factory. You start to use different types of machine tools, let’s say. Still, most of your factors will be just the same, or almost the same, as before: electricity, computers (or in the old days, office stationery), unskilled workers, workers with various types of skill such as accountants, engineers, salespeople, and managers, your factory building itself, your use of trucks to get materials into the factory and products out, and so on. In other words, the overwhelming majority of the factors you employ are not specific to higher or lower orders of production. It’s true that their application to specific tasks will shift a bit, but this goes on all the time, and is an inexact science at best.

Since the claim that physical incongruities are crucial is an empirical claim, I was then struck by the experience of the US at the end of World War II. If ever there was a case of an abrupt, almost overnight, mismatch between prior allocations of capital and today’s applications, we could hardly imagine a more spectacular example. Millions of people left the army and found civilian work. Hundreds of thousands of factories which had been producing military goods had to transform their operations into civilian production. Why was the whole system not seized by a violent slump?

To the purely monetary approach, this is simple and obvious. There was no violent contraction of the money supply, so there was no slump. But to the Austrians, what explanation could there possibly be? Their claim is that once the boom has got going it cannot be ended without a slump, and that this is so because of the need to suddenly re-allocate physical assets to completely new uses. But that re-allocation was obviously thousands of times greater in 1945 than it could ever be as the result of a few years of bank credit expansion, and yet there was no slump! The whole system adapted to the utterly changed conditions with amazing ease and smoothness. ….
http://consultingbyrpm.com/blog/2012/05/federal-government-outlays-and-receipts-as-of-nominal-gdp.html#comment-39021


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Caldwell, B. 2004. Hayek’s Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F.A. Hayek. University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.

Hayek, F. A. von, 1967 [1935]. Prices and Production (2nd edn.). Augustus M. Kelly, New York.

O’Brien, D. P. and John R. Presley (eds.). 1981. Pioneers of Modern Economics in Britain. Macmillan, London.

Marshall, Alfred. 1961 [1890]. Principles of Economics (9th edn.). Macmillan, London.

Myrdal, G. 1933. “Der Gleichgewichtsbegriff als Instrument der geld-theoretischen Analyse,” in F. A. Hayek (ed.), Beitrage zur Geldtheorie, Vienna. 361–487.

Repapis, Constatinos. 2011. “Hayek’s Business Cycle Theory during the 1930s: A Critical Account of its Development,” History of Political Economy 43: 699–742.

Witt, U. 1997. “The Hayekian Puzzle: Spontaneous Order and the Business Cycle,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy 44: 44–58.

Thursday, August 9, 2012

What was the Greatest Mistake of Lionel Robbins’s Life?

The short answer, according to the man himself, was his support for the Austrian business cycle theory:
“I shall always regard this aspect of my dispute with Keynes as the greatest mistake of my professional career, and the book, The Great Depression, which I subsequently wrote, partly in justification of this attitude, as something which I would willingly see be forgotten.” (Robbins 1971: 154).
The Austrians make much of the success that Hayek gained at the London School of Economics (LSE) in the early 1930s with his business cycle theory, but pay less attention to the fact that the leading supporter of Hayek there repudiated the theory.

Robbins made this now famous statement:
“Now I still think that there is much in this theory as an explanation of a possible generation of boom and crisis. But, as an explanation of what was going on in the early ’30s, I now think it was misleading. Whatever the genetic factors of the pre-1929 boom, their sequelae, in the sense of inappropriate investments fostered by wrong expectations, were completely swamped by vast deflationary forces sweeping away all those elements of constancy in the situation which otherwise might have provided a framework for an explanation in my terms. The theory was inadequate to the facts. Nor was this approach any more adequate as a guide to policy. Confronted with the freezing deflation of those days, the idea that the prime essential was the writing down of mistaken investments and the easing of capital markets by fostering the disposition to save and reducing the pressure on consumption was completely inappropriate.

To treat what developed subsequently in the way which I then thought valid was as unsuitable as denying blankets and stimulants to a drunk who has fallen into an icy pond, on the ground that his original trouble was overheating.” (Robbins 1971: 154).


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Robbins, Lionel. 1971. Autobiography of an Economist. Macmillan, London.

Sunday, July 8, 2012

Bruce Caldwell on the Flaw in Hayek’s Early Business Cycle Theory

I was struck in a recent re-reading of Caldwell’s book on Hayek by this passage:
“Hayek’s starting point was a system that was in a state of (what might be called, following Blaug [1990a, 185-86]) total equilibrium. He would then show what sorts of things would have to happen for the system to fail to adjust properly (i.e., fail to return to equilibrium) when it was disturbed. This approach was logically impeccable. However, to insist on starting one’s analysis with a system that is in full equilibrium when that equilibrium implies that all resources are fully utilized seemed bizarre in the midst of the Great Depression” (Caldwell 2004: 163).
Bingo. This is one of the reasons, amongst others, why Hayek’s business cycle theory was judged to be flawed and unconvincing by the economists of his day, and why the Austrians lost out in the 1930s.

