tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post7628560948842194812..comments2024-03-28T17:08:15.784-07:00Comments on Social Democracy for the 21st Century: A Realist Alternative to the Modern Left: Limits of Artificial IntelligenceLord Keyneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comBlogger40125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-52525745322725053832014-02-25T22:37:28.604-08:002014-02-25T22:37:28.604-08:00Ad 1. No doubt that that consciousness is a neural...Ad 1. No doubt that that consciousness is a neural-biological phenomenon. However is this the <em>only</em> possible way how consciousness can emerge? I am not so sure that we can rule out non-biological consciousness at this point.<br /><br />That's not to say that we will ultimately succeed in producing artificial consciousness, or even "singularity" (which I believe is just as bogus as austrian economics).<br /><br />Ad 2. I have heard of the Chinese room argument, but I can't see its relevance directly. I will look at it when time permits.Mordanicushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02555552511541697014noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-61948942705596563062014-02-25T09:32:40.896-08:002014-02-25T09:32:40.896-08:00My first thoughts on the master argument:
http://...My first thoughts on the master argument:<br /><br />http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2014/02/berkeleys-idealism-critique.htmlLord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-46526977989608440412014-02-25T07:42:04.927-08:002014-02-25T07:42:04.927-08:00Yeah, I'm aware of this. It seems like a cop o...Yeah, I'm aware of this. It seems like a cop out to me. You seem to be admitting that your materialist principles cannot fully explain many aspects of the universe -- consciousness being one -- and then you nevertheless claim that these materialist principles encompass everything that exists. I don't think that makes any sense.<br /><br />Either your materialism explains everything -- or can potentially explain everything -- or else you cannot make the claim that they are all that exist because, self-evidently, they are not.Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-41695917847229834392014-02-25T07:33:52.145-08:002014-02-25T07:33:52.145-08:00"Well, hot fronts and so forth lead to other ...<i>"Well, hot fronts and so forth lead to other things -- i.e. they cause them. But then a good materialist has to explain what "causes" hot fronts. And then they have to ask what causes these causes and so on.<br /><br />Unless you can establish an entire causal chain you have not engaged in a full explanation."</i><br /><br />But that is not true: it <a href="http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2013/04/greedy-reductionism-science-and.html" rel="nofollow">commits the fallacy of strong reductionism.</a> Modern materialist realists are simply not committed to strong reductionism. <br /><br />First, a macro phenomenon itself is likely to have its own special discipline that is semi-independent of lower-level disciples and itself provides a good scientific explanation without having to go to lower and lower levels.<br /><br />Secondly, even in explaining what a process is causally dependent on, you will reach a lower level of explanation beyond which it is not necessary to go.<br /><br />E.g., in explaining the workings of a car engine you simply do not need to go to the level of quantum mechanics, nor (probably) even to atomic physics.<br />Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-92100652455354142242014-02-25T06:42:50.301-08:002014-02-25T06:42:50.301-08:00I think you're avoiding the issue. You ask wha...I think you're avoiding the issue. You ask what "causes" weather. Well, hot fronts and so forth lead to other things -- i.e. they cause them. But then a good materialist has to explain what "causes" hot fronts. And then they have to ask what causes these causes and so on.<br /><br />Unless you can establish an entire causal chain you have not engaged in a full explanation. Instead there will always be an X that you cannot explain. If you cannot account for the X then you have not succeeded in a full materialist explanation. Rather you have to admit that at a certain point your materialist exposition can "go no further" and then you have to leave this question open.<br /><br />This is precisely why materialism has been falling to pieces in modern physics since the 1930s.<br /><br />Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-49826172518889613752014-02-25T06:29:21.281-08:002014-02-25T06:29:21.281-08:00"(e) Science does not explain non-ergodic phy...<i>"(e) Science does not explain non-ergodic physical processes. That is what uncertainty means. Ask a meteorologist if he can predict the weather two years from now and he will say "no""</i><br /><br />Well, you are conflating:<br /><br />(1) what causes weather in a physical sense (rain, winds, hot and cold fronts) that is certainly explained by natural science, with<br /><br />(2) the future specific states of the weather system<br />------------<br />There is no reason why a materialist explanation of weather must do (2), any more than my perfectly good materialist explanation of what causes a symphony must predict perfectly every future note that occurs in every symphony I listen to.Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-53514888988828956952014-02-25T06:12:11.093-08:002014-02-25T06:12:11.093-08:00(a)/(c) But again your criteria are off. Apply the...(a)/(c) But again your criteria are off. Apply the same criteria to, say, the number '1' or the notion of infinite or the 'infinitesmal' in differential calculus. Do you see any evidence for these? Of course not... there is none! <br /><br />They are not propositions that are proved inductively. What the early modern philosophers refer to as God has the same ontological status. It is not an entity that exists in the world of experience -- it is more like an a priori. <br /><br />Likewise the assumption about your "natural laws" is not an empirical assertion. We saw this clearly when you said that you believed in such laws for consciousness because... well, because you believe. This is not an empirical statement. <br /><br />(e) Science does not explain non-ergodic physical processes. That is what uncertainty means. Ask a meteorologist if he can predict the weather two years from now and he will say "no". Ask him why and he will admit that his conceptual apparatus is not up to the task of explaining it.<br /><br />The reason these systems cannot be properly explained, the reason that our conceptual apparatuses are not up to the task is because there is something else operating that material explanations cannot account for. This "something" is usually called "chance" but in Keynesian terms it can be called "uncertainty". It is something that falls outside of a probability distribution and cannot be calculated. Because it cannot be calculated it cannot be explained. <br /><br />Ditto for consciousness. There is always going to be an X -- call it "emergence" or whatever -- that will not be capable of being explained. And that is the dualist or idealist position: because we cannot fully explain consciousness from material principles and because our understanding of material principles is mediated through our consciousness then we must admit that consciousness must have an independent existence from the material world (or, more radically, that consciousness is all that there is...). Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-78186701240690656532014-02-25T05:48:22.033-08:002014-02-25T05:48:22.033-08:00Since I enjoy a good debate in philosophy and you&...Since I enjoy a good debate in philosophy and you've defended your view strongly and raised various issues that deserve a proper answer, I will write up a post -- maybe a few posts -- outlining why I do not find Berkeley's idealism convincing.<br /><br />But for now:<br /><br />ON (a) and (c):<br /><br />My atheism is not bound by what early modern philosophers said about atheism. I am not bound by their definitions of it, or their pantheism or theism.<br /><br />Atheism means -- for me -- that I see no convincing evidence that a personal, omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent god of classical Judeo-Christian theism or any other monotheistic religion exists.<br /><br />(e) No, I do not agree. If you can explain consciousness materially, it does not mean you need to predict very future behavior of very individual human being at all.<br /><br />Just look at certain non ergodic physical processes: science certainly explains them but does not claim to predict every future state of the system with certainty or even objective probability.Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-48939684864195561862014-02-25T04:12:32.283-08:002014-02-25T04:12:32.283-08:00(a) It's actually never been clear to me how t...(a) It's actually never been clear to me how this differs from theism. The Enlightenment philosophers didn't think of God as some guy with a beard in the sky. Spinoza, for example, thought that natural laws -- i.e. regularities -- were manifestations of a deep organising coherence to the universe. To most philosophers at the time that was synonymous with a God -- i.e. there was some design to the universe and so forth. Also remember that Spinoza was basically a materialist/monist. I think that these debates have been muddled today and people no longer appreciate what actual atheism entails. You read actual atheism in, say, Hume or Sartre; but certainly not in Russell. He doesn't know the meaning of the word.<br /><br />(b) No, it's not mystical. I can perfectly well describe many features of my ego/I. Kant spent a lot of time doing this. So did Fichte and Freud. It's pretty describable, unlike the mystical indescribable principles at the heart of modern materialism.<br /><br />(c) Again, I think the meaning of atheism/theism have been pretty mangled today. I'm on Berkeley's side. Not Hume's. You probably are too because you believe in some degree of constancy in the world. But you are reticent to equate this with what just about every philosopher since the 16th century would have called God which for them was just a guarantee that (i) the universe was not inherently malevolent and trying to trick them and (ii) that somewhere "out there" was a consciousness of the workings of the universe -- this latter point is assumed all the time in science; for example, the notion of infinite in mathematics and the debate around potential and actual infinity (for a true atheist there would be no such thing as the notion of infinity at all because we have real experience of it and never can). People are embarrassed to call this what it is but if you read the old philosophers its quite clear what it is. This embarrassment probably due to certain cultural changes and some myths propagated about the relationship between science and faith in the Middle Ages. I mean you can say that there is purpose and constancy to the universe and call these "natural laws" and Spinoza, who fully agrees with your monist/materialist principles, would call them manifestation of God. I see little difference apart from changing the words. The words appear to mean the exact same thing. It's tragic that this point has become so obscured today. You can't even have a real discussion about these things anymore.