tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post6620518031670137960..comments2024-03-17T00:23:24.896-07:00Comments on Social Democracy for the 21st Century: A Realist Alternative to the Modern Left: The Argument for Idealism versus RealismLord Keyneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comBlogger17125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-83112163539972833882014-03-04T14:39:08.292-08:002014-03-04T14:39:08.292-08:00I think you're missing my point here. I don...I think you're missing my point here. I don't consider analogy to be a distinct form of argument. And you seem to be using it in either one of two ways which is either an induction from <i>one</i> observation or you're offering an abductive argument.<br /><br /><b>Q1:</b> Is your population "a thing that appears to be a person with a mind", "human" or something else? <br /><br />I ask because in your response to anonymous you suggested it was important they were of the same species and not different.<br /><br />I also wanted to know what you meant by "things that appear to be a person with a mind" because I suspect that's going to be related with your properties P, Q, R and S which gets to question 2. . .<br /><br /><b>Q2:</b> Why did you choose properties like "speaks language" instead of things like "has two nostrils"?<br /><br />The way you present the structure of the analogical argument suggests that the argument should be indifferent to what properties I include. So either using properties like "has two nostrils" would be equally valid or there's something missing from the structure of the argument.<br /><br />To use an example, consider the following argument:<br /><br />x is a dove and x is white.<br />y is a dove and y is white.<br /><br />Now what conclusion should I draw from this?<br /><br />Can I say all doves are white? How about all white things are doves?<br /><br />I would suggest that <i>sampling procedures</i> are relevant here. My sample size of 2 doves (or even a million doves) is hardly representative of the entire population of white things (certainly not random).<br /><br />So if I were to say that this describes the structure of an inductive argument:<br /><br />x is S and x is P<br />y is S and y is P<br />Therefore all S are P<br /><br />you could argue that it does not take into account all of the salient features of the argument. It ignores the sampling procedures which is why we infer all doves are white instead of all white things are doves.<br /><br />As far as I can tell, given the structure you present, Anonymous' argument that dogs can fly is a perfectly valid argument which is why I think the structure you present fails to capture all of the salient features of the argument. And that's why I'm inquiring about what filler you need so on to question 3. . .<br /><br /><b>Q3:</b> What's the filler to your argument?<br /><br />What I was suggesting was that the filler amounted to: these two things are similar therefore they are the same category (and by extension, they possess all of the features of that category). I consider this entirely to be an abductive argument (we're postulating they are the same category which explains why they are similar). I think this requires a sort of "natural kind" belief. Arbitrary categories wouldn't allow any sort of inference.<br /><br />My preferred suggestion was that you were making the <i>abductive inference</i> that positing these other entities were conscious would explain why they possess properties P, Q, R and S. <br /><br />Now the other option is that there is <i>no filler</i>. What we instead have is an inductive argument of a sample size of one since only one part of your sample possesses the relevant property. I'm not sure how much credibility can be given to such arguments (I wouldn't give much.)<br /><br /><b>Last Example</b><br /><br />This should further illustrate why the structure of the argument doesn't take into account all of the salient features you're utizing.<br /><br />a ("you"), b, c, d, etc (others) have properties P, Q, R and S.<br />You have this DNA.<br />Therefore b, c, d, etc all have the same DNA.<br /><br />Would you consider this a valid analogical argument? Or does it fail to capture something in it?Samuel Gotihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07700141552017540854noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-4710326749720872022014-03-02T14:51:53.453-08:002014-03-02T14:51:53.453-08:001. The general form of your inductive argumentis p...1. The general form of your inductive argumentis problematic.<br /><br />Quote: “a, b, c, d, … n have the properties P, Q, R, S<br />a has the property of T<br />Therefore b, c, d, … n probably have the property of T,"<br /><br />In the empirical sense, one can only say that a,b,c,d,...n are associated with a certain frequency with properties P,Q,R,S,<br /><br />then the rest of argument. <br /><br />That fact lends to to have a question about your properties of<br /><br />P = speaks language,<br />Q = seems to have emotions<br />R = responds to pain<br />S = can report descriptions of objects seen<br />T = a conscious mind.<br /><br />Aren't all of these time dependent descriptions based on a human scale time frame of reaction?<br /><br />If a supermind existed why would you assume that manifestation of P,Q,R,S,T would be recognized within the normal frequency frames of the human mind's preconception of these things?