I suspect Hayek’s unrealistic assumption of an equilibrium starting point is also the reason why he sounded so ludicrous when he gave a talk at Cambridge around 1931:
“Immediately before giving his early 1931 lectures at LSE, which were his introduction to the school, Hayek gave a one-lecture to the Keynes-dominated Marshall Society at Cambridge. Richard Kahn, one of Keynes’ followers and later his literary executor, described the scene. Hayek had “a large audience of students, and also of leading members of the faculty. (Keynes was in London.) The members of the audience—to a man—were completely bewildered. Usually a Marshall Society talk is followed by a lively and protracted barrage of discussions and questions. On this occasion there was complete silence. I felt I had to break the ice. So I got up and asked, ‘Is it your view that if I went out tomorrow and bought a new overcoat, that would increase unemployment?’ ‘Yes,’ said Hayek. ‘But,’ pointing to his triangles on the board, ‘it would take a very long mathematical argument to explain why’” (Ebenstein 2003: 53).
This anecdote has always seemed strange, but I assume that Hayek here must have been thinking of an economy with full use of resources when he said that extra demand might increase unemployment: an assumption so utterly bizarre in the depths of the Great Depression, it is no wonder if people thought Hayek was crazy.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Caldwell, B. 2004. Hayek’s Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F.A. Hayek, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.

Ebenstein, A. O. 2003. Friedrich Hayek: A Biography, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. and London.

Monday, June 25, 2012

Rothbard Shoots Himself in the Foot: Why the ABCT is Anti-Capitalist

Rothbard, in the following passage, unintentionally describes the essence of the Austrian business cycle theory:
“What, then, are the causes of periodic depressions? Must we always remain agnostic about the causes of booms and busts? Is it really true that business cycles are rooted deep within the free-market economy, and that therefore some form of government planning is needed if we wish to keep the economy within some kind of stable bounds? Do booms and then busts just simply happen, or does one phase of the cycle flow logically from the other?

The currently fashionable attitude toward the business cycle stems, actually, from Karl Marx. Marx saw that, before the Industrial Revolution in approximately the late 18th century, there were no regularly recurring booms and depressions. There would be a sudden economic crisis whenever some king made war or confiscated the property of his subject; but there was no sign of the peculiarly modern phenomena of general and fairly regular swings in business fortunes, of expansions and contractions. Since these cycles also appeared on the scene at about the same time as modern industry, Marx concluded that business cycles were an inherent feature of the capitalist market economy. All the various current schools of economic thought, regardless of their other differences and the different causes that they attribute to the cycle, agree on this vital point: that these business cycles originate somewhere deep within the free-market economy. The market economy is to blame. Karl Marx believed that the periodic depressions would get worse and worse, until the masses would be moved to revolt and destroy the system, while the modern economists believe that the government can successfully stabilize depressions and the cycle. But all parties agree that the fault lies deep within the market economy and that if anything can save the day, it must be some form of massive government intervention.” (Rothbard 2009 [1969]: 12–14).
Strangely, it never seems to have occurred to Rothbard that the idea that the cause of business cycle lies within capitalism is actually a view of Hayek:
“we can … see how nonsensical it is to formulate the question of the causation of cyclical fluctuations in terms of ‘guilt,’ and to single out, e.g., the banks as those ‘guilty’ of causing fluctuations in economic development. Nobody has ever asked them to pursue a policy other than that which, as we have seen, gives rise to cyclical fluctuations; and it is not within their power to do away with such fluctuations, seeing that the latter originate not from their policy but from the very nature of the modern organization of credit. So long as we make use of bank credit as a means of furthering economic development we shall have to put up with the resulting trade cycles. They are, in a sense, the price we pay for a speed of development exceeding that which people would voluntarily make possible through their savings, and which therefore has to be extorted from them.” (Hayek 2008: 102).
According to the logic of the ABCT, since capitalism has an endogenous/elastic money supply, not only from fractional reserve banking, but also from things as simple as bills of exchange and promissory notes, it will be hit by perpetual cycles.

It is no surprise that, when Hayek was propounding his business cycle theory at the LSE in the 1930s, his theory was even attractive to socialists, as Skidelsky notes:
“Hayek, like Keynes, hoped to prevent a slump from developing by preventing the credit cycle from starting. But his method was very different. It was to forbid the banks to create credit, something which could be best achieved by adherence to a full gold standard. He was quite pessimistic, though, about this being practical politics, so his conclusion, like Keynes’s, was that a credit-money capitalist system is violently unstable – only with this difference, that nothing could be done about it. One can understand why Hayek’s doctrines attracted a certain kind of socialist: they seemed to reach Marx’s conclusions by a different route. Because of the Austrian school’s close attention to the institutional and political setting of a credit-money economy, Hayek’s picture of the capitalist system in action was altogether more sombre than that of conventional Anglo-Saxon economics, with its story of easy adjustments to ‘shocks.’” (Skidelsky 1992: 457).
In other words, Hayek would have said exactly what Rothbard denied: for Hayek, “business cycles do originate somewhere deep within the free-market economy.”