<br /><br />(d) Berkeley did not need a God to assume the existence of other minds. I suppose that you might be able to make the case that if what Berkeley -- and every other philosopher of the time -- called God was equated with some constancy and purpose to the universe then yes he needed it. But all philosophers did. Descartes, Spinoza, Pascal and so on.<br /><br />(e) But don't you see? If that is true then you cannot use physical laws to fully explain consciousness. If you concede to this point then you can never provide me with a full explanation of my thoughts or behavior based on what is going on inside my brain. That means that my thoughts and behavior -- i.e. my consciousness -- has a degree of independence from my brain and my body. That is dualism. <br /><br />(The recognition of Uncertainty proper -- surrounding the Copenhagen School of physics for example -- is why many in the higher echelons of physics are abandoning materialism, by the way. They see clearly what such a principle entails. The only materialists left are people in cruder sciences that still believe in Newton's old clockwork universe myth...).Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-89156649723615720622014-02-25T02:08:52.825-08:002014-02-25T02:08:52.825-08:00The 'lump of labour' fallacy has an opposi...The 'lump of labour' fallacy has an opposite - the 'brain surgeon' fallacy.<br /><br />This is the idea that you can turn anybody into a brain surgeon simply by throwing more training and education at them.<br /><br />It is required by those that take the view that we can never run out of new jobs as technology advances. <br /><br />As ever the actual situation is somewhere between these extreme views. NeilWhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11565959939525324309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-29892088905277583132014-02-25T02:08:02.541-08:002014-02-25T02:08:02.541-08:00Guaranteed income can never work in human society....Guaranteed income can never work in human society. It falls foul of the human need for reciprocation, and our demonstrable ability to resent others.<br /><br />Those paying the required 50% tax rate will simply eliminate it politically.<br /><br />Many of those receiving it will descend into to drink, drugs and despair - as we already see amongst the retired. <br /><br />People need something to do as well as something to spend. It is an elite view that people can keep themselves occupied. Many if not most cannot.NeilWhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11565959939525324309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-60446110762354497092014-02-25T02:01:20.373-08:002014-02-25T02:01:20.373-08:00There's quite a good series of posts on The Ra...There's quite a good series of posts on The Rational Pessimist about Technological advances and how it is hollowing out middle class jobs.<br /><br /><a href="http://therationalpessimist.com/2014/01/24/hiding-from-the-computers-part-6-what-is-to-be-done/" rel="nofollow">Here's the last one: </a><br /><br />Click the links at the top to go backwards to the first.<br />NeilWhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11565959939525324309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-86153758195628536602014-02-25T00:23:33.179-08:002014-02-25T00:23:33.179-08:00Find it ironic/amusing that I had to "prove I...Find it ironic/amusing that I had to "prove I'm not a robot" in order to make my last post ....Kenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17527422386335719003noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-69847618291629919462014-02-25T00:22:31.086-08:002014-02-25T00:22:31.086-08:00I don't see any reason at all why there would ...I don't see any reason at all why there would be a fundamental difference between a biological process and an electronic one. Any computation that can be carried out by biological "wetware" can in principle also be carried out in electronic "hardware". <br /><br />Of course, that doesn't mean we have any idea what programs/calculations we should run to produce a conscious mind. We are some kind of computing machine, but we don't know which (of an infinite possibility) machine we are.<br /><br />To reach Marchal's conclusions, you only have to believe that there is some "substitution level" in your brain where your consciousness survives even if the biological parts at that level were replaced by their digital electronic equivalent. We do not know what that substitution level is, so some brave soul would have to make a bet that the doctor got it right. Maybe it's individual neurons, maybe higher than that, maybe lower (all the way down to the quantum level) .... we do not know what the substitution level is, but the computational hypothesis asserts that it exists.