<br /><br />If the effects of the thought of the supermind "move" at light speed how would one judge them in terms effects of that which has mass less than the universal mass and since human must be limited to direct interactions of things slower than light? <br /><br />You assumptions aren't rational. They are sensually biased toward human physiological responses to stimuli not necessarily reality for another other kind of intelligent mind. <br /><br />You've brought Newton's absolute time into your definition of what counts as evidence as the actions of mind. <br /><br />The nihilist "God is dead" i.e. supermind(s) are unknowable may seem tempting at this point now that realist facade is shown to nothing more than sensual biases but do believe that history has shown that it is in fact the essence of the human to discover and "know" that which it does not perceive via directly empirical sensing. i.e. the laws of planetary motion, the principle of gravitation, etc... <br /><br />At this point, I don't believe we have looked seriously for "superminds" or that we necessarily have the tools to make such claims either way. <br /><br />The only conclusion we can make is that people should be free to consider such ideas as part of the process of generating hypothesis for science as<br />I think science is the art of adducing that which must be from the counter factual phenomena learn from inductive comparison. <br /><br />To limit oneself away conceptions of a reality that is not currently considered perceivable isn't good science or thinking. <br /><br />Great Topic by the way. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-33802422354495854912014-03-01T13:32:56.659-08:002014-03-01T13:32:56.659-08:00A couple comments that may be more on your main to...A couple comments that may be more on your main topic.<br /><br />I think there's a bit of irony with Berkeley as one of his criticisms (I can't find the quote at the moment) of the new sciences amounted to a criticism of abduction (IIRC, he criticized the fact that their conclusions amounted to assumptions) and yet his postulate of God is an abductive argument to resolve object permanence with his "to be is to perceive" bit. (Granted, the fact that I can't even find the quote means I might be misrepresenting him.)<br /><br />. . . <br /><br />1) There are two things regarding abduction in the sciences that I think are typically lacking in metaphysics. The first is that the abductions in the sciences (particularly physics) give very specific predictions on what's being postulated. Consider the postulates of both Neptune and Vulcan in which we could make very specific characterizations about their mass and orbits.<br /><br />And the second thing (and perhaps partly as a consequence of the first) is that it provides us with follow-up questions that we can research and either confirm or rule out.<br /><br />I suspect "explanatory value" means something different in metaphysics than it does in, say, physics. <br /><br />2) This discussion seems to be a quarrel between idealism and materialism. But what about, say, Heisenberg's form of Aristotelianism?<br /><br />3) All of these arguments ultimately start with classical empiricism (Berkeley, Hume and the 20th century followups with phenomenalists and positivists) or as I like to refer to it: <i>garbage empiricism</i>. There's an argument that can be made that this is a horrible place to start which might go like this:<br /><br />1) Classical empiricism offers a poor description of scientific practice.<br />2) Scientific practice has been more fruitful in expanding our knowledge than classical empiricism. <br /><br />Therefore, we should reject classical empiricism. <br /><br />I'll admit my instrumentalist sympathies might somewhat show through here but I don't see why starting with "sense impressions" need be "foundational" for knowledge. We can start with any foundation we find useful and abandon them as they wear out that usefulness. <br /><br />I'm also skeptical of philosophies that begin "all things are X" where X is (matter, ideas, water, etc) because I think the term then loses meaning. I mean, if everything is X then can I really say I have some criteria by which I can distinguish between X and not X? *shrug*Samuel Gotihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07700141552017540854noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-56166647988222331622014-03-01T13:31:48.352-08:002014-03-01T13:31:48.352-08:00(1) My list of the standard, different forms of in...(1) My list of the standard, different forms of inductive argument comes straight from Copi, Irving, Cohen, Carl and Kenneth McMahon. 2011. Introduction to Logic (14th edn.). Prentice Hall, Boston, Mass. and London.<br /><br />You'll find the same list in any standard textbook of logic.<br /><br />So presumably reading a good book on logic would be your easiest and most enlightening solution to questions about inductive argument.<br /><br />(2) <i>"We might posit something more general: say being "human". And being human entails properties P, Q, R, S and T."</i><br /><br />That would just reduce the statement "being human entails properties P, Q, R, S and T" to an analytic a priori proposition.<br /><br />The whole point of the argument used above is to infer that other humans are conscious by inductive argument, not simply define humans as conscious in a lazy tautology.Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-49384429694935415942014-03-01T12:36:52.390-08:002014-03-01T12:36:52.390-08:00I agree with your three main forms of argument for...I agree with your three main forms of argument for the most part but I'm not sure about your breakdown of induction. Perhaps you can elaborate a bit.<br /><br />I would characterize induction as an inference from a sample to a population. Then, of course, we can talk about good sampling procedures. <br /><br />Let me break down my concerns here and you can clarify a bit more what you mean. <br /><br />1) enumeration<br /><br />i) If we're enumerating the entire population wouldn't that be a deduction? <br /><br />ii) If it's a sample then by what technique are we sampling? <br /><br />Ideally it should be a random sample from the entire population. Then how is that different from (3) statistical syllogism?<br /><br />I suppose you can tolerate a "representative" sample but to actually determine if the sample is "representative" you'd have to know quite a bit about the population.