The Rothbardians attempt to evade what was plainly stated by Hayek by blaming fractional reserve banking (FRB), and arguing that FRB is fraudulent and immoral.

This line of argument shows the most astonishing illogic and ignorance, and I have refuted it before:
“My Posts on Fractional Reserve Banking (Updated),” December 19, 2011.
The cult of Rothbard stands as one of the most ignorantly anti-capitalist ideologies imaginable, with its gross misunderstanding of, and hostility to, fractional reserve banking – a fundamental institution of capitalism.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hayek, F. A. 2008. Prices and Production and Other Works: F. A. Hayek on Money, the Business Cycle, and the Gold Standard. Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Ala.

Rothbard, M. 2009 [1969]. Economic Depressions: Their Cause and Cure. Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Ala.

Skidelsky, R. J. A. 1992. John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour, 1920–1937 (vol. 2), Macmillan, London.

Monday, May 14, 2012

Jonathan Finegold Catalán on Free Banking and ABCT

I direct readers to this interesting post by Jonathan Finegold Catalán, which I welcome, where he attempts to answer my charge that free banking would, under the logic of the Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT), lead to perpetual Austrian business cycles:
Jonathan Finegold Catalán, “Fiduciary Cycles,” Economic Thought, 14 May, 2012..
I will post a proper response to this tomorrow, but some quick thoughts. I welcome the idea that the number of anti-fractional reserve banking Austrians is “dwindling ... [sc. and] more and more ... [sc. Austrians] are simply switching to supporting free banking.”

However, I am taken to task with the accusation that my question is “an illustration of just how poorly LK understands both the Austrian theory of industrial fluctuations and the theory of free banking.” That is surprising. Catalán seems to imply he will dispute my assertion that “Mises’ and Hayek’s work in the area was to show how fiduciary expansion leads to business cycles.”

Yet only a few paragraphs we read:
“In Hayek’s early writing (I have in mind his 1933 [1929] article “Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle;” specifically, chapter four), he does actually believe that fractional reserve banking leads to recurrent business cycles.”
It is like watching someone proclaim that they are going to walk down a flight of stairs with elegance and grace - only to trip over and fall head over heels to the bottom.

Nor do I find the White/Selgin model of fractional reserve banking, and how it will supposedly stop cycles, very convincing. Many nations had approximations of free banking in the 19th century, e.g., Australia. In this case, a system of banks under a gold standard, no central bank and very light regulation (that was mostly ignored anyway) produced a credit boom that blew a huge asset bubble in property. The familiar debt deflationary depression followed.

Anyway, more on this tomorrow.

Sunday, February 12, 2012

Bloggers Debate the Austrian Business Cycle Theory

There are a number of discussions at the moment of the Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT). It appears that some were inspired by this article by Mark Spitznagel on Mises and the Great Depression. I dispute the idea that Mises made some explicit and clear prediction of a global Great Depression, and Hayek certainly did not, as I have shown here, and here.

For the current discussion of ABCT by bloggers, I direct readers to these links:
David Glasner, “Ludwig von Mises and the Great Depression,” Uneasy Money, February 10, 2012.
David Glasner points out that R. G. Hawtrey and Gustav Cassel were warning of an economic crisis from about 1928. I would also add that the American Harvard Economic Service (quoted by Hayek in November 1928 in his monthly reports for the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research) was also predicting that some market liquidation and problems would emerge on the US capital market in 1929. Glasner also rightly disputes the idea that the ABCT was “ignored” by economists in the 1930s. The ABCT was widely discussed and eventually rejected by economists.

Lars Christensen, “I am Blaming Murray Rothbard for my Writer’s Block,” The Market Monetarist, February 11, 2012.
This post rejects Rothbard’s view of the causes of the Great Depression. The author writes from a monetarist perspective.

Steven Horwitz, “What the Austrian Business Cycle Theory Can and Cannot Explain,” Coordination Problem, February 11, 2012.
Steve Horwitz here defends the ABCT, but acknowledges what he sees as its shortcomings and limitations.
However, Horwitz’s defence of the ABCT has a number of problems:
(1) I find it curious that Horwitz appeals to the non-existent, unique Wicksellian natural rate of interest. There is no such thing, and other Austrians like J. G. Hülsmann and Robert P. Murphy also admit this. All versions of ABCT which use such a concept are fatally flawed. Hülsmann argues that Mises’s later versions of ABCT actually dispensed with the natural interest rate concept.

(2) Horwitz states:
“Once the turning point is reached, ABCT tells us little to nothing about how the bust will play out. Yes, we know that further inflation and interventionist attempts to prevent the necessary reallocation of resources will make matters worse, but the theory by itself doesn’t tell us a priori how this will play out in any given historical circumstance. The ABCT is not a theory of the causes of the length and depth of recessions/depressions, but a theory of the unsustainable boom.