<br /><br />That assertion, I think, is actually compatible with Searle, and leads to the strange conclusion (if you accept Marchal's proof) that the physical universe does not exist. Kenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17527422386335719003noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-47090615993380626782014-02-24T23:13:19.139-08:002014-02-24T23:13:19.139-08:00Yes, but the assumption that the brain is merely a...Yes, but the assumption that the brain is merely an information processing machine and that's all to it and consciousness can be explained by information processing alone is precisely what's highly questionable.<br /><br />Of course, Searle's view is also that the human brain is a type of biological machine -- and we all evolved from inorganic chemicals -- but there's a fundamental difference between biological processes and electronic devices.Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-70889664579043117282014-02-24T23:09:11.720-08:002014-02-24T23:09:11.720-08:00The "guaranteed income" is a very good i...The "guaranteed income" is a very good idea and Martin Ford has very interesting insights.<br /><br />Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-86893631901523342482014-02-24T21:50:12.933-08:002014-02-24T21:50:12.933-08:00You guys might find this paper interesting. Bruno...You guys might find this paper interesting. Bruno Marchal presents an eight step logical argument demonstrating that, if you believe the mind is some form of digital computer (Turing machine), than you should not believe in the existence of primitive matter.<br /><br />Only necessary to read part I to get the gist of the argument ... part II is much more complex and is just a deeper dive into the subject.<br /><br />http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdfKenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17527422386335719003noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-4339590200940007082014-02-24T16:10:43.828-08:002014-02-24T16:10:43.828-08:00Of more relevance to this blog is Martin Ford cont...Of more relevance to this blog is Martin Ford contention in "Lights in the Tunnel" which you have listed in your bibliography here, that total automation will lead perforce to some kind of guaranteed income. I'd like to see LK's thoughts on the so called "lump of labor fallacy" as it pertains to these matters.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-4164751006306047672014-02-24T13:51:03.532-08:002014-02-24T13:51:03.532-08:00"(1) The Idealist argument is that it is logi...<i>"(1) The Idealist argument is that it is logically consistent where materialism and dualism are not. It is a deductive argument, not inductive."</i><br /><br />At this point I would have to read the argument, since I think the charge that materialism is not logically consistent is not true.<br /><br />I assume it comes from Berkeley's "Three Dialogues".Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-42843640040314878582014-02-24T13:47:35.049-08:002014-02-24T13:47:35.049-08:00Well, just take (5)
(a) "The end result of a...Well, just take (5)<br /><br />(a) <i>"The end result of atheistic dualism/idealism is no belief in the constancy of the external world."</i><br /><br />That simply isn't true. The whole basis of modern science is the discovery of what we call laws: empirically regularities of experience.<br /><br />(b) but this is just a mystical "brute fact" that does not explain what it is. You make the charge that materialist is mystical, but you face the same difficulty.<br /><br />(c) since I assume you reject Berkeley's theism, then the idealist position is also like (b): it is all some inscrutable mystery.<br /><br />(d) Well, according to my reading of Alan Musgrave's <i>Common Sense, Science and Scepticism</i> (1993), in fact Berkeley needed a theistic god to ultimately justify the existence of other minds.<br /><br />But I assume you reject that, and the result is, as you say, that idealism means you cannot even really justify the existence of other minds.<br /><br /><i>"You still haven't answered my question: if I could fully explain my consciousness -- and thus my behavior and thoughts -- with recourse to material laws does this mean that I could never escape from these laws?"</i><br /><br />But a materialist explanation of consciousness would simply not entail that the same theory could absolutely predict all and every human behaviors in the future.<br /><br />A world of degrees of uncertainty in the future is consistent with materialism and some physicalist theory of mind, as far as I can see.<br /><br />So I see no serious objection to the physicalism here.<br /><br />Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-17960259427166068882014-02-24T13:29:05.533-08:002014-02-24T13:29:05.533-08:00Well, (1) I think there is a great deal of evidenc...Well, (1) I think there is a great deal of evidence the consciousness is a neural-biological phenomenon.<br /><br />(2) Searle's Chinese room argument is certainly relevant here. I am not sure if you are aware of it. Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-73066879855750831782014-02-24T13:05:36.212-08:002014-02-24T13:05:36.212-08:00An interesting piece, only I am doubting the argum...An interesting piece, only I am doubting the argument that human/animal consciousness can only emerge from a biological, i.e. organic structure. However, is there some reason why it's impossible for a highly sophisticated digital computer to gain the same emergence of consciousness; other than repeating "we have no evidence for a non-organic consciousness"? No, we don't have and unless we have a fully developed theory on how consciousness emerge from matter, and which excludes digital computers from such emergence; we should abstain for making such statements as digital computers will never acquire consciousness.Mordanicushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02555552511541697014noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-16035406700297444502014-02-24T12:23:58.813-08:002014-02-24T12:23:58.813-08:00(1) The Idealist argument is that it is logically ...(1) The Idealist argument is that it is logically consistent where materialism and dualism are not. It is a deductive argument, not inductive.<br /><br />(2) That's not how I understand it. Then brain damage would never occur. That would be a bizarre theory to have been held by one of the founders of modern medicine. I have never seen any evidence that this is a real dualist position.<br /><br />(4) I don't get you. For Berkeley there is an external world. It is the world of the senses. He just denies that there is anything "underlying" it. For materialists and dualists the external world exists and it is something called matter -- i.e. there is something "underlying" our sensations. For Berkeley there is an external world but it is just sensations.<br /><br />(5)<br /><br />(a) This is the crux of the issue. The end result of atheistic dualism/idealism is no belief in the constancy of the external world. This is Humean skepticism. But you can also find it in Descartes "malign demon" argument.<br /><br />(b) It is what we experience. It is the series of thoughts, sensations, ideas that I experience. It is also the entity -- the 'I' or the 'ego' -- that gives these thoughts some coherence and so forth.<br /><br />(c) Berkeley would say God. Hume would shrug his shoulders and say that is not a valid philosophical question.<br /><br />(d) For Berkeley you could do so by analogy. You see very close and immediate similarities between other people and yourself and so you infer that they probably possess similar capabilities as you. A radical Humean, on the other hand, would say that we cannot know.<br /><br />(6) You still haven't answered my question: if I could fully explain my consciousness -- and thus my behavior and thoughts -- with recourse to material laws does this mean that I could never escape from these laws? Does this mean I would in such a situation have no ability to reflectively change my behavior and thus that I have no free will? And if you are not willing to concede this then isn't it true that the materialist argument doesn't work because we can never fully explain consciousness?Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-85794466779270561012014-02-24T11:58:28.149-08:002014-02-24T11:58:28.149-08:00(1) When you say "belief", I think you&#...(1) When you say "belief", I think you're conflating <br /><br />(a) unreasonable and unjustified blind and absolute faith without evidence with<br /><br />(b) belief arising from inductive arguments that is held to be merely probable and not absolutely certain.<br /><br />Furthermore, if you were to you say:<br /><br />(1) I believe in an idealist theory of mind.<br /><br />What is the epistemological status of this statement? <br /><br />Is it (b) above? if so, you are in the same position as I am: we both assert as probably true some synthetic a posteriori statement, which we both accept is only probable true and potentially fallible.<br /><br />(2) But "substance dualism" does and did make the claim that mind and matter are entirely separate entities: in fact, its claim that there could be no causal relation between the two was precisely its chief weakness.<br /><br />(4) <i>Idealism does not suppose that the external world doesn't exist. It supposes that there is nothing tangible called "matter".</i><br /><br />I find this very confusing: if you are an agnostic on the existence of an "external world", it follows logically that you should be an agnostic on the existence of an external world of matter too.<br /><br />(5) But on an atheistic idealism, we are still left with the same perplexing questions:<br /><br />(a) why do we have a conscious existence with a high degree of external consistency and what looks like external constraints facing us?<br /><br />(b) what is idealist consciousness?<br /><br />(c) where do minds come from?<br /><br />(d) in fact, how can you justify the view that other minds even exist?<br />Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-69587737410271970852014-02-24T11:56:33.692-08:002014-02-24T11:56:33.692-08:00Detailed models of how neurons connect and interac...Detailed models of how neurons connect and interact in real brain matter are currently done by making very thin and small slices and studying their structure. Only very small structures could currently be simulated. Other methods currently don't allow to study brains on the level of interacting neurons.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13978734648230292076noreply@blogger.com