<br /><br />If by enumerate you mean going through every single occurrence we encounter ("this dove is white", etc) then I guess I'd be inclined to question what makes it a good argument at all. On what grounds could you conclude that the sample is anything like the population at all?<br /><br />(4) Regarding induction to a particular, what do you mean by this? Do you mean starting from an inductive generalization and then deducing a particular? Or something else? (The former I would still classify as deductive.)<br /><br />(2) I suspect my criticism of analogy will be along the lines of anonymous above. I would suggest that either:<br /><br />i) this isn't an argument at all (or at least a lousy one)<br /><br />or <br /><br />ii) it's just another form of abduction.<br /><br />In your response to Anonymous you suggest it's critical that they are different species. But can we say they are all animals? Here we have a sample of animal types and we note they all have certain properties. And birds have all of those properties plus one additional property. To the extent that this is an inductive argument, it's an induction based on a sample size of 1. We're inferring that all animals can fly based on the fact that birds can fly. <br /><br />But the thing I don't get is this: What's a "thing that appears to be a person with a mind"? What does that mean? My best guess is that it means that it possesses properties P, Q, R and S.<br /><br />. . . which is why I suspect this is just an abductive argument in disguise. I think this could be done in a couple of ways. The way I might approach would be this:<br /><br />We infer that other persons are conscious because <i>positing</i> that other persons are conscious (if granted true) would explain why they can do P, Q, R and S. <br /><br />But we might approach it like this:<br /><br />We might posit something more general: say being "human". And being human entails properties P, Q, R, S and T. We note that b, c, d, e, . . ., n possess P, Q, R and S. So we posit that they are human (as it would explain why they possess P, Q, R and S). Then we can infer that they also possess T. Samuel Gotihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07700141552017540854noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-78149869666699422402014-02-28T09:50:37.328-08:002014-02-28T09:50:37.328-08:00The argument is not that the idealist "super...The argument is not that the idealist "super-mind" theory has zero explanatory power, but that relative to the realist materialist one it has quite poor explanatory power on many issues.Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-36912176503896316842014-02-28T09:35:47.984-08:002014-02-28T09:35:47.984-08:00I'm not sure though that the "super-mind...I'm not sure though that the "super-mind" theory actually lacks any explanatory power over the "material external world" theory. For example as long as you have the super-mind "remembering" whether dinosaurs had minds or not and presenting the right perceptions at the right time then the theory is co-coherent. <br /><br />Its just (in my view) more complex and less elegant than the materialist view.<br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-8609756188416934992014-02-28T09:35:15.268-08:002014-02-28T09:35:15.268-08:00"I can describe all the substances that I ass..."I can describe all the substances that I assume to exist (minds and ideas) but you seem unable to describe one of the substances that you assume to exist."<br /><br />I think we get what ideas are, sure, but here's your definition of mind:<br /><br />"Mind = that entity that I think of as self-same and which acts and reacts to ideas. This is not an idea because it is that which reacts to ideas."<br /><br />And yet you cannot express it independently of ideas: "act," "react," even the very idea of the "that" which performs the above operations on ideas.<br /><br />Far from muddying up the water, though, this might be helpful; we now have a clear case in which an idea is a transitive/indirect object -- an idea "of" something intransitive and beyond itself. Therefore, we have an ideal basis for drawing analogies to other intransitive referents for ideas, e.g., an independent external world of which "mind" is only one object.Hedlundnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-3855897473848110122014-02-28T09:22:08.001-08:002014-02-28T09:22:08.001-08:00Thanks, and of course my arguments above are non-d...Thanks, and of course my arguments above are non-deductive: realist materialism remains a probable theory only, never certain.<br />Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-84321094468728865182014-02-28T09:13:09.342-08:002014-02-28T09:13:09.342-08:00Yes, you can see that the human brain has probabl...Yes, you can see that the human brain has probably evolved to make decisions based on these kind of "non numeric epistemic probability" inductions quite efficiently.<br /><br />And the conclusion "The universe really exists as a material external world and requires no god or mind for its existence and operation" is (I assume) also based on such "non numeric epistemic probabilities" as well as having greater explanatory powers than competing theories. <br /><br />But this conclusion can never be proven.<br /><br />BTW: Great article and I agree with this conclusion (if I have understood it correctly).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-48171507851841790942014-02-28T08:50:24.773-08:002014-02-28T08:50:24.773-08:00(1) Of course inductive arguments can't yield ...(1) Of course inductive arguments can't yield certainty and can be fallible!<br /><br />(2) But just look at your examples: ""birds, cats, dog, sheep."<br /><br />Those are <i>different</i> species of animal, so of course your induction is much less secure.<br /><br />But I invoke individual members of the <i>same species</i>:<br /><br />where a = myself<br />b = a thing that appears to be a person with a mind<br />c = a second thing that appears to be a person with a mind<br />d = a third thing that appears to be a person with a mind, etc. to<br />n = 14th thing that appears to be a person with a mind.<br /><br />(3) I don't claim that you can give any objective probability from these inductions: only non numeric epistemic probability.<br /><br />But I contend that my use of individual members of the <i>same species</i> increases the soundness and probability of my argument being true.Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-81189750202730003412014-02-28T08:40:35.156-08:002014-02-28T08:40:35.156-08:00Can you clarify