To turn to Christensen’s particular example: the ABCT cannot explain the entirety of the Great Depression. It simply can’t. And adherents of theory who make the claim that it can are not doing the theory any favors. What ABCT can explain (at least potentially, if the data support it) is why there was a recession at all in 1929. It argues that it was the result of an unsustainable boom initiated by an excess supply of money at some point in the 1920s. Yes, the bigger the boom, cet. par., the worse the bust, but even that doesn’t tell us much. Once the turning point is reached, there’s not a lot that ABCT can say other than to let the healing process unfold unimpeded. In the context of the Great Depression, one has to invoke other theories to explain why the bust, whose onset the ABCT explains, became so deep and so long. And that is where Friedman and Schwartz’s work on the 1929–33 period along with awful policies of the Hoover administration, ably documented by Rothbard in AGD and updated in this Cato piece of mine from last year, are required to explain why things got so bad so quickly.”
Steven Horwitz, “What the Austrian Business Cycle Theory Can and Cannot Explain,” Coordination Problem, February 11, 2012.
Even if one were to accept the validity of the ABCT as Horwitz himself does, there is a serious problem in this argument.

Having asserted that the ABCT does not explain the depth or length of the Great Depression (for which other explanations are necessary, he says), Horwitz commits a non sequitur: he contends that nothing must be done by government to “prevent the necessary reallocation of resources,” and that the healing process must “unfold unimpeded.” These ideas do not follow. And, in appealing to the work of Friedman and Schwartz on the Great Depression, Horwitz can only be tacitly endorsing the view that it was lack of central bank stabilization of the money supply that has a major factor in exacerbating the downturn. This means government interventions are required in such circumstances.

Horwitz also ignores the fact that Hayek retreated from his liquidationism in the 1930s and later, and eventually supported qualified Keynesian stimulus in a depression. So did Ludwig Lachmann.

Wednesday, January 4, 2012

Hayek’s Trade Cycle Theory, Equilibrium, Knowledge and Expectations

It is well known that Hayek abandoned general equilibrium theory after the 1940s for the concept of a “spontaneously emerging market order.” But Hayek’s views on equilibrium also evolved over time, and some scholars feel it is necessary to divide Hayek’s career into three phases in his views on equilibrium (Gloria-Palermo 1999: 75). In the first phase down to 1937, Hayek thought that “all legitimate economic explanations should be based upon an analysis of equilibrium” (Gloria-Palermo 1999: 75; McCloughry 1984: viii). The second phase from 1937 to the 1940s involved Hayek’s attempt to redefine equilibrium as plan co-ordination, which occurred in his important paper “Economics and Knowledge” (Hayek 1937; Gloria-Palermo 1999: 75). From the 1940s, there was a third phase where Hayek broke with equilibrium analysis and created a new concept of “spontaneous order” as a method for studying coordination processes in market economies.

While Hayek developed an intertemporal equilibrium theory in 1928 in his paper “Intertemporal Price Equilibrium and Movement in the Value of Money” (Hayek 1984 [1928]), he did not use this in Prices and Production (1931). Instead, “he reverted to the stationary equilibrium approach, by adopting the simple stationary-equilibrium model put forward by Wicksell in Interest and Money as the starting point for his analysis” [my emphasis] (Donzelli 1993: 57). In Prices and Production, an initial stationary state moves to disequilibrium and then moves via boom and bust into a new stationary state. This might be viewed as an application of Hayek’s intertemporal equilibrium theory of 1928 where perfect foresight is needed as an assumption (Foss 1995: 353). Hayek’s definition of monetary stability is a state where voluntary savings equal voluntary investment. The unique natural rate of interest is taken over from Wicksell via Mises.

An equilibrium state is the starting point of a real world economy allegedly subject to Hayek’s Austrian trade cycle (Loasby 1997: 54: “Hayek began ... with a monetary expansion ... impinging on a perfectly co-ordinated economy”). Hayek explicitly stated that he had assumed full employment equilibrium in Prices and Production (1931):
“As it is sometimes alleged that the ‘Austrians’ were unaware of the fact that the effect of an expansion of credit will be different according as there are unemployed resources available or not, the following passage from Professor Mises’ Geldwertstabilisierung und Konjunkturpolitik (1928, p. 49) perhaps deserves to be quoted: ‘Even on an unimpeded market there will be at times certain quantities of unsold commodities which exceed the stocks that would be held under static conditions, of unused productive plant, and of unused workmen. The increased activity will at first bring about a mobilisation of these reserves. Once they have been absorbed the increase of the means of circulation must, however, cause disturbances of a peculiar kind.’ In Prices and Production, where I started explicitly from an assumed equilibrium position, I had, of course, no occasion to deal with these problems. (Hayek 1975 [1939]: 42, n. 1).
U. Witt has identified the severe problem running through Hayek’s reliance on general equilibrium for his trade cycle theory:
“It is an irony that the perfectionist endeavour turned out to run into troubles which, it is claimed here, developed into a crisis of the whole program. In Mises’s understanding (general) equilibrium is a fictitious, imaginary construction useful as a logical basis of comparative statics … Though often arguing similarly in this respect, Hayek takes a different position. While Mises’s apodictic apriorism did not require Mises to derive empirical hypotheses, it is quite clear, e.g., from Hayek (1933) that he aimed at empirically meaningful propositions about the business cycle. For this reason, he was forced to identify general equilibrium in some way or other with an empirical state of the economy, and his theory indeed seems to suggest the state of the markets in the pre-upswing stage of the business cycle. However, in an empirical economic theory it is difficult to determine the conditions under which general equilibrium should be observable. It is even more obscure to see how individual imaginations of, and plans for, future events come to be coordinated so that prices can converge to their equilibrium values. The latter question is crucial in an individualistic approach where subjective expectations are supposed to play a key role.” (Witt 1997: 49).
In other words, Hayek came to see that perfect information and foresight were necessary to explain the convergence back to an equilibrium state as the upswing turned to a bust. The existence of subjective expectations in the real world and the non-existence of equilibrium states are severe stumbling blocks to Hayek’s theory.

Hayek’s assumptions go much further than the idea of a starting equilibrium state. They also assume:
(1) The flexibility of prices and perfect or near perfect adjustments in prices in response to demand and supply;

(2) frictionless markets, and perfect price information on the part of agents (Witt 1997: 47).
None of these assumptions can be taken seriously: prices are not perfectly flexible, and in reality agents ex ante expectations can be severely disappointed ex post, and Knightian uncertainty causes subjective expectations.

Karl Gunnar Myrdal (1898–1987) had already levelled this criticism against Hayek in a paper in 1933 (Myrdal 1933: 385; Foss 1995: 354), and Hayek’s famous paper “Economics and Knowledge” (1937) can be seen as the beginning of his attempt to answer these criticisms (Witt 1997: 49).

The problematic role of expectations for Hayek’s trade cycle theory was already being raised within the Austrian school in the 1930s, as Ludwig Lachmann related in an Austrian Economics Newsletter (AEN) interview:
AEN: You have talked a number of times about the importance of expectations in business cycle theory. What first drew your interest to expectations as far as the business cycle question was concerned.

Lachmann: Talking to Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, who was then a lecturer at University College, London – not technically in the London School of Economics – but he gave a course on the history of economic thought to which all of us who were research students then went. It was Rosenstein-Rodan who in discussing Austrian trade cycle theory with me said, ‘Ah yes, but whatever happens in the business cycle is in the first place determined by expectations.’ And then he told me of the work that had been done in Sweden.”
Ludwig Lachmann, “An Interview with Ludwig Lachmann,” The Austrian Economics Newsletter, Volume 1, Number 3 (Fall 1978), Mises.org.
Lachmann heard of the work of the Stockholm school from Paul Rosenstein-Rodan: the Stockholm school at this time was being influenced by Gunnar Myrdal’s incorporation of Knightian uncertainty into economic theory (and Lachmann himself later came to examine the role of expectations, see Lachmann 1943 and 1945).

In fact, Hayek delivered a lecture called “Price Expectations, Monetary Disturbances and Malinvestments” on December 7, 1933 in Copenhagen (first published in German in 1935; English trans. Hayek 1939) where he responded to Myrdal’s criticisms. Here he began to modify his ideas on the equilibrium interest rate and the concept of equilibrium itself, which was more fully developed in his paper “Economics and Knowledge” (Hayek 1937). Hayek needed to free himself from the stationary equilibrium approach and construct a dynamic approach suitable for his trade cycle theory (Donzelli 1993: 59; others like Myrdal, Ohlin, Lindahl, and Hicks also freed themselves from the stationary equilibrium approach in the 1930s, and rediscovered the Walrasian instantaneous equilibrium approach; see Donzelli 1993: 60). In his 1933 paper in Copenhagen, Hayek had revived his “intertemporal equilibrium” idea, even though this was really “a temporary equilibrium notion with perfect foresight” (Donzelli 1993: 60). The meshing of plans with correct foresight defined as equilibrium in “Economics and Knowledge” (Hayek 1937) is also a reflection of this.

By the time of The Pure Theory of Capital, Hayek asserts it is necessary to “abandon every pretence that [sc. equilibrium] … possesses reality, in the sense that we can state the conditions under which a particular state of equilibrium would come about” (Hayek 1976 [1941]: 28). In abandoning equilibrium, Hayek was in effect abandoning his early trade cycle work, and it is no surprise that he never returned to it:
“Hayek’s changing assessment of the importance of equilibrium theory has some consequences for our story. The most telling of these concerns Hayek’s trade cycle theory, a paradigmatic example of equilibrium theory, one that Witt (1997, 48) describes as ‘an impressive example of allied price theoretical reasoning that may even delight a Chicago equilibrium economist.’ But, as Witt goes on to observe, if one rejects the usefulness of equilibrium analysis, then Hayek’s step-by-step story of how the cycle unfolds, one in which ‘each single stage necessarily had to be followed by the next one’ (46), can no longer be maintained. Witt concludes that Hayek’s cycle theory may well be incompatible with his later theory of spontaneous orders, a concern that others have voiced” (Caldwell 2004: 228).
Witt is correct.