“a, b, c, d, … n have the propert...Can you clarify<br /><br />“a, b, c, d, … n have the properties P, Q, R, S<br />a has the property of T<br />Therefore b, c, d, … n probably have the property of T,”?<br /><br />As it seems likely to lead to false results of the type<br /><br />"birds, cats, dog, sheep...have the properties of breathing, eating, reproducing etc<br />birds have the property of flying<br />therefore cats, dog, sheep probably have the property of flying."<br /><br />Its not clear how you could calculate (or guess at) the degree of probability of sharing a further attribute just from sharing some other attributes in common <br /><br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-88631365127303067192014-02-28T08:38:04.076-08:002014-02-28T08:38:04.076-08:00But you aren't describing matter. You are just...But you aren't describing matter. You are just describing ideas. You cannot describe the substance. So, why assume a substance exists that you cannot even begin to describe?<br /><br />I can describe all the substances that I assume to exist (minds and ideas) but you seem unable to describe one of the substances that you assume to exist.Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-78068945532029344852014-02-28T08:35:01.046-08:002014-02-28T08:35:01.046-08:00"You cannot describe matter. I can describe t...<i>"You cannot describe matter. I can describe the super-mind.</i><br /><br />But of course I can describe it: once I accept by inference to the best explanation that my theory is better , it is probable that everything that science says about the elementary particles mediated by the fundamental forces in the standard model is our description of what matter is.<br /><br />As I said in the last thread: the counterargument that we never have direct and immediate access to "matter" doesn't refute me nor does Berkeley's master argument, because I never claimed that we have direct and immediate access to it, only indirect.Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-50920174860754384652014-02-28T08:26:14.172-08:002014-02-28T08:26:14.172-08:00I don't think it is...
You cannot describe ma...I don't think it is...<br /><br />You cannot describe matter. I can describe the super-mind. That is what I keep saying.<br /><br />If you want to prove me wrong simply describe matter. (Particles etc. are just ideas that we encounter, "matter" is the supposed substance that underlies them...). So, describe matter without recourse to ideas or minds. I don't think you can.Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-3369768681793468962014-02-28T08:20:45.207-08:002014-02-28T08:20:45.207-08:00"What does "external causal origin"...<i>"What does "external causal origin" consist of here? ... Where are you placing this "external causal origin"?</i><br /><br />= things not <i>directly</i> observed that I have called "unobserved non-mental objects": external physical objects of some kind we never have immediate access to it, just as you never have immediate access to the super-mind. <br /><br />Yes, of course what science calls matter (elementary particles mediated by forces) are what probably make up the "external physical objects" I postulate. <br /><br />Your super-mind is a hypothesis just like mine.<br /><br />The possibility of "external physical objects of some kind" (probably made of matter) is clearly logical possible and straightforwardly supportable by induction.<br /><br />Just as you inductively infer that:<br /><i>"We observe directly things that claim to be minds that probably have minds (e.g., people). On analogy, there might be an unobserved super-mind that is the external cause."</i><br /><br />These are both arguments by analogy. <br /><br />My argument (1) uses an inductive argument by analogy just like yours and (2) clearly uses logical reasoning.<br />Lord Keyneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06556863604205200159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6245381193993153721.post-45842688043609811272014-02-28T08:07:19.334-08:002014-02-28T08:07:19.334-08:00(1) I note that the term "materialism" h...(1) I note that the term "materialism" has fallen out of the conversation which is odd because that is what this is all about. For example,<br /><br />"(2) the realist:<br />We observe directly in our minds objects that appear to have no minds and probably do not have minds (e.g., tables, chairs, rocks, books). On analogy, there may be unobserved non-mental objects that are the external causal origin of our perceptions of these things."<br /><br />What does "external causal origin" consist of here? I am saying that there is an "external causal origin" too. And I am placing it in the super-mind. Where are you placing this "external causal origin"?<br /><br />Is it in matter? Or have you given up recourse to matter? Because this is the crux of the issue.<br /><br />(2) The rest of the post about dinosaurs and so on I do not understand at all. I would have identical explanations for ALL those things that you have. I do not know why you think otherwise. I literally don't know where you are getting this stuff from. I can only assume that you have misunderstood the idealist position. But I don't even know what the misunderstanding is. So, I cannot answer to it.Philip Pilkingtonhttp://fixingtheeconomists.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.com