But I would go further than Witt: Hayek’s intellectual journey in repudiating equilibrium theory requires that his business cycle theory is essentially worthless as a real world explanation of cycles.

Appendix: Hayek’s Exposition of ABCT

It is useful to list the various works where Hayek developed his trade cycle theory:
(1) Hayek’s paper on intertemporal equilibrium:

F. A. Hayek, 1984 [1928]. “Intertemporal Price Equilibrium and Movement in the Value of Money,” in R. McCloughry (ed.), Money, Capital and Fluctuations. Early Essays, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

(2) The essay Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle (1929) [English trans. 1933 by N. Kaldor and H.M. Croome] in Hayek 2008: 1–130).

(3) Hayek’s first version of ABCT from his LSE lectures in Prices and Production (London, 1931).

(4) Hayek’s 2nd edition of Prices and Production in 1935:

F. A. Hayek, von, 1935. Prices and Production (2nd edn), Routledge and Kegan Paul.

(5) Hayek’s further version of his trade cycle theory with significant changes in 1939:

F. A. von Hayek, Profits, Interest and Investment (London, 1939).

(6) F. A. Hayek, 1942. “The Ricardo Effect,” Economica 9: 127–152.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Butos, W. N. 1985. “Hayek and General Equilibrium Analysis,” Southern Economic Journal 52.2: 332–343.

Caldwell, B. J. 2002. “Wieser, Hayek and Equilibrium Theory,” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 12.1: 47–66.

Caldwell, B. 2004. Hayek’s Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F.A. Hayek, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.

Donzelli, F. 1993. “The Influence of the Socialist Calculation Debate on Hayek’s view of General Equilibrium Theory,” Revue européenne des sciences sociales 31.96.3: 47–83.

Ebenstein, A. 2001. Friedrich Hayek: A Biography, Palgrave, New York.

Ellis, H. S. 1934. German Monetary Theory, 1905–1933, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Foss, N. J. 1995. “More on ‘Hayek’s Transformation’,” History of Political Economy 27: 345– 364.

Gloria-Palermo, S. 1999. The Evolution of Austrian Economics: From Menger to Lachmann, Routledge, London and New York.

Hayek, F. A. von. 1937. “Economics and Knowledge,” Economica n.s. 4.13: 33–54.

Hayek, F. A. von. 1939. “Price Expectations, Monetary Disturbances and Malinvestments,” in F.A. Hayek, Profits, Interest and Investment, Routledge, London.

Hayek, F. A. von. 1942. “The Ricardo Effect,” Economica 9: 127–152.

Hayek, F. A. von. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 35.4: 519–530.

Hayek, F. A. von. 1975 [1939]. Profits, Interest and Investment, Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, Clifton, NJ.

Hayek, F. A. von. 1976 [1941]. The Pure Theory of Capital, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

Hayek, F. A. von. 1984 [1928]. “Intertemporal Price Equilibrium and Movement in the Value of Money,” in R. McCloughry (ed.), Money, Capital and Fluctuations. Early Essays, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

Hayek, F. A. von, 2008. Prices and Production and Other Works: F. A. Hayek on Money, the Business Cycle, and the Gold Standard, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Ala.

Lachmann, L. M. 1943. “The Role of Expectations in Economics as a Social Science,” Economica n.s. 10.37: 12–23.

Lachmann, L. M. 1945. “A Note on the Elasticity of Expectations,” Economica n.s. 12.48: 248–253.

Loasby, B. J. 1997. “Co-ordination Failure in Economic Theory: Economists in the 1930s,” in A. Jolink and P. Fontaine (eds.), Historical Perspectives on Macroeconomics: 60 Years After the General Theory. Routledge, London. 53–64.

McCloughry, R. 1984. “Editor’s Introduction,” in F. A. von Hayek, Money, Capital & Fluctuations: Early Essays (ed. by R. McCloughry), Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. vii–x.

Moss, L. S. and Vaughn, K. I. 1986. “Hayek’s Ricardo effect: A Second Look,” History of Political Economy 18: 545–565.

Myrdal, G. 1933. “Der Gleichgewichtsbegriff als Instrument der geld-theoretischen Analyse,” in F. A. Hayek (ed.), Beitrage zur Geldtheorie, Vienna. 361–487.

Myrdal, G. 1939. Monetary Equilibrium, William Hodge, London.

Salerno, J. T. 2002. “Friedrich von Wieser and Friedrich A. Hayek: The General Equilibrium Tradition in Austrian Economics,” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 12.2: 357–377.

Shackle, G. L. S. 1939. “Review of Contemporary Monetary Theory by R. J. Saulnier,” Economic Journal 47: 501–502.

Witt, U. 1997. “The Hayekian Puzzle: Spontaneous Order and the Business Cycle,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy 44: 44–58.

Tuesday, December 27, 2011

Hayek’s Natural Rate on Capital Goods, Sraffa and ABCT

Consider this passage from Hayek’s Prices and Production (2nd edn.; 1935):
“Put concisely, Wicksell’s theory is as follows: If it were not for monetary disturbances, the rate of interest would be determined so as to equalize the demand for and the supply of savings. This equilibrium rate, as I prefer to call it, he christens the natural rate of interest. In a money economy, the actual or money rate of interest (“Geldzins”) may differ from the equilibrium or natural rate, because the demand for and the supply of capital do not meet in their natural form but in the form of money, the quantity of which available for capital purposes may be arbitrarily changed by the banks.

Now, so long as the money rate of interest coincides with the equilibrium rate, the rate of interest remains “neutral” in its effects on the prices of goods, tending neither to raise nor to lower them. When the banks, however, lower the money rate of interest below the equilibrium rate, which they can do by lending more than has been entrusted to them, i.e., by adding to the circulation, this must tend to raise prices; …” (Hayek 2008 [1935]: 215).
This passage illustrates a fundamental reason why Sraffa’s critique of Hayek was so important. In Sraffa’s analysis of Hayek’s theory, we see that
(1) the relevant market for the “demand for and the supply of capital” is the market for capital goods. Depending on how one defines “saving” (see Pollin 2003: 304–308) and “investment,” the demand for capital that is met results in investment (if savings is defined simply as “income not spent,” savings can exceed investment when money or even goods are held without lending for capital goods investment).

(2) By the words
“because the demand for and the supply of capital do not meet in their natural form but in the form of money,”
Hayek is referring to the idea of loans being made in natura (in real commodities), as opposed to in money terms.

(3) A state where loans are made in in natura is a barter state (or, more correctly, a credit/debt transaction where real goods are lent out and repayed with interest with some other goods later). What would a rate of interest be when loans are made in goods? The rate of interest would be the rate on loans of a physical commodity or commodities (Sraffa 1932: 49–51). In a world of heterogeneous goods as factor inputs (including capital goods) which is out of equilibrium, there could be as many natural rates on each commodity considered as a factor input (or capital good) as there as such commodities (Barens and Caspari 1997: 288).

(4) Which one of these rates would in fact be the “natural rate”? There is no unique natural rate, but multiple rates. Any monetary rate could be both above and below a number of multiple natural rates, or, as Lachmann stated, “it is evidently possible for the money rate of interest to be lower than some [sc. multitude of commodity rates] but higher than others” (Lachmann 1994: 154). In short, one should agree with Robert P. Murphy, who concludes that “canonical ABCT does need to be updated, in light of a crippling objection raised early on by Piero Sraffa (1932a, 1932b) [my emphasis]” (see “Multiple Interest Rates and Austrian Business Cycle Theory,” p. 1).

(5) It therefore makes no sense to speak of a monetary rate of interest diverging from the unique Wicksellian natural rate of interest (or what Hayek calls the equilibrium rate), because there is no such rate outside of an imaginary equilibrium position.

(6) If some average of multiple natural rates were constructed, would this get Hayek out of his conundrum? No. As Sraffa argued,
“I pointed out that only under conditions of equilibrium would there be a single rate; and that when saving was in progress there would at any one moment be many ‘natural’ rates, possibly as many as there are commodities; so that it would be not merely difficult in practice, but altogether inconceivable, that the money rate should be equal to ‘the’ natural rate. And whilst Wicksell might fall back, for the criterion of his ‘money’ rate, upon an average of the ‘natural’ rates weighted in the same way as the index number of prices which he chose to stabilise, this way of escape was not open to Dr. Hayek, for he had emphatically repudiated the use of averages. Dr. Hayek now acknowledges the multiplicity of the ‘natural’ rates, but he has nothing more to say on this specific point than that they ‘all would be equilibrium rates.’ The only meaning (if it be a meaning) I can attach to this is that his maxim of policy now requires that the money rate should be equal to all these divergent natural rates.” (Sraffa 1932b: 251).
Lachmann also noted that Wicksell’s natural rate could be interpreted as an average of actual own-rates in a barter economy (Lachmann 1978: 76–77), and later tried to defend the natural rate idea.

For Lachmann’s attempts to salvage the notion of a natural rate, see Lachmann (1978: 75–77) and Lachmann (1986: 225–242). See Robert P. Murphy (2003) and Murphy’s paper “Multiple Interest Rates and Austrian Business Cycle Theory” for why Lachmann’s solution does not work.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barens, I. and V. Caspari, 1997. “Own-Rates of Interest and Their Relevance for the Existence of Underemployment Equilibrium Positions,” in G. C. Harcourt and P. A. Riach (eds.), A “Second Edition” of The General Theory (Vol. 1), Routledge, London. 283–303.

Hayek, F. A. von, 1932. “Money and Capital: A Reply,” Economic Journal 42 (June): 237–249.

Hayek, F. A. von, 2008. Prices and Production and Other Works: F. A. Hayek on Money, the Business Cycle, and the Gold Standard, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Ala.

Lachmann, L. M. 1978. Capital and its Structure, S. Andrews and McMeel, Kansas City. pp. 75–77.

Lachmann, L. M. 1986. “Austrian Economics under Fire: The Hayek-Sraffa Duel in Retrospect,” in W. Grassl and B. Smith (eds.), Austrian Economics: Historical and Philosophical Background, Croom Helm, London. 225–242. [reprinted in Lachmann 1994: 141–158.]

Lachmann, L. M. 1994. Expectations and the Meaning of Institutions: Essays in Economics (ed. by D. Lavoie), Routledge, London. 141–158.

Murphy, Robert P. 2003. Unanticipated Intertemporal Change in Theories of Interest, PhD dissert., Department of Economics, New York University.

Murphy, Robert P. “Multiple Interest Rates and Austrian Business Cycle Theory.”

Pollin, R. 2003. “Saving,” in J. E. King (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Post Keynesian Economics, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northhampton, MA, USA. 304–308.

Sraffa, P. 1932a. “Dr. Hayek on Money and Capital,” Economic Journal 42: 42–53.

Sraffa, P. 1932b. “A Rejoinder,” Economic Journal 42 (June): 249–251.


UPDATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE HAYEK–SRAFFA DEBATE

Barens, I. and V. Caspari, 1997. “Own-Rates of Interest and Their Relevance for the Existence of Underemployment Equilibrium Positions,” in G. C. Harcourt and P. A. Riach (eds.), A “Second Edition” of The General Theory (Vol. 1), Routledge, London. 283–303.

Bellofiore, R. 1998. “Between Wicksell and Hayek: Mises’ Theory of Money and Credit Revisited,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 57.4: 531–578.

Burger, P. 2003. Sustainable Fiscal Policy and Economic Stability: Theory and Practice, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.

Caldwell, B. 2004. Hayek’s Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F.A. Hayek, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.

Cottrell, A. 1993. “Hayek’s Early Cycle Theory Re-examined,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 18: 197–212.

Harcourt, G. C. and P. A. Riach. 1997. A “Second Edition” of The General Theory (Vol. 1), Routledge, London.

Hayek, F. A. von, 1931. Prices and Production, G. Routledge & Sons, Ltd, London.

Hayek, F. A. von, 1932. “Money and Capital: A Reply,” Economic Journal 42 (June): 237–249.

Hayek, F. A. von, 1935. Prices and Production (2nd edn), Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Hicks, J. R. and J. C. Gilbert. 1934. Review of Beiträge zur Geldtheorie by F. A. von Hayek, Economica n.s. 1.4: 479–486.

Kurz, H. D. 2000. “Hayek-Keynes-Sraffa Controversy Reconsidered,” in H. D. Kurz (ed.), Critical Essays on Piero Sraffa’s Legacy in Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 257-302.

Kyun, K. 1988. Equilibrium Business Cycle Theory in Historical Perspective Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. p. 36ff.

Lachmann, L. M. 1978. Capital and its Structure, S. Andrews and McMeel, Kansas City. pp. 75–77.

Lachmann, L. M. 1986. “Austrian Economics under Fire: The Hayek-Sraffa Duel in Retrospect,” in W. Grassl and B. Smith (eds.), Austrian Economics: Historical and Philosophical Background, Croom Helm, London. 225–242. [reprinted in Lachmann 1994: 141–158.]

Lachmann, L. M. 1994. Expectations and the Meaning of Institutions: Essays in Economics (ed. by D. Lavoie), Routledge, London. 141–158.

Lawlor, M. S. and Horn, B. 1992. “Notes on the Hayek–Sraffa Exchange,” Review of Political Economy 4: 317–340.

Lawlor, M. S. 1994. “The Own-Rates Framework as an Interpretation of the General Theory: A Suggestion for Complicating the Keynesian Theory of Money,” in J. B. Davis (ed.), The State of Interpretation of Keynes, Kluwer Academic, Boston and London. 39–90.

Milgate, M. 1979. “On the Origin of the Notion of ‘Intertemporal Equilibrium,’” Economica n.s. 46.181: 1–10.

Murphy, Robert P. 2003. Unanticipated Intertemporal Change in Theories of Interest, PhD dissert., Department of Economics, New York University.

Murphy, Robert P. “Multiple Interest Rates and Austrian Business Cycle Theory.”

Myrdal, G. 1965 [1939]. Monetary Equilibrium, Augustus M. Kelly, New York.

Sraffa, P. 1932a. “Dr. Hayek on Money and Capital,” Economic Journal 42: 42–53.

Sraffa, P. 1932b. “A Rejoinder,” Economic Journal 42 (June): 249–251.

Vaughn, K. I. 1994. Austrian Economics in America: The Migration of a Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.